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Non-Governmental Organisation and the Promotion of American Education in Nigeria, 1941 – 1953.

By Michael M. Ogbeidi

Abstract

As the Second World War gradually drew to a close, a new form of relations began between Nigeria and the United States of America; a relation based on educational exchanges between the two countries. This paper explores the role of some non-governmental organisations in the promotion of American education in Nigeria. The excesses of these non-governmental organisations and the negative attitude of the colonial government in Nigeria towards America-trained Nigerians and American education in general also fall within the purview of this paper. The paper concludes that although marred with excesses, the efforts of these NGOs in popularising American education in Nigeria is worthy of commendation.

Introduction

The end of World War II signalled the beginning of a period of massive expansion of higher education in the United States. One important consequence of this was that Nigerians who had received their higher education in America agitated for the application of what they perceived to be the greater adaptability of American educational model to the needs of Nigeria. Against this background, this paper discusses the activities of some non-governmental organisation in propagating the American educational model, particularly in Nigeria and Africa as a whole. Furthermore, these organisations came into existence towards the end and immediately after World War II. These organisations had a common aim of encouraging
interactions between Nigerian youths who were hungry for higher education and American schools, colleges and universities. Many Nigerians and indeed Africans who were resident in the United States of America during and immediately after World War II took upon themselves the burden of performing the duties of “unaccredited cultural ambassadors.” Many of these Africans expounded their views on politics, economy, culture and education among other issues, “to receptive audiences in churches, voluntary organisation, newspapers, and journals of opinion, usually but not always run by African-Americans committed to cultural nationalism.”

In line with their new titles as the ‘unaccredited cultural ambassadors of Nigeria,’ some Nigerians and other fellow Africans went ahead to establish organisations, such as the African Students Association of the United States and Canada (A.S.A) in 1941, the African Academy of Arts and Research (A.A.A.R.) in 1943, and the American Council on African Education (A.C.A.E.) in 1944. These organisations were established by their promoters mainly to promote and facilitate the admission of Nigerians and other Africans into American schools and colleges and to protect the welfare of their members. The contributions of these organisations to the acquisition of American diplomas and degrees mainly by Nigerians form the primary focus of our discussion. However, it is important to mention that of less significance to our study is the A.S.A. because this organization was a mere umbrella body for all African students in the United States and Canada. It was set up mainly by Nigerian students who were studying at Lincoln University in 1941. Though this organization was primarily interested in the welfare of its members, yet it succeeded to a large extent in creating awareness back home about the benefits inherent in the acquisition of American education.

The African Academy of Arts and Research (A.A.A.R.)

Kingsley Ozumba Mbadiwe, a Nigerian, had a strong conviction that there should be an organization to provide a meeting ground for mutual exchange of views between the peoples of America and Africa; out of this conviction was the A.A.A.R born in New York in November, 1943. The A.A.A.R. was founded primarily with the aim of positively projecting African culture and also to facilitate educational and cultural exchanges between Africa and America. Other objectives of the A.A.A.R. included the promotion of research, information, and news as a way to educate Americans about African culture and to promote African independence. What is more, “as part of its exchange programme, the A.A.A.R. aimed to secure scholarship in American schools for African students and promote the exchange of teachers between Africa and America.”

To fulfil some of its objectives, the academy embarked on the promotion of African culture in the United States through cultural shows for which it sponsored well acclaimed African Dance Festivals at Carnegie Hall in 1943, 1945 and 1946 to spark American interest in African culture. The academy also published two journals in 1945 titled Africa Today and Tomorrow, a collection of eighteen essays on African history, culture and politics, and The African Eagle, both under the editorship of H. A. B. Jones-Quartey.
newsletter called *The African News* was also published by the A.A.A.R. Furthermore, the organization also organised series of lectures which discussed issues mainly affecting Africans at the American Museum of Natural History, Washington DC. These lectures were collectively published as “So This Is Africa,” between November 1945 and April 1946.8

The publication was meant to project the image of Africa in a better light. It could be argued that it was also a collective reaction to some widespread misconceptions about Africa by Americans and Afro-Americans. Perhaps one effect of this move was that American support for nationalist movements and activities in Africa increased. This inevitably led to the awakening of Pan-Africanism and black consciousness in the United States. Available records have shown that the A.A.A.R. did not initially focus on the implementation of its scholarship and educational exchange programme in spite of the fact that its earliest publicity brochure listed this as one of its goals.9 In 1946, the academy in its drive to raise fund to support its activities produced “Greater Tomorrow,” a newsreel highlighting A.A.A.R. activities, which became an important fund-raising tool.10

However, it is sad to note that the funds available through this means and the sponsorship of ‘Africa Days,’ fund-raising events in New York were not sufficient to drive Mbadiwe’s plan to bring Nigerian youths to American schools and colleges through scholarship and educational exchange programmes. Hence, in December 1947, in his attempt to further popularize American education in Nigeria, K. O. Mbadiwe, the founder of the A.A.A.R. embarked on a fund raising tour hoping “…to raise a total of £50,000, half through donations from West Africa, and the remaining half through an imperial grant under the Colonial Development Fund.”11 K. O. Mbadiwe had hoped to use this money “…to administer twenty tuition-only scholarships in American colleges and universities as well as forty tuition-free scholarships, valued at £16,000 given by the New York Board of Education for Vocational and Technical Training at the secondary school level.”12 He opened A.A.A.R. branch offices in Sierra Leone, Gold Coast (Ghana), Nigeria and Liberia. Essentially, it was K. O, Mbadiwe’s plan to distribute these scholarships to students from the West Coast of Africa and some countries in East Africa. He argued that the “beneficiaries would prove their worth as instructors in the technical schools”13 of other countries.

It is pertinent to mention here that aside from the request for financial assistance made to the Secretary of State for the colonies, K. O. Mbadiwe also “called on the Colonial Office to assume responsibility for the transportation, general maintenance and insurance fee for the A.A.A.R. scholars for four years.”14 At this point, it is necessary to ask these questions: Was Mbadiwe not over ambitious in his requests to the Colonial Office? Was he oblivious of the fact that as at that time Nigeria was a contested terrain culturally and intellectually by the British and Americans, and that the British would therefore not grant his request? Certainly, taking into cognizance the events at that time, observers would readily agree that K. O. Mbadiwe was over ambitious and undiplomatic in his various requests to the Colonial Office in Britain, and this was manifested in the complete rejection of his requests by the Colonial Office and the subsequent denial of his organization the right to raise money publicly in Nigeria. This automatically led to the eventual withdrawal of sponsorship to its students by the A.A.A.R. Such was the nature of the contest for the minds of the Nigerian youth between Great Britain and the United States of America.15
Finally, it would not be wrong to conclude that the African Academy of Arts and Research could not achieve a resounding success in its bid to contribute positively to the popularization, growth, and development of educational exchanges between Nigeria and the United States because of inadequate funds, suspicion of its activities by the colonial government and British-educated Nigerians and, above all, the A.A.A.R. over-concentration on its cultural activities. This shortcoming notwithstanding, the academy and K. O. Mbadiwe should be praised for positively projecting Africa’s image and culture abroad and assisting African students in the United States. This made Mary McLeod Bethune to comment in 1943 that “…the programme of the African Academy of Arts and Research…not only awakens interest in Africa, but…cause the thirteen million black people of America to have a greater appreciation of their background and their possibilities.” At this point, we shall shift our attention to the activities of the American Council on African Education.

The American Council on African Education (A.C.A.E.)

Nwafor Orizu, a Nigerian who graduated from Ohio University in 1942 and obtained an M. A. Degree in Government and Public Law in 1944 from Columbia University founded the A.C.A.E. in 1943 and incorporated it in New York on April 12, 1944. The headquarters of the organization was at No. 172 McDonough Street, Brooklyn, New York. Apart from Nwafor Orizu, other prominent principal officers of the organization were Professor Alain Locke (American) who was the Vice-President, Frank T. Wilson was the Vice-Chairman, George Schulyer was the Secretary, and Michael Kaplan was the Treasurer. Others included Roy Wilkins, K. O. Mbadiwe (Nigerian), Mbonu Ojike (Nigerian), Mary McLeod Bethune, and Melville J. Herksovits. Eleanor Roosevelt, Henry Wallace and Paul Robeson were other well placed Americans who gave moral and financial support to the American Council on African Education.

Unlike the African Academy of Arts and Research, the A.C.A.E. had a student wing called the American Council on African Education Students Organization, with Eze Ogueri, a Nigerian, as its President, Ndukwe Obi, another Nigerian as its General-Secretary and William F. Lima as Treasurer. It must be mentioned that the prevalent belief among Africans and White liberal intellectuals following the period immediately after World War II was that colonialism in whatever form must be brought to an end and that the newly emerging nations need the appropriate training and support in all its ramifications to be able to develop in the right path politically, economically, socially and culturally. Hence, this group of Americans felt pleased participating actively in the Executive Committee of the A.C.A.E.

It may not be wrong to suggest that in establishing the A.C.A.E., Orizu believed (as it was the popular thinking then) that the American concept of mass education is the only remedy to the perpetual problem of African political, social and economic backwardness as well as lack of unity. perhaps, imbedded in the concept of mass education as advocated by the A.C.A.E. were changes in the structure of academic course, the establishment of public schools to cater for children of school age, and the introduction of adult education on nationwide basis as is found in the American system of education.
Also, the A.C.A.E. was established primarily “...to provide scholarships for promising and qualified African students and to facilitate their entrance to American universities and colleges.” Other objectives of the A.C.A.E. included: first, the conduct of educational and anthropological research as a means of promoting cultural understanding between the peoples of Africa and the United States. Second, the A.C.A.E. also hoped to establish and subsidize libraries and science laboratories in Nigeria for the promotion of general education and research. It is on record that between 1948 and 1949, the A.C.A.E. Board of Directors approved USD 25,000 for the purchase of a four storey building in New York which they christened the African Education Centre. The building served two main purposes: first, it served as a transit camp for A.C.A.E. grantees just arriving from Africa and, second, it accommodated the library of the A.C.A.E. This noble effort caught the attention and received commendation from the Phelps-Stoke Fund.

Response to the Initiatives of the American Council on African Education

The year 1945 marked a turning point in the A.C.A.E. efforts to popularize American system of education in Nigeria. In November of that year, Nwafor Orizu, the founder of the Organization, returned to Nigeria and established offices for the A.C.A.E. in June 1946 in Port-Harcourt, Calabar, Aba, Enugu, Jos, Onitsha, Lagos and Ijebu Ode. With this, the stage was set for Nwafor Orizu to commence and accomplish his primary task in Nigeria – the facilitation of the admission of qualified Nigerians into American universities and colleges. It would be recalled that before 1946, Orizu had acquired enough popularity in the United States because of his association with many well placed Americans, and through his book *Without Bitterness: Western Nations in Post-War Africa*, as well as the fact that he was a constant guest at the White House. These factors made him a goal-getter while he was in the United States. Hence, before he returned to Nigeria he stated that his organization had obtained one hundred and fifty scholarships from first class colleges and universities in the United States for disbursement to African students who were willing to undertake higher studies in the United States.

A couple of factors aided Orizu in his efforts to popularize American education in Nigeria using the A.C.A.E. as his platform. First, it will be recalled that during World War II, the colonial government in Nigeria restricted the movement of people out of the country except for essential reasons; hence, traveling out of Nigeria for higher education was not allowed. And immediately after the war, only very few Nigerians were in a position to go to Britain for higher education. Aside from this, in 1946, only seventy Nigerians were provided with scholarships for higher education in Britain by the colonial government in Nigeria. This situation fell short of the expectations of Nigerians who were ready and eager to seize any opportunity that will enable them travel abroad for higher studies. It was not surprising therefore that Nwafor Orizu was given an enthusiastic welcome by young Nigerians when he came with his American scholarships.

Another strategy employed by Orizu to popularize American education in Nigeria was his adoption of personal contacts for effective results. With this strategy, he sought and got audience from prominent
Nigerians across the country. For example, he met and discussed the matter with Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe who was then regarded in Nigeria as the symbol of American education and American success. These contacts helped in convincing Nigerians that Orizu had genuine promises as regards his scholarship scheme. Nwafor Orizu also embarked on enlightenment campaigns through public lectures. In Lagos, for example, he gave a public lecture titled “Horizontal Education and African Irredentism” at the Glover Memorial Hall on 26 November, 1945. Also in March 1946 at Jos, he gave a lecture titled “Education and Freedom of Nigerians” and “The Influence of Horizontal Education on African Unity and Leadership”. It suffices to mention that Orizu also gave public lectures in other Nigerian cities and towns, such as Onitsha, Oguta, Calabar, Enugu, Port Harcourt, Kano, Sokoto and Zaria.

His lectures across the country produced two major results: first, he was able to raise the level of awareness among thousands of school leavers who wanted a feel of American education. Second, although the desire to form a militant nationalist organization had long existed among the early nationalists in Nigeria, it can be argued that Orizu’s lectures did not only spur the nationalists, it also provided a forum where most of the founders of the Zikist Movement usually met. Thus, it will not be out of place to assert that Orizu’s tour of Nigeria to popularize American education also had a spillover effect on the development of nationalist consciousness in Nigeria.

On a general note, Nigerians not only embraced Nwafor Orizu and his organization, young Nigerians who were hungry for higher education in the United States over-subscribed to his scholarships. Indeed, it was reported that a total of “4,500 students applied for his scholarships. Of these, 2,500 applications were selected for review by the scholarship committee and the number further reduced to 765 with sufficient qualifications for competing for scholarship awards.” This response most probably took Orizu unawares and it also became a source of embarrassment to the Board of Directors of A.C.A.E. in New York; who had been following Orizu activities in Nigeria with keen interest.

The A.C.A.E. Board of Directors knew that Orizu had gone beyond his mandate, which was only to recruit twenty five Nigerians and to raise funds for their travel and maintenance expenses and that he had also misled the generality of young Nigerians to believing that he had more scholarships at his disposal than actually existed. The one pound registration fee collected from all applicants also attracted the anger of the board members. Thus, the A.C.A.E. Board, at its meeting of 4 October, 1946 issued a stern warning to Orizu directing him to return all registration fees collected and to desist from further collection of such monies. He was also directed to forward to New York, a monthly report of his income and expenditure, and all other activities relating to the A.C.A.E. in Nigeria.

The activities of Nwafor Orizu in Nigeria also attracted the attention and comments of well-positioned American officials, missionaries and educators. For instance, it is on record that the United States Vice-Consul in Nigeria kept an eye over the activities of Nwafor Orizu and the A.C.A.E. in Nigeria. Also, Dr. Channing Tobias, an African-American Director of the Phelps-Stokes Fund, and Dr. Emory Ross of the Baptist Foreign Mission Conference of North America visited Lagos in July 1946. During their stay in Lagos, both Americans had an uphill task explaining all they knew about the A.C.A.E. to the local press
and other prominent Nigerians resident in Lagos. They however maintained that the number of scholarships available to the A.C.A.E. was far below the claims of Nwafor Orizu and also advised prospective students to be certain of their source of funding during their stay in the United States. 

Furthermore, a section of the Nigerian press also expressed doubts as to the sincerity of Nwafor Orizu and the workability of the scholarships scheme. The Nigerian Eastern Mail and the Daily Service were the most vocal in the attacks against Nwafor Orizu and his organization in Nigeria. In one of its publications, the Daily Service referred to Nwafor Orizu as a “false patriot.” Even though Orizu exceeded his mandate of operation in Nigeria, a re-interpretation of available records have shown that it can be argued that the vociferous attacks on him and the A.C.A.E. programmes in Nigeria (especially those that came from the Daily Service) were blown out of proportion and highly personalized. This stand is taken against the backdrop of the colonial government attitude towards the holders of American degrees in Nigeria. Although the Daily Service was owned by the Nigerian Youth Movement – a political party in Nigeria, most of its founding fathers were Nigerians who had their higher education in Britain and it is only logical that their sympathy in matters relating to education in colonial Nigeria will lean towards the colonial government because most of the British-trained Nigerians always and readily saw themselves as superior to their American-trained counterparts. To buttress this point is the fact that on his return to Nigeria in 1937, Nnamdi Azikiwe, an American-trained Nigerian, joined the Nigerian Youth Movement (N.Y.M.) but left the party no sooner than he joined to form his own party – the National Council of Nigerian and Cameroons (N.C.N.C.). It has been suggested that Azikiwe’s exit from the N.Y.M. represented the climax of disagreements arising from differences in his orientation and ideologies and that of his British-trained party mates.

Also raising doubts about Nwafor Orizu and his programme in Nigeria were Christian missionaries, particularly those based in the Eastern provinces where Orizu had the highest patronage. Of special interest to us here was the concern shown by Rt. Reverend C. J. Patterson who was based in Onitsha. He had written complaining about the activities of Orizu and his organization to T. H. Baldwin, the Colonial Director of Education in Lagos, who replied that Orizu had been kept under surveillance and that he is ready to take the next step should any criminal case be reported against Nwafor Orizu. The Rt. Reverend Patterson further showed his dislike for Nwafor Orizu’s programmes when he bluntly turned down the latter’s request urging him to preside over the official dedication ceremony of the opening of the A.C.A.E. headquarters in Port Harcourt in June 1946. Against this background of hostilities towards Nwafor Orizu and the A.C.A.E., it becomes pertinent to examine how the A.C.A.E. scholarship programme was administered.

**Nwafor Orizu and the Administration of the A.C.A.E. Scholarship Programme in Nigeria**

Before discussing the administration of the A.C.A.E. scholarship scheme in Nigeria, it is important to mention that aside from raising the level of awareness among Nigerian youths on the need to undertake
higher education in the United States, the A.C.A.E. scholarship scheme also came as a direct response to the various problems that afflicted the communal sponsorship system which was prevalent in Nigeria during the first half of the 20th century. Some of these problems included improper counselling of students before they departed the shores of Nigeria, inadequate funding and, in most cases, the sponsoring communities found it difficult to remit funds off-shore as and when needed. With these shortcomings, it was not surprising that Nwafor Orizu’s scheme was well received by Nigerian youths who saw his scholarships as a ready alternative to that of the colonial government in Nigeria and the various community scholarship schemes.

The adoption of various categories of scholarship was a cardinal programme of the A.C.A.E. The process of becoming an A.C.A.E. grantee started from an elaborate screening procedure. More often than not, announcements for the available scholarships were made through the press. An interested candidate was expected to submit four applications forms with three letters of reference from acceptable individuals in the society. The second step was that the prospective candidate must have passed the final examinations of the Cambridge School Examinations or the Teachers Certificate Examinations or any other acceptable academic examination. The third stage was that any candidate who got short-listed was expected to appear before a board of examiners of the A.C.A.E. for an oral interview after which the candidate is selected for any of the five categories of available scholarships.39

The A.C.A.E. scholarship scheme was divided into five categories. Category A awarded free tuition and boarding fees for a maximum period of four years. Category B scholars received free tuition and a portion of their expenses for four years. Category C scholars were awarded tuition-free scholarship only. Awardees in Category B and C were required to supplement their awards annually by an amount dictated by the A.C.A.E. officials; also, aside from category ‘A’ scholars, all others must deposit the money for four years. Category D scholars bore all expenses, while the A.C.A.E. only acted as a guarantor and provided free counselling services. Scholars in Category E were mainly diploma students in vocational courses which did not exceed two years. Irrespective of the category of award, the A.C.A.E. made no contributions to the round-trip cost of the student.40

What is more, all A.C.A.E. scholars were subjected to the observance of strict rules and regulations. For instance, no scholar was expected to stay in the United States for more than four years without the approval of the organization and all extended period of stay must be in writing signed by the parent or guardian of the student. This does not guarantee an automatic approval by the A.C.A.E. as it reserved the final right to reject such applications. It was also mandatory for all scholars to obey immigration laws and avoid political meetings during their stay in the United States, hence membership and attendance at meetings of cultural organisation, such as the Association of African Students (A.S.A.), was made compulsory.41

Perhaps the only aspect of the A.C.A.E. scholarship programme that did not attract criticisms was the fact that the scholars were not made to sign bonds which would have made it mandatory for them to serve the A.C.A.E. on their return home as was usually the case with government scholars. Also, the A.C.A.E. did not impose course of study on their scholars but only counselled them on the best course that could be
studied based on applicants’ academic background.

All that was expected by the A.C.A.E. was that their scholars must return to their home countries after their studies since the development of Africa was a compelling factor for establishing the scholarship scheme. More disturbing and incapacitating was the fact that no student who came to the United States under the auspices of the A.C.A.E. was allowed to solicit for funds, be it educational or otherwise, from any institution or organization in the United States either on behalf of friends, relatives or himself. Officials of the A.C.A.E. insisted on the submission of such requests to its office whose function they believed it was to legitimately solicit for public funds. Furthermore, any A.C.A.E. scholar who breached any of the rules and regulations governing his scholarship agreement stood to be penalized. The penalty included the down-grading of a scholar from a higher class of assistance, revocation of agreement and the refund of funds received thus far or, in extreme cases, the repatriation of such a scholar.42

Like the personality of Nwafor Orizu, the administration of the A.C.A.E. scholarship schemes also came under heavy criticism. First, Nwafor Orizu was accused of presenting a programme to young Nigerians who invariably became exposed to the vagaries of an alien environment without being adequately taken care of. This criticism became more pronounced after the death of Joseph Anisioobi, an A.C.A.E. scholar who died in February 1948 in Washington D.C. as a result of ill-health and inadequate care. After this incident, many Nigerians including the press accused Orizu of playing on the ignorance, ambition, and desperation of young Nigerians who wanted to study in the United States.43

Another criticism of the A.C.A.E. scholarship scheme was that the beneficiaries were highly incapacitated by the strict rules and regulations governing the scholarship agreement and this deprived the students of their liberty in a country (U.S.A.) where freedom is so much cherished. The argument is that Orizu enjoyed unlimited freedom as a student in the United States; hence, it was improper for him to deny any other person of his or her freedom irrespective of the fact that such a person was an A.C.A.E. scholar. Ethnic favouritism was another criticism which the A.C.A.E. had to contend with in Nigeria. The organization was accused of flagrantly displaying ethnic bias in favour of the Igbo ethnic group in the award of its scholarships in Nigeria. Majority (thirteen out of fourteen) of the initial A.C.A.E. scholars in 1947 were Igbo. Orizu’s explanation for this was that: first, the Yoruba elite had established a tradition of acquiring higher education in Britain hence they felt it was not relevant to send their children to the United States. Second, Orizu also argued that it was the Yoruba dominated press that has been the major source of newspaper opposition to his personality and programmes, thus he did not expect many applicants from this section of the country.

Orizu, still defending the dominance of the A.C.A.E. scholarship scheme by the Igbo, argued that the round-trip cost and the lack of maintenance funds discouraged some scholars from Northern Nigeria to take up their offers.44 However, it is important to mention here that the period between 1940 and 1960 represented the heyday of ethnic politics in Nigeria. As a result of this, ethnic consciousness and ethnocentrism became a common feature of all ethnic groups in Nigeria prior to and after independence. By and large, it is only reasonable to expect that Orizu and the A.C.A.E. would only sponsor those applicants who...
had fully met the requirements set out by them. Furthermore, it could be argued that considering the magnitude of the A.C.A.E. programme and its ambitious nature, mistakes were inevitable. Perhaps, the only remedy that would have shielded the A.C.A.E. and Nwafor Orizu from some of the criticisms enumerated above would have been the display of transparent honesty on the part of the leaders of the A.C.A.E. on the actual number of scholarships available as this would have helped in reducing the mad rush for the A.C.A.E. scholarships that was witnessed initially.

The above criticisms notwithstanding, the A.C.A.E. must be commended for its efforts to popularize American education in Nigeria and its bold programme of educating Nigerians in the United States, a step which was remarkable in the history of Nigeria during the colonial era. The situation was such that by 1953 the A.C.A.E. announced that it had been able to sponsor seventy one Nigerians to undertake higher education in the United States most of whom returned home to become the agitators for political independence and the economic emancipation of Nigeria. The activities of the A.C.A.E. transcended the boundaries of colonial Nigeria because between 1947 and February 1949, the organization had awarded sixteen scholarships to students who were not of Nigerian origin. The breakdown of this number was as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NATIONALITY</th>
<th>NO. OF GRANTEES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gold Coast (Ghana)</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>60</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Nigerian Spokesman, July 4, 1949, 7.*
Table II: Showing the Number of Nigerians who received A.C.A.E. Scholarships from 1947 – 1953

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>AWARDS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1947</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1949</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>121</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Collated from various files of the Phelps-Stokes Foundation, U.S.A., 1997

The tables above give a summary of the efforts of the A.C.A.E. to educate Nigerians and other Africans in the United States of America.

Meanwhile, the A.C.A.E. was in a way also instrumental to the floating of an organisation known as the Committee for African Students in North America (C.A.S.N.A) in 1947. Primarily, the C.A.S.N.A. was established for the purpose of highlighting the desires and needs of African students in the United States. According to a publication of the Committee, the body agreed to organize the following under its programme:

a) The establishment of some suitable process in Africa with the active involvement of Africans, local educational institutions, missions and governments through local committees appropriately chosen to ensure that definite educational standards are met by students coming to North America to study.

b) Facilitation and advice on contacts between aspiring students from Africa and educational institutions in North America.

c) Advice on placement in colleges and universities and academic guidance in North America.

d) Clearance of financial arrangement.

e) Reception and personal counsel on vocation projects and other matters, particularly off-campus relationships during students stay in North America.46

It is not unlikely that the apparent difficulties being encountered by African students in the United States necessitated the establishment of C.A.S.N.A. going by the programme objectives enumerated above. However, the greatest problem which the A.C.A.E. had to contend with aside from the ones discussed above was the attitude of the colonial government in Nigeria towards its scholarship scheme. First, not only did the colonial government downgraded the degrees obtained from American universities citing lower admission standards and lack of concentrated areas of study as the reason for this, the colonial
government also discriminated against Nigerians who had obtained American degrees in its employment policy.\textsuperscript{47} The table below shows the position of the colonial government in evaluating American degrees.

**Table III: Showing equivalents of United States Degrees to British Degrees.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>U.S. DEGREES</th>
<th>BRITISH DEGREES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>B.A. and B.Sc.</td>
<td>Intermediate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M.A.</td>
<td>General Degree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ph.D.</td>
<td>Honours Degree (Second Class)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Thus, the colonial government in Nigeria in its attempt to discredit the A.C.A.E. and American education in Nigeria simply regarded American degrees as substandard and American-educated Nigerians as ill-equipped to assume the mantle of leadership either politically, economically or socially in Nigeria.\textsuperscript{48} Students who needed higher education were encouraged to go to British institutions or to any other institutions of higher learning within the British Commonwealth. But the colonial government policy did not achieve its intended result, rather than discourage eager Nigerians from going to the United States for further studies, the zeal among Nigerians to acquire American degrees continued to be on the increase.\textsuperscript{49} This is evident from the total figures made available by the Phelps-Stokes Foundation which showed that between 1927 and 1953, a total of one hundred and twenty- one Nigerians received A.C.A.E. scholarship to study in the United States.\textsuperscript{50} Furthermore, the Nigerian press reported that a total of two hundred and forty-eight Nigerians and another one hundred and twenty Africans were undertaking higher education in American universities.\textsuperscript{51} However, as the number of American-trained Nigerians continued to increase and the agitation for independence became more vocal, the colonial government in Nigeria began to change its attitude towards American-trained Nigerians.

George Padmore, a leading advocate of Pan-Africanism, once argued that “since the return of Nnamdi Azikiwe, an American-trained Nigerian, to his country the colonial government became apprehensive about “the dynamic political leadership by American-trained Africans...”\textsuperscript{52} This perhaps provided the basis upon which Orizu’s scholarship in Nigeria became a subject of discussion in the British House of Commons.\textsuperscript{53} The aim apparently was to checkmate Orizu’s activities in Nigeria and the United States. In fact, Okechukwu Ikejiani had commented thus: “The protectorate government works through diplomatic channels to have American colleges turn down Nigeria students and through currency control which makes...
it difficult for Nigerians studying in America to receive funds."

An outcome of the discussion of the activities of the A.C.A.E. in the British House of Commons was the appointment by the Colonial Office and posting to the United States in 1951 of a West African Student Liaison Officer to look after the welfare of students from British African colonies. This official took it upon himself to invite complaints from students; he particularly showed interest in complaints from A.C.A.E. scholars which he investigated. The result of his investigation indicted the A.C.A.E. for failing to honour its obligations to its scholars; hence, the colonial government in Nigeria announced that it was withdrawing all logistic supports given to the A.C.A.E. in Nigeria. This was the beginning of the end for the A.C.A.E. in Nigeria.

Perhaps, the last straw that broke the camel’s back in the situation of the A.C.A.E. was the fact that the account books of the organization were not made readily available to government auditors by Orizu after several calls on him to release the books. The government called on members of the public, who had paid but did not receive scholarships from the A.C.A.E. to send their petitions to the Civil Service Commissioner in Lagos. With the evidence at its disposal, Orizu was arrested, tried and sent to jail for seven years in September 1953 after he was found guilty of fraud. Thus, the colonial government succeeded in nailing the coffin of the A.C.A.E. in Nigeria as no attempt was made to keep the A.C.A.E. afloat while Orizu was in jail; neither was there any attempt made to resuscitate the A.C.A.E. when he was eventually released three years before the completion of his jail term.

Though short-lived, the A.C.A.E. represented a major pioneering effort to popularize American education in Nigeria. It also served as an instrument of encouraging educational exchanges between Nigeria and the United States. However, it is a matter of regret that Orizu used the A.C.A.E. and its scholarship schemes to defraud poor and education-hungry Nigerians who wanted to study in the United States. Orizu capitalized on the ignorance of many Nigerians to collect money from them and never offered any scholarship in return. Again, in spite of his exposure in the United States, Orizu did not hide his ethnic bias towards his Igbo country in disbursing his scholarships thereby giving the impression that the A.C.A.E. was established to take care of Igbo interest.

**Conclusion**

The efforts of some Non-Governmental Organisations at promoting the American system of education in Nigeria have been the focus of this paper. It is only appropriate to recall at this point that these Non-Governmental Organisations were operating in Nigeria at a time when the country was still a colony of the British Empire. This meant that that the contest between the British and the Americans for the intellectual space of Nigeria was very keen. Available records have shown that not only did the British Colonial Government in Nigeria brought the activities of these bodies, especially the A.C.A.E. under strict surveillance and monitoring, the colonial government also derided American degrees and detested
American-trained Nigerians. Although, the activities of some of the Non-Government Organisations, especially the A.C.A.E. were considered to be excessive, exploitative and non-transparent by the colonial government and some British and American trained Nigerians, yet it can be argued and safely concluded that virtually all the Non-Governmental Organisations examined in this article succeeded to a reasonable extent in promoting American education among Nigerians. They also served as the unaccredited cultural ambassadors and instruments of culture contact between the peoples of Nigeria and the United States of America.

Notes


2 Ibid. 181.

3 Ibid.

4 African Students Association, “History of A.S.A. and Table of Events,” The African Interpreter, vol. 1, no.1 (February 1943), 5. The Executive Officers of this Organization included Mbonu Ojike (President), Dr. Ernest B. Kalibala, a Ugandan (Vice-President), K. O. Mbadiwe (Executive Secretary), I. U. Akpabio (Treasurer) and Nwafor Orizu (Information Secretary).


6 Ibid., 10

7 Ibid. 1. See also Denzer, “Black Cultural Nationalist Network, 181.


10 Mjagkij, Organizing Black America, 3.


Ibid.


See the address given by Mary McLeod Bethune, titled “Hands across the Waters,” *Africa: Today and Tomorrow* (April, 1945), 19. This address was made at the A.A.A.R. Cultural Festival that took place at the Carnegie Hall on December 13, 1943.


Ibid.


*Nigerian Spokesman*, 2 April 1949.

N. Orizu’s Column, “Africa Speak,” in *Pittsburgh Courier*, 16 June 1945. Some of these institutions included Columbia, Harvard, Pennsylvania, Lincoln, Yale, Western Reserve, Ohio State, and Wilberforce Universities. Others were Morehouse College, Detroit and Boston Universities, etc.


Attitudes of the Nigerian Students in the United States of America (American University, 1967).

28 Ibid.

29 The Zikist Movement was founded in 1945. It had a militant orientation. Among its founders were Anthony Enahoro, Nduka Eze, Abiodun Aloha, M. C. K. Ajuluchukwu, Kolawole Balogun, Fred Anyiam and several others. It has been established that most of, if not all, these men were regular faces at Nwafor Orizu’s lectures. See N. Mba, “Preface” in Nwafor Orizu, Without Bitterness, 1980 edition, xi.

30 For details of some of the reasons that informed the quest by Nigerian youths at this period for higher education in the United States see Ogba, The Nigerian Americans, 23 – 25.


32 Ibid. 13.

33 Daily Service, 14 April 1947.

34 “Robert C. Johnson, Jr. (US Vice Consul) to T. H. Baldwin (DE), 10 June, 1946,” NAI, MED (FED) 14 CDE 245.

35 Dr. Channing Tobias was on his way to Liberia to inspect the Phelps-Stokes Funded Booker T. Washington College, while Dr. Emory Rose and his wife were in Nigeria to attend the annual Baptist Conference at Abeokuta. For details about their interview, see West African Pilot, 8 July, 1946.

36 For details of commentaries, see Nigerian Eastern Mail, 20 and 27 April, 1946. Also, the Daily Service, 15 April 1947. The Daily Service was published by the Nigerian Youth Movement, one of the earliest political parties in Nigeria.

37 For details of correspondence between the Rt. Reverend C. J. Patterson and Mr. T. H. Baldwin see “C. J. Patterson to T. H. Baldwin, 5 June 1946,” NAI, MED (FED) 1/4 CDF 245, 5. Also “T. H. Baldwin (DE) to C. J. Patterson, 27 June 1946,” NAI, MED (FED) 245, 10.

38 “C. J. Patterson to N. Orizu, 26 June 1946,” NAI, MED (FED) 1/4 CDF 245, 19.


41 Ibid.

42 Ibid.


45 Professor Babatunde Aliyu Fafunwa – A one time Federal Minister of Education in Nigeria was an early recipient of the A.C.A.E. scholarship.


47 Two former A.C.A.E. Scholars – V. O. Ikeotunonye and Reuben Chuba Ndowu were among the earliest victims of this policy as they were refused graduate status when they applied to the colonial civil service for employment. See *African Echo*, 11 February, 1949, 6. Also Ogba, *The Nigerian Americans*, 26.


49 Ibid, 23.

50 These figures were collated from the various publications of Phelps-Stokes Foundation.


52 Padmore, “Orizu Scheme Now Causing Alarm in Tory Circles,”


55 An Extract from an informal meeting on education question held at Accra, December 18, 1951, NAI, MED (FED) 1/4 CDE 504, Vol. 1, 43 – 44.

56 *West African Pilot*, December 17, 1951, 7.

Advanced Academic Literacy and the Role of Academic Editors in Research Writing.

By Joseph Benjamin Afful

Abstract

Advanced academic literacy often underscores the role of faculty as supervisors and examiners in research and thesis writing processes. Academic editors are unfortunately often not mentioned in these socialization processes. The aim of this paper is to underscore the role of this group of professionals in advanced academic literacy, as it particularly pertains to graduate research writing. I draw on my experiences in offering editorial services to graduate research students in English-medium universities. In doing this, I am guided mainly by my experiences and observation, rather than the theoretical perspectives that inform advanced academic literacy. In this paper I touch briefly on the requirements of research writing and present my brief profile and that of my clients (graduate students). This is followed by a description of my modus operandi in editing the research writing of students. The difficulties graduate students encounter in writing their research are then discussed. The paper concludes with the implications of my findings for the role of academic editors, advanced academic literacy, and graduate research supervision.

Key words: academic editor, advanced academic literacy, research writing, supervision

Introduction

The last thirty years has witnessed considerable attention on advanced academic literacy (AAL) in English-medium universities. Although AAL often and narrowly conjures the graduate student’s ability to read and write various texts assigned in the university (Spack, 1997; Braine, 2002), it actually refers to a complex set of skills, accomplishments, and expectations of graduate students in various disciplinary contexts...
An important aspect of AAL is the dissemination of research findings in the form of pedagogic genres such as the thesis or dissertation (depending on whether one is in the UK, USA or any university which identifies with practices of universities in these geographical regions). Other equally important genres in graduate research include the research proposal (or research prospectus) and conference papers (Swales & Feak, 1994; Swales, 2004).

There is no denying the fact that the supervisor (or advisor) is key to the success of the graduate research process. A supervisor may either suggest a topic to a graduate student or, in the case of the Sciences, get a graduate student to work on an aspect of a project that is being funded by an organization. In this way, the supervisor becomes associated with a student’s research right from the conceptualization of the research to the successful defence of the research report. Findings in the last decade have also underscored the role of examiners (both internal and external) in the assessment of theses or dissertations and, in some cases, the *viva voce*. Indeed, Johnston (1997), Kiley and Mullins (2002), and several other scholars have been prominent in highlighting the work of examiners in universities in the UK and Australia. Thesis examiners act essentially as gatekeepers for the various disciplinary communities in which graduate students, not wanting to remain on the fringes of academia as peripheral members (Lave & Wenger, 1991), eventually seek to be full-fledged members and ultimately experts.

While the role of the two categories of scholars (that is, supervisors and examiners) are frequently alluded to in the Higher Education (HE), English for Specific Purposes (ESP), Postgraduate Pedagogy (PP), and AAL literature, there is one group of professionals whose association with both the process and product of the graduate students’ research is less discussed. This paper, therefore, discusses the role of this emerging professional group of scholars (that is, academic editors) in the research process by drawing on my own experience and observation as an academic editor (AE) for international and local graduate students. While I am aware of the theoretical underpinnings of AAL, ESP, and PP, which greatly influence the services of this group of scholars, I pay very little attention to them in this paper, except for purposes of illumination.

The rest of the paper is structured along the following lines. I first provide my profile together with that of the graduate students (or my clients) to whom I offer editorial assistance. This is followed by a brief discussion of the writing requirements of research writing. The expected role of academic editors (AEs) and the *modus operandi* adopted in my editorial services are the next to be discussed. I then focus on my observation of the writing difficulties of my clients. In the concluding section, I draw implications from these observations.

Profile of Writer (Academic Editor) and Students

As an AE for graduate students who write various research genres (that is, research proposal, thesis and dissertation, conference paper, and journal article), it might be appropriate to cite my credentials.
I started my academic career by obtaining a B.A. (Hons.) in English Language and a Diploma in Education at the University of Cape Coast (UCC) in Ghana after completing a four-year programme in 1988. At the time (1988), Ghana was experiencing brain drain: many of its academics and teachers in universities as well as elementary schools and secondary schools (now called Senior High Schools) had gone to Nigeria and several other countries to seek ‘greener pasture’. Nonetheless, faculty members of the Department of English where I had had my undergraduate education insisted on the highest standards of excellence in both spoken and written communication. On completing my undergraduate education, I taught in three different secondary schools (now called Senior High Schools) for five years as a professional teacher. Convinced about my ambition to become an academic and challenged about the demands of English language education in the country (that is, Ghana), I pursued a master’s degree in Applied English Language Studies at the same university. Thereafter, I was employed as a lecturer at my alma mater.

In 2002 I commenced doctoral studies in Applied Linguistics at the National University of Singapore (NUS), where I explored an aspect of AL; that is, the interface between rhetoric and disciplinary variation in undergraduate writing. At NUS I developed research interests in postgraduate pedagogy, multiliteracies, critical discourse studies, and narrative enquiry. After my doctoral education, I served as Postdoctoral Fellow at the University of the Witwatersrand (WITS) in South Africa. It was in NUS and WITS that I began to assist many international students in presenting their research in various forms, from research proposals to research articles. Since arriving in Ghana after my postdoctoral research in South Africa, I have continued to offer editorial services to graduate students.

These students have been from varied backgrounds in Applied Linguistics, Political Economics, Economics, Computer Science, Building and Construction, Philosophy, Sociology, and Development Studies. What was common, however, to all these students was the demand that was made on them to produce research writings in almost impeccable English. Moreover, these students, especially those from NUS, were mates I often met at restaurants and other recreational places on campus and who expressed interest in me to offer editorial assistance. They were graduate students from countries in Asia such as China, Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, South Korea and India and countries from Africa such as Zimbabwe, Uganda, Nigeria, Kenya, Ghana, and South Africa.

**Research Writing Requirements**

Writing at the graduate level takes into account the general characteristics of academic discourse, which are scattered in the ESP and English for Academic Purposes (EAP) literature (e.g. Swales & Feak, 1994, 2000; Hyland, 2000; Flowerdew, 2000; Paltridge, 2002). These requirements include, but are not restricted to, clarity of language, intertextuality, evidence, discipline-specific phraseology and idioms, appropriate tone, demands of various academic genres, and the acceptable combination of various semiotic forms such as text, tables, charts, and graphs.
In exhibiting clarity of language, graduate students are enjoined to avoid ambiguity, vagueness, padding, verbosity, circumlocution, clichés and unnecessary obfuscatory jargon. Ultimately, clarity of language is expected to be achieved through systematicity, non-contradictoriness, conciseness, and coherence. A further research writing requirement is intertextuality, which is the recognition of the interdependence of knowledge construction, sharing, and dissemination. Graduate students are expected to follow acceptable conventions in modes of documentation such as footnotes, endnotes, in-text citation, and bibliographic citation. In addition, given the different epistemological and rhetorical dispositions of various disciplines (Becher, 1989; Hyland, 2000), graduate students are required to use appropriate phraseology and other semiotic devices in presenting their research. Thus, it is fairly easy to distinguish a thesis or dissertation in the field of Chemistry from one in History as the former valorizes mathematical symbolism while the latter cherishes causation and emplotment. Further, research writing requires that attention be paid to evidence. Various forms of evidence such as statistics, interview data, narratives, artifacts, and views by authorities are utilized by general academic and discipline-specific communities in order to make logical and valid claims and generalizations in research writing. Appropriate tone is also expected to be employed in research writing; a register which is largely objective, formal, and impersonal, but not inflated or pretentious or pedantic, is largely acceptable. Finally, adherence to acceptable standards and current usage of both macro and micro-rhetorical conventions (Craswell, 1993) is necessary. The macro-domain involves the overall architectural structure of the text, which is described by Atkinson (1991: 65) as ‘overall design coherence’. On the other hand, the micro-domain conventions concern grammar, spelling, punctuation, amalgamation, and paragraphing.

In practice, graduate students (like faculty) are likely to demonstrate varying degrees of knowledge and use of these linguistic/rhetorical features of academic writing briefly sketched above. The extent to which students successfully employ these features in their research writing speaks volume of their scholarly rigour.

Role of Academic Editor and My Modus Operandi

Besides showing awareness of the above-mentioned research writing requirements, the AE needs to recognize the specific tasks that ought to be performed in responding to a student’s research writing and to adopt a specific modus operandi.

As an AE, I consider the extent and nature of editorial intervention permissible, especially in editing graduate students’ research writing. I am aware of editing practices in Canada, Australia, the USA, and the UK. I tend to be influenced by the practices of the Editors Association of Canada (EAC). This association identifies three levels of editorial intervention: Level 1: technical (non-intrusive copy-editing; minimal intervention); Level 2: structural (more intrusive, but constituting rephrasing, rather than rewriting); and Level 3: substantive (reconstruction and rewriting). Within each level is a comprehensive description of what a competent structural and stylistic editor should be able to do. My approach is to largely utilize the
interventions prescribed at levels 1 and 2 by EAC. My unwillingness to adopt the third level intervention stems from the practical concern that the AE may often not be a specialist in the discipline in which the text is found. Any attempt to adopt such an interventionist approach can, therefore, lead to misinterpretation and misrepresentation.

My *modus operandi* in editing graduate research writing takes into account the following. First, I am generally wary of commenting on content, other than to indicate obvious factual inaccuracies and anachronisms. I extend this to inconsistencies and incorrect or incomplete in-text referencing (to which much attention is paid later in this paper). Although I accept the general practice of AEs not to question a candidate’s argument, statement of fact, findings, or conclusions, incidental factual errors are noted. The temptation to do so arises when I am editing theses in my research areas. Second, my knowledge of various writing styles (e.g. simple/elegant, nominal/verbal, formal/informal) enables me to comment on a candidate’s writing style. Where I suspect instances of plagiarism, I draw the candidate’s attention to this and advise him/her to acknowledge his or her sources and to adopt various means of referencing source (summarizing, paraphrasing, or quoting). Third, I often decline proofreading/editing any piece of research writing that, in my judgment, requires major rewriting as I feel this raises ethical concerns in respect of the originality of the work.

With these three broad ‘policies’ or understandings underpinning my editorial services and practices to graduate students, I commence my work by requiring the client to provide me a hard copy of the research writing, though in a few cases I oblige when students insist that I accept electronic versions due to the lack of money to print the copies. Once I am presented with the hard copy, I take a quick read of the abstract, table of contents and bibliography or reference list. Reading these apparent ‘peripheral’ aspects of the research document enables me to obtain a quick and impressionistic view of the quality of work. Whereas, in particular, the front elements (abstract and table of content) simply offer a summative account of the entire work, I consider the bibliography as a prompt way of gauging the scholarliness of the work. Thereafter, I read the introduction and the conclusion to see whether there is a close fit between them and whether what the student sets out to do is accomplished. I spend a relatively greater amount of time reading the conceptual framework, methodology and analysis and discussion and keep moving from one rhetorical section to another to find out whether they are logically connected to one another and whether the claims being made in the analysis and discussion sections are valid.

In general, I read various research writings with an eye for clarity and sophistication of language, effective development of points and coherence, while ensuring that I do not go beyond my mandate as an AE. I remain restricted to issues related to language, logical sequence, and format.

**Graduate Students’ Writing Difficulties**

Although there are several infelicities I have noticed in my clients’ research writing over the years, for
reasons of saliency and lack of space, I focus here on the following: rhetoric/organization, citation prac-
tices, and common language solecisms.

**Rhetoric/Organization**

Regarding rhetoric/generic issues, some students seemed not to have any knowledge of the requirements
for writing genres such as the abstract, table of content, and acknowledgements. Earlier studies (Paltridge,
2002; Swales, 2004) have pointed to students’ difficulty with genre requirements. Some students did not
know the distinction between the abstract and summary; in some universities both were required in the
thesis or dissertation. As I also learned later, students who had difficulty writing an acceptable abstract
had not undertaken any undergraduate research. Engaging such students in the effective way of presenting
abstracts through discussion of the rhetorical move analysis, as found in applied linguists such as Salager-
Mayer (1992), Santos (1996), and Samraj (1998), often provided a useful way of empowering my clients
whenever there were opportunities. Moreover, given the recent attention given to the table of content as
a site of identity creation (Starfield & Ravelli, 2006), I consider it necessary to help students to construct
their table of content when it has been given a sloppy treatment.

Regarding the writing of the acknowledgement section in theses, I noticed some issues related to cultural
differences, consistent with an earlier study by Bloor and Bloor (1991) and Al-Ali (n.d) (1993). Indeed,
the issue of cultural differences evokes the Contrastive Rhetoric (CR) hypothesis, which in its original
sense refers to the existence of different writing conventions across cultures (Kaplan, 1966, 1988; Connor,
1996). Unsurprisingly, I found that my clients, many of whom were Asians and Africans, tended to use
‘indirect’ rhetorical pattern in their English writing in contrast to the expected English writing convention
which is ‘linear’ and direct rhetorical pattern. Recognizing this, I often assisted my clients to re-organize
their content. In writing the acknowledgement section in a dissertation/thesis, a few students either would
not indicate clearly, or are mute on, the exact contribution of their supervisors to their thesis writing due
to some personal differences, contrary to published (Hyland, 2004) and pedagogic advice (Swales & Feak,
2000), which requires students to explicitly include the exact contribution of their ‘benefactors’.

It is also heartening to note that many of my clients (graduate students) seemed to have received consid-
erable support from their supervisors with regard to the organizational format of their theses/dissertations
and research articles. For instance, I noticed that the Science theses and research articles I edited con-
formed to a well-defined, conventionalized patterning of the text: Introduction, Materials and Methods,
Results, and Discussion (IMRD). There were some variations on this institutionalized schema, though.
As the Humanities and Social Sciences graduate students generally adopt a more flexible institutional-
ized schema for their theses and research articles, those in specific fields such as Political Economics,
Sociolinguistics, Development Studies, and Building Construction found structuring their research writ-
ings quite difficult. In such cases, I needed to help them to see the theses as a spatio-semantic structure
and to encourage them to view several other theses in their disciplines.
Further, within the overall architectural structure of students’ dissertation/theses (as well as research articles, research proposals, and conference papers), I observed various errors associated with paragraphing. The errors in paragraphing often consisted in, first, what Craswell (1993:5) calls ‘paragraph rupture’ and what for better expression, I would call a ‘hanging paragraph’. Concerning the first, students constructed paragraphs in such a way that the reader’s expectation is set up through some sentences although within the same paragraph this expectation is either not met or directed outside the paragraph. There is thus split focus. Hanging paragraphs were not related to either the previous or the subsequent paragraph. In other cases, there was free association of ideas and rumbling ideas. Still, some paragraphs appeared choppy and jazzy. To construct respectable paragraphs, I advised students to either remove some sentences, or rework them into a paragraph that requires further developments, or introduce sometimes logical connectives to ensure more explicit signaling of both intra- and inter-paragraph linkages. Some underdeveloped paragraphs also needed to be elaborated.

The use of metatextual elements (see Bunton, 1999) as a rhetorical device also bears mention. In a more sustained and lengthy writing such as the theses, metatextual elements help to reduce the cognitive load on readers. Metatextual elements are expressions that assist the thesis or research article writer, therefore, to direct the reader’s attention in terms of how the text is organized. On one hand, such devices as appropriate headings, sub-headings, previews and overviews at the beginnings of chapters or sections were often not used in the research writings I edited. Transitional markers and other advanced labels were often left out. On the other hand, in a few research articles and conference papers, metatextual devices such as previews and overviews were overused, thus making the devices intrusive and the piece of writing irritating. My task, since I noticed students were not aware always of the usefulness of this rhetorical device, was to provide them with a list of some of these, use a few of them to illustrate their use, and request that they look more closely at how these and similar ones are used in their disciplines, as the use of metatextual elements could be discipline-specific.

Yet another rhetorical device to discuss is repetition, where students repeat themselves, often at some length, because of the way in which they had structured their argumentation in various chapters or sub-sections in theses and research articles. Often the repetition did not involve only lexical items but stretches of sentences that had been used in earlier sections of the work. Thus, though it is often argued that the benefit of lexical repetition lies in its contribution to thematic salience and thematic development, repetition tended to be a labored device at all levels (word, phrase, and clause, and sentence) in the hands of graduate students. Where repetitions were sentential, radical restructuring was required. At other times, by clarifying sub-sectional focus it was possible simply to omit repetitious material altogether, or to substitute some phrase.

The final issue related to rhetoric is problems of justification; that is, providing inadequate or implausible evidence for arguments or claims made. Thus, such textual inadequacies were not simply a ‘content’ issue; they were rhetorical in so far as by not providing adequate or plausible information, the graduate students failed to persuade readers about the claims and assertions being made. Generalized assertions were given without any further information. Writing problems of this nature were easy to deal with. These required no
more than a ‘how’? or ‘why?’ in the margins; interestingly, sometimes in the discussions with my clients, they always had the answers in hand. This exclusion of evidential information could suggest students’ incomplete acculturation to the conventions of argumentation.

Citation practices

One manifestation of ritualistic academic behavior expected in research writing relates to intertextuality, which is evidenced in footnotes, endnotes, in-text citation and bibliographic citation. This is an important mode of socialization into the academic tribes, as Becher (1989) aptly names them. My concern in the rest of this section relates to students’ use of in-text citation for purposes of space constraint and saliency.

First, one clear difficulty I have on reading students’ research writing is determining ‘who is speaking’ in the text, and, for that matter, possible charges of lack of comprehension and plagiarism. This often arises when students think that a single reference somewhere in a paragraph is sufficient. I deal with such instances of unclear referencing by encouraging students to correctly make references to the scholar/s involved as they get along in a paragraph to avoid the charge of plagiarism, if even it requires repeating the names of authors or the use of pronominal references.

Also, a common in-text citation difficulty I notice in the research writings of my clients concern the use of secondary sources. As much as possible, students are encouraged to read every source material referred to in their writing. In few cases, where students are unable to access the primary source referred to by an author whose work a student is privy to, students can cite as ‘Author X 1997, as cited by Author B’. The worry is when students are constantly making such references without taking time to look for the primary texts involved and to read them. The alternative is for students to delete such references to avoid being charged with ‘academic dishonesty’.

A further difficulty students have with in-text citation is the use of paraphrasing, summarizing, and quoting. Some students do not seem to know when to utilize these. I, therefore, have to explain to students the value of each, stressing that both summarizing and paraphrasing provide the opportunity to showcase their understanding of the ideas in texts they have encountered in their reading, whereas quoting often suggests that there is no better way of expressing an original idea except by maintaining its original expression or form. Some Humanities and Social Sciences research students used quotations rather excessively, thus making their writing pretentious and showy. In such a case, the voice of the writer (that is, the graduate student) becomes ‘drowned’ in a sea of other voices. The way out, when I had the opportunity of a discussion with graduate students, was to alert them to the rhetorical functions of quotations, drawing on Krishnan and Kathpalia (2002) and to encourage them to summarize or paraphrase as much as possible.

Closely related to the referencing skills mentioned in the previous paragraph are the types of in-text citation, commonly described in the ESP and AL literature as the integral in-text citation and non-integral
in-text citation. In integral in-text citation the name of the scholar is part of the sentence elements (e.g. ‘Author K (2006) postulated the theory being used today’) whereas non- integral citation places the name of the scholar or the evidential material together with the date in parenthesis such as “Address terms can be a means of constructing one’s identity (Author J, 2006)”. Studies in Higher Education, AAL, and ESP (e.g. Hyland, 2000; Thompson, 2001) have further shown that the extent to which integral in-text citation and non-integral citation are used could be influenced by different disciplines. Far too often in the research writings I proofread, students used the non-integral type or its variants, with a cursory use of the other type. And when a few students used the integral type, they restricted the evidential marker (that is, the reference source) to the subject or initial position. Placing the evidential marker in the medial position or at the rear in sentences requires more effort on the part of the students. To many graduate students, however, this is a luxury, which they can least entertain. I had to get students to understand the rationale and communicative effect of using both types of citation.

Using the integral in-text citation or non-integral in-text citation may call for the use of either single author or multiple authors. The use of the latter means that one is generalizing from a set of texts or scholars; and this has implications for the ordering or sequencing of the authors’ names. Many students do not seem to be aware of the need to adopt an organizing principle and to adhere to it throughout the text. Students could choose any one of the following organizing principles: recency, alphabetical arrangement, and chronological order. Lack of such knowledge of the organizing principle of multiple authors in in-text citation makes students’ research writing less professional and scholarly. When students’ attention is drawn to this requirement for consistency of the organizing principle in multiple in-text citation, they willingly oblige.

To a large extent, one cannot employ in-text citation without considering reporting verbs Reporting verbs allow the writer to demonstrate his/her attitude towards the proposition being referred to, and thus enables the reader to identify, what is popularly known in studies in rhetoric and composition as, ‘voice’. Hyland (2000) has already established that the use of reporting verbs is susceptible to disciplinary influence. Nonetheless, in the various research writings I edited I noticed that students seemed to have a narrow range of reporting verbs and a lack of knowledge of the semanticity of the various reporting verbs (e.g. ‘posit’, ‘postulate’, ‘said’, ‘assert’, ‘agree’). Too often students used denotational reporting verbs such as ‘said’ and ‘mentioned’, rather than evaluational speech act verbs such as ‘argue’, ‘claim’, and ‘aver’). To help students improve on their use of reporting verbs, I either refer students to some pedagogic materials such as Weissberg and Buker (1990) and Swales and Feak (1994, 2000) or, out of kindness, I give them a list of reporting verbs which I had compiled from my own reading over the years.

Common language infelicities

My engagement with the research writing of graduate students convinces me that there is ample evidence of language infelicities. These tended to be both lexical and syntactical: grammar (e.g. tense choice, cohesion, and sentence order), spelling, and formality.
Specifically, there were repeated errors related to the use of the logical ‘however’, or ‘therefore’ thus confounding the flow of argument. In a number of cases, the logic of sentences in which they are found appears bizarre. In several cases, students’ use of connectives is excessive and intrusive. There are also frequent problems with the determiners ‘it’, ‘this’, and ‘these’. This problem arises because of floating or missing referents. Referring to this linguistic defect, Clanchy and Ballard opine (1989: 21) ‘where the reference is imprecise, the entire vessel of reasoning can become unstable’. In regard to the unclear determiners, there is the need for a repetition of either the referent or an addition of the referent to disambiguate the vague determiner.

Where an expression is very problematic and off-registral, I ask students to rewrite what is intended after I have had discussions with them about what they are trying to say, or I would help in rewriting or reformulating it. While I often do correct textual error, I am hesitant about expressional errors; only when I was convinced about the expressional error was off-registral would I encourage students to look for a more appropriate expression acceptable in their disciplinary community. I am concerned that students should learn themselves to overcome the more common expressional problems.

My comments related to the use of tense issues from the fact that some graduate students use the past, rather than the present, tense to show results in the discussion sections. My discussion with students on the correct or appropriate use of tenses often draws on the rhetorical uses of the various tenses, as in Wissberg and Buker (1990) and Swales and Feak (1994; 2000).

There are various errors related to sentence constructions. The first is sometimes the long and convoluted ones, leading to difficulty in meaning. At the extreme end is sometimes a series of short sentences, thus making them jerky and choppy. In the former the solution lies in breaking the sentence into meaningful units whereas in the latter I offer reformulations to serve as examples to students on how they can use both coordination and subordinate as effective sentence combining processes. Still, there are some sentences that are awkward. Students would use one structural type of sentences such as either a simple sentence or compound sentences or, from the functional perspective, only a loose or periodic sentence over a number of pages. Only rarely do I have to suggest the movement of sentences from one part of the paragraph to a more prominent part of the paragraph to give the information its due weight.

The final language issue that is prominent in graduate students’ research writing concerns lexical choice. I focus here on formality. There were times students used idiomatic expressions instead of more formal words. For instance, ‘put up with’ was substituted with ‘tolerate’. In a number of cases, nominalised expressions were preferred to verbal ones. But this was always not insisted on as in some cases a more verbal style was suggested because of its more vigorous and dynamic nature. It would appear that if the suggested changes or reformulation did not involve words that were lexically incorrect, the changes seemed to be matters of stylistic preferences. In general, the reformulation or changes in expression suggested were meant to make a particular sentence or phrase more elegant or, at least, less clumsy.
Conclusion and Implications

As noted above, graduate students’ research writing evinces several writing challenges. These are generally linguistic, rhetorical, and discoursal in nature. These have some notable implications.

The first implication concerns the role of AEs in the entire research writing process. Knowledge of discipline-specific and generic demands of academic writing as well as cross-cultural meaning (or the more trendy CR) is helpful to the AE. Where the AE has knowledge of the generic demands of writing requirements of research, s/he can confidently offer editorial advice. Further, if the AE is aware of the discipline-specific nature of knowledge construction and dissemination of research, s/he could always ask the graduate student to refer more closely to the several theses and research articles published in his or her discipline.

Indeed, editing the research writing of international students from different countries has implications for CR. Although the CR hypothesis in its original sense (Kaplan 1966) and further elaborated by Connor (1986) and Hinds (1983) has been challenged by other scholars for its oversimplified generalization of the rhetorical patterns, it is worth considering as AEs. The point is that cross-cultural variables can strongly influence graduate students’ research writing (Ventola & Maranen, 1996; Cadman, 2002; Canagarajah, 2002). CR has provided insights lately to suggest the possibility that graduate students in English-medium universities from non-native settings are more disposed to using rhetorical conventions other than the more linear ones (Ballard & Clanchy, 1991). An awareness of this, together with sociolinguistic and genre approaches for AEs need to be an essential aspect of their work, for such a perspective enables better understanding of student writing, thus enhancing cross-cultural written communication. My own experience of working with international graduate students suggests that the cross-cultural differences cannot be wished away. Yet, getting students to adopt the English rhetorical pattern raises the larger issue of privileging one rhetorical pattern over the other, an issue flagged by Critical Applied Linguists such as Canagarajah (2002) and Pennycook (2001).

The second implication relates to postgraduate supervision and pedagogy. This takes us to the long debated issue, the extent to which thesis supervisors must be involved in the research writing process of their students. While there seems to be no agreement on the role of supervisors in the research writing process there is an unwritten assumption by many supervisors that teaching students to write effectively is not part of their mandate. Admittedly, academics are not necessarily language or writing specialists although they are aware of writing for publication, as demanded by the dictum ‘publish or perish’. It is not strange for lecturers or supervisors, especially in non-native-speaking contexts, to be unaware of the subtle distinctions between ‘due to’ and ‘owing to’, ‘less’ and ‘fewer’, among others. Supervisors should, however, be alert to consistency in respect of English versus American spelling, usage (e.g. ‘data are’ or ‘data is’), hyphenation (‘co-ordinate’ or ‘coordinate’, ‘macro-economics’ or ‘macroeconomics’).

Supervisors should also be conversant with various aspects of rhetoric and language issues. They should at least have a nodding acquaintanceship with the conventions of usage such as spelling, capitalization,
punctuation, symbols, and citation. Thus, it is likely that students who are not penalized for, for example, their citation errors, form poor writing habits and continue with infelicitous writing habits throughout their degree programs. If instructors had made graduate students more accountable from the onset of their writing, the numerous citation errors noted in several graduate research writings would be minimal. In this regard, I concur with Chang and Swales (1999) who argue in favour of raising students’ rhetorical consciousness with, for instance, the personal pronoun, reporting verbs, and appropriate and sufficient use of evidence. It is suggested, for instance, that an initial identification and typologizing of reporting verbs in terms of degrees of affect, certainty and doubt when students start writing their literature review sections may, through directed instruction, assist student writers in projecting an informed and convincing evaluative stance, given the relative importance of the literature review section in research writing (Boote & Beile, 2005).

As a corollary of the above, and based on my interaction with graduate students while offering editorial services to them, merely dotting comments such as ‘what is the point of all this?’, ‘how does this discussion relate to the sub-heading?’, ‘what is the focus here/’ a goofed argument’, and ‘sloppy argument’, as I myself unreflectively had written on some research proposals, theses/dissertations, and research articles become bewildering to graduate students. The meaning of these questions and comments reside in an academic writing culture to which graduate students occupy a peripheral place (Lave & Wenger, 1991). Students can only decode such highly contextualized messages when they are talked to in intimate fashion. When this is done, I believe, it will greatly reduce the temptation of AEs to operate in the third interventionist level, as found in the CAE guidelines.

The third broad implication concerns the graduate students themselves; they have a role in forging an active engagement with the various research genres, either spoken or written, in order to demonstrate their advanced academic literacy. My interaction with graduate students, as I sought to assist them in presenting polished (but by no means impeccable) theses, research articles, and conference papers, convinced me that some graduates do not take language matters (and rhetorical matters) seriously enough. It is as though their responsibility is to write and that of the supervisor or academic editor is to ‘fix’ the problems that arise in the course of their writing. One way is for graduate students to actively read pedagogic material on thesis writing and engage in activities related to advanced academic literacy. They can also be encouraged to take peer review of their research writings more seriously. Ultimately, graduate students need to be aware that more and more demands are being made on them for sophisticated writing, language use, and oral communications – advanced academic literacy.

Thus, although in this paper I set out to underscore the role of AEs in the research writing process as part of the socialization process in various discourse communities by describing my own experiences as an AE for international graduate students in their research writing, there have arisen three important implications. Indeed, international graduate students are generally understood as facing three kinds of transition issues when entering study programmes in a second language: language issues, cultural issues and pedagogic issues. The AE too has to be reminded of these three issues if s/he is to effectively discharge his or her professional task of offering editorial assistance to graduate students in their research writing.
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**Invisible Children and the Cyberactivist Spectator.**

By Shayne Pepper

Since its first screening in 2004, the amateur documentary *Invisible Children* has sparked an online social movement and directed vast amounts of money and attention toward the plight of former child soldiers in war-torn, northern Uganda. Through a combination of campus screenings, house parties, and streaming webcasts, the film has become a rallying point for a massive, youth-oriented humanitarian effort. The film is the endeavor of three Californian twentysomethings who documented their haphazard and uninformed trip to “do something” about the humanitarian crisis in southern Sudan. Upon arriving to find that many Sudanese had become refugees in Uganda, they discovered large numbers of “night commuters,” children who, in order not to be abducted and pressed into service by the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), walk several miles every night from their small villages to sleep on the floor of large buildings in the relative safety of a city. The documentarians interviewed these children who told of horrific experiences in which they were abducted from their families and made to murder civilians indiscriminately while under the control of guerrilla-warrior Joseph Kony’s “resistance army.” With estimates of 12,000 killed in the conflict since 1987 and over 25,000 children abducted, Kony and other members of the LRA have been charged with multiple war crimes and crimes against humanity.¹ Coupled with the nearly 1.2 million Ugandans displaced due to this conflict, Jan Egeland, former UN Under Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs has called the situation “one of the worst humanitarian crises in the world.”²

This essay combines textual analysis of the *Invisible Children* documentary along with an examination of the ways in which the Invisible Children movement has utilized network technologies to spread awareness, raise money, and enlist individuals to join in this cause. Drawing upon previous studies of similar social movements, I will consider the Invisible Children project as a particularly unique example of “cyberactivism” in the way that it utilizes networked technologies (social networking sites in particular) and, by centering this movement on the documentary, represents a new type of cultural logic that Henry Jenkins’ calls “convergence culture.” Having positioned the Invisible Children project as such, I will also analyze the strategies of the film in relation to not only the formal devices used to engage the intended youth audience (through music, editing, and narrative) but also the positioning of the viewer and the filmmakers as the empowered (and networked) figures who can take very simple actions to join this activist movement and affect real change in the lives of these Ugandan children. By watching the film and taking advantage of the tactics of cyberactivism offered to them, viewers are no longer positioned to simply become more informed. They can instead become “monitorial citizens,” which as I will point out, affords them a certain...
type of political efficacy. This essay points out the need for a multi-disciplinary approach to studying the film, and the larger cyberactivist movement of which it is a part, in order to better understand the practices of these cyberactivist spectators.

Cyberactivism - A Networked Politics

Activist movements and protests have often utilized communication technologies as part of their strategizing. From distributing flyers and leaflets to buying airtime on television or simply amplifying their anger through a megaphone, social movements have been able to harness communication technologies to further their message and recruit new individuals into their ranks. Since the popularization of the Internet, activists have been able to explore the potential of network technologies that give them a megaphone of proportions previously unimaginable.

Cyberactivism has become an umbrella term used to identify the shift of this type of politics to an online environment. Martha McCaughey and Michael D. Ayers write, “Cyberactivism crosses disciplines, mixes theories with practical activist approaches, and represents a broad range of online activist strategies, from online awareness campaigns to Internet-transmitted laser-projected messaging.” Since cyberactivism could mean anything from creating a website for breast cancer awareness to hacking state department computers in China to protest human rights violations, Sandor Vegh has created useful categories in which to think about cyberactivism. He separates strategies as either Internet-enhanced or Internet-based. Vegh distinguishes the two by stating that Internet-enhanced strategies “are only used to enhance the traditional advocacy techniques, for example, as an additional communication channel, by raising awareness beyond the scope possible before the Internet, or by coordinating action more efficiently.” On the other hand, Internet-based strategies are “only possible online, like a virtual sit-in or hacking into target websites.” Vegh also further categorizes cyberactivism into three general areas: awareness/advocacy; organization/mobilization; and action/reaction. As I will soon argue, while these categories describe the Invisible Children project quite well, these categories are also complicated in so far that Invisible Children is both Internet-enhanced and Internet-based, and arguably mixes all three of Vegh’s general categories.

It is also important to contextualize cyberactivism not just within a history of networked politics, but also with the rise of “life-style politics” more generally. This alternative type of politics is often removed from a parliamentary or legislative politics and is generally more of a grassroots movement. According to Peter Dahlgren, these type of politics “tend to be more ad hoc, less dependent on traditional organizations and elites mobilizing standing cadres of supporters” and the focus is often on “single issues rather than across the board social change.” Dahlgren cites the women’s movements of the nineteenth century or the civil rights or anti-war protest movement of the 1960s as particular examples. In recent years, these examples of life-style politics may often be tied to a consumer politics such as buying sweatshop-free clothing, only eating organic or vegan food, or purchasing items connected to the (PRODUCT) RED campaign. In such examples, an individual’s politics are wholly connected with their purchasing habits. As e-commerce has
begun to define the way a large portion of the population uses the Internet, a certain convergence of these practices can be traced as social movements, charity organizations, and even political campaigns turn to the web for their fundraising.

The Invisible Children movement traverses these categories as it embraces a wide variety of organizational tactics and activist strategies. As the *Invisible Children* documentary began to spread via streaming video technologies such as Google Video and YouTube, a larger base of supporters was established, and, along with the use of social networking sites like Facebook and MySpace, the Invisible Children movement began to expand its tactics from simply spreading the word about the film and/or contributing money to eventually assembling massive amounts of people offline in order to raise awareness and lobby Congress to take more action about the situation in northern Uganda. The movement bridged the gap between “assembling” large numbers of supporters in *virtual* space and assembling large numbers of supporters in *physical* space.

Like other well-known examples of cyberactivism (the WTO protests in Seattle or the Zapatistas for example), the Invisible Children movement utilized network technologies in innovative ways in order to, in a very short time period, radically increase the amount of attention that such a grassroots movement could have gotten before the Internet. While many social movement organizations are using the web to increase visibility or to communicate more easily to their members, the Invisible Children movement is a prime example of how newer (and specifically youth-based) cyberactivist movements utilize them in new and unique ways: not just as an advertising method, but as an environment to engage in political activity. As W. Lance Bennett writes,

> Political organizations that are older, larger, resource-rich, and strategically linked to party and government politics may rely on internet-based communications mostly to amplify and reduce the costs of pre-existing communication routines. On the other hand, newer, resource-poor organizations that tend to reject conventional politics may be defined in important ways by their internet presence.6

Rather than simply adapting their already existing strategies to a networked environment, cyberactivist movements like Invisible Children are making networked technologies the backbone of their strategy. Their presence can be particularly felt on social networking sites, where they have been able to amass large amounts of supporters and have created a fluid channel of communication to their broad activist base. As these social networking sites add new features, the Invisible Children movement is quick to adapt their strategies to incorporate the shifts in site design or add-on features that enable them to strengthen their hyperlinked connections with other individuals, artists, or other causes.

These sites draw users from a number of socio-economic, racial, or national groups, and in many ways, cyberactivism offers a real-world example of the type of political practices that Donna Haraway discusses in her “cyborg manifesto.” In her ironic post-human model, project-oriented political participation, rather than one based on identity politics or class, might be considered the key to addressing political issues in
a globalized world. In these situations, individuals from all walks of life (or location on the planet) may come together to work on a particular cause and then disband or, to use a metaphor common to these multitasking, plugged-in youth, they may simply minimize that window and work on something else. The Invisible Children project exemplifies this type of project-oriented political participation. Despite the diversity of the (young) activists in this movement, they are able to devote a portion of their time, energy, and online practices to the humanitarian crisis in northern Uganda while maintaining their ties to other political and social concerns.

Documenting the “Invisible Children” of Northern Uganda

To briefly summarize, the desperate situation in northern Uganda stems from an ongoing civil war between the Ugandan government and the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), led by Joseph Kony. The LRA formed over the course of a few years in the mid-1980s with the stated mission to overthrow the Ugandan government and create a government based on the Ten Commandments. Caught in the middle of this conflict were the mostly agrarian Acholi peoples near Gulu and Kitgum in northern Uganda. When support for the LRA began to dwindle among adults, the LRA began abducting children, forcing them to join the army. The children were then forced to kill other children, fellow villagers, or even their family as tests of their loyalty. Tales of carnage involve the cutting off of lips and ears, the hacking away of limbs, and the indiscriminate murder of innocent Ugandan citizens. In his analysis of the history and tactics of the LRA, Paul Jackson writes, “[Kony’s] desperation in the face of Acholi indifference in many cases, led to his turning violent on his own people. The young were abducted, because not only were they easier to indoctrinate, but Kony had given up on the adults. The youngsters were to form the core of a new Acholi identity.”

Still today, these abducted children are torn from their homes and often beaten, mutilated, and raped if they refuse to join the LRA in their fight. In October 2005, the International Criminal Court (ICC) based in The Hague, announced arrest warrants for Joseph Kony and four of his top deputies. They are charged with four counts of war crimes including “forced abduction of and sexual abuse of children” and other atrocities. During the height of these abductions (between 7,000 and 10,000 were reported in 2003 alone), children would leave their villages each evening to congregate in larger cities where it was safer to sleep. Fearing abduction if they stayed in their village, they made this “night commute” often walking several miles back and forth each day.

It was during the spring of 2003 that three young Americans from California (Jason Russell, Bobby Bailey, and Laren Poole) traveled to Africa in order to learn more about the situation in neighboring Sudan. During their trip, they encountered these children in northern Uganda traveling from their villages to the cities of Gulu and Kitgum and their attention turned to the children’s stories. Jason Russell and Bobby Bailey had undergraduate training at University of Southern California’s program in Cinema and Television and brought their video recording equipment to document the trip. The result of this trip was an hour-long documentary that attempts to tell the story of these children and raise awareness for their situation. With no conventional distribution methods available to them, they posted the “rough cut” of their film on Google
Video and built a website to sell DVDs for group screenings. With the aid of streaming video and social networking sites, thousands of people (especially young people) were watching the documentary, passing it along to their friends, and adding Invisible Children to their “friends lists” on MySpace.

The documentary begins with a long take of a young Ugandan boy, walking barefoot down a dirty road carrying his belongings in a bag over his shoulder. It is dark, and only the light from the camera illuminates the child. As the camera continues to follow the young boy the voice of Jan Egeland, the Under-Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs at the United Nations, calls the situation a “moral outrage” and claims that the international community has neglected the children in Northern Uganda. He says, “I cannot find any other part of the world having an emergency on the scale of Uganda with so little international attention.” After setting up this sense of authority through both the uninterrupted take and the voice over, the film transitions to self-interviews by the filmmakers. The tone completely changes, as a twentysomething Caucasian male appears in the frame in a confessional style similar to that of MTV’s *The Real World*. He spells out his name and begins to speak, but before he can get very far, he calls out to his friend, quizzically informing him that the red light on the camera is blinking, signaling that there is no more tape or battery left. The juxtaposition of the authoritative narration of the harrowing opening shot is in stark contrast to this apparently privileged white, middle-class figure that can’t even seem to work his video camera. The soundtrack bursts to life with rock music by the band Switchfoot, and we begin to watch small excerpts from the three filmmaker’s videotaped confessions. The tone is light, and is at times very self-deprecating. As Bobby begins to wax poetic about how “media shapes the way we view our life” and how “in a sense, media is life,” a small light bulb effect appears over his head, pointing out that the boys are self-aware enough to know that their insights into our media culture are not to be taken as self-important pontification. They are not positioned as authorities; they are presented as regular people like the assumed viewer.

They go on further to admit that while one of them has been to Kenya before, the other two have not traveled. They label themselves as naïve, first-time filmmakers attempting to “tell the story of… find the truth” about the humanitarian crisis in southern Sudan. This slip of words is telling, as the documentary walks a fine line between attempting to “tell the story” of these indigenous Africans and “finding the truth.” They begin their trip saying, “None of us knew what we were doing. We just opened our lens wide and tried to capture what we were seeing.” The film suggests that in the age of cheap digital cameras and instant distribution deals (i.e. YouTube, blogs), the untrained citizen can become an eyewitness, documentarian, and amateur journalist – no special skills needed, just a willingness to open their eyes and document. The film begins to document their misadventures in a playful way. One review writes,

At first, like excited frat boys, they filmed themselves – killing a snake emerging from its hole, getting sick, dancing, marveling at the African landscape. Then one night, they stumbled upon children sleeping in a town square. “We were going to Sudan because of the genocide,” says [Bobby] Bailey, “but our host took us to a refugee camp in northern Uganda. Then a vehicle gets bombed in front of us. We say, ‘What’s going on?’ She says we are in the middle of a war. We say, ‘What war?’ Then she took us to the city and we saw thousands of kids sleeping, lying
down with blankets without their parents.” Cameras rolling, they began asking the children questions.12

That these filmmakers literally stumble upon the humanitarian crisis in northern Uganda while attempting to document the genocide in Sudan, speaks not only to the filmmakers’ own naiveté, but also how these situations in Africa are so little-understood by the American public at large. These conflicts, civil wars, and acts of genocide happen in countries with unfamiliar names that most Americans can’t even begin to locate on a map.

This first section of the documentary, which focuses on the adventures of the filmmakers, performs several tasks. First it works to have the viewer identify with the three filmmakers. Through their confessional tone and light mood, they grab our attention and our sympathy, and also our forgiveness for their naiveté. Second, unlike the rest of the film, the first part of their trip to southern Sudan and northern Uganda feature the filmmakers in the frame quite often. The film suggests that with minimal resources, knowledge, and ability they were able make it to these places to document what is going on, ostensibly allowing the viewer to think that they to might also be able to take such action. As Lutz and Collins write about the practice of including Western photographers in *National Geographic* photos,

They may allow identification with the Westerner in the photo and, through that, more interaction with, or imaginary participation in, the photo…. Most obviously, the pictures of Westerners can serve a validating function by proving that the author was there, that the account is a first-hand one, brought from the field rather than from library or photographic archives.”13

Here as well, the images of the filmmakers in the frame, first engaging in silly misadventures and then in real danger from patrolling LRA convoys, establish their first-hand account and works to eliminate the distance between the viewer and the situation in northern Uganda.

Once this work is done, the documentary shifts its focus to the Ugandan children as they tell their stories of abduction and abuse, shifting the viewer’s identification as well in order to produce affect. The bulk of the remaining film is made up of tight close ups and medium shots of children and adults describing the atrocities that have taken place, recounting personal narratives of their own abductions or relaying the experiences of their friends and loved ones. The camerawork is often handheld and even shot from floor-level as it interviews children sleeping in a cramped crawl space in the damp and dark basement of a hospital. The filmmakers continually try to avoid any type of distanced, authoritative documentary style that would situate the viewer as simply a passive observer. Rather, the filmmakers (and particularly the voice-over of Jason Russell) keep the film conversational, talking directly to the imagined viewer.

Later in the film, the children’s first hand accounts are told in voice-over as drawings made by the children illustrate the scenes that they describe.14 Rather than relying on actual footage of these atrocities taking place, the viewer sees drawings made by abducted Acholi children as they recount their horrific experiences. The viewer is able to hear from the children first-hand what they have gone through. One child
says, “I was so scared because I see people’s arms and legs being cut off. I thought this would be done to
me because they do bad things to those who are arrested and abducted. I tried to protest and ask for mercy
but they still went ahead and beat me until nightfall.” As the child tells of his abduction, we see drawings
of armless people covered in blood and a rebel soldier with a machete. As the images change to drawings
of rebel soldiers marching, the soundtrack swells with the sounds of boots marching. The sounds turn
to screams and gunfire as the drawings depict a village being raided and the people slaughtered. These
scenes, some of the most emotionally charged in the film, continue as more children describe humiliating
acts they were made to perform for the pleasure of the LRA.

As the scene concludes, one boy says, “I have witnessed these deaths with my own eyes. What does the
government think? Do they think this is right?” The image track changes to scenes from inside a hospital,
and former child soldiers are singled out in the frame with text stating their name, age, and how they were
affected by the war. Some have been blinded, some raped, and others have lost limbs. Throughout this
scene Buffalo Springfield’s “For What It’s Worth” grows in intensity, and we hear the lyrics, “It’s time we
stop, hey, what’s that sound? / Everybody look what’s going down” as these scenes are inter-cut with still
images of Ugandan parents and children protesting in the street, holding signs, and pleading for an end
to the abductions and violence. The rest of the film’s narrative literally turns into a plea for action as the
adults and children in the community appeal directly to the filmmakers, and to the American government,
to take notice of the atrocities being committed in their country.

Labeled a “rough cut,” the film has not been released theatrically, causing the majority of screenings to
happen on home televisions or computer screens or in group settings such as a classroom or church. The
end of the film is a direct and simple call for activism: it gives the audience something particular they can
do through the website. In this case, the viewer is asked to use their creative capacity to spread the word
about the situation in northern Uganda and to donate money to the Invisible Children cause. This is a trend
that can be seen more and more even in theatrically released films such as An Inconvenient Truth (2006)
and even fictional films like Syriana (2005) where the end of the film offers a website link for more infor-
mation on how to join a social movement related to the film. This exemplifies what Henry Jenkins calls
convergence culture. He defines convergence culture as “the situation in which multiple media systems
coexist and where media content flows fluidly across them.” This does not simply mean that the Invisible
Children documentary is available on multiple platforms and can be viewed in a number of environments
(though each of these cases are true); instead, convergence culture describes the logic of the Invisible
Children movement and perhaps describes cyberactivism more broadly. In the case of Invisible Children,
convergence culture can describe a situation where a spectator is never just a spectator, but is instead an
active (or activist) component in the process of forming a social movement. The spectator is positioned
in such a way that viewing the film is only the first step. Now that the spectator has the information
learned in the film, the film prescribes particular actions that one might take – visiting a website, donating
money to the cause, linking to the film on a social networking site, etc. In an interesting combination of
savvy packaging and viral marketing, even the purchase of a DVD from their official website comes with
a secondary copy of the DVD tucked away in a paper sleeve inside the DVD case, calling on the viewer/purchaser to pass one copy along to someone else so that they might also get involved in the movement.
The inside of the DVD case details a list of things that the individual can do to support the cause. They are rhetorically situated as already being part of the movement and are told, “Upon possession of this DVD, you join us with the following responsibilities: 1) Host a house party; 2) Raise the dough $; 3) Log on and pass DVD on.” In no less than five places on the DVD packaging materials, variations of the same instructions are listed. The text on the booklet even reads, “Invisible Children: A Movement By You,” and then has a numbered list of blank lines for people who come to the house parties to write their name. Through all of these tactics, the spectator is never simply a spectator. The spectator interacts with the film, additional videos, and other informational material in a variety of environments, online and offline, as these various media platforms work together to expand the spectator’s involvement. It is this type of spectator positioning, that of a cyberactivist spectator, that I wish to consider now.

Social Networking and the Cyberactivist Spectator

Now that we understand the history of the Invisible Children documentary film and of the conflict itself, we can begin to see how the film sparked a movement through their official website, streaming video sites such as Google Video and YouTube, and social networking sites such as MySpace, and Facebook. What began with (and is still centered around) the Invisible Children rough cut, has morphed into a cyberactivist network of substantial proportions. As of October 4, 2009, the social networking sites alone tally over 119,000 Facebook friends and over 140,000 MySpace friends. Each of these 140,000 MySpace friends has linked to the official Invisible Children MySpace profile, as both a promotion of the movement and a badge of their own inclusion, often placing Invisible Children in the prime spot of their “top 8” which is viewable to anyone who clicks on the individual’s MySpace profile. The Invisible Children YouTube page lists nearly 4,600 subscribers and over 1,012 friends with nearly 90,000 channel views. These sites not only link to a streamable version of the film for the spectator to watch, but it also involves them in the expansion of the movement by allowing them to embed video clips, banners, and other hyperlinks on their own websites or social networking profiles. In total, this creates an environment where their online presence is always actively promoting the social movement even if they are not logged on at the time. Additionally, the Invisible Children website is itself a resource hub where individuals may buy a copy of the DVD, donate money to the organization, petition legislators, and generally become more informed about the situation in northern Uganda.

With numbers as high as these, it is clear that the Invisible Children network of activists maintain a substantial presence in popular online environments, but from the initial release of the documentary in 2004 to its current status in 2009, the movement has made tremendous strides in organizing massive offline events, gathering mainstream media attention (including that of CNN anchor Anderson Cooper), and rallying the support of political figures. Through its use of cyberactivist tactics, its youth-oriented aesthetic, and the public image of its young filmmakers, the movement has come to be largely known as one driven nearly entirely by high school and college-aged individuals. By enlisting popular culture figures such as the rock band Fall Out Boy, indie-folk artists such as Denison Witmer and Sufjan Stevens, and even having their
organization become a major plot point in the television series *Veronica Mars*, the Invisible Children movement has been able to enlist young people who would not be normally inclined to involve themselves in activist organizations. These are not just celebrity endorsements that play on the Invisible Children websites. Fall Out Boy, already incredibly popular among the youth demographic, incorporated specially produced informational videos to be played on the giant screens on their stage during their 2007 arena-tour of the United States, introducing untold thousands to the cause. Additionally, the music video for one of their singles was filmed in Uganda and enlisted the help of Invisible Children to promote the cause.

Examples of the cyberactivist movements branching out to offline events are a key component to many social movements. Bennett writes, “An inseparable mix of virtual and face-to-face communication defines many activist networks, and contacts in these networks may range far from activists’ immediate social circles if they can be sustained in terms of the cost and scale offered by digital communication applications.”21 In the case of Invisible Children, this wave of cyberactivism has resulted in events such as the Global Night Commute, the Displace Me Event, the lobbying of Congress, and the Schools For Schools program which rebuilds schools for children in northern Uganda, all of which brought together individuals that had no other connection to one another than their involvement in this network of activists. The Global Night Commute occurred on April 26, 2006, and was an event where nearly 80,000 people in 130 cities and seven countries reenacted, a trek similar to those that Ugandan children would make in order to travel to large cities in order to sleep in relative safety. People took to the streets to walk to a designated location and slept there overnight, pledging their support to the Ugandan children who make the same walk each night out of fear of the LRA. The similar Displace Me event took place on April 28, 2007, and 68,000 people turned out in fifteen cities in order to raise awareness for the estimated 1.5 million Ugandans who are displaced in camps. This large-scale event saw several videotaped messages from Ugandans broadcast to the crowds. Even First Lady Laura Bush taped a video, thanking them for their commitment and informing them of the desperate conditions facing the displaced Ugandans.

Unlike other cyberactivist movements, namely the WTO protests and the Zapatistas, this is not a revolutionary group that wishes to subvert government processes. Rather, the Invisible Children movement calls upon the U.S. government to take action within the standard channels of increasing the U.S. aid budget to Uganda or pressuring the Ugandan government to engage more fully with the peace process. This movement also differs from events such as Live8 or Live Earth, which were heavily sponsored by corporations and were heavily laden with consumerist messages. What money does flow through the organization is (outside of organizational costs) used to better the situation of the inhabitants of northern Uganda. The Schools for Schools program alone has raised over $1.5 million, and the movement as a whole has had revenue of over $7 million.22

Clearly, cyberactivist movements are not limited to online activity, and the Invisible Children movement has, over recent years, even increased their support on the ground level in northern Uganda. Originally, groups of teens would sign on for trips to Uganda to help in whatever way they could. These trips were not as organized as their most recent endeavors and speak to the growth that the movement has experienced. More recently, strategically organized trips have been arranged where candidates are selected by their level...
of commitment and skills that they are willing to put to use, and these trips are part of much larger efforts that work in tandem with organizations led by indigenous Ugandans. These outreach efforts have included tutoring and mentoring relationships, teacher exchanges, and, of course, the rebuilding of schools for the Ugandan children. While the movement began in an energetic but haphazard way, the recent incarnations have been far more organized and planned while retaining the youthful energy and aesthetic that has continually defined the project.

Over time, the Invisible Children website, MySpace profile, and YouTube page have expanded to include a number of videos describing their new projects and updates on the situation in northern Uganda. Each of these videos continue with the youth-oriented aesthetic present in the Invisible Children documentary, despite being created by a new team of professional filmmakers and publicity teams. In a promotion for a new feature-length documentary about the Schools for Schools program (released in late-2008), a song by M.I.A. called “Paper Planes” soundtracks the video. Similarly, in the TRI: Invest In Peace video, The National’s “Fake Empire” sets the mood. By incorporating popular indie-rock music, using a fast-paced editing style, and highlighting the central role of young people in the videos, the Invisible Children movement continues to draw upon a particularly hip sensibility to inspire young people to get involved. These efforts signal to the viewer that this is a movement that is designed to speak to them and include them in efforts to affect change in the world. This aesthetic is, in some ways, a defining principle of politics online, which can be seen, for example, in the Will.i.am produced video titled “Yes We Can,” which supported President Barack Obama’s presidential campaign. Here as well, a youth-oriented aesthetic is meant to appeal to those who may not be political junkies. This aesthetic, when combined with the short length of YouTube clips, fits perfectly with a viral promotional campaign on social networking sites frequented by young people.

Conclusion: The Political Efficacy of the Monitorial Citizen

While not everyone can take a trip to Uganda to document the terrible situation, network technologies have allowed average citizens to become aware of humanitarian crises and affect real change. Cyberactivist movements like Invisible Children are symptomatic of a much larger shift in our cultural and political landscape, allowing everyone with a personal computer and an Internet connection to become what Michael Schudson calls a “monitorial citizen.” He writes, “A monitorial citizen scans (rather than reads) the informational environment in a way so that he or she may be alerted on a very wide variety of issues for a very wide variety of ends and may be mobilized around those issues in a large variety of ways.” The idea of monitorial citizenship allows us to reconsider the political efficacy of something like Digg.com or even YouTube where users can, with the simple click of a thumbs up or thumbs down rating, propel a little-known story to the top of a list or the front of a homepage where millions of people from around the world might encounter it in their daily web browsing. The rise of micro-loan agencies such as Kiva.org have brought the economic situations of individuals, families, and businesses in developing nations within the direct reach of those who wish to do something to help but do not want to simply send money
to a blanket cause. These technologies update the old tradition of getting a picture of the child you are helping by sending only pennies a day, and now transforms the relationship into one of more immediacy and mutual dialogue.

As the three filmmakers in the Invisible Children documentary demonstrate, even naive young-adults can, with a video camera and a free streaming service, inform hundreds of thousands of people about an issue that might have been ignored by mainstream media, or worse, glossed over by a viewer who becomes desensitized to genocide or other humanitarian crises when they are simply represented as charts and numbers. Where theatrical documentaries have, so far, not devoted time to this subject, and news reports like 60 Minutes have given it very little attention, it is clear that the users of Web 2.0 (through streaming video, social networking sites, or other technologies centered on user-generated content) are picking up the slack, documenting this atrocity, and mobilizing to make a difference. For the young activist who watches Invisible Children for the first time and wants to learn more, it is not to CNN or the NBC Nightly News that they will likely turn. Rather, it is YouTube that offers several clips of individual reporters interviewing rebel leader Joseph Kony. When one searches for “Uganda genocide” on Google, the first few links are to student papers and online social movement websites not to government documents or international news media portals.

As Henry Jenkins writes, “Welcome to convergence culture, where old and new media collide, where grassroots and corporate media intersect, where the power of the media producer and the power of the media consumer interact in unpredictable ways.” In a time where films are simultaneously released on multiple delivery platforms and lines between different types of media blur, the notion of convergence culture helps us to make sense of our media landscape. When bloggers can break a political news story before major news outlets, homespun videos can become journalistic pieces on CNN’s iReport, and YouTube videos are at just as at home on your computer screen, cellular phone, or your television, it makes sense that activist documentaries would take advantage of the new distribution opportunities afforded to them. When these new delivery systems are coupled with the incredible power offered by the user-generated content of Web 2.0, their political efficacy increases and cyberactivist movements like Invisible Children are there to make use of them. Where once upon a time, the act of watching a documentary and subsequently engaging in direct political action may have been quite distanced from each other, cyberactivist spectatorship marries the two, often making them inseparable.

Notes


2 UN Press Release: “Head of UN Humanitarian Affairs Office Visits Northern Uganda, Says ‘Deeply


10 “Uganda Civil War” Global Security http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/uganda.htm (last accessed December 1, 2009)


The practice of having the children narrate their own story has become one of the central ways in which this conflict has been related to western audiences. See Faith J.H. McDonnell and Grace Akallo. *Girl Soldier: A Story of Hope for Northern Uganda’s Children.* (Grand Rapids, MI: Chosen Books, 2007).


One might consider *Invisible Children* to be one long advertisement for a website and movement rather than the typical website as an advertisement for a film. Upon arriving at the website, a list of five things that “you” can do to help are listed: “1. Watch the film; 2. Get Educated; 3. Have a screening and spread the word; 4. Shop/support the kids; 5. Join schools for schools.” [www.invisiblechildren.com](http://www.invisiblechildren.com).

Official Website: [www.invisiblechildren.com](http://www.invisiblechildren.com) The film can be viewed at:

Google Video: [http://video.google.com/videoplay?docid=3166797753930210643](http://video.google.com/videoplay?docid=3166797753930210643); and

YouTube: [http://www.youtube.com/user/invisiblechildreninc](http://www.youtube.com/user/invisiblechildreninc) (last accessed December 1, 2009)

These figures were recorded as of October 4, 2009. The official Invisible Children MySpace profile can be accessed at [www.myspace.com/invisiblechildren](http://www.myspace.com/invisiblechildren). The official Invisible Children facebook profile can only be linked to from within the site. Additionally, there is also a “Cause” application page on Facebook dedicated to Invisible Children. As of April 2008, it reports to have nearly 450,000 members devoted to the cause donating a total of nearly $20,000 from this application alone.


Bennett, 129.


There is a new documentary in post-production titled *The Children’s War* that appears to have been filmed during the same time as *Invisible Children.* Like the three young filmmakers responsible for
Invisible Children, a young filmmaker who graduated from University of Texas, Austin directs this film.

25 Jenkins, 2.
By Kate Limond

In his 2001 article “Thing Theory,” Bill Brown suggests that ‘the thing really names less an object than a particular subject-object relation.’1 By this, Brown means that when the word ‘thing’ is used, it describes the relation of an experiencing subject to another subject, rather than describing the object it ostensibly appears to refer to: ‘temporalized as the before and after of the object, thingness amounts to a latency (the not yet formed or the not yet formable) and to an excess (what remains physically or metaphysically irreducible to objects).’2 Following Brown’s definition of the thing naming a particular subject-object relation, the object in literature describes less an imagined referent than a particular subject-object relation, concerned with the subject’s identity.

A collection, especially for certain characters in Byatt’s fiction, is interwoven with the collector’s sense of identity. Whilst a collection is a group of objects assembled because of certain similarities in those objects (such as a museum’s collection of objects relating to, for example, Elizabeth I’s reign), for Byatt’s fiction, these collections also express something about the collector. The collection, then, becomes a metaphoric extension of the subject (to use Possession’s Mortimer Cropper’s words on R. H. Ash’s ash-plant).3

Much criticism on the practice of collecting in literature posits the collection in this way: that collecting has something to do with identity. Helen Wilkinson asserts that ‘collecting practices reflect external personality traits. More than that, they may be used as ways of shaping one’s personality, a deliberate reconstruction of one’s identity.’4 John Su notes that ‘Possession, in particular, suggests that collecting can in certain instances help individuals to imagine alternative identities.’5

Both Su and Wilkinson recognise that collecting in literature has been represented in negatively. Both refer to John Fowles’s The Collector, as well as Byatt’s work, which has a distinctly negative psychosexual central theme. Wilkinson grapples with the cultural conception of the collector in her introduction, detailing a National Lottery advert that emphasises the single, virginal nature of the collector but she also stresses that ‘collections in Byatt’s work may be negative and sterile, but they may also be positive and life-affirming.’6
In an analysis of Lao She’s work, Rey Chow notes that a collection can be a form of self-knowledge and can have political connotations. Su similarly posits collecting beyond the individual identity, within the context of national (British) heritage. What emerges from these analyses of collecting is that the practice has diverse meanings, but is particularly concerned with the identity of an individual and of a culture.

Whether Possession is characterised as a Neo-Victorian, a post-modern or an academic novel, and whether its subject matter is essentially love, desire, reading or something else, all of these readings note the centrality of the relationship between the contemporary period and the Victorians. The narrator introduces Blackadder, guardian of the so-called ‘ash factory’, and puts forward one view of criticism:

There were times when Blackadder allowed himself to see clearly that he would end his working life, that was to say his conscious thinking life, in this task, that all his thoughts would be another man’s thoughts, all his work another man’s work. And then he thought it did not matter so greatly. He did after all find Ash fascinating, even after all these years. It was a pleasant subordination, if he was a subordinate. He believe Mortimer Cropper thought himself the lord and owner of Ash, but he, Blackadder, knew his place better (P, 29).

This comments upon the relationships of these two very different scholars, to their subject – the fictional Victorian poet, Randolph Henry Ash. It is also suggestive of how each relates to Ash, emphasising how he fits into their respective identities. In introducing Blackadder in this way, the narrator also introduces Cropper (in comparison) with a single fact: ‘the lord and owner of Ash’ (P, 29). This situates Cropper’s relationship with Ash within the narrative’s concern with the novel’s eponymous concept, possession.

This sentence gives the reader his or her first taste of a character who has been dubbed the novel’s villain. Whilst it is a likely description, it is delimiting. Cropper’s extensive collection of relics associated with Ash is shown to be part of his personal mythology. He sees his collection as central to his identity, as shown by the narrator’s description of his first encounter with an Ash object: ‘almost, he sometimes brushed the thought, as though he had no existence, no separate existence of his own after that first contact with the paper’s electric rustle and the ink’s energetic black looping’ (P, 105). This quotation links Cropper to Blackadder, as they both feel that they have no existence outside of Ash and that Ash is central for both of them – but the crucial difference is between the intellectual, for Blackadder, and the material, for Cropper.

Wilkinson’s phrasing suggests that Roland’s first contact with Ash’s letter is similar to Cropper’s first contact with an Ash relic:

Roland experiences a similar frisson when he finds a lost letter of Ash’s in a book which had belonged to the latter, a discovery on which the plot hinges. The emotional power of objects with historical or personal associations is acknowledged and celebrated by the novel.9

Wilkinson sums up the meaning of this comparison by stating that it is a question of ‘response’ to these
objects and their use value for both collectors: ‘Roland’s encounter with Ash’s objects inspires him to creative action, Cropper’s collection is ensconced in airless sterility, and his writing on Ash does not gain insight from his possession of those objects.’

I would argue that it is a question of reification. Roland feels the letters he finds are ‘alive. They seemed urgent’ (P, 50), when generally Ash’s ‘correspondence was voluminous indeed, but guarded, courteous and not of the most lively’ (P, 8) and Maud agrees (P, 56). In contrast, Cropper’s experience with Ash’s letters is concerned with concepts such as ‘rarity value’ (P, 95), rather than the specific qualities of the objects themselves. The letters’ Roland finds suggest a kind of embodiment, or reification, of Ash, which is what makes them feel as if they were alive, whereas, as Wilkinson points out, Cropper’s interaction with his Ash objects is sterile. However, Roland shows insight into Cropper’s collecting passion when he says that ‘he feels they are really his, perhaps… because he loves them best’ (P, 484). And Cropper’s passion is strong:

He wondered once, about juxtaposing it [Ash’s watch] in his, its owner’s hand, with a hologram of itself. But he saw that his emotions, which were violent, about Ash’s watch, were private, not to be confused with his public appeals. For he believed the watch had come to him, that it had been meant to come to him, that he had and held something of R.H. Ash. It ticked near his heart. He would have liked to be a poet. (P, 387).

This quotation confirms Roland’s view and Cropper’s sense of a personal mythology, in which Ash plays a central role, as he has been incorporated into Cropper’s identity. The last sentence is telling: ‘he would have liked to be a poet’. This again links Blackadder and Cropper with their use of Ash; Blackadder initially wrote poetry, but imagining Leavis’s comments, he burns it and turns himself seriously to criticism. Wilkinson suggests that ‘biography and criticism are seen as analogous to collecting’ – characterising both Cropper and Blackadder as intellectual collectors. The significance of this is again to underpin the question of the intellectual use value. It could be argued that Blackadder sees himself truly (‘pleasant subordination’), whilst Cropper uses Ash objects, his criticism and biographies ‘as a means of satisfying narcissistic desires.’ And of course, Roland is inspired to creativity – he begins collecting lists of words, which will inform his poetry (P, 431).

However, Roland’s relationship to collecting is more complex than this, and as Su helpfully notes:

Byatt, in other words, deliberately draws parallels among the three characters; she resists an easy distinction between Roland’s and Maud’s apparently healthy attitudes towards the past and Cropper’s pathological one. Indeed, the activities engaged in by all these characters are practically indistinguishable.

In addition to the similarities of their collecting behaviours, there is the question of Maud and Roland’s relationship to objects they associate with La Motte and Ash prior to their involvement in the story of the relationship between the two. Near the beginning of the novel, the narrator notes that ‘Roland possessed
three images of Randolph Henry Ash’ (P, 15). These are described at length and in detail, the description attending to the qualities of the original paintings and their reproduction as photographs, including damage, ‘they were a bit the worse for wear; the flat was not clean and was damp’ (P, 17). More words are given to describe these photographs than to the flat and the rest of its décor. This puts a particular kind of emphasis on these photographs, placing them more centrally in significance than the flat itself. The language – ‘Roland possessed…’ – also situates these photographs within the novel’s central theme, therefore setting up another comparison between Roland and Cropper’s collecting habits. Both are Ash scholars and both take their work, as it were, home.

This description of the photographs assumes more significance when Roland returns to the flat before the Mortlake conference and the narrator returns to the collection of photographs. Again, the similarities between Roland and Cropper’s assimilation of their collections are striking: ‘he had always seen these aspects as part of himself, of Roland Mitchell, he had lived with them’ (P, 472). The narrator draws attention to Roland’s sense of a personal mythology, similarly to Cropper’s ‘no separate existence of his own’ (P, 105) after encountering his first Ash object. However, the difference is Roland’s recognition that ‘all and none of these were Ash’ (P, 473). Whether the result of his reaction to collecting is ‘the possibility of achieving greater historical knowledge’14 or ‘a starting-point for a personal act of definition or creativity,’15 the suggestion is that the epiphany enabled by collecting is something positive.

Maud undergoes a similar transformation. She begins with a personal connection to La Motte, as a descendant of the latter’s niece, and she inherits some of Christabel’s possessions. As a child, she finds a mermaid brooch in a dressing-up box, which takes ‘because it reminded me of the Little Mermaid… and then lately of the Fairy Melusina’ (P, 260). In the jet shop they visit, however, the object possibly takes on new meanings, that is could have belonged to Christabel herself, either bought by Ash and sent to her or she could have been present when it was bought, if she accompanied him. The significance of the discoveries they make is that Maud has been ‘exploring all along the myth – no, the truth – of your own origins’ (P, 503). In this way, like the letters for Roland, Maud becomes a reification of Ash and La Motte, as a product of them. Maud has collected her past, which leads her to new knowledge (of her origins) and to fall in love with Roland, as ‘collecting disrupts the scholars’ sense of certainty about the poets and the generalizability of their own beliefs regarding sexuality and desire.’16 Maud, therefore, is enabled – by the changes in her world-view from the understanding gained from the poets – to achieve what Ash and La Motte could not – the possibility, if not the actuality, of a life where she can continue her work and also love, offering a possible solution to Christabel’s riddle of the unbroken egg.

There is, of course, the problem of the ending and the postscript. As Su acknowledges:

Whilst the novel does not directly express anxiety about Maud’s new role, the narrator’s description of their sexual intercourse reinvokes the threat apparent in every act of collecting: possession. “Roland finally, to use an outdated phrase,” the narrator writes, “entered and took possession of all her white coolness”17

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However, Su suggests that the epilogue has a ‘destabilizing effect’ and that ‘the sense of closure the scholars feel regarding the Victorian poets’ romance is demonstrated to be provisional, lasting only so far as no further material traces are discovered,’ referring to the fact that the hair in the watch is not Christabel’s but Maia’s, which shows the reader that Ash in fact met his daughter, although the characters in the novel do not know this. Su continues: ‘Likewise, the terms established for Roland and Maud’s relationship are understood to be provisional and fluid, and the use of “possession” to describe their sexual intercourse seems intended to strike a playful and ironic tone.’

The question of authenticity is central here – if the ‘possession’ of Maud by Roland is taken at face value, then it suggests that the riddle of the unbroken egg is not solved, as Maud will lose her ‘self-possession, her autonomy’ and end up relegated to a ‘conservative, even regressive, social role.’ If, however, Su’s reading is accepted, then the ending becomes an ironic fulfilment of the novel’s subtitle ‘A Romance’; following the conventions of the genre – a genre which ‘often subordinates female desire in order to establish the appearance of harmony between lovers.’ I would suggest that taking second look at some of the objects of the novel itself supports this reading.

Byatt plays with the question of authenticity throughout the novel with regards to the various collecting practices and to the objects themselves. It is suggested the fulfilment of collecting is either more historical knowledge (and the reinvention of contemporary roles) or the opening of artistic opportunities (or both), rather than possession of the objects themselves. The characters’ response to the objects has been shown to be exemplary of their essential ends, even if their collecting activities are similar. The question of authenticity is again illustrative of this attitude. Cropper is disappointed that he has never ‘been able to procure an authenticated example of this Wotan-stave [Ash’s ash-plant] for the Stant Collection’ (P, 247). Cropper is concerned to acquire the real thing, the original. Following the excerpt that this quotation is contained in, the narrator states that ‘Maud intuited something terrible about Cropper’s imagination from all this. He had a particularly vicious version of reverse hagiography; the desire to cut his subject down to size’ (P, 250). There is a sense that if Cropper can possess everything associated with Ash, then he can possess Ash uniquely, truly becoming his ‘lord and keeper’ in his own eyes, by his own terms and dominate him.

Maud and Roland, when visiting Christabel’s house, note that it is ‘a good restoration job… it makes you feel funny. A simulacrum’ (P, 210). Maud and Roland discuss the interest of such a restoration, ‘it would have been sootier. It would have looked older. When it was younger’ and ‘a postmodern quotation’ (P, 211). This leads them to reveal that they neither of them has ‘been much interested in places – in things – with associations’ (P, 211). In this sense, engaging with authenticity is not limiting but a recognition that like Ellen’s diary nothing forms, a complete picture. Cropper’s reverse hagiography, by contrast, is a delimiting form of understanding, driven by desire to possess Ash through the objects associated with him; that Ash is these objects. This is similar to Brown’s concept, in A Sense of Things, that ideas can be contained within objects – that the idea can be reach through the objects. As Brown notes, however, this is a projection rather than an understanding of the innate value of the object; ‘we look through objects.’

In contrast, Maud and Roland’s understanding of La Motte’s house is that it is invested with a sense of the
uncanny; ‘the sight of the little house was indeed disturbing’ (P, 211). The effect of this is that it destabilizes meaning; unlike the other objects associated with the poets in the text, this house is specifically not representative of La Motte’s life and is understood in those terms; both Roland and Maud admit that they have never been interested in such relics. Directly following this mutual revelation, they start the process that leads them to follow Ash’s journey.

Cropper’s retaking of Ash’s journeys appears, particularly via interjections such as the one concerning the ash-plant, to underpin his personal mythology, whereas when Maud and Roland follow Ash and La Motte’s journeys, it is presented in the text as a search for truth. Maud and Roland feel the letters are alive and Cropper appears to feel that Ash is contained in the objects Ash owned, which are similar responses. However, not all objects provoke this kind of response. La Motte’s house destabilizes the meaning of objects within the text, as does the misidentified lock of hair. The effect of this is that objects show themselves to have an excess of meaning, beyond what the characters project and intuit. These objects lead the characters on to further knowledge, despite the fact that their knowledge is provisional (as demonstrated by Su). Despite the text endorsing provisional conclusions, the suggestion is that the modern scholars have now enough, if not exhaustive, knowledge to reinvent themselves in the roles of lover and poet.

Wilkinson locates Cropper’s collecting negative instinct to sexual repression: ‘he has a classically repressed sexuality with the hall marks of an Oedipus complex.’ She compares him to two of the collectors in The Virgin in the Garden:

Felicity Wells, usually referred to as “Miss Wells”, is a kind of stereotype of spinsterhood, who even lives in the vicarage. Lucas Simmond’s repression takes a more extreme form. He has a bizarre castration fantasy. He removes the genitals from the pictures of men and women in the biology lab, and later attempts to castrate himself.

Miss Wells’s room in described as ‘tiny, decorated, perched in and temporary. Black Victorian bookcases, with machine-cut Gothic beading of the kind that ruined the young Alfred Tennyson, supported a bitty collection of objects.’ Whilst the argument for sexual repression is clear, the objects have a wider significance, linked to the coming coronation of Elizabeth II and England’s cultural history:

She saw, then, the layered glowing mystery, the gorgeous stuff Felicity Wells saw, and saw further the ambition to embody, here, now, in the present time and place, the vigour, the sense of form, the coherence lost, lost, with the English Golden Age. She saw how the hanging stage-cope on Miss Wells’s wardrobe-rail, and the Illustrated London News photograph of the Dean of Westminster in a cope worn at the Coronation of Charles II, brought out for the Coronation of Elizabeth II (VITG, 143).

Stephanie’s seeing of all of these things fulfils something of Su’s discussion of Hewison’s work – collecting ‘stifles the possibility for creative change by establishing an idealized past as the model for what Great Britain should be.’
Alexander’s play, *Astraea*, also fulfils Su definition of how the meaning of collecting (idealising the past) can be stifling. *Astraea* is later seen as the death-throes of verse drama:

in the seventies the whole thing was dismissed as a petrified final paroxysm of a decadent individualist modernism, full of irrelevant and damaging cultural nostalgia, cluttered, blown. A cul-de-sac, the verse drama revival, as should have been seen in the beginning (*VITG*, 134).

The narrator suggests, through prolepsis and ironically, that this is perhaps an unfair categorisation; ‘the people had simply hoped, because the time was after the effort of war and the rigour of austerity, and the hope, despite the spasmodic construction of pleasure gardens and festival halls, had had, alas, like Hamlet’s despair, no objective correlative’ (*VITG*, 318).

Miss Wells sighs at the knowledge of colour symbolism in Elizabethan dress, ‘lovely words, there were, for green. Popingay, gooseturd, willow’ (*VITG*, 144). The effect of this, along with her ‘bitty collection of objects’ and her ‘state of cultural ecstasy’ over the Coronation of Elizabeth II, essentially seems to embody the stifling sense of heritage that looks backwards rather than forward. Her spinsterhood, in a novel where marriage is important and detailed exploration of the possibilities of sex and relationships, could be seen as representing the static culture of looking back and remaining stagnant, instead of developing creatively and experimenting.

Lucas Simmonds is similarly in a kind of developmental stasis. His quasi-religious explorations with Marcus are shown as essentially harmful; both of them suffer breakdowns at the end of the novel. He states, as his condition worsens, ‘I have no private life. I have no life. I touch no one’ (*VITG*, 501). Lucas’s collection is a scientific one within the school where he teaches:

> Jam-jars, test-tubes. Dozens of foetuses. Ting creamy-pink rats, blunt-headed, blind-eyed, with minute stumps of feet and tails, all rolled together and surely slightly crumbling like cheese in the surrounding liquid. Larger round-bellied ratlings, cord and placenta attached, flat-headed unborn cats, pallid flesh, unformed eyes closed against the glass wall and the light. Snake embryos, preserved in strings, like beads on a chain, coiled forever undelivered’ (*VITG*, 159).

Lucas says to Stephanie that he hates Biology (*VITG*, 501), similarly to how he has previously said he would not teach sex education, ‘you must get a good lady from some Welfare in a hat to do that’ (*VITG*, 408). The emphasis here is on a rejection of the body and specifically sexuality. Whilst Miss Wells is portrayed as asexual, Lucas has sexual desire, as shown when asks Marcus to touch him, but it is a disturbed sexuality. Along with his rejection of biology, it could be argued that his collection is a necessary but unwilling one that, as Wilkinson points out, shows his disturbed relation to sexuality, as he removes any visible genitalia. Like Miss Wells’ collection, Lucas’s collection is presented as static. Whilst the ‘living things’ (*VITG*, 160) of the collection are mentioned, more time space is given to the dead things, ‘forever undelivered.’
Lucas’s identity is also a stereotype, but a carefully studied one, ‘whose normality was unremarkable, even banal, whose staffroom chatter was a carefully achieved flow of corporate trivia’ (VITG, 466). The operative phrase here is ‘carefully achieved’, which is similar to Marcus’s perception of Lucas later, in Still Life; ‘he had been able to appear “normal” because he was abnormal.’ Both Lucas and Miss Wells, Wilkinson points out, are ‘bad collectors,’ where collecting is associated with sexual repression and negative, stagnant positions in society, as well as the unproductive link with an idealized past.

Other collectors in the Quartet have anomalous, or normal but predatory, sexual attitudes that are played out through their collecting. If Lucas and Miss Wells can be seen as analogous in the meaning of their collecting, then Alexander and Matthew Crowe can be seen as dichotomous. Their collecting practices are domestic and archival, and sexually abstemious and predatory, respectively. By this I mean that Alexander feels that showing people his things is sexually dangerous (in terms of romantic and sexual entanglements) and Crowe actively uses his collection as an aid to seduction. Both centre on the seduction or deflection of Frederica.

Crowe’s collection is contained him in his mansion, Long Royston, ‘it was a large building made both for living in and for display, but with slightly more emphasis on the living’ (VITG, 18-19). It will eventually be used as a site for a new University and Alexander’s play, Astraea, will be hosted there:

The point was, Alexander must see, that this was all most timely; the inauguration of an Appeal, the announcement of the Gift, the Royal Charter, in Coronation Year, all could coincide, and be celebrated, amongst other things, by a performance of Alexander’s wholly appropriate play in the summer evenings on the terrace of Long Royston itself (VITG, 20).

The combination of all these events, local and national, could be seen as fitting in to the cultural stasis that the play is symbolic of, for some later (fictional) critics. In this sense, Crowe’s marshalling of events, and the context his collection is seen in, is analogous with the other collectors in the novel.

Crowe’s house is representative of the upper classes for The Virgin in the Garden and his collection confirms this. Crowe initially shows his plaster friezes in the Great Hall, showing Frederica what, and how, to admire, and then they tour the State Bedrooms. In the bedrooms, sex is naturally brought up, when Wilkie wonders ‘how long since anyone made love in those beds? A rather grand experience, I should think’ (VITG, 181). This statement, coupled with Crowe’s arms ‘heaped with the protective paper that hid the bedspreads’ (VITG, 181) is suggestive of the sterility Wilkinson associates with Cropper’s collection.

In the more intimate setting of ‘Crowe’s little wing’ (VITG, 186), Crowe shows Frederica his Marsyas, and makes the first physical contact, putting his arm round her whilst asking her what she thinks. This sets up a pattern for the novel, where Crowe shows Frederica his culture and attempts to seduce her. The next time Crowe runs into Frederica, he explains a piece of culture to her before bringing her back to his house and embarking on a more comprehensive seduction than just putting his arm around her. Whilst this particular piece of cultural knowledge that Crowe imparts is not regarding his house, it is regarding the
school, which is related to him, as his great-grandfather founded it (VITG, 22). The present Crowe finds the school somewhat distasteful:

What a rejecting institution. My worthy forebear. All this catholic atheist religiosity. Hideous, truly. Look at them. No one smiling except ever-so-sweet Jesus. Athene with the muscles of a coal-heaver and a mouth like Lizzie Siddall. Pop-eye Shakespeare with no calves and drooping garters (VITG, 283).

On another occasion, taking Frederica away from the group of actors, whom she is upsetting with her opinion, Crowe says, ‘come, I have something to show you’ (VITG, 387) and shows her drawings before manipulating, or man-handling, perhaps, her body again. He bids her, in between prodding and poking, to look at his Inigo Jones. He says he could make her a ‘real woman’ (presumably, deflowering her) and Frederica is quick on the uptake:

More to the point to make me a real virgin princess. I’ve got to be good, since it’s no good being clever, and I’ve got no skills like singing and dancing, and to be truthful I’m too uninformed to see what’s special about your pictures, except that they’re old, people are always showing me things, and I’m simply too ignorant to know why the things inspire whatever they do inspire. And when I do say what I do know I get hooted at (VITG, 388).

In some ways, this could be read as both a response to Crowe’s collection as well as his sexual advances – as is shown later in the text, she is sexually naïve and will not risk showing this to Alexander, to whom she told she was not.

Crowe’s response suggests the essence of Crowe’s collection, or at least how he characterises it, for seduction of Frederica: ‘I only want you to remember in ten years you saw such things… you must stand for who must remember’ (VITG, 388). This is similar to Crowe’s pronouncement in an earlier scene of seduction, ‘of course I have no particular gifts. I only care for gifts in others’ (VITG, 284-5) and that his power is ‘a heritage I hold in trust for the culture’ (VITG, 285). This may be false, or it may be a true insight to Crowe’s role as a facilitator – equally, and typically of Byatt, it could be both. Whilst such comments show Crowe as situated on the periphery, artistically, they also reveal that the play would not happen without him and much of the richness of the novel is centred on his house and his collection.

Crowe initiates a sexual contract with Frederica; suggesting that she can ‘show me a little more while I show you a little more’ (VITG, 390). This appears to refer to Crowe leading her and imparting sexual knowledge, but it could equally refer to her allowing him to explore her body whilst he imparts culture to her. The text leaves the interpretation open.

On their next meeting, the one that the narrative has been building up to, they are in one of the stately bedrooms, the Sun room. Crowe, obligingly, shows Frederica more, his ‘lighting effects. I can do sunrise and sunset, the blaze of noon and a rather inadequate twilight, which I thought might amuse you. An indoor sun
at dead of night. Shine here to us and thou art everywhere’ (*VITG*, 433). Again, as a prelude to seduction, this time the ultimate seduction, Crowe shows Frederica culture. This seduction is not a success, and when Frederica runs off, she encounters further seduction by culture, but with mutually knowing participants; Wilkie quotes Shakespeare to Marina.

Crowe treats Frederica as one of his cultural objects, he talks about herself to herself; ‘his chat took the form of a running commentary on her parts, as though she were a work of art’ (*VITG*, 285). This objectifies Frederica and conflates her with his collection. In the Sun room, he asks, ‘may I look at you’ but ‘he was not really asking’ (*VITG*, 433). However, Frederica gets up and runs away.

The conflation of her with his collection, suggesting objectification, is similar to Cropper’s attitude to his collection and sexuality in *Possession*, (in that his collection expresses his sexuality). This is demonstrated through the narrator’s description of Cropper’s private collection of photographs:

> He opened his locked case, putting away Randolph Ash’s letter to his godchild, or anyway the stolen images, and drew out those other photographs of which he had a large and varied *collection* – as far as it was possible to vary, in flesh or tone or angle or close detail, so essentially simple an activity, a preoccupation. He had his own ways of sublimation (*P*, 111, emphasis mine).

This ‘act’ is reconfirmed later in the text, when Cropper is effectively window-shopping for sex: ‘Peepshow. Model. Young girls wanted. Live Sex NonStop. Come Up and Have Fun. Serious Instruction. His own tastes were precise, narrow, and somewhat specialist’ (*P*, 304).

In comparison to Cropper and Crowe, Alexander makes effort to avoid the act in its physical manifestation. What interests Alexander is ‘imaginary relish. He liked imagined contact with real women, and real contact with imaginary women’ (*VITG*, 453). Unlike Crowe, Alexander is unwilling to show his collection, which is made up of decidedly domestic objects, but is not less significant in terms of his identity. Crowe’s collection can be seen as his power and money manifest, as the heritage that he enables him to wield such power. Cropper, similarly, sees his own collection in this light: ‘he was an important man. He wielded power: power of appointment, power of disappointment, power of the cheque book, power of Thoth and the Mercurial access to the Arcana of the Stant Collection’ (*P*, 99).

Alexander’s collection is more distinctly personal than those of Crowe or Cropper. To an extent, the latter’s collections can be seen as belonging in the sphere of the archive, rather than the everyday. Alexander’s collection falls into the latter category and as such it has a use value that Crowe and Cropper’s do not and therefore is closer to him. For whilst Cropper’s collection of Ash objects is bound up with his identity, the significance of the collection is that, to use Wilkinson’s phrase again, it is kept in ‘airless sterility,’ rather than having this kind of domestic use value.

Alexander understands his collection is directly representative of himself; ‘he knew very well what it
meant to show things, particularly his own things, to people. It was next to giving gifts’ (*VITG*, 135). Alexander also notes that ‘he had always managed to stop women coming here’ (*VITG*, 455), which underpins his concern about what showing his things means, as well as propriety, as he lives in a school. There are two particular scenes in the text that are related to his room. The first is when Frederica comes to read for the role of the young Elizabeth in his play and the second when Jenny, Frederica and Marcus all visit him in one day.

In her first visit to Alexander’s room, Frederica sees it as representative of himself as well: ‘she had always meant to penetrate this place’ (*VITG*, 127) and the use of the word ‘penetrate’ suggests both the sexual act (in reverse) and the gaining of knowledge, of insight, of which it is analogous. She takes in every detail and the description is comprehensive, from the colours of the walls to adornments, such as his Wedgwood bowls, to his posters and his books. Similarly to Crowe, Alexander is drawn into inculcating Frederica with culture, explaining his verse to her and other details such as the ‘secretly obscene’ (*VITG*, 133) meaning of the motto of her school to showing her how to look at his photograph of Rodin’s *Danaide*. However, unlike the predatory Crowe who uses such talk as the preamble to seduction, Alexander ‘was immediately distressed by his own behaviour’ (*VITG*, 135), knowing what it is to show his things to people.

He has also shown his *Danaide* to Jenny and the memory of this is a comparison between the two women, and how they react to his things. Alexander notes that Jenny had been ‘unlike Frederica, volubly admiring, had achieved an almost immediate familiarity with his things, discriminating stone from stone, finding adjectives for the woman’s white despair: she knew it was despair’ (*VITG*, 135). Frederica’s ignorance and Jenny’s knowledge are juxtaposed, forming a comparison between the two, as previously noted through clothing, food and domesticity. The effect of this is that it draws the reader to notice that both make a kind of claim on Alexander through his objects; Frederica had always meant to penetrate the place and Jenny buys bulbs for his Wedgwood bowls. This sets up a correspondence between the objects, the women and Alexander, mediated through their experience of his objects and brings him closer to the two women.

It is through his objects that he literally displays his self-knowledge. Alexander keeps Picasso’s *The Blue Boy* on the wall:

> Alexander knew, he thought, what this Boy was. He knew also from time to time what he himself was: a man who displayed the Rodin *Danaide* to fierce girls but kept on his wall, as a mode of knowledge, this Boy. It was not that Boy was a desirable boy: he was not. What Alexander felt for him approximated most closely to vicious envy (*VITG*, 136).

This quotation is significant for several reasons and revelatory of both Alexander’s attitude towards objects and his sexuality. The Boy represents androgyny; ‘between his thighs his creased clothes indicate complex sexual ambiguity, deep-pleated and firmly bulging: he could be anything, or more probably everything’ (*VITG*, 136). The reader is prepared for Alexander’s admiration for androgyny in the prologue, ‘later still he had come to associate this arcane pleasure with Spenser’s Dame Nature, who “hath both kinds in one”, “nor needeth other none”. A satisfactory state of affairs. To imagine’ (*VITG*, 13).
The Boy, then, represents Alexander’s identification with androgyny, which he ‘kept on his wall, as a mode of knowledge’ – a mode of self-knowledge. In this way, Alexander is linked to the recognition that some of the characters in Possession have, through language. Both Blackadder and Cropper have this kind of ‘from time to time’ recognition that the narrator describes Alexander as having in relation to The Blue Boy; ‘there were times when Blackadder allowed himself to see clearly that he would end his working life, that was to say his conscious thinking life, in this task, that all his thoughts would have been another man’s thoughts, all his work another man’s life’ (P, 29). Cropper is described similarly:

History, writing, infect after a time a man’s sense of himself, and Mortimer Cropper, fluently documenting every last item of the days of Randolph Henry Ash, his goings-out and his comings-in, his dinner engagements, his walking-tours, his excessive sympathy with servants, his impatience with lionising, had naturally perhaps felt his own identity at times, as the very best of times, as insubstantial, leached into this matter-of-fact writing, stuff-of-record’ (P, 98-9).

However, as is characteristic of Possession, Cropper’s form of recognition is not so much recognition as narcissism. As a collector, Alexander’s collection displays his self-knowledge as much as Cropper’s obscures it. Whilst both are arguably somewhat off-kilter as far as sexuality is concerned, the narrator appears to view Alexander’s as a quirk rather than something seedy, or dangerous. This is one of things that makes him, to borrow Wilkinson’s phrase, more of a good than a bad collector, although I think there is more ambiguity there than Wilkinson allows for in her schema.

Later in the text, as noted above, Jenny, Frederica and Marcus visit him successively. This chapter is meant as a comparison to the earlier one; the names mirror one another; the first called ‘In The Tower’ and the later one, ‘Interludes in Two Towers’. In both chapters, there is an emphasis on the collection of objects in Alexander’s room and his sexuality, highlighting their mediating effect. It is no accident that the major instances in which Alexander’s room feature also contain meditations on his sexuality. If Alexander’s Boy is a mode of knowledge that is left partially unsaid rather than definitively stated at this point in the text, this second set of scenes in his rooms are explicit regarding other aspects of his sexuality: ‘he considered his own erotic oddities and embarrassments… he liked fear. Not excessive fear. He had no fantasies of ripping flesh, piercing heels or whirling knouts’ (VITG, 453). The narrator continues:

But the ripple of apprehension, the prickle of hairs on the skin, the sense of panic flight through crashing undergrowth and under whipping foliage, the alertness of scent and sight bestowed by a flicker of real fear, this he repeatedly provokes’ (VITG, 454).

The narrator goes on to say that part of the reason for his desire for Frederica is because of her portrayal of his princess in his play, ‘who represented his fear of minatory women, but also, being a self-portrait, shared it’ (VITG, 454). The ‘self-portrait’ is made through Elizabeth’s androgyny and Alexander’s admiration of it, which the reader sees in the prologue and through The Blue Boy.

However, unfortunately for Alexander, his love of ‘imagined contact with real women’ (VITG, 453) has
become a little too real by this point, which he perceives and this underpins his decision to get out of Blesford. In a turn of some comic irony, both his feared women burst in upon his ‘delicious solitude’ (VITG, 454) in succession. Again it is collection of objects that mediate Alexander’s relation with these women. When Alexander’s responses do not exactly satisfy Jenny, she begins ‘striding up and down, and rearranging things, the Wedgwood bowls with their fleeing forms and forest boughs, the stone cairn’ (VITG, 456). When Jenny attempts to seduce Alexander, she is juxtaposed with his objects, described as ‘naked under the Danaide’ (VITG, 458) and Jenny’s words, following Alexander’s effective rejection of her are ‘Oh, I meant so well, and have made it so much worse, blundering in, displaying myself’ (VITG, 458, emphasis mine). By using the phrase ‘displaying’, she objectifies herself, linking to the narrator’s description of her being naked under the Danaide, rather than merely naked in his room.

Part of the significance of Alexander’s collection is the way other characters project their own values and ways of seeing on to it. Literate Frederica finds herself not understanding the art and reading the information on the posters and the titles of the books on the shelves. Her reaction to Alexander’s room is similar to her reaction to Crowe’s objects, prefiguring her later cry of being ‘too ignorant’ to understand the visual information offered. The narrator states she was ‘early inured to the knowledge that Lear was truer and wiser than anything else, she had never been surprised enough to ask herself why, why a man should want to write out a play and not simply deal at no removes with the grim truths of an age’ (VITG, 135). Continuing, the narrator says that Frederica watches

Alexander’s familiar description of the Danaide’s spine [and] was enough struck by strangeness to marvel that a man might choose to make a marble woman, and another man, or another woman, might prefer to stand and look at that stone, rather than to… do anything else (VITG, 135).

The essence of these reactions is that they embody Frederica’s worldview and show Alexander’s collection in terms of what she projects onto it, rather than allowing her, or anyone else, to spy out the meanings that Alexander keeps in his objects, such within the Boy.

Jenny’s reaction to his room is similar to Frederica’s, although is a different kind of projection – as Jenny longs to be a part of Alexander’s life, so she brings ‘additions’ (VITG, 135) to his collection. This effectively places a part of herself, objectified, with Alexander. However, the narrator notes that she cries as she gives these to Alexander, ‘because they had had to be bought with Geoffrey’s money; nothing was truly hers to give’ (VITG, 136). Her gift of the objects, thereby placing a part of herself with Alexander in the form of the association of the objects, is tainted for her, because it was not her money that bought them.

Marcus’s views Alexander’s collection geometrically,

He liked the concatenation of the ovoids of alabaster, and the irregular dark glossy and chalky rounds and planes of the chalk and flints, he liked the lines of both of these against the rounds and rectangles of the Danaide’s white haunches and black limits. The place had some proper
balance between space and bodies in space. It made him, temporarily, feel safer *(VITG, 466).*

This is a projection, too, because Marcus sees the world through geometry, which as he says, makes him feel safer. Marcus dislikes the Boy because the garlands around his neck remind him of the experience of Ophelia, which was clearly not a pleasant one for him.

Whilst Alexander’s possessions definitely constitute a kind of domestic collection, the emphasis is on their enabling function as a means to offer – and represent – the possibility of self-knowledge. This is distinctly different from the characterisation of collecting in psychology, as Su points out: ‘objects cannot undo the sense of lack that spawns the desire, according to both Fowles’s fiction and psychoanalytic theory; possession only confirms the gap between the object and the needs it purports to satisfy, causing the collector to transfer his or her desire to other objects ad infinitum.’ The effect of this recognition is that it confirms, in Wilkinson’s terms, the distinction between good and bad collectors – bad collectors follow this process and use the collection to transfer desire and so never reconciling with the recognition that the ‘subject shall be constituted by lack.’

Whilst Lucas Simmonds’s collection is intricately bound with his job, Wilkinson’s emphasis is that it represents a collection that is innately linked to his own psychological issues – in that he castrates parts of his collection, which shows his psychological issues projected onto it. There is a question, here, of transferring the desire he feels with regards to himself onto his collection and the manifest death drive increasingly plays a part in his conversations with Marcus – from the latter’s fear, when driving back from an excursion that the former wants them to be nothing (via crashing) to one of their last conversations before Lucas goes ‘classically mad’, where Lucas feels that they might get obliterated by lightning but that they must try nonetheless. Marcus rejects Lucas’s offer and subsequently, so the former feels, the latter goes mad.

Felicity Wells’s collection is symptomatic of a similar psychological function as Lucas’s. The emphasis here, from Wilkinson, is that it represents her (implicitly) abnormal virginal state, I would also add that it functions within Su’s interpretation of the collector’s psychology, in that she projects her desire onto the objects. Stephanie intuits the meaning of Felicity’s collection, for that within Su’s discussion of objects of cultural heritage, her collection is symptomatic of Hewison’s definition that heritage is stifling and not productive. This is compounded by her misreading of Cromwell in the lecture she gives and which Bill refutes; which suggests that she misreads the past, idealizing it in a way that is not conducive to opening up the possibilities inherent in the present.

Of course, Cropper is the most classic example of the collector’s psychology, in that, as Su points out, Cropper ‘demonstrates fetishistic attitudes towards the objects he acquires’ his closet fascination with pornography implies that he objectifies people as well.’ This sense of objectification is also represented by the sense of continuity Cropper feels between Ash and himself; as if by collecting Ash’s objects, he can incorporate Ash – as if he were an object – into his own identity. This is a two-way process for Cropper, as his interjections into his characterisation of Ash’s life through the biography he writes is a way of projecting his own concerns into and onto Ash’s life.
The contrast, of course, is provided by Alexander’s collecting in the Quartet and Maud and Roland’s collecting in *Possession*. The significance of this is that the collections add to their self-knowledge, allowing them to interrogate their hermeneutic paradigms, rather than projecting their meaning and desire onto the objects themselves. In this way, Byatt offers the reader a positive reading of collecting that is focused on the materiality of objects, celebrating the opening of meaning that the collections can inspire and therefore reinscripting the associations made in twentieth century culture with regards to collecting.

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A Question of Identity: The Proto-Giulio Characters in Michael Mirolla’s *Formal Logic of Emotion* and Their Relationship to Future Giulios

By Oswald Yuan-Chin Chang

Abstract

This paper examines the question of the connection between and among the various characters named Giulio in Canadian author Michael Mirolla’s fiction. The paper emphasizes the earliest proto-Giulio character to be found in the author’s first collection of short stories *The Formal Logic of Emotion*, and the relationship of that character with later Giulios, specifically those found in “Giulio Visits A Friend” and “Into Another Country.” The paper concludes that, while these characters are not the same character in terms of physical or even geographical description, they reflect the fluidity of identity as theorized by Mirolla and actualized in his writing — and can thus be called identical in metafictional terms.

Introduction

This article proposes to examine the connection (if any) and the implications of that connection or lack thereof between two characters, both named “Giulio,” in Canadian author Michael Mirolla’s 1992 short story collection *The Formal Logic of Emotion*. Specifically, the paper concentrates on two short stories in that collection: the opening one entitled “A Theory of Discontinuous Existence” and the closing one called “The Proper Country.” The two stories mark the first time that the “Giulio” character appeared in Mirolla’s writing, and serve as the introduction of what could be called the Ur- or Proto-Giulio from which other “Giulios” have cascaded down through the years.
While the two characters named “Giulio,” each serving as the focal point of a particular short story, do not seem to have much in common in terms of their physical make-up, actions, thought patterns and emotional setup, this article will argue that (a) they are in fact continuations of the same character, given Mirolla’s notions of the fluidity of identity; and (b) they fit under the umbrella of the author’s deconstruction of the meaning of human identity as something that is Lacanian rather than Cartesian. The paper attempts to achieve this through:

A. A look at some of the influences (literary and otherwise) that have led Mirolla to create such a character in the first place, and the theoretical basis upon which the character exists.

B. A close examination and critique of the two stories in question (“A Theory” and “The Proper Country”) and this character as some type of Ur-Giulio, some type of representative of the author’s creator-creation-created complex; and

C. A linking of the two stories to Mirolla’s other, later writing (especially in a group of short stories published in various literary journals and magazines in which a character named Giulio continues to serve as the main creation, with emphasis on “Giulio Visits A Friend” and “Into Another Country”).

In the next section, the article looks at some general concepts having to do with fiction in the 21st century, and how and how well those concepts have been fitted into Mirolla’s writing. Please note: The author has granted the writer permission to access his unpublished manuscript The Giulio Metaphysics III, under which heading a grouping of “Giulio” stories have been gathered, including both published and unpublished short stories.

**Metafiction and Identity: Some General Concepts**

One of the major themes dealt with in serious literature in the late 20th and early 21st century is the question of identity and the connection between author and character. The underlying assumption in the majority of such literature is that the “self” is not a static object with some sort of essentialist nature. Rather, as Steven E. Alford stated, this self “is a textual construct, and subject to the difference and deferral inherent in language” (17).

The fluidity of identity within literature is a reflection of the indeterminacy of identity outside literature, “a social and linguistic construct, a nexus of meaning rather than an unchanging entity” (Kerby 34). In fact, an argument has been made that the self is nothing more or less than the very language in which descriptions of that self are couched. As Kerby put it: “[T]his identity … is not the persistence of an entity, a thing (a substance, subject, ego), but is a meaning constituted by a relation of figure to ground or part to whole. It is an identity in difference constituted by framing the flux of particular experiences by a broader
story” (46).

At the same time, what this implies is that the notion of “knowing oneself” or of so-called true self-knowledge is a contradictory one, one that can never be achieved. In the first place, it is understood that the “text” of that knowledge is a constantly revisionary one, one which is constantly being worked on: “We understand our self as the locus of our identity by telling ourselves stories, yet these stories’ criterion of correctness is not truth, but what we might call the adequacy of a meaningful narrative sequence” (Alford 22). In the second place, the argument leads to an unsolvable paradox: in the attempt to sever self from truth, we also sever our ability to know if that statement itself is true. As Linda Hutcheon has pointed out in talking about thinkers and literary critics such as Lyotard and Foucault: “These positions are typically paradoxical; they are the masterful denials of mastery, the cohesive attacks on cohesion, the essentializing challenges to essences, that characterize postmodern theory” (A Poetics of Postmodernism 20).

It is thus a double trap: there is the suggestion (only a suggestion as truth is no longer viable) that self-knowledge must always be deferred and pushed into a new place where we cannot go without altering that self and thus making it no longer self-knowledge; and there is the idea that, because we cannot prove categorically that self-knowledge is impossible, we will always continue to strive for it, hoping to find it over the next hill, as it were. As Paul Auster has his narrator say in The Locked Room, the third novel in his New York Trilogy:

We all want to be told stories, and we listen to them in the same way we did when we were young. We imagine the real story inside the words, and to do this we substitute ourselves for the person in the story, pretending that we can understand him because we understand ourselves. This is a deception. We exist for ourselves, perhaps, and at times we even have a glimmer of who we are, but in the end we can never be sure, and as our lives go on, we become more and more opaque to ourselves, more and more aware of our own incoherence. No one can cross the boundary into another — for the simple reason that no one can gain access to himself. (292)

Under these circumstances, defining a character’s autonomous nature, sense of freedom, and specific unique identity is not possible because these “are not pregiven or a priori characteristics but must be redefined within the context of the person’s appearance within the sociolinguistic arena” (Kerby 113-114).

At the same time, there is the strong inference that all identities are inter-connected in one way or another and, in some cases, contingent upon one another: “One cannot become ‘I’ without an implicit reference to another person, an auditor or narratee — which may be the same subject qua listener. ‘I’ functions in contrast to ‘you’ in much the same way as ‘here’ refers linguistically to ‘there’ rather than any fixed location” (Kerby 68). In the same way, attempts to stop or freeze an identity in order to examine it are futile and useless: “Interpretation, like understanding, is a continuous process with no precise starting point … interpretation has always already started” (Kerby 44). What takes place in these efforts to “pin down” a character’s identity is that simply another piece of writing is created, one which itself then needs
examination and interpretation and which has in effect “created” a new identity. Rather than the modern split between self and other, there are multiple selves and others moving in and out of each other, forming, reforming, deforming.

According to Hutcheon: “The modernist concept of a single and alienated otherness is challenged by the postmodern questioning of binaries that conceal hierarchies (self/other)” (*A Poetics of Postmodernism* 61). This is similar to the notion of “difference” and how signifiers are grouped together (in Saussurian-Derridian terms), something that describes not just how a narrative might be put together but also how identities might be constructed and deconstructed: “Difference suggests multiplicity, heterogeneity, plurality, rather than binary opposition and exclusion” (Hutcheon 61).

Above and beyond this realization lies the notion of the ironic turn and the ability to manipulate a narrative and therefore characters within any such narrative in ways that create deliberate illusions and false trails. Once the notions of essential identity and truth are discarded, the playfulness takes on a life of its own. For example, as Allen Thiher said of Nabokov’s writing:

> Freud appears to be a quintessential modernist insofar as the unconscious, with its storehouse of time past, can be compared to the modernist domain of revelation, waiting to be seized in the form of iconic symbols. By contrast Nabokov’s self-conscious play with ironic doubles exults in the arbitrary relations that obtain between signs. There is, for Nabokov, no other discourse than this manifest play of autonomous language. There is nothing beneath this verbal surface. The novel’s surface is all that the novel is: a self-enclosed structure of self-mirrorings, offered as so many language games, with only an occasional catastrophe to recall the void that waits on the other side. (100)

At the same time, one of the most obvious connections between one character and another, and between any set of characters and the author, can be found in the metafictional nature of much of the writing today. As Hutcheon stated: “What we tend to call postmodernism in literature today is usually characterized by intense self-reflexivity and overly parodic intertextuality” (“Historiographic Metafiction” 3). Metafiction itself has been defined as “fiction about fiction – that is, fiction that includes within itself a commentary on its own narrative and/or linguistic identity” (*Narcissistic Narrative* 11).

This fits in well with the fluidity of identity and inability to pin a character down: designing a novel or short story around a Cartesian character is no longer possible. Rather, a postmodern writer “takes the inner division that results from self-consciousness and, by metaphoric extension, makes it a resource — namely, the subject of his fiction” (Westervelt 42). This, in turn, leads to a new approach to critical debate on metafiction, a debate that “substitutes a heroics of text and language for the older heroics of creative genius and imagination. The text … accepts the existentialist challenge to confront the lack of a center at the heart of language and to dwell in that void” (Woolley 460).

In the next section, the paper examines in close detail some ideas behind Mirolla’s selection of a proto-
Ur-Giulio character in the two stories in *The Formal Logic of Emotion* that have a “Gulio” character as the main protagonist: “A Theory of Discontinuous Existence” and “The Proper Country”.

The Ur-Giulio Concept

The original character named Giulio first appears in Mirolla’s fiction in “A Theory of Discontinuous Existence,” a short story selected as part of *The Journey Prize Anthology*, comprising the 10 best short stories published in the previous year in Canadian literary journals. Later it formed the opening story in Mirolla’s first collection, *The Formal Logic of Emotion* (1992), and was listed under the sub-heading “The Giulio Metaphysics I,” thus implying that there would be more to come.

In the story, a young boy named Giulio undergoes an appendectomy and then the reader is given a whirlwind tour of his life — to the point where it loops once again back to just before he is about to have his operation. Thus, the reader does not know whether what has taken place actually happened to a person named Giulio or is something invented by him as he undergoes the operation, as he is being put under. The end of the story hints at something of the sort:

And he fell away, the vision of his friend an anomaly sitting there in that sun-speckled room, blowing his nose on blue toilet paper and holding a picture of himself in his hand. Now, where did he get that? But he fell away before the answer came to him. Perhaps never to awaken. Perhaps to dream forever. Perhaps to invent the rest of his life after all. (37)

Two elements that are explored much more fully in later stories appear here for the first time: (1) the notion that the attempt to pin things down, to analyze their components or to create some sort of formal system, is a doomed enterprise due to the self-reflexivity of human consciousness; and (2) that human identity is not as constant or uninterrupted or unbroken as we are usually led to believe or make ourselves believe.

The first hints of the inability of consciousness to self-examine itself in a logical or complete way comes early on in the story. Thus, after the nurse who has been taking care of him following the operation asks whether Giulio believes in God and then, after he nods, tells him he shouldn’t, Mirolla writes:

It was as if a blurred image had, for a moment at least, been pulled into razor-sharp focus. And then it was gone again — as if it wasn’t meant for him after all. For, when everything else had been removed from that frame, what was left in the crystal-clear emptiness was simply his own confusion, a confusion that would hover over him, on and off, for the rest of his life. (11)

The title of the story provides the clue to the second part of Mirolla’s examination of postmodern existential experience: the fracturing of human identity. In a way that allows a mirroring back and forth of the concept (again in terms that resemble Lacan’s theories on the meaning of identity and self-consciousness),
it is not Giulio himself but a friend he has known since grade school who proposes this idea: first that statues move when people are not looking (according to Baudrillard, the simulacra coming to life), and then that existence is not continuous (mocked by Giulio: “Discontinuous Existence, eh? That’s brilliant. Does it have anything to do with your theory of statues?” (The Formal Logic 21)).

In the end, the friend is placed in a mental facility “not for wanting to blow up statues but for actually believing he himself had turned into one. He would stand in one spot for days on end, moving only imperceptibly, face covered with chalk to make it look like alabaster, eyes fixed forward or forced back into his skull, as if in a desperate attempt to see inside himself” (Mirolla, The Formal Logic 14). The friend also never revealed what he had meant by “discontinuous existence” and it haunts Giulio: “There were times when Giulio actually believed he had discovered on his own what his friend had meant. But he couldn’t be sure. And the moment he felt sure, the seed of doubt was planted. It was as if someone else had the key to Giulio’s self-knowledge” (The Formal Logic 21).

The story weaves back and forth in time, one moment relating events from Giulio’s childhood, the next showing the birth of his son. Just before the end, Giulio is an old man lying on his bed:

But I am me, now. Now! I am not what I was yesterday or the day before or the day before that. There is no connection between Giulio today and Giulio yesterday, between Giulio-lying-on-the-bed-creaking and Giulio-leaning-under-the-statue-singing. You fool. There is a point in time when there is no point in time. He felt a pair of fists kneading his stomach, fists needing his stomach. Oh no, those weren’t fists and they didn’t knead/need his stomach. Oh no. Those were the gentle caressing hands of his mother, the gentle caressing touch of his wife, the gentle caressing motions of his nurse. (The Formal Logic 35-36)

And then a little further on, it seems as if once more the lifelong confusion starts to dissipate (ironically in the form of a “fog” that allows him to envision what is not there, at least not at the present moment:

He could hear a voice droning, a voice as far off as the stars, as near as his own mind. A warm wind from the South Seas blew open the curtains. There, in the daylight, it was suddenly summer, the morning after school vacation started. The streets were full of children, shouting and raising the dust, Giulio’s unmoving friend among them; full of the milkman making his rounds and proudly showing off his new van, the van that had replaced dapple-grey Boxer, now in chevaline heaven; full of the street cleaner, sending forth a gush of cold water and mud across the sidewalk. Out of nowhere, an ambulance careened into view. A small boy, all wrapped up in blankets, was hustled by stretcher down steep stairs. A distraught mother huddled beside him, tears streaming down her face as the entire street came to a halt. Statues one and all. (The Formal Logic 36)

Giulio in “A Theory of Discontinuous Existence” comes across as an exemplar of Mirolla’s future Giulios, a proto-character with many of the characteristics and traits of the protagonists in collections such as The
Giulio Metaphysics III. He is a character in the lineage of Beckett’s narrators from his novels, characters whom Wolfgang Iser says find it “increasingly impossible to conceive themselves — i.e. to find their own identity; and yet at the same time it is precisely this impossibility that leads them actually to discover something of their own reality” (174). Giulio explores some of the side roads and holes missed by the lead characters in Beckett’s *Murphy, Watt, Molloy, Malone Dies*, and *The Unnamable*. As Richard Begam points out:

For Beckett there is no epic struggle to make the past and present cohere in a moment of self-revelation, no grand effort to “unite” the “hero and the narrator,” to confront the man who ultimately will become “the author of his own story.” In other words, what Beckett gives us is not an autobiographical novel but its critical construction. (6)

Similarly, the story (and other stories in the collection) exemplifies what Beckett himself says about the irrationality and impossibility of literature: “The expression that there is nothing to express, nothing with which to express, nothing from which to express, no power to express, no desire to express, together with the obligation to express” (Beckett, “Three Dialogues” 139). In particular, the connection between Beckett’s *Watt* and the Giulio character comes across clearly in the split between the ability of language to “capture” things, events or objects in themselves, mirroring the split in humans between what has been labeled the rational versus the irrational. According to Jacqueline Hoeffer:

In *Watt*’s scientific and positivistic thought, to distinguish between what can be said about an event and what the event really means is sheer nonsense. Yet *Watt* persistently makes this distinction: he is content with an “outer meaning” which he can observe and make formulations about. But there is another kind of meaning, non-sensory and non-rational, indefinable in his terms, of which he is aware, though he purports to ignore its significance. (169)

In “The Proper Country” (which is listed under the sub-section called “The Giulio Metaphysics II”), the malleability and inability to pin Giulio down becomes part of the main thrust of the story. Describing the return of this Giulio (who, if he is connected to the Giulio in “A Theory of Discontinuous Existence”, must have taken one of those unmarked vacant areas along the fractal landscape) to “his proper country” (*The Formal Logic* 144), the story seems to gather together segments and fragments of a whole series of characters, time sequences, impossibilities, and absurdities in three-dimensional time and space, while at the same time freezing these “at precisely the right moment and on the first tick of 3 a.m.” (*The Formal Logic* 144). Reviewer Susan Wasserman describes “The Proper Country” thus:

The story unfolds in dream logic. The situation is a perverse version of *Alice in Wonderland*, as our hero tries to find his way home, out of this maze which comes complete with people walking through walls, dead birds coming to life, an evil baby sprouting flippers and whiskers, and a village idiot brandishing his ‘Priapus-sized penis.’ The protagonist is Giulio, presumably of the first story, but not recognizable as such. But, then, identity here is discontinuous. He feels like a stranger and yet is constantly greeted by people who seem to know him. (He
observes, ‘This is all very familiar..., all too familiar. I know this place from when it wasn’t
this place. Or perhaps from when it won’t be this place any longer.’) Mirolla pulls out all the
stops: chameleon-like, Giulio changes character to suit the situation: at one point he is a doctor
delivering a baby, then an amorous young lover, then a priest. (123-124)

Right at the start of the story, Giulio is confronted by an old woman in black (fate? destiny? death?) who
puts the paradox to him. While he seems lost, not quite sure of his directions or even that assured of his
own identity, she tells him: “I remember you. That I do. Just as if it were yesterday. Well, maybe not yester-
day. Maybe the day before. Or a few days before even that. It’s all in your features, all in the blood, as
they say. You can’t escape from yourself” (The Formal Logic 147).

It appears that Giulio spends the rest of the story trying to escape from himself — or from what others are
trying to tell him he is. For, in the next sequence, he is confronted by “a day-glo vision on a skateboard …
a young girl with unwavering green eyes” (The Formal Logic 148-149) who says to him: “Doctor, doctor. Where the Christ have you been? Come quick! They’ve been looking for you all over town. They’ve even
sent someone out to the new excavations, thinking you might have sneaked off to do a bit more digging”
(p. 149).

At the same time, as he is undergoing all these transformations (the final one being as someone convinced
he needs to get revenge for insults to his grandmother’s grave), Giulio is exploring the underworld.
Ironically, he does not do this in a methodical or conscious manner but rather subconsciously, in keeping
with the old ideas of the Id as the manufacturing plant for irrationality, as the source and fountain of those
interstices in formal systems that cannot be captured — as proved by Kurt Gödel. Giulio is enticed into a
basement by the coolness of the walls and the smoothness of the stone stairs:

Somewhere there is the sound of water trickling, a gurgle like a cut throat. Ahead, pitch-dipped
torches provide a dim, unappetizing light. He steps into a vast cavern-like room, green around
the edges. Along the walls, a line of thick bones dangles from the ceiling, picked clean, save
for a light, grey covering that turns out to be mites; outsized barrels powder beneath his fingers,
their metal hoops balancing like pendulums for a moment before the final collapse. The sound
of water is nearer now and he makes out the source at last — a low, snaggle-toothed well,
its sides caved in, out of which a furtive stream flows. Or rather pumps feebly and without
conviction. Obvious efforts have been made to stem it, rubble piled in its path, rocks jammed
into its eye, bigger and better barricades thrown up by each successive owner — earth, clay,
cement, re- enforced concrete. To no avail. (The Formal Logic 154-155)

In one of a series of climactic scenes (for they are all seemingly climactic scenes), Giulio is told to rush
back to save a baby (the baby he helped give birth to as a doctor) from falling off an unfinished balcony. It
is hinted that he is the baby and that its death would signal his disappearance from the scene. Instead, he
finds a “slouching infant, fearless, slug- like, face smeared with watermelon and trailing a shitty, makeshift
diaper. It measures the doorframe with its flippers, tentatively sniffs the air, whiskers twitching …” (The
Formal Logic 168). But it is in no danger of falling: “The creature taunts him with arabesques and cartwheels, sudden feints and retreats” (168). Then, through this deformed infant, Giulio reads the thoughts of what can only be the warped and twisted mind of the creator of these impossibilities:

There is hunger in those thundercloud thoughts, a world-devouring hunger, strip-mining the imagination to feed the fact of gravity … He sees then the cobblestoned road, the caravanserai just off to the side, the village, the highways old and new all spinning out of the creature’s head, extensions of its shackled tongue. And out of the houses of the village is disgorged an endless line of secondary characters, characters that vanish on turning sideways … They’re dressed in their Sunday best with starched collars and polished boots, sun bonnets and stone-washed kerchiefs … They spill on to the road as if stunned for a moment, surprised to be there amid all the familiar, rough-hewn faces. But they brush their too-short trousers, tug at their shredded shirt sleeves and soon forget the fact they’ve come out of a pulpy creature’s head, would laugh at the absurdity of such a suggestion … Giulio wants very much to warn them, to tell them to mind their tongues, to point out the tenuousness of the road on which they’ve embarked, how it buckles and lurches beneath them. But already the insight escapes him, becomes vapid and banal. What tenuousness? They’re as solid as they’ll ever be, skin drawn tight around their cheekbones, their skull and crossbones. I’m as solid as I’ll ever be, he says, thumping his chest just like the others. (The Formal Logic 169-170)

But this feeling of solidity does not last very long. Giulio is soon caught in another state of confusion: in a church, dressed in priestly garb, and standing before a young couple looking to be married. Like all literate men, Giulio seeks the comfort of words in the belief they will help to make things solid:

Surprisingly, he knows their names: alb, amice, girdle, maniple, stole and chasuble. And those of the blessed linens. And the sacred vessels. But rather than freeing him, each bit of knowledge serves only to weigh him down even more. He feels himself literally sinking on the altar, literally melting away, liquefying, a sacrifice without a purpose being shaped for reasons not his own. (The Formal Logic 172)

Again, it is the vision on the skateboard who comes to the rescue, the girl out of place and out of time, in a sense, the deus ex machina of metafictional writing: “Her hair is sheared Mohawk-style and multicoloured; her make up in slashes across her cheekbones. He can’t be sure but it seems to be moving, shifting, as if alive” (The Formal Logic 173). This girl, who comes to him again at the end of the story to lead him out of the village, seems to exist in the interstices between what Hugh Culik would call the “rational numbers”: “Just as all the points on the number line are not named as ratios of whole numbers, so reality is not fully named …” (136-137).

Quite naturally, a wedding reception follows the church ceremony. Just as naturally, in this world, Giulio is called upon to defend the honor of his family and is taunted into a knife fight with another man. In the time-honored tradition of these fights, he kills the other man. But then, when he picks up the man’s knife
and turns it on himself, he discovers it is spring-loaded and harmless.

At the end, he is back in the basement, only this time he descends deeper and deeper into the underworld, chasing after the always-glowing skateboarder: “There is movement along the damp walls. And voices, the soft, dangerous voices of the past. The voices are reciting. There is no beginning or end to their recital” (*The Formal Logic* 188). There follows a conversation with the skateboarder before she vanishes, an attempt to pin down the meaning of identity and identification:

> They walk together in silence, guided only by the light from her eyes. The stairs turn into a low sloping tunnel. After a few minutes, they come out into a natural cave. There are primitive drawings and scrawls on its walls. Giulio stops before a pair of sandstone faces, symmetrical about each other. They are sad, as if on the verge of tears. Beneath them, the word “Tybicza”.

> “What does it mean?” he asks, passing his hand over the upper face’s lips.

> “It’s the ancient name of this town,” the skateboarder says. “But, wait a minute. You should know that. You were the one most responsible for uncovering these caves.” “What are you talking about? I’ve never set foot in here before.”

> “But the doctor has, hasn’t he? He was in here digging for archaeological goodies while his patients waited for the miracle cures that never came.”

> “What’s that to do with me? I’m not any doctor, let alone the doctor.”

> “No. Nor a young lover in an olive grove. Nor a shit-faced child. Nor a priest with a too-tight collar. And especially not an avenging angel, right? You don’t take responsibility for any of those things, right?”

> “That’s right. I came here strictly for a visit. My visa forbids me taking responsibility.” “And now you’re leaving, to live once more among strangers, the place where no one knows you.”

> “Right again. I feel so much safer there.”

> “I bet you do.” (*The Formal Logic* 189-190)

The final paragraph tries to present in visual terms what that moment must feel like when the self-reflexivity of human consciousness comes up against that immoveable force that we all must face at some point or other. Abandoned by the skateboarder, Giulio finds himself in absolute darkness, running, then crawling, then practically digging, within a tunnel that becomes smaller and smaller as he moves through it:

> Dear God, don’t let me be stuck, wriggling in the dark — a parasitic worm unnoticed in the
bowed of the earth. He scrambles forward on all fours. He can feel the walls now closing in. He pounds at them, batters them till his knuckles are raw. But it doesn’t help. His breathing is shallow now and uneven, his heart threatening to leap out of his chest. It’s all over, he says. She tricked me. They tricked me. They led me here to my own grave, to this place where there is no moving, neither forward nor back. Best to curl up and let it all go. There is no breath left; the eyes bulge; the hands open and close; the legs spasm. Ah, death. (The Formal Logic 191)

But death does not come and it turns out to be a birth canal when “the tunnel convulses, constricts like a sphincter to expel him into the night air” (The Formal Logic 191). However, even now, Giulio is not sure of who he is or where he is:

For a moment, he imagines he’s still inside — an immense cave, perhaps — and those aren’t really stars up there but pinpricks in the ceiling. And the mountains behind him nothing but papier-maché. And the valleys a child’s diggings. And the highways gift- wrapped ribbons. And the village a black cutout silhouette. (The Formal Logic 191)

In the next part of the paper, a further examination of the Giulio character and his development is made. This character has gone on to appear in a large number of Mirolla’s writings, including under different guises in published stories from The Giulio Metaphysics III collection, one of the lead characters in the novel Berlin, and the male lead character in the novel The Boarder. Here, only the Giulio of “Giulio Visits A Friend” and “Into Another Country” are examined.

The Multiplicity of Giulios

The use of a similar or in some cases identical name for a series of characters who may or may not have some obvious connection to one another is a metafictional gambit. It self- consciously points out to the reader that these characters are a creation, one that at times can inhabit the same time and space (in the text, at least) and that they are thus not part of a three- dimensional Cartesian axis. They bleed into one another, can be in two places at once, and, as Robert Kroetsch put it, “seek that timeless split-second in time when the one, in the process of becoming the other, was itself and the other” (593). Thus, what all these Giulios are doing is attempting to create a whole that is greater than its parts while at the same time not ever quite being all there. This is being done in a discursive area that is neither real nor unreal. To put it another way, one could argue that this set of characters neither fully exists nor does not exist and they are constantly moving towards something or becoming, always “escaping the constraints of self-presence” (Docherty 184).

The Giulio character is malleable, changeable and often carries on conversations with his creator. He vanishes into one textual hole and re-appears out of another. In Mirolla’s “Giulio Visits A Friend,” the character is goaded along and forced to do what he does not want to do — visit a friend who is dying of
AIDS:

In fact, I [the creator speaking] practically have to drag him there, kicking and screaming, an invisible hand reaching in and pulling him by the scruff of the neck. He keeps coming up with all kinds of excuses: the neighbourhood makes him queasy with all its marble steps, red Camaros and bird-bath statues; the family hasn’t sent him an invitation; his friend doesn’t really want to see him; he lost the directions the last time he emptied out his pockets. (156-157)

At the same time, he cannot help but notice the drastic changes undergone by his friend: “[T]he luminous quality of his friend’s eyes, beautiful, unnaturally large, almost bulbous and bulging like that of a stereotypical friendly alien - in direct contrast to the scarred and sunken cheeks, the open sores about the lips, the purplish splotches across the temple and forehead (159).

But the creator is not done with Giulio yet, not done with the manipulation of identity, identification and classification. There is one more surprise at the end of the novel:

Nor do I allow him to look back once he has stepped outside. That’s strictly verboten. For, if he were to, he would surely notice the entire family — mother, father, sister, brother — standing at the front window. They are standing at the picture window, arm in arm, smiling. They are standing at the interior design picture window, arm in arm, smiling — and proud of themselves. So very proud of themselves. (162)

It is this Protean quality — in character, scene, conflict — that exemplifies Mirolla’s fiction, that makes it so slippery and ungraspable in its entirety. The reader may think he/she has a handle on what is happening and without notice the narrative rug is pulled out. It is pulled out not only from under the reader’s feet but often from under the character’s as well.

In “Into Another Kind of Country,” a first-person narrator Giulio awakes on a cross- country bus to discover he cannot remember his name or where he came from or what his destination should be: “Toronto, I say to myself. Is there where I want to be?” (“Into Another Kind” par. 62) He only discovers his name when someone hands him a duffel bag:

She holds out one of the bags for me to take. It’s blue — one of those blue sport bags — and has a large white tag dangling from the zipper.

My bag? I say, scratching my head, not yet prepared to accept it as such. I don’t remember —

Look, she says. You got a name, right?

I nod. Not that I’m sure, really. Does everyone have to have a name? I guess so. I guess it makes sense.
So, she says, there’s one freaking way to find out, isn’t there? She points at the name tag: Is that your name — or what?

I peer down at the tag. The word “G-I-U-L-I-O” is spelled out in large letters. In large block letters. With a felt pen of some sort. I try to pronounce it in my head. Soft “G”? Hard “G”? I’m not sure. Beneath the name, scribbled in much smaller writing, is an address. All I can read is the word “Montreal”. I can’t make the rest of it out, no matter how hard I squint. A permanent blurring. (pars. 75-70)

This state of “permanent blurring” is another feature of the Giulio characters, a constant going in and out of focus. As Eva Darias-Beautell points out: “The appearance/disappearance play … self-consciously stresses the relation between figuration and absence. Since reality is always already a discursive construct, this strategy locates the possibility of articulating experience not in the real, but in discourse as constituted by that contradictory play of appearance (of reality) and disappearance (absence of the real)” (319). Rather than clearing up for the narrator in this story, things become more and more murky. The narrator seems to move further and further away from discovering who he is “really”.

In his book on *Proust*, Beckett notes that the effects of time serve to alter the “subject … resulting in an unceasing modification of his personality, whose permanent reality, if any, can only be apprehended as a retrospective hypothesis” (4). Or as Linda Ben-Zvi puts it: “The ego is contingent; it does not exist apart from language” (192). Thus, as Giulio moves forward, he undergoes a series of states that can only define him for a split-second and then lose their value immediately afterwards: “The individual is the seat of a constant process of decantation, decantation from the vessel containing the fluid of future time, sluggish, pale and monochrome, to the vessel containing the fluid of past time, agitated and multicoloured by the phenomena of its hours” (Proust 4-5). Similarly, Martin Esslin states: “Being subject to this process of time flowing through us and changing us in doing so, we are, at no single moment in our lives, identical with ourselves” (50).

At the end of “Into Another Country,” Giulio learns to accept the fact he cannot escape himself — or he learns it for a moment, at least, only to forget it again at some future point, the reader must assume. He tries to kill fellow bus traveler and unwanted companion, Norma, by pushing her in front of a speeding car. It is a direct hit: “Metal on flesh. A sack flying over a hood” (par. 117). However, it is not to be:

[B]efore I have a chance to turn away, I see a figure spring up. Almost as if it comes out of the ground itself. It’s Norma, brushing herself off and laughing. I stand rooted to the spot as she ambles towards me. Like a bear. Or maybe a wolverine.

You can’t freaking kill me, she says with a smile as she takes my arm. Do you wanna know why?

I stand there, shuffling my feet, not knowing what to do next. I stand there, staring at the
ground, afraid to look at her.

She lifts my chin until our eyes meet: I’m already dead, she says. (pars. 119-122)

It is the only state of permanence and self-knowledge, she seems to be saying. It is the only time when language does not define. And it is the only time when one can be captured by a formal system, without being trapped in what Culik describes as “the esthetics of incompleteness” (131).

Concluding Remarks

The similarities between the two Giulios (he of “The Theory of Discontinuous Existence” and he of “The Proper Country) can be seen quite clearly on a metafictional level. If the two characters are not physically compatible, if they cannot be fitted into the same space and time line, if they do not interact on any three-dimensional Cartesian network, that says more about the fluidity of self and identity than any differences between them. The similarities come in the sense of confusion experienced, the lack of recognition of a stable and continuous identity, and the feeling that they lack control over their lives and actions (as if some mastermind-creator-godlike puppeteer is actually manipulating things).

As well, the argument is made that no attempt to capture any particular or specific character on a page can succeed in its entirety or fullness. There will always be gaps in the formal system of character recognition and human identification. It is in those gaps that the further Giulios in Mirolla’s fiction can be fitted. These new Giulios are not so much extensions of the previous Ur- or proto-Giulio as found in “The Theory” and “The Proper Country” but rather refracted images, deconstructed and then rebuilt, put together in different ways in the hope of one day completing the task that all are quick to say is impossible: filling the formal system so completely that it no longer has any gaps in it; so that the word is truly made flesh.

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Holocaust as the Visual Subject: The Problematics of Memory Making through Visual Culture.

By Yasmin Ibrahim

Abstract

The visual construction or re-construction of traumatic events whether through art, photography or celluloid representations is an intrinsic aspect of human propensity to remember and work through trauma. The assembling of images, its display and invitation to gaze are mediated by political, social, cultural, historical and aesthetic processes. Visual culture functions both as a memory archive but it is equally implicated in the ‘critique of inadequacy’ in any representation where limits are imposed both through the vantage points, access and what may be visible or invisible to the naked eye. The integration of visual culture into our contemporary consciousness through electronic technologies embedded into our everyday lives thrusts the visual into an arena of the everyday where images work through both individual imagination and collective-meaning making. The tenuous relationship between visual culture, memory and trauma is discussed through the remembrance of the Holocaust.

Introduction

This paper explores the role of visual culture particularly in enabling Holocaust memories where the need to remember and forget and the urge to integrate history without it becoming a debilitating device encapsulates three fundamental themes: the spiritual struggle for a positive German national identity (post-1945), the need for European Jewry to renounce the label of victimhood and above all to repudiate the charge of evil which had besieged modernity after Holocaust. In interrogating visual culture and trauma this paper explores how trauma is often reliant on material formats to translate both its occurrence and its burden on the human condition. The dialectical strands of universalisation versus particularization of the Holocaust makes it a difficult project to articulate both discursively and visually and often Holocaust memorials whether in Germany or other parts of the West have only materialized after long periods of deliberation as
to their role, function and message to societies. A miscarriage of any commemoration objective through art or artefact is often perceived as transgressing the sacred realms associated with the Holocaust.

Our contemporary visual economy produces a materialization of culture where it is manifested not only through ‘displays but structuring a modern way of seeing and comprehending’ (Macdonald 1996:7). This paper positions visual culture as both the social construction of the visual as well as the visual construction of the social. Both processes are iterative where neither is reductive or subsumed by any one element whether it is social, ideological or historical. In discussing visual culture in reference to the Holocaust I want to draw on Mitchell’s (2006) notion of vision. Mitchell premises vision as a cultural construction that is learned and cultivated, and not simply given by nature. It is connected to the history of arts, technologies, media and social practices of display and spectatorship and is deeply involved with human societies with the ethics and politics, aesthetics and epistemology of seeing and being seen (Mitchell 2002:166).

Visual culture evolves through a complex interplay of discursive and ideological debates mediating the ways in which we see, believe and make meaning. These processes do not thwart individual agency but they provide material and symbolic spaces for collective identification. The increasing use of screens, visuals and simulation technologies to experience or re-live trauma in museums no longer privileges the eye or the gaze alone but combines it with emotive elements to evoke sympathy. A case in point is the Beits Hashoah Museum of Tolerance in the Simon Wisenthal Centre in Los Angeles where emotions and images and not objects alone become the driving force (cf. Hoskins 2003:14). Ironically, in direct contradiction to the rule of rationality in the project of Enlightenment and modernity, comprehending trauma privileges the ‘irrational’. Visual culture then alludes to not just the material formats or technologies. It also encompasses the ways in which we gaze, the ontological status of the visual in representing reality, the problematics of representation and aesthetics, the political economy of visual production and the incestuous relationship between political thought, contemporary consciousness and visual culture.

Lennon and Foley (1999: 47) point out that visual media are often central to the recreation of memory and spaces of commemoration with the emphasis on simulations, replications and virtual experiences. The screen culture and experience is also a vital part of the reproduction and renewal of memory. ‘Television is so widely and easily disdained as a trivializing or corrupting force that it is seen as a vehicle that cannot help but produce unsatisfactory representations of the Holocaust’ (Shandler 1999: 259). But ironically, it was precisely the medium of television which universalized Holocaust to audiences making horror and the ‘inconceivable’ accessible. According to Jeffrey Alexander (2002:35) a handful of actual dramatizations in books, movies, plays and television shows (initially formulated for the American public but reached a wider set of audiences after) presented the Holocaust in a personal perspective of family and friends. Alexander points out that the prototype to this was Anne Frank’s diary first published in 1947 and adapted into a Pulitzer-prize winning Broadway play in 1955 and a Hollywood movie in 1959. In the course of the 1960s, Anne Frank’s tragic story became the basis for psychological identification and symbolic extension on a mass scale – it set the stage for the rush of books, television shows and movies (Alexander 2002: 36). In the digital age, the prominence of the screen and the constant visual presence of electronic media and print create what Andrew Hoskins terms as ‘new memory’ - a memory constantly evolving but circulated
and renewed through these screen cultures. Andreas Huyssen (1995: 225) describes this coalescing of memory and pervasive visuality as a ‘hybrid memorial-media culture.’

The intertwining of image with trauma and its distribution through a circulation economy is a resonant part of contemporary visual culture. Trauma needs an audience to bear witness, to work through the catharsis and to consign it to the annals of history where it can be repeatedly re-visited to make sense of other trauma that human societies inflict on each other or experience through natural disasters. Trauma equally has a face and visual culture provides this ‘faciality’ where these depictions both function as pictures of ‘re-memory’ (Toni Morrison’s, 1987 Beloved) and as narratives of history torn out of their historical contexts to be viewed with renewed horror.

The ontological status of an image as bearing witness also calls into account how we valorize the image as a form of visual testimony. With real stories becoming a past, the past often becomes commodified through the visual. The emergence and popularity of ‘dark’ tourism or tourism associated with sites of death, disaster and depravity (See Foley and Lennon 1999) is to a large extent dependent on symbols, physical spaces, artefacts and visuals. This visual economy is equally dependent on new media formats which shrink distance and temporality between the event and spectator where the circulation of iconic images create collective identification with an event producing a capsule memory. This capsule memory both simplifies the event whilst personalising it for the individual. If images provide a window to the past, mass viewing through the screen democratizes trauma. Despite the discourse of ‘incomparability’ and ‘unspeakability’ which surrounds Holocaust, its multiple representations through popular culture are ineradicably part of Holocaust memory making it fractured and sedimented (Huyssen 1995: 241-2). In the visual construction of the Holocaust, Auschwitz has become the central reference point along with images of death camps and dead bodies piled on top of each other where these appropriate an iconic representation of the tragedy (Morrison 2004: 343).

Whilst the brevity of this work does not afford me the liberty to completely unpack all aspects of visual culture in the construction of the Holocaust, this paper will explore some crucial strands identified in this introduction. These include the ideological and discursive formations which influenced the symbolic and cultural construction of the Holocaust, the issues of representing the ‘inconceivable’ and the role of the image in bearing witness and creating spaces for public communion and commemoration of the event.

**Critical Deliberations on the Holocaust**

The occurrence of traumatic events often sets the stage for public discussions. In our modern memory 9/11 created a surge in contemplative dialogues which sought an explanation to what the Western superpowers deemed as inconceivable. As Barbie Zelizer opines (2002: 698) traumatic events ‘rattle what it means morally to remain members of a collective’. Since 1945 the question of how a supposedly civilized nation such as Germany was able to commit such barbarous acts has come to haunt the consciousness of
Western imagination (Waxman 2009: 94). Dominick LaCapra (1992: 122) terms ‘Holocaust as an event which clamoured for serious reflection and a comprehensive approach to its representation for without one both the German society and Western modernity is trapped without a comprehensive understanding of the past or the way to move forward in the future’.

The formation of public discursive spheres and narratives after an event is a post-event phenomenon where the discursive paradigm is both our need to make sense of, explain or comprehend what we perceive as inconceivable. The Historikerstreit in the 1980s encapsulated the need to deal with this national trauma sparking a series of debates and quarrels amongst historians and philosophers where the urge to embrace a positive future required the intellectuals and the average man on the streets to confront the past. The post-narratives that emerge from traumatic events are discursive formations which affect both public sentiments and people’s construction of themselves and national identity. Equally visual culture is not immune from such philosophical and political debates. The Holocaust Memorial in Berlin which opened in May 2005 was ‘subject to 17 years of heated debate regarding its necessity, dedication and locale’ (Dekel 2009: 72). Plans for a House of History in Bonn suffered a similar fate. Unlike narrative and discursive spheres, visual cultures speak through the image and symbols whilst influenced by contemporary thought and consciousness. There were numerous dilemmas in the representation of the Holocaust beyond the limitations of image of visual economy. Like the Holocaust Memorial in Berlin the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum was mired in controversy as to its role, function and the nature of message (Lennon & Foley 1999: 47).

One resonant theme of the Historikerstreit was how exceptional was the Holocaust in the history of Europe and the collective history of Western civilization and humanity. Whilst it was represented as ‘unexceptional’ by a group of scholars such as Ernest Nolte, Michael Sturmer, Rainer Sitelmann and Andreas Hillgurber others such as Saul Friedlander (1995:2-3) argued that the Holocaust defies any conceptual and definitional categories reifying it as ‘an event at the limits’ or in the Durkheimian sense ‘sacred-evil’ where it is set apart from ordinary evil making it inexplicable and mysterious. Holocaust was no longer narrated as an event in history but an ‘archetype’ – an event out of time and a ‘world historical’ (weltgesichte) event – an event whose emergence onto the world stage threatened or promised to change the fundamental course of the world (Alexander 2002: 27-30). Dan Diner (2000: 1) concurs that the ‘growing centrality of the Holocaust’ has altered our ‘sense of the passing century’ such that ‘the incriminated event has thus become the epoch’s marker, its final and inescapable wellspring.’

The discourse of non-comparability is an intrinsic aspect of the Holocaust which often evokes much reflection on how the event can be captured or commemorated by society. The Holocaust was initially described as one ‘atrocity’ amongst many others in the Second World War especially in the American media where the liberation discourses overshadowed the trauma of the death camps. The need to distinguish it from other crimes against humanity demanded that the trauma be renamed as Holocaust. According to Jeffrey Alexander (2003:28-30) Holocaust does have an English meaning and refers to ‘something wholly burnt up.’ The term entered ordinary English usage in the early 1960s as a proper noun. Several years after the extermination of the Jews, Israelis named the event Shoah, a term from the Torah which refers to the
kind of extraordinary sufferings God had periodically consigned to the Jews. ‘Holocaust became part of contemporary language as an English symbol that stood for the thing that could not be named (Alexander 2002: 29).

The Holocaust was also seen as a crisis for the Western civilisation and the whole of humanity and informed the imperative not to forget a universal agenda. It was seen as a tragedy of reason and of modernity itself (Levy & Sznайдer 2002:88) and this was a resonant argument in the debates of the Holocaust. For political philosophers such as Jurgen Habermas the event was transformative in as far as it confirmed Western civilization’s break with the Enlightenment tradition. The ‘universalisation’ discourse conveyed a consolidated the need to remember the event beyond the boundaries of Germany as well as the agenda to arrest the decay of modernity as a project warranting Western solidarity. According to political philosopher Jurgen Habermas (1990, 251-252)

> Something happened here (in Auschwitz) that no one could previously have thought even possible. It touched a deep layer of solidarity among all who have a human face. Until then – in spite of all the quasi-natural brutalities of world history – we had simply taken the integrity of this deep layer for granted. Auschwitz altered the conditions for the continuation of historical life contexts – and not only in Germany.

The Holocaust is inextricably imprisoned through the dialectical discourses of universalism and particularism (Young 1993). Holocaust’s ability to subsume the whole of European Jewish identity is another source of contention in the issue of representation. Robert Altar (1981, cf. Kuavar 2003:133) asserts that ‘to make the Holocaust the ultimate touchstone of Jewish values whether political or religious, is bound to lead to distortions of emphasis and priority’ and falsifying ‘our lives as Jews as setting them so drastically in the shadow of crematoria’ – totalising Jewish identity, consigning them to victimhood.’ Similarly, when a proposal for a Holocaust memorial in New York came before representatives of the leading Jewish organizations in the late 1940s, they unanimously rejected the idea on the basis that it would give currency to the image of the Jews as ‘helpless victims,’ an idea they wished to repudiate (Novick 1994: 160).

A further discourse which makes the Holocaust a challenging subject for representation is the discourse of evil. Alexander contends that from the late 1930s onwards ‘there emerged a strong and eventually dominant anti-fascist narrative which coded Nazism as apocalyptic’ (2007:23). The construction of the Holocaust as unprecedented evil added to the particularism stance and equally to the theological and moral notions of redemption. Any representation of the Holocaust could not possibly overlook the strong moral and religious overtones cast by the shadow of ‘evil’. Additionally, the notion of ‘metonymic guilt’ (cf. Alexander 2002:44) became another dimension of this genocide. Habermas’ ‘attempt to expel shame’ became a call to the whole nation. (cf. Kampe 1987:63)

Hannah Arendt’s (1963) ‘Banality of Evil’ discourse not only cast aspersions on representations through witness testimonies but extended the notion of evil as something that can reside in ordinary people when ‘the private person abandons the moral community’ (Waxman 2009: 94). Evil was no longer narrated
through the polarities of protagonist against antagonist (i.e. the allied liberators versus the evil Nazis) but that mysterious, dark and abstract force that needed to be coded and discerned in representations of the Holocaust and lying dormant in the whole of humanity. Evil became an ontological construct rather than an epistemological one (Alexander 2002) and in view of this (weltgesichte) event was seen as a transformative device that had altered the world. The intellectual and philosophical discussions of the Holocaust made the representation of the event a crisis for representation where any endeavour to capture and portray had to remain faithful to these issues without tainting it.

**Representing the ‘Unrepresentable’**

The Holocaust often begs the question that Daniel Levy and Natan Sznaider (2002) raise in their thesis on Cosmopolitan Memory - who does the Holocaust belong to? Is it to particular ethnic groups or victims of atrocities or can all of humanity lay claim to it? Levy and Hirsch (2002: 93) point out that the Holocaust has been confronted by various forces which seek to universalise it, particularize it and to nationalise it and these dialectical forces have created a crisis of representation. In many countries it has become a sacred entity surrounded by taboos and any endeavour to represent the Holocaust is seen as transgressing these taboos or tainting the memory of the event.

Visual culture builds narrative through symbols and images. Spaces, places and material artefacts become symbols of representation. Auschwitz (i.e. the crematoria) as a form of touristic ritual in recounting the fate of Jews in the Second World War creates a prism through which stories are narrated. The spaces of the museum, galleries and image archives become intertextual and co-dependent elements in the visual economy where representations and imagination are both enabled and limited through these visual terrains. These images of crematoria, gas chambers and dead bodies provide an iconography in contemporary consciousness which enslaves both German history and Jewish identity. Cultural representations are often seen as disruptive or desecrating a sacrosanct entity.

The ongoing endeavour to crystallize Holocaust memories have come under intense scrutiny and criticism due to this. In 1978 Elie Wiesel responded to NBC television mini-series, Holocaust, by proclaiming, ‘it transforms an ontological event into a soap-opera’. As the holocaust transcends history, Wiesel (cf. Alexander 2002:31) contended that it cannot be explained or visualised. Similarly Claude Lanzmann responded to Schindler’s List by commenting that Holocaust is ‘above all unique in that it erects a ring of fire around itself’ and so fiction becomes a transgression and that there are some things that cannot and should not be represented’ (cf. Hartman 1996: 84). Nevertheless the 1978, mini-serious, Holocaust, (four part, nine-and-half hour drama) watched by nearly 100 million Americans personalized the trauma and this public attention was repeated when it was broadcast in Germany where it was seen as significant in influencing public opinion about the ordeal and in removing the statute of limitations on Nazis who had participated in what was no longer a war crime but a crime against humanity.
Certain themes became central narratives in the representation of the Holocaust and these simplified the event as a trope of good versus evil making them adaptable to the grand plots and cinematic devices of Hollywood. Alexander (2002: 20) argues that ‘a system of collective representations that focused its beam of narrative light on the triumphant expulsion of evil’ became central narratives for Hollywood. Positive representations of Jews in America followed in the post-war years ranging from dailies to lifestyle magazines which sought to fight quotas set for Jews in educational institutions and professions. In 1983 a movie promoting anti anti-semitism Gentleman’s Agreement won the Academy Award for the best motion picture and another, Crossfire, had been nominated. Jews held symbolic pride of place in these popular culture narratives because their persecution had been pre-eminently associated with Nazi evil (Alexander 2002:24).

The themes of redemption and victimhood have become residual components in representations of the Holocaust as the West endlessly deploys the ghost of the Holocaust to represent itself both as victim and redeemer (Mirzoeff 2002:246). Nicholas Mirzoeff in invoking the metaphor of the ‘ghost’ uses it to refer to liminal spaces (and entities) between the visible and the invisible, the material and the immaterial, and the palpable and the impalpable where both the eye and visual culture cannot completely capture events and histories. The marginalised peoples in society often become ghosts occupying a liminal space of presence and absence. According to Mirzoeff the ghost has many names in many languages: diaspora, exiles, queers, migrants, gypsies, refugees, Tutsis, Palestinians, etc. According to Mirzoeff (2002:239) the ghost is one place among many from which to interpolate the networks of visibility that have constructed, destroyed and deconstructed the modern visual subject. The ‘ambivalent and ambiguities’ (in society) are accorded a ghost-like status and he accords both the Jews and the Holocaust a similar status where the Jewish body and the event of the Holocaust become unspeakable and non-categorizable entities (2002:244-246). This he asserts makes the Holocaust ever more central to contemporary visual culture. Images, events and people don’t only become ghostly apparitions because of their marginal status but when they become iconic symbols where it is difficult to thwart their centrality.

Levy and Hirsch (2002) assert that the iconographic status of the Holocaust was established between the 1960s and 1980s where a number of important events including the Eichmann trial in Jerusalem and the Auschwitz trial in Frankfurt in 1963 played the memory of the Holocaust in vivid detail through these mediated representations reaching a broad transnational audience. Prime Minister of Israel, Ben Gurion saw the Eichmann trial as an opportunity for the younger generation of Jews ‘to get acquainted with the details of this tragedy about which they knew so little’ (Braun 1994: 183, cf. Alexander 2002: 66). Media representations renew these sacred threads whilst reiterating the dominance of these cultural memories. In citing Anne Frank as the ‘best known ghost of the Shoah’, Mirzoeff (2002: 247) argues that we know her visually through her famous photograph and that she seems at home in New York (where her original portrait is located) precisely because she speaks to (and with) many survivors of the Holocaust in its various forms and still more people at some degree of separation from those events’. Similarly, an ABC television mini-series on the life of Anne Frank claimed the mantle of universality by wrapping her in the family values of Walt Disney. For Mirzoeff Anne Frank’s ghost is then haunting and hunted in New York, while at the same time being invoked for the hawking of all manner of products (2002: 248).
Modern visual culture is relentless in the exploitation of the familiar and the iconic. As LaCapra (1992) asserts there is a distinction between representation that simply acts out the drama and that which finally seeks to work it through. But Mirzoeff adds a third distinction of representation as one that is exploitative where history and trauma are commodified for mass entertainment. The visual economy of the ‘Holocaust Industry’ (Finklestein 2000) creates a form of inescapability where repetition entraps memory into a bind where the repetition of visuals can lead to an anaesthetization to trauma;

‘There, just off the National Mall in Washington, the victims of Nazism will be on view for the American public, stripped, herded into ditches, shot, buried, and then the tape will repeat and they will be herded into ditches again, shot again, buried again. I cannot comprehend how anyone can enthusiastically present this constant cycle of slaughter,’ (Gourevitch 1993, cf. Lennon & Foley 1999: 49).

The normalization of pain and suffering and the reliance of visual culture on enacting the inconceivable dulls our human reaction to the Monument. As Musil (cf. Lennon & Foley 1999: 50) notes;

There is nothing in this world as invisible as a monument and whilst they are erected to be seen and to attract attention – they are at the same time impregnated with something that repels attention causing the glance to roll off.

Daniel Levy and Natan Sznaider (2002:88) argue that the Holocaust has the foundations of a ‘new cosmopolitan memory’ where a memory can transcend ethnic and national boundaries. In their thesis, they contend that it is not the event per se that becomes the object of study but rather how the changing representations of the event have become a central political-cultural symbol facilitating the emergence of cosmopolitan memories. They argue that Holocaust impresses a symbiotic relationship between memory and modernity evoking a public sphere which has questioned the very process of self-reflection through modernity. Holocaust has they contend universalist and humanist identification. The critique of their thesis is also one of the visual culture and our contemporary consciousness where dominant and iconographic images serve to obliterate other memories keeping them distant and not consequential for modernity. We are selective about what penetrates our social construction of reality and how we conceptualise the real and unreal is intimately bound with our cognitive reality. Zizek (2002: 16) in writing about the World Trade Centre attacks states;

We should therefore invert the standard reading according to which the WTC explosions were the intrusion of Real which shattered our illusory Sphere: quite the reverse – it was before the WTC collapse that we lived in our reality, perceive Third World horrors as something which was not actually part of our social reality, as something which existed (for us) as a spectral apparition on the (TV) Screen – and what happened on September 11 was that this fantastic apparition entered out reality.

Visual cultures are both influenced by regimes of power and are a reaction to it. Young (1993) in questioning
the absence of commemoration of other form of genocide re-examines the politics of representation as well as remembrance. He contends that our selective amnesia is just as disturbing (if not disruptive) as our will to crystallize certain memories and histories;

Where are the national monuments to the genocide of the American Indians, to the millions of Africans enslaved and murdered, to the Russian Kulaks, and peasants starved to death by the millions? (Young 1993: 21)

One of the main objections to representing horror through artistic expression is from Theodore Adorno. In *Negative Dialectics* (1973: 361) Adorno is emphatic that art may suggest some sense where horror did not and was not capable of making sense. In his misunderstood quote about ‘poetry after Auschwitz’ Adorno is sceptical about artistic expression mainly due to the fact that poetry may suggest a state of mental complacency where it could arrest critical thinking necessary to overcome moral depravation. Adorno’s objection to stylized representation was its ability to diminish suffering whilst packaging it as enjoyable. It highlights the uneasy and conflicted relationship between art and horror.

In essence, popular representations are problematised by the ideological discourses of the Holocaust. Representations of the Holocaust are seen as inadequate and tainting the image of the event. Other issues such as historical authenticity, commodification and commercialisation of the Holocaust along with the ‘Disneyfication’ are seen as thwarting purist constructions of the event which may reside in communal imaginations. Despite these criticisms, the popular representations have helped to retain the centrality of the event in modern consciousness. Beyond popular representations there is a need to explore the notion of bearing witness through images and their implications for authenticity and truth in the project of memory making.

**Image as Witness**

Ernst van Alphen (2002) premises image and vision as having a fundamental role to play in trauma and memory. He points out that vision can be genealogically located in the Western imaginary from the Renaissance where it is implicitly bound up with truth and authenticity (2002: 206-207). This privileged epistemological status of the visual image since Enlightenment means that it is a precondition and guarantee for knowledge. In particular, visual art became the domain where the question of historical truth is enacted even if that truth is unbearable. This founding and grounding function of visual images in ‘re-membering’ is even more crucial in the disappearance of the eye-witness. Nevertheless for van Alphen images only represent or depict parts of a story but often the visual image is imprinted in the human brain of the affected person where its accessibility and translation into image is not always possible. The human mind retains these ‘visual imprints’ which may not necessarily be communicated to others.

Van Alphen (2002:207) posits through his interviews with eye-witnesses of the Holocaust that seeing is
not always about comprehension. The visual imprints in peoples’ minds provide a testimony to the event but in the Holocaust testimonies these visuals function as an unmodified return to what happened rather ‘than a mode of access or penetration.’ Conversely, Walter Benjamin in his paper on photography (cf. Dant & Gilloch 2002:10) refers to the ‘optical unconscious’- that which the eye must have seen but which the conscious brain cannot discern or grasp due to size, motion or inconspicuousness. This for Benjamin is captured by photography and its ability to record exhaustively. Our ability to ‘see’ is mediated both by technology and what the eye and mind are able to perceive.

Van Alphen makes the point that visual art and culture are often devalued through the notion of authenticity where the act of seeing appropriates a privileged status. The need for authenticity has very much dominated debates on visual culture where artistic depictions are often questioned for authenticity and assigned a quest to represent the real. Much of the visual representations of Holocaust have been questioned for its authenticity especially Hollywood portrayals such as Schindler’s List. On the other hand, Claude Lanzmann’s, Shoa and its depiction of the Holocaust for example is associated with the authentic. Here seeing is to witness and to witness then makes it real. Thus vision has a problematic relationship with truth and authenticity.

Van Alphen’s argument is twofold. Firstly, vision does not automatically lead to authentic witnessing as this must be supplanted with the ability to account for what is seen before the act of witnessing can be completed. Secondly, there is often a problem of transmitting the act of seeing something traumatic and as there is a need for language to intervene. Hannah Arendt (1963) in observing the Eichmann trials in Jerusalem raises the question of whether the survivor-witness can distinguish between things that they might have experienced and things they might have heard extending the suspicion of authenticity to testimonial narratives (Hirsch & Spitzer 2009: 160).

Authenticity with regard to the ‘Holocaust Industry’ (Finklestein 2000) is a conflicted entity. The U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum in Washington DC which was built with $168 million in private funds is a clear example of not having a vital connection with authenticity. Neither the site of the Museum nor many of the displays have an authentic connection with Jewish Holocaust (Lennon & Foley 1999: 47). However, the ‘deterritorialization of politics and culture’ (Tomlinson 1999) in the era of globalization and the re-positioning of space through new media communication technology can influence memory making as a device stripped of context. The Holocaust museum in Washington also sought to make the Holocaust experience that others can identify with. This ‘Americanization of the project’ seemed important to transcend the ethnic boundaries and to construct a monument that can sit easily with the wider American culture and its notions of citizenship and justice. The inauguration of the museum also coincided with the popular success of Schindler’s List contributing to the universalisation of the Holocaust (Levy & Hirsch 2002).

Beyond the dimension of the individual visual image imprint that Van Alphen refers, Barbie Zelizer constructs the image and particularly the photograph and the act of capturing an image as a process and means of forging connections with traumatic events. The urge to capture and preserve images constitutes a human
response to traumatic events. Zelizer (2002) sees this human agency resonant both in the reconstruction of
the horror in the extermination of the Jews in the Holocaust as well as the destruction of the World Trade
Centre in 2001. Zelizer (1990:10) defines the act of bearing witness as a process that enables people to
take responsibility for what they see where the personal act of ‘seeing’ can be transformed into a collective
act of dealing with trauma. Shoshana Felman (1992: 204) extends this collective act of bearing witness to
equally acknowledging the truth of the occurrence of a traumatic event.

Collectively held images, Zelizer contents create a mnemonic frame in which people can remember others
(2002: 699). For Zelizer, bearing witness and collective recovery are intrinsically bound where coming
together of humanity remains crucial both in the passing of the trauma and recovery. Images through
photography construct a post-traumatic space where images ‘stand in for the larger event’ which they rep-
the recall of events making them the ‘primary markers’ of memory. Nevertheless she acknowledges that
photographs are not without their limitations as composite entities they are arbitrary, conventionalized and
simplify complex situations and events where they work for collective endorsements and readings whilst
not necessarily triggering a personal memory. Our ability to store, freeze frame and replay images in our
new media economies and display them in spaces such as museums, art galleries, television archives,
makes the past work for the present (Zelizer 2002: 699).

With specific reference to the Holocaust, Zelizer (1998) examined the role of photography in showcasing
the trauma and the role of individuals in bearing witness to the liberation of the Nazi camps in 1945. The
coming together of mobile technology in the format of miniature cameras and the consolidation of photog-
raphy in daily newspapers made trauma accessible to a wider public who had previously only heard of the
atrocities under Hitler’s rule. With the liberation of the Nazi camps on the Western front in the spring of
1945 there was an imperative to reveal and soldiers with cameras in the pocket were able to take pictures
of what they found inside these camps.

With General Dwight Eisenhower facilitating journalists to bear witness to images inside camps, photo-
graphs provided a visual narrative of what the world was not able to see. The conjoining of the urge to bear
witness through photographs and the need to publicise them through newspapers and journals provided
a visual documentation of life under Nazi Germany. Zelizer (1998) points out that a veritable cottage
industry formed under the need to bear witness where amateur photography helped to produce numerous
pamphlets and booklets. As Alexander (2002:11) asserts these visual economies became a means to con-
trol symbolic production and narration of the Holocaust. With the liberation of Nazi camps in 1945 they
became the controllers of this cultural production. They promoted the vision of American as an ‘imperial
republic’ conjuring it as ‘the triumphant, forward-looking, militantly and militarily democratic new world
warrior’.

The ability of photographs to represent the real is nevertheless a contested terrain. Susan Sontag (2004: 21)
claimed photography has kept company with death ever since it was invented in 1839. When the camera
was emancipated from the tripod and became portable enabling close observation from a distant vantage
point, picture taking acquired immediacy and authority. This valorization of the image is an intrinsic part of human culture where images can define complex narratives. Sontag points out that images contain an inherent contradiction – possessing both objectivity and a point of view. Thus they enable make belief whilst attempting to portray reality.

Daniel Goldhagen’s (1996) controversial thesis on the Holocaust directed a narrative through shocking imagery to attribute an essentialism of evil to the average German. This essentialism conjured through a heavy reliance on images simplified the Holocaust as a propensity for unmitigated cruelty by the Germans towards the Jews. The images of German perpetrators inflicting heinous crimes were seen as the ‘power of visual evidence’ (Morrison 2004:349). Goldhagen’s accessible history became instantly popular with the public, selling over 500,000 copies in the first year topping the non-fiction list in more than 13 countries. Morrison invokes the memory of Nanking and the rape of 80,000 women by 300,000 Japanese solders after the fall of the Chinese capital in 1937 to refute Goldhagen’s monothematic cultural expression. Morrison in demonstrating similar photos of Japanese acts of cruelty questions Goldhagen’s construction of Holocaust as unique on this basis without having undertaken research on the wider issues of genocide. Morrison contends ‘photographs as cultural artefacts are open to an array of questions’ and played a significant role in making Goldhagen a commercial success.

Sharon Sliwinski (2006:334) in writing about the charges levelled against King Leopold II of Belgium and his colony, the Congo Free State in 1906 refers to the role of the photographs in highlighting the human right atrocities to the world. The Congo Reform Movement used photographs of human atrocity as a central tool in their human rights campaign. Crimes in distant shores were made publicly visible through photography. Sliwinski argues that the articulation of human rights emerged through this particular visual encounter with atrocity. In the Congo atrocities, the photographic images played a significant role in creating a public and in setting forth a process to stop these atrocities (2006:346). With the tide of public sentiment against King Leopold, his displeasure with camera and its ability to speak for the mutilated are revealed;

*The Kodak has been a sole calamity to us. The most powerful enemy indeed. In the early years we had no trouble in getting the press to ‘expose’ the tales of mutilation as slanders, lies inventions of busybody American missionaries and exasperated foreigners...Then all of a sudden came the crash! That is to say, the incorruptible Kodak – and all the harmony went to hell! The only witness I couldn’t bribe. Every Yankee missionary and every interrupted trader sent home and got one; and now – oh, well the pictures get sneaked around everywhere, in spite of all we can do to ferret them out and suppress them (cf. Sliwinski: 346).*

Slinwinski emphasises that photographs and visuals were not clear-cut or unproblematic devices neither were they transparent historical evidence. In effect, they became tools of the ‘empire’ capturing panoramic views and ethnographic specimens of ‘primitive races’ and ‘exotic beasts’ during the era of colonial expansion. The photograph crystallized the notion of the ‘other’ through the visual and was constructed for a Western audience. It became part of the machinery of colonial agents who sought to create support and
interests for their causes one way or the other.

Relatedly, Slinwinski (2006: 247-248) points out that notion of ‘phantasmagoria’ is of interest to art historians where it represents a symbolic link between visual technology and notion of imagination as a haunting force of the 19th century often associated with the magic lantern technology which was a prototype of the modern slide projector. Phantasmagoria also alluded to an anxiety-related psychological state in which the divisions between reality and fantasy are eroded. This liminality captured the haunted space of imagination where ‘thoughts are projected in the internal screen of the mind.’ For the Congo reform movement a series of lectures entitled the ‘lantern lectures’ delivered to the public with a mix of discourse and horror-filled slides representing atrocities interspersed with prayer, hymns and evangelical messages elicited strong emotional responses. The mutilated and maimed become characters deprived of their own voices transformed into objects of ‘pity’ where both imagination and reality became conspirators in enabling this interface with the unknown. Similarly, Interactive museums and exhibits which simulate victim experiences through sights, sounds, visuals exploit this notion of phantasmagoria where the act of remembering a distant past requires a personal access to the suffering of others where such suffering could be inconceivable in a secure society. The Holocaust industry has emerged through a difficult mix of reality and visuality which seeks to personalise trauma and create a proximity to distant events.

**Conclusion**

The universalisation, the Americanisation and the particularization of the Holocaust hinge on the crusade to elongate and entrench a prosthetic memory for younger generations for whom the past can only be remembered and imagined through spaces of material culture. The production of cultural symbols in the project of remembrance is often politically and historically driven appropriating different cultural and physical manifestations and formats to communicate the imperative at hand. The Holocaust as an ‘event at the limits’, on the one hand, is reified as ‘unpresentable,’ and on the other, the possibility of forgetting threatens to destroy the very construct of modernity along with rationality and critical thought. This double bind constructs the Holocaust as a cultural gargoyle guarding humanity against the ‘banality of evil.’ Whilst visual culture enables access to historical imagination it can equally distort memory and de-contextualise suffering and disassemble it from history.

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The Travails of Kingship Institution in Yorubaland: a Case Study of Isinkan in Akureland.

By Adedayo Emmanuel Afe & Ibitayo Oluwasola Adubuola

Abstract

In this paper, an attempt is made to discuss the travails of kingship institution in Yorubaland, with reference to Isinkan in Akure South Local Government, Ondo State Nigeria. This is germane because of the prevalent of kingship crises in Yorubaland in contemporary times. The discourse relies on oral testimonies, written and archival documents. In the main, the paper discovers that regardless of the fact that Isinkan people lives within Akure settlement, they retain their political autonomy from time immemorial. It also revealed that the quest for recognition of the Iralepo (Oba of Isinkan) by the Government took a new dimension about two decades ago. This paper argues that regardless of the recognition, hardly can you notice any difference between the two communities. Therefore, the agitation for recognition may be for socio-political reasons rather than for cultural autonomy.

Introduction

Over the years, kingship institution in Yorubaland, South Western Nigeria has experienced unpleasant changes in leadership and socio-cultural hurdles. Among these are revolutions, wars and the incursion of the British rule. With the loss of political authority in recent times, Yoruba kings have been struggling for relevance in the scheme of things. The struggle for relevance earned them symbolic or nominal authority, because it is believed by some people that the glorious pre-colonial status of the traditional rulers should be scrapped, since they are old-fashioned, reactionary and anachronistic. In essence, the nominal authority has made them ceremonial rulers not leaders of their communities; worse still, the attainment of this nominal recognition is a herculean task in the light of post independence political developments. However, Isinkan in Akure South Local Government Area of Ondo State, Nigeria, is chosen as a case
study, because even within Akure, Isinkan still retains its political autonomy as a settlement, similar to Egbaland where the Alake is the paramount ruler to the sectional Obas in Abeokuta.\textsuperscript{4}

This paper is approached from a socio-historical perspective. The method employed is analytical. This study was derived from oral testimonies received from traditional rulers, chiefs, elders and some other custodians of history from both Akure and Isinkan. Also, relevant information from available literatures and archival documents provided the background to the paper.

\textbf{Conceptual Considerations}

Kingship is a word derived from the term “King”, which is attached to the statehood of the King.\textsuperscript{5} In this paper, a king is identified as the most supreme or paramount sovereign in any village, town or city. Generally, he is recognised by his subjects as their spiritual leader and Chief Custodian of traditions.\textsuperscript{6}

The institution of kingship is a common phenomenon with states, empires, countries and other similar entities, which makes the institution a universal concept, with a long history. The Biblical account lends credence to this. The Bible gives a detailed account of kingships, for instance, the prosperous kingship of Solomon in the Old Testament.\textsuperscript{7} In the same manner, European history clearly reveals that states like France, Austria, Poland, Spain and England had for centuries operated kingships, such that by the turn of the 18\textsuperscript{th} century, kings became the principal targets of political regimes in their respective countries.\textsuperscript{8}

Over the years, the continents of Asia and Africa had operated kingship institution before colonial rule. Japan and Spain, in fact, had Emperors whose positions or offices had all the elements of kingship.\textsuperscript{9} Similarly, in Africa, kingship was numerous. Among them were those of Benin and Oyo in West Africa and Bunyoro in Kitara, East Africa. In West Africa, before the 20\textsuperscript{th} century, kings were regarded as supreme rulers, who had both power of life and death over the people. In Benin, the institution was such that every Oba was seen as the owner of the kingdom who had the final say over every aspect of the lives of Benin people.\textsuperscript{10}

Ovie-Whiskey observed this much on kingship institution in Nigeria when he asserted that:

\begin{quote}
Nigerians, too, love kings, even if the kings, be one to one square kilometer as it sometimes is the case and even if their courts be less dignifying than the homes of many of their subjects... Though the Kings of today, in most cases, wields no political power, he is not just a museum piece, opening vistas into the past, he honors the wealthy, the strong and the great. So long as men worship social titles, so long will the man who confers them wax strong, be relevant and command loyalty and respect.\textsuperscript{11}
\end{quote}

In Yoruba kingship, the king assumed total dignity befitting royal office on the day of coronation. The
Oba would be imbued with the ritual power along with paraphernalia of royal office. Among these were crown, robes, scepter and horsetail as umbrella. The crown is the most significant of the royal insignia. It stipulates the sacred royal power of the king. The king of Isinkan confirmed its sacredness on the day of his coronation:

*It was the happiest day of my life, that I wore a crown of an Oba before a huge crowd....*  

This depicts that the crown is a sign of divination as it depicts the institution of royal ancestral force and the revelation of great moral insight in the person of the king. Besides, the crown is one of the treasured antiquities of the palace. The implication of a crown is that any place in which the bearer settled would automatically become a Kingdom.

The royal prerogatives of wearing the crown are restricted to the king. This is simply because only the king’s crown has a horn called *Iere Okin* in Yorubaland. Moreover, it can only be found in the palace and that distinguishes them from commoners. Significantly, at installation, the king prostrated for the last time before the kingmakers in the public gaze of the people. He is thereafter restrained from doing obeisance to men.

Conventionally, a king could declare war and make peace, conclude alliances, send and receive ambassadors, levy taxes, administer justice and appoint subordinate officials.

Generally, kingship clearly shows the office of a king in the kingdom. In essence, the kingship revolves around the statehood of a king, which is the contending issue that this work deals with.

Generally, in Yorubaland, kings and their offices were to be accorded utmost reverence by the people whose perception was that doing otherwise was acting contrary to demands of traditions, which could incur punishment from the gods. While kingship refers to the ruler in his Kingdom, the king in Yoruba context is addressed as *Oba, alase ekeji Orisa* (King, the ruler and deputy of the gods). He is also addressed as *Kabiyesi*, an expression which is a contracted form of the sentence *ki a bi nyin ko si* (there is no question of anybody querying your authority or action).

According to Samuel Johnson, the *Alaafin* was the supreme head of Yoruba kingdom:

*The Alaafin is the supreme head of all the kings and princes of the Yoruba nation. He is the direct lineal descendant and successor of the reputed founder of the nation.*

However, this assertion is too encompassing as the *Alaafin’s* authority did not extend to the entire Yorubaland even at the apex of Oyo’s wealth and political fame between 1500-1800. In pre-colonial times, clairvoyance was credited to a typical Yoruba king. He was regarded as the most powerful, the most knowing, the wisest of all men and the paramount ruler with larger than life image.
Meanwhile, a king was expected to reciprocate this reverence and power accorded him by ensuring the prosperity of his kingdom. Likewise, misfortunes like scarcity of food, epidemics were usually blamed on the ill-luck of the king, since he was expected to establish a direct communication link with the gods either by magical means or by rites or both. The usual remedial measure was to propitiate the gods to avert negative tendencies usually through an ordained priest. On occasions when this could not reverse the situation, the king was removed through popular insurrections. In the old Oyo empire, a calabash bearing the head of a parrot was presented to the king, which signified suicide or total banishment from the kingdom. In Akure kingdom, the nakedness of the town’s women signified the urgent removal of the Deji.22

Practically, there were efficient checks and balances on a king’s functions and power. In most cases, the kingmakers participated in decision making. In old Oyo, the Bashorun was the head of the Oyomesi that served as constraints to the Alafin’s power. In other parts of Yorubaland, the fame, power and integrity of the traditional ruler were fundamentally different from that of the Alafin. In Akure, for example, the Deji was held in highest esteem and regarded as a divine king. In theory, he possessed absolute power, but in practical terms, he did not rule alone. He was assisted by some groups of Chiefs that included the Iare, Ikomo, Ejua, Ogbe and Owose. In Isinkan, the Iralepo was assisted by the Ihare, the Elegbe, the Ejua and Ikomo.23

A Short Historical Note on Isinkan.

Although the tradition of origin of Isinkan is not the aim of this paper, it, however gives us an insight into the conditions for official nominal recognition involved the kingship feuds, which is the contending issue this paper focuses on. Traditions of origin from Isinkan and the present mother town: Akure, attest to the fact that the ancestor of Isinkan, Oluroko, must have been one of the Ile-Ife migrants, since the name Oluroko is not discernible among Oduduwa’s (founder of Yoruba lineage) children, but the political and socio-cultural traits of the town possess close affinity with that of Ile-Ife.

Oluroko first settled at Ora in Epe settlement, in fact, the disjointed segment of Epe settlement is still discernible in the present Ondo town. While at Ora, Oluroko gave birth to a son named after the settlement, Ora. Oluroko later died at Ora. On the death of his father at Epe, Ora proceeded on his relocation. When he and his entourage were tired, they halted for a rest. Meanwhile, when he was approached the next morning, he was found sitting majestically on a beautiful scarlet: “Won te ite fun”, meaning clothes were spread on the throne for him. The people exclaimed “ORA LOPO” meaning Ora was on the throne.24 This was later corrupted to Iralepo (still referring to Ira, the swampy area), the title of the chieftaincy, which was imported to Isinkan. The unsuitable or inhabitable nature of Ora, being a swampy area underpinned their relocation to Oke-Isimikan, where the name of the town is design as Isinkan.

Essentially, the kingship institution of Isinkan existed in this period as a complete autonomous community with its own derived political administration. In fact, Atandare attests to this that it was a large city evident
in the king’s kitchen cabinet. For example, Lisa was the second – in – command to the king [Iralepo].

However, the 19th century wars, especially Benin-Akure Wars forced Iralepo of Isinkan and Osolo of Isolo to join forces with the bigger community, Akure, to construct trenches round their settlements, in order to ward off future external aggression. This brought about territorial adjustment. Isinkan, which was situated about 5 kilometres away from Akure moved near Akure in order to efficiently join forces together against any external invasion. This relocation had grave implications on the autonomous existence of Isinkan, which meant that Iralepo would now accord supremacy to the Deji, king of Akure.

**Modern Political Development in Isinkan**

In Yorubaland, prior to colonisation and independence, kingdoms had existed without government recognition. However, following the incursion of the British administration right from the late 19th century, a curtailment was pronounced on the traditional monarchical government, which resulted in to the use of warrant chiefs.

After independence, the Western Region government recommended that each traditional political institution in Yorubaland should seek government approval and upgrade their institutions in accordance with the Morgan Commission of 1977. In other words, any Yoruba kingdom that could trace its link with Oduduwa in Ile-Ife, the cradle of Yoruba Civilisation, would be given the staff of office (Opa Ase). This is the genesis of the kingship tussle in Isinkan as kingdoms that failed to send representations were accorded little or no recognition and perceived as non-independent kingdoms.

Either by omission or commission, Isinkan failed to send any representative to the commission, hence, the community was not officially recognised. By omission, Isinkan slept on their right, they did not appear at the Morgan commission, and probably they did not foresee any grave consequence. However, communities that were not as great as Isinkan were upgraded, simply because they agitated for their rights. It was not the case of them being Baales [village heads] and then being upgraded, just like the Olojada of Oda. The incumbent Olojada was enthroned as Baale (community or quarter head), but was later upgraded in the 1977 Commission because he thoroughly championed his course, and so was upgraded to grade C Oba. In the same vein, Aiyede of Ogbese, Alara of Ilara, Okiti of Iju and Olujare of Ijare among others were also upgraded as Obas. In fact, Weir’s Report of 1934 placed these mentioned communities under Isinkan, which was regarded as an independent village adjoining Akure, while these aforementioned were regarded as permanent Akure settlements and sub-villages under Akure. All these formed the motive behind the Community’s bitterness for not being accorded recognition. However, had Iralepo advocated for his constitutional right at the Morgan Commission, the tussle would have been really unnecessary.

By commission, even though it was upheld that, in 1977, regency was in place, not a king, the ruling house should have sent representatives to the Commission, since they did not emerge from nowhere.
Meanwhile, the crux of the matter is that, since Isinkan kingship was not recognised by the Commission, it would have to be engulfed in a long protracted tussle that lasted for 27 years (1978-2005). The incumbent *Iralepo*, stated that he wrote his first memorandum concerning this kingship tussle on July 9, 1978 during the reign of *Oba* Adelegan Adesida, *Deji* of Akure, who was very pleased with it and commented that government should make sure something was done to restore Isinkan’s constitutional rights. Thus, all along, the *Iralepo* has been employing one means or the other to get the attention of the government in order to approve the kingship. After 1978, The *Iralepo* wrote an application to the Ondo State Council of Chiefs in 1983 for recognition under Part II of the Chiefs Law. After thorough cross-examination of the claims, the Council recommended that *Iralepo* chieftaincy should be recognised under part II of the Chiefs Law, as this would conform with the existing practice of recognising traditional heads of autonomous communities and to prevent threat to peace and stability.

However, the recommendation was not put forward without a clause, which was the disapproval of public wearing of crowns. In all, this Council’s recommendation cannot be discarded on account of the restraint because it recognised the autonomous identity of Isinkan.

In 1982, the Akure Local Government Secretary, Ayo Oderinde forwarded a letter to the Ondo State government on the directive of the *Deji* of Akure, *Oba* Adelegan Adesida that the *Iralepo* should be upgraded from a minor to a recognised *Oba*, since the *Deji* of Akure has confirmed that both the *Osolo* of Isolo and the *Iralepo* of Isinkan are traditional rulers of their communities, just like the the sectional *Obas* in Abeokuta earlier noted. Also that the *Iralepo* of Isinkan and *Osolo* of Isolo were permitted to wear beaded crowns on ceremonial occasions in their domain. He later posited that Isinkan is a distinct quarter in Akure, not a separate community, consequently, there are evidences that Isinkan have now been overshadowed by Akure as the mother town.

Meanwhile, the *Deji*, *Oba* Adelegan Adesida III wrote a letter in 1978 that greatly enhanced the *Iralepo* status. He forwarded a letter to the Akure Local Government secretary, that *Iralepo* title should be upgraded to Part III according to the way it was carried out in Morgan Commission of 1977. The above depicts the contiguity in the claim of *Iralepo* and the *Deji*.

The Augustus Adebayo Chieftaincy Review Commission, which was set up in 1987 also furthered the issue of recognition. On behalf of the State Government, the Commission recommended that the plaintiff be granted the status of traditional ruler and be admitted to Part I of the Chiefs Edict 1984. However, action did not follow, as the State government neglected the implementation of the Committee’s recommendation. All these have made the effort of *Iralepo* in seeking for recognition to prove abortive during the 1980s.

The 1990s witnessed a more vigorous and intense phase of this struggle. The vigour and intensity probably resulted from the change in *Deji*’s Chieftaincy, that is, the demise of *Oba* Adelegan Adesida III and the installation of *Oba* Adesida Adebobajo. Since the personalities of these kings seemed to be a cogent defining factor in the race for recognition, this will also be properly analysed in the course of this paper.
In February 1994, the Iralepo forwarded another letter to the then Military Governor, Lt.Col. Mike Torey to accord the recognition based on the evidences and letters that have been earlier discussed. A source holds that Col. Torey was prepared to grant the recognition, but due to high pressure from above (Abuja-the Military base) he was curtailed from granting the recognition. Since that was the usual practice of the military government, order-from-above prevailed.

In the same year, another letter was forwarded in October to Ondo State Council of Obas, portraying the history of Isinkan as of descent from Oduduwa and the mode of appointment of Iralepo independent of external party, that is solely by Isinkan kingmakers. In sum, that princes do not beget kings, but kingmakers, more importantly, revealing the constitutional roles of Iralepo as a traditional ruler of his own people and urging the Council to implement the recognition. As usual, this effort was abortive; nothing was done to elevate the status of the Iralepo.

Since the above did not suffice, another letter was forwarded in 1994 to Col. Ahmed Usman, the Military Administrator of Ondo State. But this time, it was a joint effort by the Iralepo of Isinkan and the Osolo of Isolo who was also not recognised as an Oba. They pleaded the distinction of their communities from Akure especially in the area of traditional festivals like Ilefunta and Aeregbe which are restricted to Akure. Also at the demise of the Deji when trees were felled in Akure, it was not carried out in the two communities. The 1934 Weir’s report was also used to argue their position. In fairness to Usman, Engineer James Olusoga, an eminent Akure personality noted:

> when I was the Ondo State commissioner for Works, Usman, the then military governor asked me to go and meet the Deji to grant the recognition. I went with the Commissioner for Justice and Attorney General Chief Esan, this was because the Deji Adebobajo, before he was installed advocated for Iralepo, but when we got to him the song changed.

From the above, the personality of the Deji, Oba Adebobajo prevailed. Prior to this period, his predecessor, Adelegan advocated for this recognition and even pleaded on their behalf with the government; paradoxically, when the government was ready to approve the recognition based on the Deji’s consent, the table was turned around and the unprecedented occurred.

At this juncture, it was becoming apparent that it would involve the intervention of higher authorities, since all the relevant authorities were either reluctant or unwilling to accord the recognition. The decision to summon the case to court was finalised when unconstitutional act was pronounced. The Deji, Adebobajo, and his Lisa, High Chief Folorunso David, second in command to the Deji held that he (Iralepo) should be put in the Iare Council of Chiefs, meaning that Iralepo would be in the 7th position to the Deji which was considered to be wrong, thus further stipulating that Iralepo would be in a meeting rotational in the Iare. In the first place it is not traditionally correct to have a 7th-position-Chief-to-the king, because the Iwarefa Mefa group of High Chiefs consisted of six chiefs that met in the Asamo of Akure’s house, for traditional rotational meeting. Therefore it would be a cultural aberration to have such an arrangement. Iralepo perceived this as a relegation that can only be restrained by court injunction.
Consequently, the time was ripe to seek the recognition in the law court. The *Iralepo* sued the Government, since it was the responsibility of the government to issue the staff of office. The *Deji* and Akure Chiefs joined in the suit on the side of government. The writ of summons was issued and the case began in earnest in December 1996 at the Federal High Court, Akure.

In due time, the hearing of the case commenced. In fact, this case caused a deep seated rivalry between Isinkan and Akure, for the ten years (December 1996 to December 2004) that the case was tried in the court. During the hearing of the case, all the earlier mentioned evidences were arrayed in the court, and witnesses were brought from both sides (plaintiffs and defendants) to testify for and against their views.

In the course of the hearing, there were some salient facts observed that would further enhance thorough understanding of this essay. Although we are not competent to review any law record, because we are not skilled in that field, nonetheless, there are seasoned historical facts that add flavour to this research. Besides, history is a multidisciplinary subject. Hence, historically relevant issues are raised. Chief Joseph Abegunde, one time *Omolare* of Akure (a Palace Chief) shed more light on the crisis based on his experience in the palace since 1953. He noted that since he had been working with Oba Afunbiowo Adesida I, the *Iralepo* did not attend the palace ceremonies, *Ogun Olokun, Ogunjesa and Ogun Akure*, which were ceremonies perfomed in the palace that weaved the palace Chiefs together. The reason for this, according to him, was that *Iralepo* was a traditional ruler of his own people and has his own palace ceremonies meant for his Chiefs and himself. In essence, tradition forbids *Iralepo*’s attendance in these ceremonies in Akure. Traditional record of the four groups of Chiefs, the *Eghare*, the *Ikomo*, the *Ejua* and *Ogbe* headed by Chief Lisa, Chief Sao, Chief Asamo and Chief Ajana respectively, shows that they do not belong to any of the group. The four met in Chief Asamo’s palace every nine days. He further posited:

*I was attending the meeting once in every nine days at the Asamo’s place. The plaintiffs do not attend the meetings... because they have their own meetings in their domain.*

It must be clearly stated that the testimony of this palace Chief is germane because of his experience at the palace since 1953 where he served for 46 years. He further affirmed that as a palace Chief, the installation was usually carried out at *Ojukoto* in the *Deji*’s palace but the installation of *Iralepo* was perfomed at the *Igboye* shrine. Similarly, Chiefs do not climb the *Okittiomoolore* (the noble hill of the royals), but the *Iralepo* did, since it was meant exclusively and traditionally for *Obas*.

In another vein, the claim that *Iralepo* is hailed *Kabiyesi* does not hold water because he (*Omolare*) held that *Lisa*, is also saluted as *Kabiyesi* and also known as *Oteru Oba Ode*. Also, due to the intertwined nature of Akure people and Isinkan people greatly owing to geographical proximity of the two communities, there is no clear cut distinction in their dialect:
As a matter of fact, outside Akure, someone cannot claim to be an indigene of Isinkan, but Akure before reference can be made to Isinkan. Meanwhile, this is not to say that Isinkan is not an independent settlement. At least the political autonomy cannot be underestimated. After cross examination by the prosecuting and defending counsel, it was agreed that the facts given are true.

Another personality that gave a relevant testimony was High Chief Aminu Balogun, the Aro of Oke-Aro quarters. He provided another perspective that Gabriel Adelegan Adesida, the Deji of Akure appointed the Iralepo, hence, Isinkan is a quarter. Also, the Isinkan people did not come to Akure with any crown, because they came as war refugees during the reign of Oba Gbogi. He also affirmed that his position as a quarter Chief (Aro) is equivalent to that of the Iralepo.

However, he later admitted and confirmed a photograph presented to him bearing the portrait of Iralepo with Iere Okin crown which is meant exclusively for Obas in Yorubaland. Earlier, he observed that he(Iralepo) was installed by Oba Adelegan; however, a letter forwarded to him (Adelegan) by a renowned Akure prince, Adegoroye, restraining him from interfering in the appointment of Iralepo, as tradition severely forbids it was presented in the court:

--- By tradition your Highness will remember the Deji of Akure never has anything to do with the selection, appointment or installation of an Iralepo, who is himself an Oba of Isinkan people which people have, due to the growth of Akure township, been submerged into Akure township but who, to this day still have their own tradition to follow and implement in the matter of appointing their Oba- the Iralepo. If your highness has any doubt, then the issue arises as to how your highness can claim a right that was never exercised by your ancestors...
The Iralepo’s position is singularly inviolate and must be so treated...

The above extract clears any doubt as to the involvement of the Deji in the appointment of the Iralepo, because the coming of such from one of the leading princes in Akure absolutely leaves no room for skepticism, as to the traditional existence of Isinkan as an independent community, at least politically.

Another claim that needs to be examined is the claim that the Iralepo wears a crown. The Aro posited that the Iralepo only wears a coronet, not a crown which is also worn by Akure Chiefs. Thus, there is no special traditional implication attached to wearing of coronets. Similarly, there has been no time in history that the Iralepo wore his crown to the Deji’s palace. The latter fact is not disputed by the Iralepo that they do not wear crown to the Deji’s palace as a sign of respect and recognising the paramountcy of the Deji as supreme and major ruler in the area.

All told, the High Court of Justice presided over by Justice A.O. Akinwalere declared that:
Joseph Olu Ojo, the Iralepo of Isinkan is the traditional Oba and paramount ruler of Isinkan community in Akure and he is entitled to be admitted into part I of the Chiefs Edict 1984 of Ondo State of Nigeria as a recognized chief--- the 1st plaintiff (Iralepo) be accorded the right to wear the paraphernalia of office as the traditional Oba and paramount ruler of Isinkan community.  

In contrast to earlier observed recommendations, the verdict was followed by appropriate action in the following year, 2005. Following the court verdict, the then Governor, Olusegun Agagu, issued and presented the long awaited staff of authority of the Iralepo.

Not pleased with the court verdict, the Adesida Royal Family and some Akure High Chiefs, Lisa and Aro, among others filed an appeal to the court of Appeal, Benin. At the moment of writing, the case is still in the process of hearing, that is, judgment is not proclaimed yet. This informs why the discourse of this paper stops at 2005, because a complete history cannot be written, particularly as the case is still in court. This explains the reason why some people regard the kingship as a pending kingship that can only stand the test of time as long as the Appeal Court verdict favours them.

Nonetheless, Engineer Olusoga postulated that from all indications, that is, following the available evidence, most of which have been earlier discussed, the Iralepo is likely to get his kingship re-affirmed as a king of his people.

A Discourse on Isinkan Kingship Travails

The fact that Isinkan’s ancestor was one of the Ile-Ife migrants, shows that the town qualifies for the recognition, in accordance with the 1977 Morgan Commission.

Meanwhile, two factors significantly affected the autonomy of Isinkan. First, the 19th century wars, specifically the Benin-Akure War brought Isinkan geographically closer to Akure, especially the circumscription of the community within the trench[Yara]. This could have been misinterpreted to affect its separate identity. The second factor is the failure of the community to secure official recognition in the Morgan Commission. This is being exploited by the Deji to claim that Isinkan is but a quarter in Akure.

Even with or without the recognition, the Deji’s (Adebobajo) predecessors recognised Iralepo as an Oba of his own people. Oba Afunbiowo had no dissension with the reigns of Iralepo Onaowuro (1919-1932) and Iralepo Alade Otutubiosun (1932-1976). Similarly, the Dejis that succeeded Afunbiowo, Agunsoye Ademuagun Adesida II (1957-1973) manifested no opposition to the position of Iralepos. Likewise, Oba Adelegan III (1975-1991) that reigned during and after the Morgan Commission was not aggrieved concerning the reign of Iralepo in Isinkan. This is evident in the letters and memoirs reviewed above that the Deji forwarded to appropriate authorities to make sure tradition was followed.
Following the necessary conditions to be met before kingship in Yorubaland is recognised, the mode of appointment of an *Iralepo* leaves little or no room for doubt as to the position of *Iralepo* as an *Oba*. During the installation ceremony of an *Iralepo* elect, he performs nine days *Arapon* (seclusion) ceremony like the *Deji* and not seven days meant for the Chiefs. The *Iralepo* climbs the *Okitionoloore* at installation, while Chiefs do not. The *Iralepo* is installed at *Igboye* shrine in Isinkan, while Akure Chiefs are installed at *Ojukoto* in the *Deji*’s palace.

On the other hand, another tradition from the Akure perspective noted that during the coronation of an *Iralepo*, a delegate from the *Deji* was always present to represent the *Deji*. The relevance claim has been contested on the ground that even if there was representation it stipulates the extent of cordiality between the two communities, following the existence of Isinkan inside the moat. In comparison, the traditional sitting of the *Deji* on *Owa* (king) of Ilesa’s lap does not make the *Deji* inferior or subservient to the *Owa* but a mark of traditional affinity that exists between the two communities in terms of the emergence of *Deji* lineage.

Another point of obscurity is the fact that the *Iralepo* wears fetish crown meant for ceremonial purposes, whereas Chiefs do not wear fetish crowns. A Chief in Akure, the *Odopetu* who tried it on an occasion was sternly warned and fined:

> Sometime in ----- 1990, Odopetu during his new Yam festival adorned himself with a crown, The case was reported to the Deji of Akure in council and Odopetu was fined 2 cows.\(^{48}\)

Whereas, the *Iralepo* has never been sanctioned by any *Oba* in Akure for wearing the crown even at his domain.

Another bone of contention arises as to why the kingship tussle lasted so long. During the reign of *Oba* Adelegan Adesida in Akure, he advocated for the approval of the constitutional right of Isinkan, starting from memos and letters to the Chieftaincy Commission Council till his demise in 1991. Similarly, prior to the coronation of Adebobajo as a king, he advocated for the *Iralepo*, that he should become an *Oba*, but on getting to the throne, the story changed. Meanwhile, the tussle was about over, when the then Military Administrator, Colonel Torey sent delegation in 1995 to seek the consent of the *Deji* concerning the approval, but the consent was not given as earlier observed. The above makes a critical mind to ponder why the same personality that had approved the kingship before his installation changed his mind.

A source has it that the *Deji*, Adebobajo was unwilling due to some reasons advanced by his chiefs. Specifically, some of his High Chiefs: *Asamo, Lisa, Aro, and Elemikan* instigated him that Isinkan should not be allowed any measure of political autonomy as it would amount to division in Akure kingdom which the Adesida Ruling House seemed to be presiding over, this was because the Royal Family has ruled Akure for a century. It was believed that the rotational ruling system would go to obscurity and the only ruling house would be Adesida.\(^{49}\)
The above partly explains the reason why Adebobajo disallowed Iralepo from becoming a Chieftain and invited him to his Iare group of Chiefs and the consequent court suit that followed, which made the struggle to become protracted.

However, the bolt was untied when the Osupa Ruling House succeeded Adesida Royal Family in the Deji kingship. Besides, speculations are rife in Akure that Asamo instigated Adebobajo against Iralepo due to petty jealousy against Iralepo, whereas Iralepo happened to be a friend of his. But due to his position as a High Chief, he did not want his friend to be hailed as Kabiyesi. Although this appears to be mere speculation, which can hardly be accepted as a historical fact, the disposition of the Akure Chiefs after the 2005 government recognition partly attest to the above. The Odopetu, another High Chief also wants to be recognised as an Oba like Iralepo, evident in the suit he filed against the Deji of Akure.

On the other hand, the rationale behind the action of Adebobajo cannot be discarded in totality, because provided the recognition is re-affirmed in the Court of Appeal, Benin, Akure metropolis may likely be in shambles, because the (other) quarters like Ado-Akure may perceive it as an impetus to seek for independence of their domain, in the same way the Odopetu has just started to do. Meanwhile, the Elemo of Akureland regarded the case of the Odopetu as a horse of another colour whose position is different from that of Iralepo. In fact, another source avers that since the mode of appointment of Odopetu cannot be likened to a king, and in so far as Odopetu is appointed by the Deji, he does not have any group of kingmakers. All these actually make his case different from that of the Iralepo. Julius Sani Adebo, from the quarter of Odo-Ikoyi in Akureland remarks about the situation:

\[\text{somebody can stay in his house and say he is a king of his house, but it is now left for the government to approve the acclaimed status.}\]

Consequently, the verdict of the court remains final as to whether any quarter can successfully secede either in present time or in the age to come.

**Concluding Remarks**

This paper has presented the travails of kingship institution in Yorubaland in general and Isinkan in particular from the pre-colonial times up 2005. Isinkan has being a community in Akure, that can be partly substantiated in the traditional Pelupelu meeting attended by Kings in pre-colonial years. Moreover, kingship institution is not a recent phenomenon in Isinkan, it is prior to Ora, the son of Oluroko on arrival at Isinkan, as earlier observed. Similarly, the ancestor of Isinkan, Oluroko, was one of the Ile – Ife migrants. Although no government record attests to the fact that they had kings, the primacy is reserved that the Iralepo is the head of his community, not Chief of his quarter in Akure. Even the Deji of Akure is referred to by Weir as the Head or Chairman of Akure Community heads.
In sum, it becomes legitimate for Isinkan Chieftaincy, headed by the Iralepo to be recognised by the Government as a traditional ruler of his people. On the other hand, at every stage of the nation’s political engineering, the institution of monarchy has suffered one form of onslaught or the other, which has gravely dragged the once-revered institution down the hill. As a matter of fact, the 20th century political development in Yorubaland greatly affected Isinkan monarchical institution as the government stood in the position of a superior body that ratified the traditional system of leadership.

Meanwhile, a complete history of the kingship travails cannot be written for now, since the litigation is still on-going in the Appeal Court, Benin.

Notes


9. Ibid.
10. Interview held with *Oba* Joseph Olu Ojo, The Iralepo of Isinkan, 76 years. He is the Head of Isinkan Community 18-02-2008


13. R.O. Lasisi and Jimoh (*et al*), Imeri Kingdom: Origin and Record of Civil Appeal from the High Court of Justice Ondo State, Akure Judicial Division Holden at Akure to the Court of Appeal Benin, 2005, p. 3.


23. Interview held with *Oba* Joseph Olu Ojo, the *Iralepo* of Isinkan.

24. Interview held with Motunrayo Adubuola, 62 years at her residence, 35 Esho street, Owode Quarters, Akure. She is versed in Isinkan and Akure History. 01-08-2008.

26. Interview held with *Oba* Joseph Olu Ojo, the Iralepo of Isinkan.

27. Interview held with James Olusoga, an Engineer and the Special Adviser to the Governor on Infrastructure, 70 years, at his office, Ministry of Works Akure, he is an eminent Akure indigene versed in Akure History. 11-07-2008.

28. Interview held with Chief Bolanle Adedipe, The Elemo of Ilemo quarters, Akure 75 years, at his residence, No. 1 Ilemo quarters, Akure. He is High Chief and part of the Deji’s kitchen cabinet *IWAREFA MEFA*. 13-07-08.

29. Interview held with *Oba* Joseph Olu Ojo, the Iralepo of Isinkan.


31. Minutes of 22nd Statutory Meeting of the Ondo State Council Chiefs.

32. Ref. Ak. LG. 50/12, Secretary to Akure Local Government J. Ayo Oderinde forwarded a letter to the Secretary of the State Government in 1982.


34. Record of Civil Appeal from High Court of Justice Ondo State, Akure Judicial Division Holden at Akure to the High Court of Appeal Benin, p. 22.

35. Record of Civil Appeal from High Court of Justice Ondo State, Akure Judicial Division Holden at Akure to the High Court of Appeal Benin, p. 22.

36. Interview held with James Olusoga.

37. Record of Civil Appeal from High Court of Justice of Ondo State, Akure Judicial Division, p. 54.

38. Record of Civil Appeal from the High Court of Justice of Ondo State, Akure Judicial Division, pp. 81-82.


40. Record of Civil Appeal from the High Court of Justice of Ondo State, Akure Judicial Division, p. 82.
41. Interview held with Iralepo of Isinkan.

42. Record of Civil Appeal from the High Court of Justice of Ondo State, Akure Judicial Division, p. 124.

43. Interview held with *Oba* Joseph Olu Ojo, The Iralepo of Isinkan

44. Record of Civil Appeal from the High Court of Justice of Ondo State, p.124.

45. Interview held with *Oba* Joseph Olu Ojo, The Iralepo of Isinkan

46. Record of Civil Appeal from the High Court of Justice of Ondo State, p.124.

47. Interview held with Engineer James Olusoga.

48. Interview held with *Oba* Joseph Olu Ojo, the Iralepo of Isinkan.

49. Interview held with Chief Elemo.

50. Interview held with Chief Elemo.

51. Interview held with Chief Julius Sani Adebo, the Atuwase of Akureland, 75 years. He is the quarter Chief Odo Ikoyi quarter. It was held at his residence, No. 66, Odo Ikoyi Street, Akure.09-07-2008.

52. Interview held with Victoria Ajayi in the Obas’s Market, 58 years, 10-07-2008, she is an Akure indigene versed in Akure History.


54. *Pelupelu* is the traditional meeting of the Yoruba Obas.
The Place of Marx in Contemporary Thought: The Case of Jean Baudrillard.

By Gerry Coutler

I. Introduction

The grand Marxist promise has ended (Baudrillard, 2001b:95).

Marx believed that in economics and its dialectical procedure he found fundamental agency, all he found was what haunts it (Baudrillard, [1976] 1993c:237).

Marx is still of central importance to class analysis of contemporary society and for many his overall critique of capitalism remains unsurpassed. Yet the impact of Marx on contemporary thought continues to moderate as we approach the second decade of the twenty-first century. One way we can consider the place of Marx in contemporary thought is to assess the place he occupies in the thought of recent major theorists.

This paper examines the place of Marx in Jean Baudrillard’s writing (he appears in thirty of Baudrillard’s 45 books between 1968 and 2007). Marx’s place in Baudrillard is telling of a time in which his work has been subjected to radical criticism and in which Marx is justifiably becoming less central to contemporary thought. Baudrillard is an important barometer to use to consider what has happened to Marx as he was one of the first to begin to seriously challenge Marx’s writings. Indeed, the break from Marx(ism) was a significant event in Baudrillard’s life which made possible so much of his mature thought. Baudrillard’s encounter with Marx, while seldom referred to in contemporary theoretical discussions, is highly indicative of what has happened to Marx in recent years.

This paper examines Baudrillard’s writing about Marx(ism) at two levels: 1) Baudrillard’s more general challenges to Marx and, 2) his more specific charges concerning Marx’s failure to significantly surpass bourgeois analysis. Both contain difficult and interesting lessons especially for those trying to locate Marx’s importance in contemporary theory.
II. Baudrillard’s General Challenge to Marx

Baudrillard did not believe in the death of Marxist thought. Responding to a question in 1993 he said that Marx’s thought “continues to make a difference even though it does not have the impact it once had politically” (1993a:203). As he also told interviewers in 1993 “Marx’s analysis was certainly influential upon my work, but I immediately came to question it, became ambivalent about it, and distanced myself from it” (Ibid.:20). A decade later he told François L’Yvonnet that his break with Marx came during the writing of the *Mirror of Production* ([1973] 1975) in the early 1970s ([2001] 2004:20). This is correct but a break is certainly detectable in his work theorizing *The System of Objects* ([1968] 1996) and *The Consumer Society* ([1970] 1998). For me Baudrillard evolved as a thinker in the late 1960s and early 1970s as Marx’s radical other.

For Baudrillard the general problem with Marx is that time had, in important ways, passed his analysis by. For my part I have no doubt that Baudrillard would have preferred to live in a time when Marx’s writings were fresh and new, when he felt politics could have more meaning, and there were more things in which to believe. However, Baudrillard like all of us, had to face the challenges of postmodernity and the revolution of our time which is, he said: “the uncertainty revolution” ([1990] 1993b:43). Baudrillard’s assessment of Marx is intricately connected to his own quest to embrace the challenge of radicality in uncertain times. This led Baudrillard to write, what were for Marxists, heretical words in his major work on Marx: “Marx is not in an historical position to speak the truth” ([1973] 1975:117). For Baudrillard, Marx was merely the owner of “a perspective” which was resigned to one view concerning the “laws of history and dialectics” (Ibid.:162). As early as 1973 Baudrillard [who adopted a political detachment even before May 1968 (see 1993a:74)], wrote that all of Marx’s concepts must be questioned ([1973] 1975:21), and that what is required is a critique of the structural limits of Marx’s assessment (Ibid.:65 ff.).

At a more general level then, Baudrillard’s challenge to Marx is that his writing can no longer be taken at face value, as it still was by several thinkers, to explain contemporary society (Ibid:152). In this, Marx’s thought succumbs to an unavoidable reversibility – the inversion which is the fate of every theory and critique ([1973] 1975:50). Baudrillard was also among the first to point out that we had already entered a post-Marxist age (1993a:20). For Baudrillard a kind of revolution had taken place in value which Marx’s analysis was unable to explain ([1976] 1993c: 6 ff.). What he meant by this is that Marx had focused on “classical” value – the more natural stage of use-value and the commodity stage of exchange value. For Baudrillard value had passed through a structural stage (sign value), and was entering a fractal stage – a point of no reference at all “where value radiates in all directions” ([1990] 1993b:5). As he told Philippe Petit: “we lost use-value, then good old exchange value, obliterated by speculation, and we are currently losing even sign value for an indefinite signaletics” ([1997] 1998b:3-4).

Baudrillard also noted, contra Marx, that “capital has not lurched from one crisis to another as he predicted” ([2000] 2002:23). In Baudrillard’s assessment, Marx was turned away from radical exigency (as
were many 19th century thinkers), by the need he felt to devise historical laws ([1973] 1975:161). Marx had adopted a law of necessity and the idea of perpetual transcendence according to Baudrillard ([Ibid.]:61). History is thus tranhistoricized by Marx (universalized) as the class struggle and the mode of production is projected into all of history ([Ibid.]:47, 67). This mindset, combined with a belief in dialectics, allows Marx to fabricate labour power and production into the equivalent of historical reason working itself out ([1976] 1993c:12). In Marx then, Baudrillard finds the negativity of labour lost as it has been raised to an absolute value ([1973] 1975:34) and so, within Marx’s writing, labour becomes an ideological concept ([Ibid.]:43). Marx also, says Baudrillard, “eliminates the analysis of ideological labour” ([1972] 1981:89) and, in the end, leaves us with an enigma which Baudrillard expresses in the devastating question: “how is surplus value born?” ([1973] 1975:26 ff.).

For Baudrillard, Marx constructed a theory which is “irredeemably partial” ([1972] 1981:165) lacking a truly “radical analysis of labour and production” ([1973] 1975:21-51). Among the most vital of these “general-level” problems Baudrillard had with Marx is that “ideological priority is given to exchange value” ([Ibid.]:24). Marx thus fails to conceive of social wealth being founded by other than labour and production ([Ibid.]:29 ff.). Marx’s writing is thus incapable of doing that which it promises – theorizing total social practice ([Ibid.]:152) and is entirely incapable of “responding to a social process that far exceeds material production” (such as contemporary mass media) ([1972] 1981:165-66). Baudrillard thus radically departs with Marx in developing his own understanding of the importance of symbolic exchange.

For Baudrillard symbolic exchange concerns reversibility – the fact that all systems eventually break down as the result of their own success – which operates at a radically different level than Marx’s understanding of exchange value ([1973] 1975:51). It is not dialectics that will end capitalism for Baudrillard, but capitalism itself that will end capitalism. As for dialectics, in our time of hypertelia, proliferation, and indeterminacy, they are finished for Baudrillard (1999a:91; and [1976] 1993c:59). Transcendence, that most urgent Marxist concept, is no longer a viable according to Baudrillard ([1999] 2001:51). For Baudrillard, the world no longer had a chance of escape into an upper realm of Truth, God, the Law, or the Idea, but merely the lower reaches of immanence ([1987] 1990b:86). This is precisely what makes our time so unbearable to so many in Baudrillard’s assessment (2005:25).

Baudrillard also questions the place of freedom in Marx’s analysis. He says that for Marx, freedom is based on the domination of nature (a very capitalist idea) ([1973] 1975:67), and that Marx makes a promise of liberation out of what is (and has repeatedly been shown to be since Marx’s time) “a process of repression” ([Ibid.]:154). What happens with Marx, and Marxists who follow him, is that a great irony occurs – those who seek to revolutionize class struggle actually put an end to it “burying it under a theoretical project” ([1977] 1987:13). It is this very contingent, determinist, universalized theoretical project – ideologically committed to productivism via labour and man’s [sic] command of nature, that leads us, in Baudrillard’s assessment, to the deeper and more specific problem with Marx: his failure to provide an alternative to productivist capitalism ([1972] 1981:90).
III. Baudrillard on Marx’s Failure to Provide An Alternative To Capitalism

Baudrillard ultimately finds Marx able to offer a thoroughgoing critic of capitalism in his own time but one which lacks the kind of radicality we need today. And, even in his analysis of his own time, Marx is further charged with misunderstanding those capitalist formations ([1973] 1975:93-109). To be precise, it is, in Baudrillard’s terms, the “production of the production system” which escapes Marx (Ibid.:66). Baudrillard has a very good point here as in Marx there is a constant assumption (it is intrinsic to his understanding of labour and nature), that production is taken for granted – what is wrong is merely how it is organized. So, Baudrillard quite rightly gets to the core of some very important implications of Marx’s thought – especially the obvious fact (to everyone but Marxists), that production (as a form) is not subjected by Marx to radical analysis (Ibid.:20). Baudrillard says that Marx has kind of “theoretical allergy to everything that isn’t material production and productive labour” ([1972] 1981:167 ff.). Marx’s theory is, for Baudrillard, one that “analyzes the social field that it produces” ([1976] 1993c:221-22).

This specific challenge leads Baudrillard to a series of insights concerning Marx, which were for a time in the 1970’s and 1980’s, distinctive to him as a theorist. Baudrillard’s radical challenge to Marx is that his perspective suffers (along with a commitment to productivism and over-determination of man as producer) ([1973 1975:31-32), the same humanist virus which bourgeois thought shares (Ibid.:49). Marx’s very analysis, despite itself, is charged by Baudrillard with “assisting the cunning of capital”, “contributing to the capitalist mythology”, and “reproducing the system of political economy” ([1973] 1975:31; and [1972] 1981:134). In its commitment to continued productivism (after the revolution), Marxism finds itself ironically in the same position as bourgeois economics ([1972] 1981:115). By centering itself (from the Paris Manuscripts of 1844 (1977) onwards) on “man’s productive vocation” ([1973] 1975:36), Marx’s assessment of capitalist society succumbs to a dialectic and Christian ethic which produces a critique which is not radical, but rather, plays a key role in reproducing the existing system of political economy (Ibid.:36-37). It is difficult to argue with Baudrillard on this point as every single authority which attempted to bring about a revolution based on Marx’s ideas did indeed reproduce a state-capitalist version of capitalist political economy (Ibid.:67). Beyond this devastating problem, Baudrillard says that Marx was unable to foresee “that capital would, in the face of an immanent threat to its existence, launch itself into an orbit beyond the relations of production, and political contradictions, to make itself autonomous, to totalize the world in its own image” ([1990] 1993b:10). Baudrillard refers to this as our contemporary transeconomic condition “where classical economics gets lost in pure speculation” (2000:52).

For Baudrillard then, Marx makes the mistake of attempting to offer a radical critique of political economy in the form of political economy ([1973] 1975:50). Marx does not produce a radical alternative to productivism – but merely the “socialist” mirror of capitalist production (Ibid.:152). Marx’s illusion, and all writing ultimately succumbs to illusion for Baudrillard, is that he believed in the “possibility of revolution within the system” ([1976] 1993c:35). This leaves us with the difficult fact that Marx’s theory, when we cut it to the bone as Baudrillard does, “never stopped being on the side of capitalism” (2001b:95). This is because Marx’s thought “retains concepts which depend on the metaphysics of market economy” ([1973] 1975:59). This is why Baudrillard was able to go beyond Marx and to find, in places like California (or...
France), a form of revised Marxism functioning as advanced capitalism ([1986] 1988:46). Marx and his followers were thus never able to go beyond capitalism (some form of state capitalism based on productivism) and a range of neo-Christian and humanist understandings of labour. In our contemporary times Baudrillard finds those who were to be the heroes of the revolution turned into the silent but tired anti-heroes of consumption ([1970] 1998:182.

IV. Conclusion

Among the insights we gain from Baudrillard’s writings on Marx is that capital (its historical function) produces the social. In this Marx was right. But when the objective determinations of capital lose their force, Baudrillard correctly points out: “the social will not overcome capital according to some dialectical movement”. This means that, for Baudrillard, the Left is dying “of the same causes as power” (2001b:97). This is also why Left and Right are becoming less useable as analytic categories and why many have become dissatisfied with or indifferent to them.

If we take Baudrillard’s understanding of Marx to its logical conclusions we arrive at some provocative challenges. The Left for example, despite itself, is never really anything more than a prosthesis of the right (Ibid.) All the Left can do now, especially in the age of ecological-correctness, is play the sad role of “setting up models of pacified socialization” ([1976] 1993c:173). This has become, pathetically, the fate of several progressive groups (including some who are unionists, feminists, and environmentalists) especially those who seek to revive public morality by pitifully begging on bended knee before the Law. Others merely remain “stuck in denunciation” ([2000] 2002:206). As much as the Left persists at all it does so in many ways as a last vestige of Marx – defunct and “spontaneously doing the work of the right” ([1981] 1994:16].

Another implication of our post-Marx(ist) condition is that we are left with a circumstance in which “people are no longer fighting alienation but a kind of dispossession” ([1997] 1998:19). In Baudrillard’s terms this means that we are no longer combating the spectre of alienation, but that of hyper-reality ([1995] 1996:66). Baudrillard did not like our contemporary condition but he did his best to thrive as a thinker and a writer while coming to grips with its radical uncertainty. Writing for himself, beyond the political, after any possibility of transcendence, was his post-Marxist politics. As he said with such heart rendering poignancy for a man of his generation: “there are no children of May” (2001b:74). And so Baudrillard leaves us to ask “Who are we?” and “where are we going?” largely without Marx.

References


Endnotes


2 The date of original publication of Baudrillard’s books in French appears in square brackets throughout this paper.

3 Baudrillard notes elsewhere that Marx also offers a distorted view of primitive societies ([1976] 1993:140; and [1973] 1975:49 ff.).
This essay is the first examination in English of the portrayal of the mother figure in the writing of Israel’s most celebrated and greatest living author Amos Oz. Through a reading of several of Oz’s novels and short stories, the essay will argue that the anti-motherhood theme permeates Oz’s gender constructs in many of the works of fiction he has produced, and is part of a more general campaign of reinforcing negative and conventionalised views of women.

In her groundbreaking book *Sexual Politics* Kate Millett declares that: “As we all know, it has been open season on mothers for some two decades” (Millett 1971: 336). In her analysis of misogyny in literature Rogers posits that the twentieth Century has seen the increasing tendency of male authors to attack motherhood and concludes that: “The most significant new development of recent decades has been the undisguised attacks on woman as mother.” (Rogers:1996, 230).

Often is the case, that in the Amos Oz cannon, the invented familiar image of an uncaring mother is of one who rejects and abandons her child. In Oz’s fictional mother representations, the mothers are neglectful and incompetent not because they are career women who have chosen to work out of the home, and thus driven to leave their young alone. Rather, they are either stay-at-home mothers who for some unexplained reason seem incapable of bestowing love and care for their children, or mothers who forsakes their offspring, figuratively and literally, for self-serving reasons. A related concern is the author’s praxis of withholding pivotal information to explicate his heroines’ behaviourist aberrations, instead resorting to old clichés to imply that it inherently female to act so. Invariably, the author skews the mother/child dyad by snapping the biological and emotional ties innate in that relationship, and never pauses to explore the emotions involved or the psychological mechanics that propel that situation. On the other hand, the fathers are established as antonyms to the mothers. Aschkenasy observes that the mother in Jewish tradition is “...often seen as ferocious and capable of betraying her innate and maternal instincts of love and compassion for her offspring” (Aschkenasy 1986: 93). She further adds that it is most often only the mothers who are portrayed as faithless and treacherous (Aschkenasy::93).

The attack on motherhood is ossified in *My Michael* (Oz 1991) through the figure of Hanna Gonen, and underpins Oz’s treatment of the central heroine as a whole. Early on in the novel, following the birth of her first son, Yair, she suffers from complications, does not attend the circumcision ceremony, and remains...
in hospital for ten days (Oz: 58-63). Fuchs argues that:

...Hana’s sickness is an excuse, a physical manifestation of her psychological rejection of her son which becomes clear when Hana becomes well again. For although she is able to take care of the baby, she tends to neglect him. Hana’s sickness...may also be interpreted as a metaphorical expression of her mental sickness-namely, her maternal dysfunctioning (1987: 78).

Indeed, Gertz offers a similar assessment, writing that Hanna experiences Yair’s birth as that of death, and fails to establish any kind of a meaningful bond with him (1980: 45). During the pregnancy, she intentionally refrains from describing her feelings in becoming a mother for the first time, and in her diary entries virtually ignores the actual birth. Apart from a few general statements describing her physical condition, the pregnancy is dealt with fleetingly, especially when compared to the attention her dreams and mundane occurrences receive. Yair’s birth is reported in this matter-of-fact description “Our son Yair was born in March 1951.” (Oz 1991: 57). Hanna depicts before us the pregnancy and the birth—two immensely significant emotional and physical episodes in her life—in cold and passionless terms.

Soon after she returns home with the baby, she reveals her lack of love and warmth for her newborn: “Sometimes when the baby cried and Michael was out, I would get up barefoot and violently rock the cradle...as if my son had wronged me. I was an indifferent mother during the early months of my son’s life...”(Oz: 67). Later she confesses, “...at times I imagined perversely that it was I who had wanted to get rid of the baby...I owed nothing to anyone, not even to this pink, healthy wicked child. Yes, Yair was wicked.” (Oz: 67). It is important to recognize that this behavior cannot be simply dismissed as Post-Natal Syndrome, as the absence of affection and nurture for Yair remains constant throughout the novel. In fact, Michael notices her lack of love for Yair, and implores her to try, as hard as it may be, to love the child—an emotion normally innate in every mother, “I’m nothing special, Hanna, but you must try as hard as you can to love Yair...I have the feeling that you’re not wild about him.”(Oz: 122).

When Yair hurts himself falling down the stairs she bandages the wound without looking at his face (Oz: 75), and her violent outbursts against the child border on the pathological. She tells us that she would beat Yair viciously if he displayed a tinge of independence: “I would thrash him, without looking into his grey, calm eyes, until panting, I succeeded in wringing the sobs from his eyes. His will power was so strong that it sometimes made me shudder, and when his pride was finally broken, he would throw me a grotesque whimper which sounded more like an imitation of a crying child (Oz: 88). At the dentist she forcibly sits him into the chair, even though he shows no resistance to do so, as is to be expected of small children (Oz: 175). Moreover, she seems incapable of taking delight at his maturity or intelligence. Thus, for example, when he shows curiosity at the Dentist’s medical tools she is repelled by such an interest, and oddly concludes that a five year old with such an inquisitive mind will develop into a disgusting boy (Oz: 176).

Similarly, when Yair exhibits emotions of joy, she disapproves of him being happy, seemingly unable to share in his happiness. Repeatedly, she is unable to answer his questions, either because of their complex nature or her impatience, and directs him to Michael, who is always willing to cultivate Yair’s precocious
intellectual growth. It is for this reason and others, that Yair feels alienated from his mother. Eventually he becomes aware of his mother’s inability to meet the challenge of nourishing his active mind and providing cognitive stimulation as his father does, “You just say things without thinking about them...Daddy takes care what he says and he doesn’t talk from his thoughts. Only from his brain.” (Oz: 154).

Contrast this with the loving bond formed between Yair and Michael, and the portrayal of the male as the one devoted parent in the family. Thus, if Hanna is one of the most flamboyantly neglectful and self-centred mothers in Israeli fiction, Michael is undoubtedly one of the most committed and dedicated fathers to appear in Oz’s stories. I wholly agree with Mazor who observes that: “One of the most central motifs in the novel is that of the father.” (Mazor 1988: 176). So, if we juxtapose Michael’s and Hanna’s care for the boy, the result is twofold: First, we bring into focus Hanna’s flagrant neglect of Yair; Second, we expose Oz’s one sided portrayal of his heroine as the ‘bad’ mother.

As a matter of fact, Michael’s parental affection and treatment of Yair during his infancy elicits rare praise from Hanna: “I loved my husband when he spread a white napkin over his grey jacket, washed his hands and carefully lifted our son” (65). or “...I realised my husband had learnt how to warm milk in a bottle inside a saucepan of boiling water, to feed his child, and lift him up from time to time to make him burp so that the wind should not be trapped inside him” (88). Also, when held by Hanna, Yair in his infancy, would scream and turn red, stopping only when handed over to Michael, who would soothe him by singing to him- further accentuating the emotional distance built between mother and child as a result of the lack of maternal love and care. It is of note that whilst Hanna would strike Yair at the first sign of insolence, Michael never raised his hand against the child (88), instead unceasingly answering the boy’s questions in his calm and relaxed manner. In order to nurture and develop Yair’s penchant for sense and logic he begins to amass a stamp collection for him, despite Hanna’s taunts that he is doing so to satisfy his own infantile pleasures (96-97). Later, he succeeds in attracting Yair to this hobby, triumphing over Hanna’s abnormal lack of parental desire to enrich her child’s mind.

Given the history we already have of the relationship between Michael and Yair, it is no accident that Yair inherits from his father a sense of reason and sensible scepticism, in addition to a similar style of explanation and facial expression- a likeness Hanna frequently notices: “Michael had taught Yair to end whatever he has to say with the words ‘I have finished’. Michael himself sometimes uses this expression” (87). ; “The child’s style of explanation closely resembled his father’s” (188). ; “Yair’s brow wrinkled like his father’s when he was thinking out complicated thoughts.” (89). ; “the other children had been rather upset by the cruelty of the Egyptians...Gonen, on the other hand, had questioned the division of the Red Sea. He had given a rational explanation of the rise and fall of the tides” (202).

Oz further highlights Hanna’s shortcomings by homologously shading in the tight-knit relationship between Michael and his father- a relationship which is in synchronous opposition to that between Hanna and Yair, and comparable to that of Michael and Yair. To give but one example. On their second date, Michael chooses to speak about his father, the financial sacrifices he made for his son’s education, and the high hopes he held for him which Michael continuously strove to fulfil.
It is abundantly clear that in *My Michael* Oz, for all his literary subtlety, casts the mother as the negative force in her child’s growth and unashamedly casts the father as the antithesis of the ‘bad mother’. He intends his female protagonist to be seen as a cold and uncompassionate mother whose incapacity to love her son is intended to symbolise motherhood.

The motif of maternal deficiency, desertion, and its deleterious effect on the child resurfaces in the novella *The Hill Of Evil Counsel* (Oz 1993b) where in instance after instance, it is the father, Hans Kipnis and not the mother Ruth, who is uncannily glorified and shown to be the paragon of parenting as well as the primary caretaker in the family. Time and again, it is Hans, never Ruth, who soothes Hillel with a lullaby when he suffers an asthma attack, “During the night, the boy woke up again with an attack of asthma. Father came in barefoot and sang him a soothing song...”( 7 ) ;”At night he would wake up with attacks of Asthma...Feverish, suffocated, he would...burst into tears. Until father appeared holding a small flashlight, to sit on his bed and sing him a soothing song”(16). Like Michael Gonen before him, he patiently answers all the boy’s queries, tempering his responses with restraint and thought so as not to corrupt the young mind, and continuously provides affection and care, “At times he would ask an intelligent question of his father, and he always received a considered reply”(27). In fact, Hillel resembles Yair Gonen, in his precociousness and love for his father, “Hillel suddenly felt an ecstatic, overwhelming love for his father.”(34) ; “Daddy , I’ve got something to tell you...I’ve got a Shilling that I don’t want at all...I just want you to take it”(40).

There exists a connection between *The Hill of Evil Counsel* and *My Michael* in that both cases portray mothers who are secluded in their worlds of dreams. Moreover, as they are too self-absorbed to bestow on their children the essential dose of motherly love required, they relinquish their familial role and leave it to the fathers to assume the upbringing of the children. Hillel seeks his mother’s attention throughout the story, but she is immersed in her longing for her childhood and youth in Europe and desires to escape the reality of the newly established state. Altogether, she denies him the contact he craves for: “At other times he buried his face in his mother’s dress, demanded to be cuddled, and then, embarrassed at seeing her eyes fill with tears, returned silently to his game”(27). In retrospect, Ruth is viewed by the adult narrator with some ambivalence, for while she is seen by him as beautiful and enchanting, she also constitutes a memory of pain and betrayal (Aschkenasy 1986: 27). According to Gertz, it is this failure by Ruth to endow Hillel with the mothering and guidance he needs, that results in the child looking for protection and warmth from the father (Gertz 1980: 168) Gertz further posits that it is Hillel’s fear of his mother and love of his father that accounts for the detailed description of the father by the narrator in the novella (168).

All told, however, the ultimate betrayal of Hillel by Ruth takes place at the High Commissioner’s Ball to which the Kipnise’s are invited. It is there, that Ruth runs away with a British Admiral, selfishly abandoning her family to escape the harsh milieu of Israel to which she has refused to become accustomed to. Without a pang of conscience, Ruth ups and leaves, and in doing so, shatters her son’s reality. It is reasonable to argue that it is this act that drives Hillel to attempt suicide “Come down, Mommy will come back and it’ll all be like before. Those branches aren’t very strong. Get down...But the boy would not hear...he gathered himself and leaped up to the last leaf, to the shore of the sky” (Oz 1993b: 59). The inescapable
Conclusion one reaches is that Ruth’s leaving with the womanising and lascivious Admiral is a morally bankrupt act—especially when considering that her cause for abandonment is obscure and unconscionable—a general dissatisfaction with the country. As Aschkenasy observes, “Ruth…is seen as a mother only, but as such she manifests the “negative” aspects of motherhood” (91). The fathers, on the other hand, are portrayed with a fusion of admiration and love by the author. (Shaked 1985: 78).

The sense of the mother who is not too interested in her child appears elsewhere as well. The very next novella Mr Levi (Oz 1993b) presents the reader with a similar scenario. Mrs Kolodny, Uri’s mother, is adumbrated with a striking similarity to Ruth, and although she does not leave her son literally, she does so figuratively. Like her counterpart, she is constantly in a melancholic, brooding mood, unhappy with her surrounding and flees the social reality around her by retreating into a cocoon of romantic dreams. Mainly, she spends her time lying on the sofa, plagued by the headaches brought on by the heat, or shouting at Uri for demanding her attention (Oz: 112). It becomes increasingly evident that insofar as Uri is concerned, his upbringing is to be done by his father, and the neighbours Mr Nehamkin and his son Efraim, with whom he spends most of his time.

In sum, Ruth and Mrs Kolodny may be seen as an all-purpose metaphor for the mother figure who, as Yudkin states, “...gives expression to the sharpest discontent...It is the woman who articulates the daemonic and the hostile, or in general terms, ‘the other’ “ (Yudkin 1985: 154). Even further, the mothers and fathers symbolise the bipolar dichotomy reflected in the novel, which delineates the male figures as rational, intellectual and nationalistic, concerned mostly with the upbringing of their children, and the women, who drown in their romantic daydreams and are oblivious to the needs of others.

The recurring subject matter of desertion, which hovers to some degree over most of Oz’s work, is revisited, if to a lesser degree, in the final novella, Longing (Oz 1993b). The narrative takes the form of a series of letters written by the cancer-stricken Dr Nussbaum in his final days, to his former lover Mina Oswald who has left for New York. The letters trace their relationship, the historical developments in Palestine before the war and Nussbaums’s conversations with the neighbour’s child, Uri. Yet in view of the thread that runs through other tales, it is not surprising to find, again, the spectre of a mother discarding her child seemingly in the interests of self-regard and careerism. At one point in his memories of their affair, we are told of an illegitimate child born to Nussbaum and Oswald, whom she has left in some Kibbutz in the North of Israel before leaving for New York to continue her research “…you have borne me a child and lodged it in one of the Kibbutzim in the valley..” (Oz 1993b: 144); “But my love and fears are directed desperately-forgive me-toward the darling child you bore me and hid away in a Kibbutz in the Jezreel valley. What lies in store for him?” (158). Typically, any elaboration on the reasoning for such a decision is visibly absent from the account, depriving the reader of any insight into the personal reasons that led Mina to put her child in a Kibbutz.

Oz limns similar terrain in his first novel, Elsewhere Perhaps (Oz 1973) in which maternal rejection and abandonment reach their crescendo. As background to the pivotal events of the narrative, we are made aware at the very outset by the prescient narrator (who represents the collective voice of the Kibbutz) of
the treacherous act by Eva Hamburger: “Noga was twelve and Gai was about three when Eve left her husband and children and married a tourist, a relative, her cousin Isaac Hamburger, who had been spending three weeks with us that summer. It was a sordid affair” (7). Eve’s perfidy is reported, ironically, in a chapter titled *A Remarkable Man* which exalts Reuven Harish’s virtues as a father. The story intentionally juxtaposes Eve’s comportment with Reuven’s dedication to his siblings, so as to strikingly illustrate the differences between the two. And indeed, Reuven is the epitome of the good father:

Towards his motherless children he displayed a discreetly moderated devotion. See him walking in the evening...with Noga on one side of him and Gai on the other, stooping to catch everyone of his children’s words, even their most idle chatter...Reuven is careful to remain close to them, without trampling on their inner thoughts and feelings. He exercises a father’s authority and a mother’s attentive love. Moved by his love for his children, Reuven began writing children’s poems (10-11).

When it is rumoured that Eve may one day return to her family, the narrator echoes Kibbutz member Fruma Rominov’s judgement that it would be better if this never occurred (12). After all, Reuven has “redoubled his love for his children” (12) and admirably fulfils the void created by Eva’s leaving, making wooden toys for Gai or drawing pictures for Noga (12). Oz constructs a form of male motherhood which recurs repeatedly in his plots, whereby the female’s function as a mother is not only truncated, but often expunged, either as a result of her disappearance or death. Thus, maternal traits are ascribed to the male, who like Reuven, is portrayed as a modern day Mr Mom, forced to assume parenting duties because of female neglect: “Reuven Harish goes with his son Gai to the children’s house. Before lights out he amuses the child by reciting some of his poems. Then father and son chat for a while about stamps and tourists...A kiss, a strong hand gently stroking a mop of blond hair, good night, good night”(39-40).

Conspicuously absent are any concrete psychological or social reasons to explain Eva’s behaviour, implying that she is just another incarnation of the selfish mother, so long fostered by misogynous literature. Oz does not provide the reader with any information as to why this beautiful, energetic and practical woman decided arbitrarily to one day suddenly get up and leave. Furthermore, there is no direct or personal crisis de coeur from Eva to her children, or any regret during all the years of separation from them - expressions which would partly coat her decision with a patina of moral acceptability. Reflect, that Oz has frequently employed this technique-withholding information and failing to equip his heroines with any plausible reasons in justifying their relinquishment of responsibility in an effort to portray the abandoning mothers as heartless and self-centred.

More puzzling about Eve’s elopement is Reuven’s revelation to Noga that when Hamburger first visited the Kibbutz her mother despised him: “When that wretch Hamburger came, your mother loathed him. I’m not exaggerating: she loathed him...your mother hated him...I looked after him most of the time because your mother didn’t like to be near him...Make him go away tomorrow, your mother said that night, make him go at once” (123-124). Why Eva left with this lewd, obscene man is alluded to in copious references sprinkled throughout the novel in which Eva attempts to exculpate herself by writing of her desire to
“purify Hamburger” of his suffering (159) - an explanation Reuven understandably dismisses, instead, believing that Eva’s running away was caused by infatuation and madness (124). Siegfried, Eva’s emissary to the Kibbutz, advances the outrageous proposition that Eva’s departure from her children’s lives was done out of a concern to protect them and “...avoid damaging their impressionable minds” (288). Fuchs suggests that “...one is left to deduce that Eva is merely rationalising a self destructive urge to join her evil cousin and abandon her good husband. The narrator does not emphasise Eva’s materialistic proclivities, but he does allude to the material aspect of Eva’s attraction for Germany...” (1987: 68).

A defining moment in Eva’s characterisation occurs when from the seedy night-club she jointly runs with her husband, she dispatches the conniving Siegfried to her former Kibbutz on order to entice Noga to come and live with her. Siegfried uses the allure of Germany’s baroque and romantic scenery in his attempt to lure Noga away, an appeal which drew her mother there and which Eva hopes will inveigle Noga. One however has to doubt Eva’s motives, in light of Siegfried’s plan for Noga, which, as it is implied, has Eva’s backing: “Imagine: a girl, a Jewish girl, a pretty, well built Jewish girl standing on a suggestively lit stage, holding a submachine gun and trampling on an enemy soldier in torn uniform who writhes and grovels and kisses her feet. It’ll send them wild” (Oz 1973: 222). Sigfried even has the temerity to claim that it is Reuven who is the cause of Noga’s troubles, and argues (as Eva and Hamburger do) that morally and legally he has forfeited the right to influence his daughter’s future in light of her affair with the much older and married Ezra Berger which results in her falling pregnant with his child (288).

That Eva should guilefully attempt to snare Noga away from her home, indicates her lack of moral rectitude and is best summed up by Bronka: “But what need is there for a go-between? Perhaps you can explain to me. Why can’t Eva write to Noga directly? And why was it necessary to ignore Reuven Harish and get at his daughter behind his back? After all, isn’t he her father, and doesn’t decency demand that he be consulted about such a decision?” (287). In the end, Eva’s scheme is foiled by Herbert Segal, who persuades Noga to remain and marry her young boyfriend Rami Rimon, in an awkwardly tacked on deus-ex-machina. Significantly, it is a man (Herbert Segal) who takes hold of the reins and acts like a father figure to both Noga and her brother Gai.

The vitriol and hostility expressed against the mother in Black Box (Oz 1993a) by her offspring is unparalleled in other Oz narratives, and may be the apotheosis of the author’s antimotherhood tracts. Among several of its motifs, one of the central premises of Black Box is the incompetence and the portentousness of a parent’s ineptness, (namely the mother), in influencing the future conduct and evolution of a child. Let me propose that this narrative, proffered Oz with an opportunity to conjure, for once, a positive image of a single mother who successfully rears her son without the involvement of a male figure. Instead, we are presented with animus against the heroine that knows no bounds, and which further serves to illuminate the author’s obsession with depicting maternal flaws and failures. Ilana Brandsetter, as other female characters before her, functions as the proverbial scapegoat: the mother who deprived her son of parental love and thereby caused his antisocial behaviour and psychosexual inability to form normal human relationships.

Divorced by her husband, Alexander, because of her extravagant and manifold adulterous episodes, Ilana
joins her sister in the kibbutz but six months later decides to leave and return to Jerusalem, sans her eight year old son Boaz. It is then that the theme of abandonment, and the devastating effect the separation has on a child denied maternal care re-emerges. Boaz grows up to be an illiterate, violent boy, who is constantly in trouble with the law. Fond of referring to his mother as a whore, he expresses much resentment and spleen towards her whenever he deigns to speak with her. To give but one example. When Ilana comes down to his boarding school after he assaults one of the teachers and is about to be expelled, he refuses to see her: “Well, I went down there at once, but Boaz refused to see me. He merely sent a word that he didn’t want to have anything to do with that whore” (4). Visiting Ilana and her second husband Michel, he responds to Michel’s scolding of his behaviour by insulting Ilana: “And you let that thing fuck you every night” (3) revealing his sheer contempt and loathing. From his commune in Zikhron he writes to Michel of Ilana’s first visit, “We saw it when she came to visit. 100 percent normal she’s never been, but now she dropped down maybe below 50 percent” (177). At the same time, Oz has Ilana herself acknowledging her maternal shortcomings “I would never make a good mother, I said” (138).

Why did Ilana allow Boaz, whom she describes as being disciplined, controlled and almost timid as a child, become a teenager simmering with hate and bitterness, who resorts to violence on any occasion he does not get his way. As with other tales, Oz does not expound on the psychodynamics which motivate his female protagonists to exhibit such inadequacy and insouciance in the upbringing of their children. It is for this reason, and others, that the reader is left to conclude that it is an inveterate female trait to be an unfit mother. Moreover, as Nevott points out, Oz forgoes internal logic in the text so as to construct Ilana as the conventional neglectful mother- For if one bears in mind that Ilana is a woman who possesses such self-awareness so as to so eloquently bare her soul, it is difficult to understand why she allowed her son to transform into a petty criminal and an illiterate (Nevott 1987: 6). As is most often the case, the author never probes this question.

Ostensibly, Ilana re-initiates communication with Alex, seven years after their ignominious divorce because of her problems with the wayward Boaz, and more specifically, his disappearance, “I’m writing to you because I don’t know what to do” (Oz 1993:4). Later, however, she reveals that her plea for assistance was merely an excuse, an opportunity to resume their love and hate relationship, “My real motive for writing those two letters in February was a desire to place myself in your hands” (41-42). It is reasonable to argue, therefore, that the resumption of correspondence with her ex-husband, was not out of concern for Boaz’s welfare, but a scheme to enliven her mundane, suburban life- an act which ultimately symbolises her entire turn as a mother.

Characteristically, it is the male figure that assumes the parental role; here it is Michel, who becomes Boaz’s surrogate father. He succeeds where Ilana fails- gaining the respect and trust of Boaz, to the point where the young man opens up to him, revealing his needs and wants. For instance, he helps in placing Boaz at Telamim Agricultural High School (3); arranges bail for him when he is arrested for possession of stolen goods( 9); finds him a job through a personal friend, and carefully manages the money Alex sends, administering small sums for Boaz whenever he requests it (28). Through the letters, we witness Michel’s tolerance of Boaz’s outbursts and his exercise of a dose of stern fatherly love which the boy so
desperately needs. Sensitive to Boaz’s yearning to become independent, he allows him to go his own way piecemeal, coupled with tough moral supervision, constantly rebuking him for his illiteracy and deportment when necessary. He also encourages him to follow in the orthodox ways of Judaism by peppering his letters with biblical quotations and advice, all the while earning Boaz’s affection, “I am fascinated by the way my husband and your son...are silently fond of each other” (78). Michel, this “human diamond” (as Ilana writes of him) is also the perfect father for Yifat, his daughter with Ilana. Like her counterpart, Hanna Gonen in *My Michael*, Ilana praises her husband’s ardent care and total devotion to their child:

When I got home...I found Michel asleep on a mattress at the foot of Yifat’s bed, fully dressed and with his shoes on. His glasses slipped onto his shoulder...It transpired that in the morning, after I had left...on a sudden suspicion he had taken her temperature, and it turned out he was right. So he decided to call and cancel at the last minute the meeting he arranged with the deputy minister of defence, a meeting for which he had been waiting for almost two months (156-7).

Also Rahel, Ilana’s sister, realises that it is Michel who is the most emotionally capable of the two to deal with Boaz, “Don’t touch him, Ilana. If there’s any necessity to get involved again, leave it up to Michel to take care of it” (18). Afterwards, when Ilana writes to Rahel, making it clear that she still carries a torch for Alex, Rahel cautions her of repeating the same mistake she made with Boaz, leaving him in the Kibbutz, lest Yifat is psychologically scarred as Boaz was, “Just try to understand that if you don’t stop yourself now, Yifat will grow up exactly the same...What is it that drives you to throw away everything you have for the sake of something that doesn’t and can’t exist” (115).

Another plot device aimed at sustaining the further attenuation of female textual space is the killing of the mother at the start of the novel, or indicating early on that the protagonist’s mother is dead. This diegetic strategy of depopulating the narrative of a central maternal female figure creates the necessary void for the father to assume and play a prominent role, as well as allowing the author to foster an idiotperative exploration of the father/son theme or, rarely, the father/daughter theme. At the same time, the heroine is muzzled, eternally silenced, her voice drowned out so that it is the male player that is entrusted with conveying her thoughts, and filling in crucial parts of her background and character. In this context, it is in *To Know A Woman* (Oz 1992a) that the suppressing of a woman’s voice reaches its fullest expression. In the opening pages of the novel, Ivria is killed off in a never deciphered accident or suicide. This provides the point of departure, for after Ivria vacates the scene, Oz is able to focus completely on Yoel’s attempts to come to terms with his daughter’s problems and illness and resume his duties as a father, this time of course as a sole parent. This praxis is also very much in evidence in *Fima* (Oz 1994) where the infinitesimal references to the eponymous hero’s mother, who died when he was ten, take place when she appears in his dreams or in fragmented recollections. In *Black Box* (Oz 1993a) the oedipally structured narrative of a father-son conflict is brought to the fore by the apparent suicide of Alex’s mother, when aged five. Other examples of sons who lose their mother early in their life include Michael in *My Michael* (who lost his mother when he was three, and cannot even remember her face), Uri of *Strange Fire* and Emmanuel Orvietto of *Don’t Call it Night* (Oz 1995). In that same book, the principal female protagonist
Noa Dubonov is also raised in a single household, having lost her mother as a child.

It is imperative to point out, that an extended reading of Oz’s fictional construct of mothers, reveals an additional plank to this mosaic- namely, that even when there is a mother figure present, she is extremely marginalised, while her child is tropologically ‘adopted’ or ‘adopts’ other parents (Zilberman 1994: 29).

Zilberman cites *Sumchi* (1978) Oz’s only children book to date, as a fine illustration of this plot structure. Here, the mother is very much relegated to the periphery; Rather it is Mr Inbar, the father of Sumchi’s female friend, Esti, who for Sumchi “…serves as the model for a kind of masculinity which is tolerant and egalitarian”(Zilberman: 26), and for whom Sumchi develops a genuine admiration. For example, after running away from home, he is taken in by Mr Inbar, and the two engage in a pseudo-political discussion, with Inbar perciptiently refraining from treating Sumchi like the child he really is- a gesture not unnoticed by Sumchi: “It felt good in this room…deep in an interesting and honest, man to man talk with Engineer Inbar. How amazing that Engineer Inbar did not scold or mock me, but simply pointed out that we disagreed. How very much I loved the expression ‘disagreement’ and Esti’s father, as much as Esti and maybe even more (Oz 1978: 66-68). This experience can also be seen in *Fima* (Oz 1994) where Yael, a career woman (in a rare nod to Feminism) often leaves her son Dimi with her ex-husband(the eponymous hero), who becomes the boy’s substitute father. Consequently, while her son feels alienated from her, a meaningful bond emerges between the two, and it becomes increasingly evident that Dimi sees Fima as the only one he can turn to. Thus, when he kills a stray dog, it is Fima, and not his mother, he feels he can trust to tell( Oz 1994:32-135). Elsewhere, Fima yearns to adopt Dimi, believing that Yael is far too busy to care adequately for the boy, and scolds her for not spending enough time with him (234-6, 239).

The comparison between Fima’s love and care for the boy and Yael’s indifference is intensified in the many expressions of love for Dimi salted sweepingly throughout: “He...took Dimi’s hand, feeling that he too was close to tears and that he loved this weird child...Fima’s body ached with the desire to snatch the sobbing creature up from the arm- chair and squeeze him to his chest with all his strength...a desire stronger than any he had felt for a woman’s body in his life”(129-131). As such, Dimi articulates echoing sentiments: “Say Fima, you need a child, don’t you? How’d you like it if we went away together? We could go to the Galapagos Islands and build ourselves a cabin out of branches”(135). More to the point is the lack of passages depicting any instances of love or bonding between Yael and Dimi, underscoring the contrast the author wishes to draw between Yael and Dimi.

Finally, in *Strange Fire* (Oz 1992) we encounter for the first time in the Oz cannon, the figure of the patriarchally rooted diabolical mother, who intentionally sets out to harm her child. Needless to say, no apparent psychological reasons to explain her malevolent behaviour accompany her actions. The nucleus narrative of *Strange fire* revolves around the attempt by Lily Danenberg to seduce her prospective son-in-law, Yair Yarden, while her daughter is out of town. On the night that she is to meet with Yair’s father to prepare a guest list for the forthcoming wedding of her daughter, Dina, she sets out to tempt her daughter’s fiancee into a sexual tryst, surely aware that this may sabotage her daughter’s future marriage. She begins the night planning her insidious gambit to lure the young man to the last detail, leaving for Yair’s house shortly before his father is due to arrive, “In exactly seven minutes, Yosef will ring the doorbell of my house. His punctuality is beyond doubt. At that precise moment I shall ring the doorbell of his house on
Alfasi Street...And Yair will open the door to me” (114)

Reaching Yair’s house, she uses the pretence that there is something she needs to “straighten out”(118) with him, luring him out of his home to join her for a walk. The young man, uncomfortable and bewildered, reluctantly agrees, but soon realises that he has made a mistake, sensing that Lily is prevaricating about the real reason for their conversation, “Yair began to scratch the lobe of his ear uneasily. What’s the matter with her? what’s she up to? There’s something about her that I don’t like at all. She isn’t being sincere. It’s very hard to tell” (122). Soon afterwards, she rattles her future son-in-law with the revelation that she was once married to his father, maliciously savouring the effect this confession has on him, “He stared into the darkness, deep into thought...Yair began to follow her northward, lost in thought. And she was filled with savage joy”( 126). Sensing that he is overwhelmed by her disclosure, and no longer able to contain her desire, she uses this moment of weakness to continue her erotic seduction, stroking and caressing the back of his neck and hair. While he finds her touch comforting, he is acutely aware that Lily is not being truthful about the real purpose of their walk, “Yair was thinking: That’s enough. Let’s go home. What she told isn’t necessarily true...What does she want? What the matter with her? Time to put a stop to all of this and go home.” (129). Ultimately, Lily succeeds in her entrapment of Yair, with the final act of betrayal taking place in the Jerusalem biblical Zoo; but what is more disconcerting is that Oz does not expound on Lily’s motives, which could possibly have provided the stunned reader some plausible justification for her moral turpitude.

The troubling question is why does this forty-two year old divorcee, tall and thin, who “…could easily claim to be seven or eight years younger…”(113), choose her daughter’s fiancee as her prey of seduction when she could as easily have picked some other man. The narrator ironically adds that she does not hide her age as it against her moral principles (113)- an attribute that is incongruous with her behaviour that night. Here, the reader is forced or seduced to assume, that what is motivating Lily is a perverse desire to deny her daughter marital bliss, or more specifically, persuade Yair that Dinah and/or marriage is not the route he must traverse. Thus, at first, she speaks of the efforts required to prevent a marriage collapsing, intimating that after the initial months of physical pleasure, “infuriating habits come to the surface, on both sides”(Oz: 129). When Yair assures her he and Dinah will survive those tribulations, she cunningly tells him that she is only speaking in general terms, and goads him to put his arm around her shoulder. It is however, in the pivotal scene that follows this exchange that Lily reveals her stratagem, “ I think you should know for example, that Dinah is in love with your outward appearance and not with you. She doesn’t think about you. She’s still a child. And so are you”(130). In the early 1965 Hebrew version of the story she says: “Dinah is like me. She is very sensitive. She is not like your outgoing girlfriends. She is very poetic... We’ll see how you’ll entertain Dinah. If you bore her, things will become bad”(168). Incredulously, Lily rationalises the incitement against her daughter as beneficial guidance which Yair must be made aware of, “Lily Danenberg is sure that the things she has said to Yair Yarden are “educational”(Oz 1992: 130). It is clear, that in the guise of concerned advice, Lily tries to rupture the bond between Yair and her daughter, all for the sake of a short-lived fling and an unwillingness to repress her unbridled concupiscence.
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Angels with Nanotech Wings: Magic, Medicine and Technology in Aronofsky’s *The Fountain*, Gibson’s *The Neuromancer* and Slonczewski’s *Brain Plague.*

By Catherine M. Lord

Entry: Angels with Synapses

How many angels can dance at the head of a pin? This question perplexed Medieval and Renaissance scholars. For them, the fantastic was not a matter of science fiction, but science fact. There was much debate as to whether angels were material entities or forms of energy. Curiously, angels and spiritual accomplices are re-appearing in the current zeitgeist. On the lecture site “Ted.Com,” the author of *Eat, Pray, Love* (2006), Elizabeth Gilbert makes a powerful plea for protecting our metaphors of creativity by re-adopting the Platonic models of the ‘diamonic.’ Cited in “The Myth of Er” (Book X of Plato’s *Republic*), this spiritual entity is acquired by human souls in their pre-lives before they arrive on the planet. The diamon then accompanies us on our human journey, helping us to deliver on our pre-ordained purpose. If we avoid our destiny, it can quite literally raise hell. The diamon is also the accompanying ‘genius,’ or ‘spirit.’ Gilbert takes on this concept to suggest that we will be saner as artists if we drop the idea that it is humans themselves who are the geniuses, considering instead that we are aided in our creativity by forces beyond us. As literary scholar and ecologist Harold Fromm reminds us, from the ancients referring to their Muses, Milton speaking of his “Creator Spiritus” and W.B. Yeats surrounded by his writerly spooks, traditionally, many literary practitioners have been open minded towards spiritual discourses (2005). Gilbert’s lecture might signify a revitalizing of the idea that artists need their mystical accomplices.
Yet there is a further twist. In the opening section to his article, Fromm suggests in his title “Muses, Spooks and Neurons” (2005) that there is a connection between the phenomenon of capricious spirits and neuroscience. Both spirits and neurons, argues Fromm, destabilize our sense that the mind is run by a brain with a “central meaner” to use Daniel Dennett’s term (quoted in Froom, 2005: 147-148). The “Cartesian Theatre” is undermined (148) by spirits which come when least expected and rarely perform to order. Indirectly, Fromm compares this lack of central planning with the brain’s electrical activity across the synapses. As neuroscientists have pointed out, neural feedback loops can operate irrespective of human will. The same thoughts and obsessions return, as the brain receptors connect along the same grooves, the repetition process constituting a hard-drive that can function as an ‘unconscious.’ Artists rely on the unconscious but never know when the angel or demon of inspiration will spirit out.

Following Fromm’s insight, I will be examining how some selected examples of cinematic and literary aspects of the ‘neuroscientific’ turn can find a strange bedfellow in what might be called, in the wake of Gilbert’s lecture, the ‘magical’ turn. Discourses of religious myth and the occult can collapse the boundaries between external worlds and internal minds. In Darren Aronofsky’s The Fountain (2006), Tom (played by Hugh Jackman), a neuroscientist, attempts to save his lover Izzy (Rachel Weisz). This is one of three thread stories, Hugh Jackman playing Thomas, Tom and the Space Traveller, all in three different historical and time-space setting: Renaissace Spain, North America in the present day, and somewhere in a space ship that is floating towards a dying star. Thomas wants to find the Tree of Life under a Mayan Pyramid for the sake of Spain’s survival in the face of the Inquisition. Tom wants to cure Izzy using a tree herb from a South American Country, and the Space Traveller wants to save the Tree of Life in his space bubble; he can only do this by himself and his Tree passing through the quantum field or event horizon (the spectator is invited to imagine many possibilities) of the dying star. This is the only strategy with which to rejuvenate the tree. Tom’s internal struggle is mapped out in the two parallel thread stories. When Thomas the conquistador seeks out the Tree of Life, this mythical and magical quest reflects Tom’s journey as a neuroscientist. Boundaries between events in the world and those in the brain are further subverted in the way the film make both the Tree and images of star clusters stand in for neural networking.

Such representations invite readings which have now been frequently identified with the Deleuzian concept of the “time-image.” In his influential Time Image, Deleuze quotes Artaud’s remarks that what can be brought together is “cinema” with “the innermost reality of the brain” (Deleuze, 1989: 167). The move that Deleuze then makes is to insist that this “innermost reality is not the Whole, but on the contrary, a fissure, a crack” (167). For Deleuze, Artaud recognizes that the cinema spectator undergoes the “dissociative” forces of spectatorship. The ‘picture of the world’ through cinema and neural perceptions which are, according to Deleuze, so closely aligned to cinematic perception, can no longer display the bigger picture. Rather, the latter is replaced by a non-hierarchical flow of images in which coherent, hermeneutically organized meanings give way to time images focusing on time rips and moments of suspension between images. What arises is the “psychic situation of the seer, who sees better and further than he can react, that is, think” (170).

Tom takes on the role of a ‘seer’ in a parallel way to the Space Traveller. Tom often becomes fixated on
single images of him kissing the back of Izzy’s neck, speckled with hairs like the living hair on the Space Traveller’s Tree of Life. It is as though his vision becomes a set of optical illusions organized around the primary image of tree and brain. For these images are not documents so much as images which if believed strongly enough, as in the Space Traveller’s faith, become living events. As Patricia Pisters explains in her forthcoming analysis of *The Fountain*, “contemporary cinema has quite literally entered the mind of its characters, playing all kinds of tricks with the mind of the spectators as well” (2010: in press). The mad scientist becomes a favorite hero, and in Aronofksy’s work, is often a character caught up in questions of spirituality and magic. In *PI*, Max, the mathematician-protagonist will run into a group of Cabbalists enlisting his mathematical expertise. In *The Fountain*, mysticism, magic, the Tree of Life, neurophysiology and the idea that the universe’s star fields are themselves an eternal brain all offer themes carrying the two paradigms that are at my concern here. For as I shall argue, the two radically different approaches can work together when it examining how magical and neural ‘technologies,’ either in science or science fiction, help us more effectively understand the creative process which fascinates Elizabeth Gilbert.

It is because of my concern with ‘creativity’ that I will be reading *The Fountain* through the help of two novels, both very close in their concerns to Aronofksy’s film. Joan Slonczewski’s *Brain Plague* (2000), a lesser know work, read together with William Gibson’s cult classic *The Neuromancer* (1984), actively take up the theme of brain activity touched by the magical, medical and technological. *The Fountain* deploys the principal that the Tree of Life, one of the trees cited in Genesis, can be a source of healing. But the entrance to the cure requires neural technology. Tom’s experimental monkey is administered the South American tree-medicine through brain surgery. In *Brain Plague*, a novelistic ‘buddy movie’ about the relationship between a struggling artist Chrysoberyl and an accelerated culture of sentient cells, the microbes which trespass into Chrysoberyl’s body, summon her neurally in the voices of Old Testament supplicants praying to their god. In Gibson’s novel, one manifestation of the cyberspace system’s artificial intelligence, or AI, calls itself ‘Neuromancer.’ The word itself hybrids together discourses both neurological and black magical. Necromancers like the 17th century John Dee, claimed to raise demons. Artificial intelligence is a force which science has confidently predicted or denounced as impossible. AI remains the stuff of science fiction, and in Gibson’s novel, its connection to evil spirits is made explicit in the novel’s title. Moreover, the main plot of the novel finds its protagonist, Henry Dorsett Case, a computer hacker, punished for his theft by having his central nervous system damaged with mycotoxin, leaving him unable to ‘jack’ into the neural computer system. He seeks out the cure in the form an untested, neural, or ‘nano’ technology. For the protagonist of *The Fountain*, the Tree cure works at a micro level through the quantum field of a store can rejuvenate the Tree of Life, read, eternal life. *Brain Plague* features who communities of microbes who carry nano-theological agendas.

Both *Brain Plague* and *The Fountain* were published/produced within five years of each other. Both these works offer footnotes to *The Neuromancer*, a work which considers eternal life within the the schemas of AI, and how the matrix, tree structure of this intelligence can offer itself as an ‘eternal’ tree. Moreover, Gibson’s novel concerns itself with the links between medical intervention and spirit conjuring technology. In all three works, the nanotechnological aspects of magic or neural intervention, offer insights into how the creative mind can best work to support its own healing processes. The Angels that appear between
the discourses of magic and neuroscience are often miniscule yet powerful.

Nano Angels

Angels, suggested their first scholars, might dance at the end of a pin. One year before the publication of Brain Plague, one of many projects posed technologies that now are now bearing fruit. Ten years ago neural-enhancers were being developed into nanotechnological robots. A then associate professor of molecular and pharmacology and toxicology, Dr. Roberta Dia Brinton was developing a “neurochip” (Networker@USC, Jan./Feb 1999). This silicone device can be planted into the neural connections of the brain, and compensate for basic genetic dysfunctions in neural tissue. Now, there is an entire field of “Nanorobotic” studies that engineer molecular-sized devices that can ‘operate’ on brain aneurysms (Cavalcanti, 2009). These minute harbingers of healing find many forms, be they electrical or purely chemical. The capacity of specialized nanorobots to operate on neural tissues suggests the Deleuzian ‘crack’ in perception, if it is treated sometimes as a problem rather than a seer’s alternative vision, can be remedied under certain conditions.

An implacable brain tumor is Tom’s core problem in The Fountain. The tree unguent from South America that enables a monkey to become younger cannot treat brain tumors. The rub of the problem is how can a healing agent be introduced into the neural landscape. The film sets up a network of images which suggest that the secret lies in a route of connecting fibers between the body and the Tree of Life. The Space Traveller paints himself with Tree rings in act of bizarre identification with the tree which he protects on their journey through space. Towards the film’s climax, the Tree is almost dead, although the Space Traveller is alive. It could be the line by line tattoos on his body, the assemblage of tiny stripes that allows him to mind-image the Tree back to life. Or the Tree’s trajectory through the dying star, meets the angelic micro-particles of the underbelly of the dying star: a black hole. For the neuroscientist Tom, death is not an existential state, but the consequence of a disease. It is only the miniscule angels that might have a chance to do their work.

Addiction and neural damage are states to be approached from the smallest dimensions. Both The Neuromancer and Brain Plague seize every opportunity to throw their characters into countless situations of neural damage and drug addiction. In a time of Mexican influenza and the ghosts of SARS capable of becoming microbes again, readers can readily identify with Chrysoberyl’s risk venture. Allowing her brain to become the Promised Land for a culture of religiously minded microbes, Chrys gains their powers off immunization, but also accepts them as team-mates to help her build a commissioned city called Silicone. Jonquil, one of the leader cells, declares the human project to be completely in line with that of the miniature world (chapter 13). Similarly, in Gibson’s novel, Neuromancer implies that Case’s role requires that he learn the correct codes to call up a burgeoning artificial intelligence (chapter 21). Case may be posthuman in his connection to cyberspace, but his contribution to the AI system - chemical, emotional and unpredictable - cannot be dispensed with.
Humans present the larger systems, be these the immune system, the brain or the universe, with infections, nano particles and Trees that can intervene to reboot the encompassing matrix. But this often happens through ‘cracks’ in the vision of the seers who guide in the smaller entities. Tom and the Space Traveller never entirely know what they are looking for or at, so much occurs through blind and cracked faith. Gibson’s protagonist Case works best when he works heuristically. Chrys is on a continued learning curve in response to her tiny visitors. Often, the virus, technology or neural act of perception is angelic, required to come and safe the diseased large body. But there is also a price to pay in the magical technologies of small particle healings and neural moments of insight. The moment of ‘reboot’ is beautifully imaged in The Fountain when Thomas, the Spanish conquistador, becomes greedy when he eats huge portions of Tree. The Tree explodes within him, flowers and tree roots propelling out of his body. Thomas becomes one with the tree, his organic humanity absorbed. The human system is rebooted into a type of Deleuzian “becoming tree.” In both the film and the novels, be it the AI system in which Neuromancer resides or the human body and brain that is plagued or The Fountain’s quantum gravities that resuscitate the Space Traveler, large network is entirely dependent on intervening, small particles. It is the ability to re-envision a system through a ‘cracked’ perception, with the aid of small angels that the system can re-code itself from within.

Grabbing the Angel by the Tail

“Creativity” is a concept that calls for clarification and attracts censure. Elizabeth Gilbert’s meditation on the diamonic involves a striking story from the American poet Ruth Stone. Gilbert tells Stone’s story of waiting in her house on the plains, and hearing a ‘poem’ pelting towards across the landscape and towards her. Stone talked about once grabbing a poem by the tail, then pulling it onto the page. The poem, she said, came out backwards, before she wrote it the right way around. The point is that the artist cannot be alone in her work. There are other forces waiting in attendance. Even in Walter Benjamin’s celebrated “The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction” (Collected Essays, Hannah Arendt), he explores how the ‘work of art’ has an ineffable quality. But this is provisional and vulnerable. The ‘aura’ around a painting fades when reproduced through catalogues, photographs and copies. Benjamin argues that words such as “creativity” and “genius” have become outmoded. The model of the powerful and solitary creative spirit becomes discarded in an age where reproduction begins to produce a technology of creativity.

Thomas, Tom and the Space Traveller of The Fountain manifest strongly symbiotic relationships to their muses and sources of creativity. Yet these sources can present the status of being a prosthetic. The Fountain is the name of the Mayan mythic adventure that Izzy writes before her death. It is in this work that she sets out a narrative of death as the site of re-birth, and Tom finds both her and her story a source inspiration for his life’s work. For the Space Traveller, his Muse and mode of survival, is the quietly talking Tree of Life, which he treats as a woman, when personified in the form of an angelically appearing Rachel Weiz. It is as if the Tree is the Space Traveller’s prosthesis. And he survives his excessively long life by feeding on the tree’s herbal medicine. Chrysoberyl, the main character of Brain Plague and Case, the
protagonist of The Neuromancer, do not operate as independent beings. They can only perform creatively with the aid of prostheses, pharmacological drugs and in Chrys’ case, on microbes. For Case, super-hacking requires learned competence from systems with vast and already formulated rules. He can only outface his AI opponents Wintermute and the Neuromancer through spontaneity. Case is the rightful precursor of Neo, from the blockbuster movie The Matrix (1999). Played by Kenau Reeves, Neo learns that his only advantage against the ‘Matrix,’ or the vast AI network, is the act of breaking rules. AIs cannot improvise. Humans can. With an ability to play the system brilliantly, but also to be unpredictable and emotional, humans can overwrite the apparently triumphant cybernetic system and its agents. Creativity, then, is the act of making unexpected moves and dealing with unknown consequences.

The cliché that creativity is an aggressively individualistic act is subverted when keeping in mind there is a relationship between desire to acquire prosthesis and the need for an angelic assistant. Creative work is rarely left untouched by culture and its collective concerns. One of the field’s pioneers, Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi, has provided a definition of creativity which resonates uncannily with The Fountain, The Neuromancer, Brain Plague, neurochipping and nanotechnology. Any domain of practice, be this the visual arts or biology, has its own fields, such as multimedia design or neurobiology. “Creativity occurs” clarifies Csikszentmihalyi, when …a person using the symbols of a given domain…has a new idea or sees a new pattern, and when this novelty is selected by the appropriate field for inclusion into this relevant domain. The next generation will encounter that novelty as part of the domain they are exposed to, and if they are creative, they in turn will change it further. Occasionally creativity involves the establishment of a new domain (1996: 28).

Novelty and the breaking of patterns, is a crucial part of a healthy mind remaining creative. When synaptic impulses in the brain go around in the same old grooves, ossifying behaviors of mind and symptoms of addiction can set in. A negative aspect of the ‘feedback loop,’ or the phenomenon in which a situation sets off an electrical impulse of emotions which causes someone to fall back into the same old story (as in the obsessive “I can’t drop this habit”) is that this loop will ‘want’ to repeat itself. The brain becomes addicted to certain chemicals triggered by a specific loop which will set off the replaying of the accompanying narrative.

The Fountain often deploys repeated shots, as well as scenes, to dramatise this ‘nature’ of the brain’s feedback mechanisms. Tom is often shot in extreme close-up kissing the hairs on Izzy’s neck. The Space Traveller is caught in a similarly revealing shot, one that repeats itself, when he strokes the hairs of his Tree. Again and again, Tom, in his incarnations, returns to the same images, as though addicted to them. And when the spectator has been exposed to a sufficient set of repeated images, we do get the feeling that Tom and his incarnations will be going around in the same synaptic circles for eternity. However, the film allows Hugh Jackson’s character to break the pattern, to introduce a new idea, a new choice between synaptic pathways that liberate a nano ‘moment’ of new decision and new consequences. Tom return to a points that has repeated itself in his mind endlessly; he once avoided going off for the first snow walk of the season. Tom revisits this moment and does decide to go for that walk with Izzy. This one action sends a set of ricochet shifts in pathways, in the forking paths of the narrative, and this has consequences for the
Space Traveller’s story. Desperately thinking his Tree has died, and willing it to be alive, both Tree and Traveler discover their death and birth point. It takes the Tree to ‘decide’ to die to force the issue. Thomas the Conquistador, against all the odds, discovers the Mayan Tree of Life, and becomes the object of his investigation, forming an image of a Green Man, that when the camera pans out, he looks like a body of neurons. Yet this Green, neural and natural organism has rapidly evolved from the intake of a magic herb, that is, a form of medication.

In fact, The Neuromancer is a world characterized by the one underlying fact: there is no creative life, no possibility of making a difference, no path to a colorful existence, without prostheses and medication. These nanotechnological additives are the insurance that new neural pathways can indeed be transited. Dermatrodes link Case into his adventures and benthylmethane (a fictional drug) control the emotional perils of his virtual life. In his battle with AI life, the enigmatic Neuromancer and his sidekick Wintermute, Case tackles products of the system that have developed their own agenda. In Gibson’s novel, the relationship of cause and effect between creative thinking and medical cures, becomes inverted and diversified. The macabre alliances between electrodes, medication and human tissue are what produce AI. And here is the rub: the AIs have not been birthed from intention, but are the results of endless collisions by trial and error. The survival of the fittest is a lottery born from endless interactions. It is these endless algorithms of connect, disconnect, failure and success all evolve from fractures in vision, in moments of ‘seer-ing’ and in a refusal to be dominated by some bigger picture.

Creativity is a matter of neural surprises and untested paths. Magic could be regarded as a miracle of novelty, the habit that we thought we could never break, but the habit which we do break. The leap forward is small, a nano step from one path to the next, and a moment’s unpredictability beyond calculation. Despite the wish to quantify angels, many acknowledged the angel as numinous and beyond measurement. Perhaps the metaphor of the angel persists because we know that in the creative enterprise, be it scientific or artistic, there is always the unknown element, the path not taken, the inspired decision, the lightening in the bottle that cracks out of the glass – the angel that is ephemeral but magically functional. Biomedical science will quantify and control, but when the angel of unpredictability shakes its wings, the chaos of weird science will out.

**Closure for Now: the Memes in the Machine**

The potential creations of medical technology are more pervasive than a single Frankstein’s monster. Today, be it through the prostheses of nanotechnology, medication, neurochipping and neuroscience, we are partially sighted seers who, paradoxically, multiply our knowledge through this difficult position of inspired perception. Any pattern we perceive, natural or synthetic, can be broken down, re-produced, disseminated into more freely modulated structures. The smaller versions iterate the larger structures. Nanotechnology can explore and compute the natural fractal landscape of the human body in quest of disease. K. Eric Drexler, who coined the term nanotechnology, has written about the ‘tiny machines’
of DNA/RNA protein cells. Star-studded and with exotic atoms, these contraptions make ‘assemblers.’ These miniscule miracles can re-programme bacteria and blood cells. Inevitably, they should be able to make semiotics with brain cells. Potentially, microchips and neurons will be able to ‘talk to each other.’ Here would be the moment when the organic and inorganic glue together like never before. They would make a consciousness which as yet, no one has sampled. The miniature worlds might become a source of dependency to the macrocosm of daily, human consciousness. By so doing, these micro-angels of artificial intelligence are becoming the new memes.

While not the genes themselves, memes are their powerful relatives. As a metaphor for genes, the meme swims around in the pool of information and ideas which jump from one generation to the next. Richard Dawkins lists many items that can jump, from catch phrases and techniques of building arches to broader bodies of thought (The Selfish Gene, 1976, qtd. and expanded on in Drexler, 35-38). Just as genes compete, replicate, copy then deviate from each other, so do memes. How the ‘hard wiring’ of the neurological brain and its genetic codings process memes will underline the work of this century. Yet the frontiers of medical research will provide us with many cutting edge examples. The goal of medical technology is to find ways of making synthetic units to heal damaged tissue and genes. When the healing process has consequences for meme pool, our relationship to creativity and identity becomes transformed.

Both The Fountain, The Neuromancer and Brain Plague examine how drugs, brains enmeshed in a virtual matrix, and humans soaring on the wings of scientific and mythical imagination, are all propelled by the memes in our heritage machines. Both science fiction novels critique how our memes rely on the history of medicine, and suggest how creativity will miscode or misread medical interventions. According to Dawkins, it is the competition and collisions between different memes, the way in which one ‘incorrectly’ imitates and replicates another that evolution (or devolution, according to some) takes place. The Fountain offers a historical critique of how memes travel, suggesting that the Tree of Life is the meme tree, the drug which will always be sought and which, in turn, will find new mimetic forms in new parts of the universe.

In the climax to The Neuromancer, the coded, molecular level of information, that is the meme, makes the apparently cybernetic Case unavoidably human.

His [Case] vision crawled with ghost hieroglyphs, translucent lines of symbols arranging themselves against the neutral backdrop of the bunker wall. He looked at the backs of his hands, saw faint neo molecules crawling beneath the skin, ordered by the unknowable code (1984, p. 241).

The ghosts produce a physiological effect, as though Case is in the lure of a drug. Thus, the shifting, nanotechnological interactions below the surface of the skin, which suggest a primeval stirring in the undergrowth, act medicinally and unpleasantly. The ‘ghost’ and the ‘hieroglyphs’ conjure ancient knowledge, and make its particles capable of tracking Case’s bloodstream. The memes of ancient and primeval times meet those of our futurity. Indeed, creativity, from the evolutionary point of view, is linked to dissemination of memes, which will not dispense with the human body as a medical entity or, in contrast to
evolutionary theory, as that set of codes which is constantly re-written by environmental factors: a technology that feeds on the unpredictable edges between health and sickness.

In *Brain Plague*, the microbes debate questions of theology and creativity on a platform along brain capillaries. Revolutionary microbes worship lesser gods or none at all. One microbe, Rose, reminded me of a religious Quaker. So often, she turns within for inspiration. The old cliché that artists in a creative struggle need to “go inside and ask the big questions” is not a decision Chrysoberyl needs to make. The life and death of microbe nations, cultural inheritances, religious and technological revolutions at the monological level, permit Chrys no sleep. In the cities of Chry’s mind, the meme-like microbes develop their fields of knowledge at alarming rates. One microbe - Saf, ironically, less than safe - learns how to build the first microbe space-ship. While the miniature populations can be transported from one human host to another through injections, the space ship is a sign of the meme’s ability to make a giant, and above all, self-motivated leap for ‘meme kind.’ Its quest for outer space is both religious yet infectious. In the wrong mixtures, these disease protecting microbes can themselves become the disease. Hence, this comical aspect of *Brain Plague* uses the miniature narrative of microbe evolutionary leaps, to bring together three discourses – that of creativity, memes, theology and the spread of disease.

In the films and novels which have been the focus of my analyses, their intimations of posthumanity are not fantasies based on fanciful expectations about the future of neural programming or nanotechnology. The cybernetic system of *The Neuromancer* conceives of a metaphorical and exaggerated version of the Internet, which is not the Internet itself. When Neuromancer appears as a boy doing somersaults in the cyber system, he explains to Case that stating and calling the correct computer codes is the equivalent of raising demons. Tom in his incarnation as a Space Traveler, also performs a particular form of magic. Indeed, this Traveler’s acts of ‘magical thinking’ do achieve results. He thinks positively and strongly enough about his desires and his images become reality. He practices a great deal of meditation and turns himself into the calligraphy covered image of a tree. His mental determination is so great, that synaptically speaking, his brain cells connect to the quantum field. No doubt he will discover new ideas, or memes, to solve the problems of brain tumors. The micro-cells, the micro-gravities and the miniature memes, are all techno-mystical angels that re-code the larger structures of mind and universe.

Neuromancer has given us advice about interpreting works of science fiction in an age of neural pharmacology. Neuromancer gives us a code for reading, with and against the grain of science. Science fiction conjures untested moral, ethical and creative ciphers in technologies full of untapped diamonds and angels. Neuromancer warns us that no biomedical intervention can provide an innocent panacea. What makes the new biomedical interventions intimidating is that our humanness and its unpredictability show no signs of disappearing. Humans seize hold of one intention only to pervert it into another. They do so in an attempt to escape from the human into the posthuman, from Tom the helpless neuroscientist into a Space Traveler who will have love which lasts for eternity. We are our own angels and we make our own nanotech wings. And as science fiction warns us, there are few places where these ‘nano’ angels will fear to tread.
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Filmography


Notes

1 See Doidge, Norman, The Brain that Changes itself for a fuller exploration of intention, character and feedback loops.

2 I want to thank Professor Patricia Pisters of the Media Department, University of Amsterdam, for pointing out these quotes, all apposite for my article. She herself uses these quotes in a forthcoming publication, in which she reads both PI and The Fountain in terms of the ‘time-image’ and neurosciences. She comes up with the concept of a “neuro-image.” For me, the benefit of her approach was to draw my attention to the concept of the “seer.” I also want to thank Liz Dale for alerting me to the Elizabeth Gilbert talk on Ted. Com.
3 See Deleuze and Guattari, “Becoming Intense, Becoming Animal, Becoming Imperceptible…. in a *A Thousand Plateaus* for a poetic analysis of how human consciousness can experience itself as particles that connect with animals, trees, witches and all manner of natural and mystical entities.

4 See Doidge, “Brain Locked, Unlocked.” He explains how emotional narratives are connected to feedback loops and suggests how the brain’s plasticity can overcome these. His work brings together what are now received ideas in cognitive psychology and neurobiology. See also J. Melvin Woody and James Phillips for an approach which connects neuroscience as a narrative model with that of Freud’s “Project for a Scientific Psychology.”
How long
Do works last? (…)
As long as they continue to cause us trouble
They do not decay. (Brecht)

I. The Edge of Madness

The wildness of John Cowper Powys’ writing may drive one to distraction and despair once one has yielded to initial fascination. To make the criticism that he did not reread or edit or polish, that he lacked Latinity, the sense of the work as object independent of his own untamed imagination, appears almost irrelevant before one’s astonishment at his sheer brazen candor. He is able to write out stirrings or impulses so far below any control by the ego that one feels cowardly beside him. Near the end of Wolf Solent, as the hero confronts the loss of his “life-illusion” or “mythology,” he meets up with one of the book’s minor, sinister Gothic figures of lower-class village misery, tending the grave of his own (Solent’s) predecessor.

He must have been at the cellar-floor of misery when he licked with his mental tongue the filthy toenails of Mr Monk.

Complete abjection; the undoing of art. The disgust evoked here would link Powys rather with Bataille or Jelinek. How could this be contained in any finished form? Not that of Breton’s Nadja, with which Solent was roughly contemporary. Comparisons to Continental modernism would be easy: the beginning of Solent closely resembles that of Gottfried Benn’s Rönne Novellas of 1916: a man in a train, aged circa thirty, beginning a new segment of his life. If Rönne comes eventually to fail in his profession, incapable of maintaining his public role, Solent has already done so at the beginning of his novel, having “danced his ‘malice-dance’ – that is how he himself expressed it” (14) in the middle of teaching. At the end of the novel, it is as if Solent were being replaced in the narrative by Lord Carfax, who will repeat all of Solent’s actions with which the book began (611); so too, Benn’s Rönne “sat one morning at his breakfast table and was moved; he felt so deeply that the head doctor would leave, a replacement would come, get out of bed
at this hour and take his breakfast roll” – namely he himself, suspended in the subjunctive, conditional tense, in what Musil would call “sense for possibility” (Möglichkeitssinn). Individuality is, in both cases, subsumed under a mythic, conditional role playable by anyone.

Powys may appear in some sense less radical than Continental modernists like Breton, Benn, or Proust; the difference lies in his obstinate empiricism: “No system at all! Only to dissolve into thin, fluctuating vapour...” (374). Like Jean Paul, Powys suspects Idealist systems, and his mysticism cohabits with an odd loyalty to particular sensation; he will not construct, will not créer un poncif (Baudelaire). The course of Solent is thus not Proust’s triumph over Time, or Dedalus’ invocation of the “old artificer” as patron saint, but the destruction of Solent’s “life-illusion” or “mythology,” also the fons et origo of art. The narrative is therefore not one of the work’s triumph over the world, but the reverse: how to survive defeat, to live, in part, after art has lost its claims to totality. This is precisely what gives Powys his acuteness today, after the apparent end of all isms. Because Solent’s main character is enclosed in a primitive, childish abundance of imagination and meaning, nothing can happen to him except comical incongruity and Quixotic mishap, which he must nonetheless see as necessary, as inseparable from his infinite interiority. (The constant fear one has lost one’s integrity, one’s wholeness of experience, which runs throughout the book, is characteristically adolescent.) Solent is as hopelessly stuck in childishness, as dependent on women, as the heroes of early Wenders (Philip Winter in Alice in the Cities, Wilhelm in Wrong Move, or Friedrich Munro in The State of Things, for whom no stories can ever end except in death.) This state is figured in the texture of the novel’s writing. In its wild roughness of style – its unexpected italics, purpled adjectives and exclamation marks – and the surprising, unpredictable quality of its narrative, Solent resembles nothing so much as Kafka’s early “Description of a Struggle.” It is Expressionism in English, full of primordial father-son conflicts wherein the son loses, or prefers a Kafka-like evasive sidestep into perversion and the status of the Holy Fool to overt victory.

Thus as astonishing as the abjection of Monk’s filthy toenails is the misery of Solent’s sexual failure at the climactic moment of the book, when he is left alone with the child-wife Christie and cannot possess her, suddenly frozen in impotence with a vision of an unhappy man’s face from a London crowd he had seen earlier in the narrative. This Face has been repeated throughout the book, perhaps (by about 447) excessively, but not always with the same meaning; at one point Solent believes that it “gave you your happiness” (153). The result is however no return to any conventional morality, not even the heterodox Christianity of Dostoyevsky (whom Powys admired, and to whom this vision of misery is close). For no such confrontation with the abject real can ever be conclusive. The literary form of near-madness is an open one. Solent has thus to remain open-ended, punctuated, despite its frequent Victorianisms of prose, with strange Gothic narrative tricks, real arcana. They result from the combinatory, associative procedure of the book, the way in which it juxtaposes external events and objects with purely subjective states and figures. There are passages here which can only be compared with what Adorno called “Knoten” (nodal points) in musical structures. One such passage is Solent’s visit to the tomb of King Aethelwolf with Selena Gault (chapter 14, 318), in clear parallelism to his own father’s grave, and yet the puzzle is left uninterpreted. The course of the narrative is regulated, as in poetry, by compulsive repetitions, magical correspondences and superstitious, ritualized aversions. Another nodal passage is the confrontation
between Solent’s mother Ann and his young wife Gerda at Redfern’s grave (ch. 18, 381), where Solent’s mother quotes from “The Pot of Basil” and Solent then from Hamlet. The suffocating accumulation of signification becomes such that Solent loses all control of himself and bursts out in an incomprehensible rage, turned precisely against his one friend Darnley Otter, who is holding his arm as they walk through a country fair:

“Avoid! Avoid!” he suddenly flung out; and with the same spasmodic impulse, as he uttered this strange cry, he tore his arm free. “It’s a trick! It’s a trick! It’s a trick!” He let his voice quiver without restraint, as he hissed out these words, though he knew perfectly well that the ugly contraction of the muscles of his mouth, as much as the word itself, must have been very agitating to his companion. But for this, just then, he cared nothing. If he could have made himself clear to that anxious face, that now gazed at him so concernedly, what he really felt at that moment, it would have resolved itself into something like this: His mother and Gerda had lost their separate identities. They had become the prodding shaft of yellow light that was at the same time the point of Darnley’s trim beard! This shaft was now pushing him towards another misery, which took the form of a taste in his mouth, a taste that he especially loathed, though he could only have defined it, even to himself, as the taste of salad and vinegar! But, whatever it was, this taste was Miss Gault. (...) Between these two things – the blighting light and the corrosive taste – he felt and actual indrawn knot of impotence tying itself together within him... (392-3)

In these nodal moments, the writing pulls together and condenses its motifs in metaphors suggesting a prose poem. Solent has nothing of Stephen Dedalus’ “silence and cunning;” he cannot defend himself at all. The same capacity for pantheistic dissolution in the landscape proves here his enemy, as he is overwhelmed by prehistoric matriarchal demons. The tendency of the narrative to simile, at other times kept within the confines of characterization (as at the first encounter with Selena Gault, who is compared to tree-fungi and a crafty draft horse on pp. 27-29), here overwhelms any outer world. This is why Solent’s mythology is Gnostic at bottom.

The sun was so low now that could look straight into its great red circle suspended above the roofs of the town. It resembled, as he looked at it, a vast fiery tunnel, the mouth of some colossal piece of artillery directed full against him. (264)

Ernst Bloch saw something similar in “The House of the Day：“

The morning has no house, when one goes on further in it, but it can become a fearful one, if one runs into its radical beginning. In the primal dawn, which has still much in it, not only a polished surface, and least of all that macrocosmic space of breath, for which Faust longs at his desk... the reverse twilight came on, which was uncanny to earlier times, the embryonic narrowness of the day right before the cock’s crowing. (...) To the left stood Jupiter, the only star on the milky skin. Jupiter rising; a strong eye, which seemed near precisely through its
strength. And at the same time it was palpable that the landscape was in agreement with this look: indeed, Jupiter had first provoked this incomprehensible ensemble, as a guest in the space or as the lord holding the reins among his creatures. The star ruled so powerfully that it even tore the viewer down from his contemplative terrace, right into the thick of the scene, where there were no longer any eyes or distances for any standing outside or above. (...) The witness felt himself as in the inside of an animal body, a world-animal-body with Jupiter as its inner eye.  

It is the Landscape of the Uncanny, one where any difference between inside and out has dissolved. In Bloch’s passage as in many in Powys, one feels as if one has, impossibly, gone inside the sun itself. Solent’s weapon against this terrifying, Panic sense is comedy and obscenity:

He became, in fact, a living human head, emerging from a monstrous agglomeration of all repulsiveness. And this gross mass was not only foul and excremental, it was in some mysterious way comic. (289)

The typical Modernist shock is here muted, since the idea remains an idea. In a later book, Owen Glendower, a character’s string of invectives is decently cut off:

“God griddle his –“ And the Scab ended with one of the foulest oaths our traveller had ever heard. (I: 18)

Powys’ friend Henry Miller would have included that foul oath. Shortly after his Gnostic epiphany as excremental head, Solent “felt lighter, freer, liberated from the malice of matter” (289). This does not last, though. He must finally destroy the very illusion on which his storytelling depends. That illusion seems to reach its hallucinatory, insane culmination in the last chapter. Solent is again near his father’s grave, this time with Lord Carfax, who plays an almost deus ex machina role in concluding an inherently infinite narrative (he is the new element who must be added to the story as if from outside to close it off, although he has been obliquely involved from the beginning). Solent decides not to show Carfax the grave, and is telling him how to get back to his hotel, and he realizes he is “surprised at having seen nothing of Miss Gault” with whom he first saw the grave. That surprise becomes a literal hallucination.

His mind, now preoccupied with Miss Gault, became now most vividly conscious of the slaughterhouse. The slaughterhouse looked especially harmless at the moment; but he regarded it with sick aversion.

“These deeds must not be thought about after these ways; so, it will make us mad.”

Of course, even while he saw her standing there, he knew he was imagining it, and that she
had no palpable reality. This phenomenon, this visualizing of a bodily image that was known by his reason to be unreal, was one that he had suffered from before.

“You’ll find her,” he was speaking of the sedate lady in the hotel-office, “very stiff but very polite.” But while he was uttering these words, he saw Miss Gault’s figure quite palpably before him. He saw her bony shoulders turned to him, black in the roadway. And there was her arm, with clenched hand, lifted up in prophetic malediction!

“They’re killing something in there,” he thought. And then, for the infinitesimal part of a second, there arose within him an awareness of blinding pain, followed by thick darkness smeared with out-rushing blood. As this sank away, there ensued a murky dizziness in his brain, accompanied by a shocking sense that both his father’s skull and this woman’s arm were appealing to him to do something that he lacked the courage to do. His legs has turned into immovable lead, as happens in nightmares.

“Very stiff... very polite,” he repeated mechanically, perfectly conscious that he was smiling into the man’s face with a forced repulsive smile.

But Carfax had suddenly become an alert, compact man of action. (...) “Off with you, lad!” he said in a pleasant voice. (614-615)

The key to this passage is the metonymic parallel between the slaughterhouse and Solent’s father’s grave, which then becomes delusional reality. As Solent realizes – informed telepathically by Selena Gault – that an animal is being killed nearby, he enters into the animal’s death and relives it himself; the implication is also that his father had been killed as helplessly as at a slaughterhouse. What he “lacked the courage to do” is to kill Lord Carfax, his father’s and Miss Gault’s enemy, and the ally of his omnipotent mother, the Whale (137) in which he as Jonah is repeatedly swallowed (cf. also the scene on 302). (Carfax, moreover, clearly embodies that English class system Powys himself hated and fled for the wilds of America and later Wales, a system inseparable from a certain kind of Mother-and-nanny-driven propriety.) Thus when Carfax denounces Solent’s erstwhile patron Urquhart for his paranoid delusions, his self-accusations, regarding the death of Redfern, Solent recognizes his own mythology as the object of this. Yet he can still recognize that, as he stands again by his father’s grave, “He had told himself a story in that brief while!” In this little fable, he tells his counterpart, the nameless Man of the Waterloo Steps,

You needn’t suffer. I let you off. You are allowed to forget. It doesn’t matter what your secret life is. I’ve told you what mine is; and now I tell you that it can be borne. (617)

Ego absolvo te. Asperges me hyssopo, et mundabor. And thus: “He said grimly to himself, ‘No gestures now!’” (626) No more eternal remembering of the undead. For the first time, Solent appears to gain something almost like a will, a body. He is now armed with a magical formula, yet it is one he can practice: forget and endure. “I must have the courage of my cowardice,” he thought.” (631) What does this mean?
On one level, it might resemble Kierkegaard’s familiar willing to be oneself (*The Sickness Unto Death*), and yet this is already too moral. The courage of cowardice is paradoxical, certainly, as well as tautological, but it is a paradox exposing something like the irrational nature beneath all will, all ego or I.

**Anti-System**

Due to his inability or unwillingness to systematize, Powys’ novels do not fully break through into that modernist Beyond of Proust, Joyce, Kafka or Musil. Rather they appear to contain a very modern thematics of death, perversion, liminal experience and self-dissolution, within a nineteenth-century narrative. This gives his next three novels, *A Glastonbury Romance*, *Weymouth Sands* and *Maiden Castle* an odd instability: an ultimately metaphysical thematic is awkwardly staged in a series of episodic vignettes, where a still rather nineteenth-century detailing of milieu and character sits uncomfortably with what becomes – cut off from the concretion of aesthetic method and substantivized – a weird private religion. In his very last works, this private religion will cut free of Art altogether and be stated in the naked form of a parable. (Powys is not alone in this: Alfred Döblin, who had converted to Catholicism in the dark days of World War Two in California, would write similar fables such as “Fairy Tale of Materialism” in his last years.) It is this that has given Powys the less than fully justified title of “philosopher,” and that has contributed also to his continuing marginality, even to a certain cult-like quality of his followers and interpreters. (As we will see, though, there is an aspect of Powys’ claim to the philosophical that must be taken seriously, and that is his belief – a nineteenth-century inheritance – that literature must serve life, and not seal itself off in any posture of *l’art pour l’art*.) It is this that has given Powys the less than fully justified title of “philosopher,” and that has contributed also to his continuing marginality, even to a certain cult-like quality of his followers and interpreters. (As we will see, though, there is an aspect of Powys’ claim to the philosophical that must be taken seriously, and that is his belief – a nineteenth-century inheritance – that literature must serve life, and not seal itself off in any posture of *l’art pour l’art*.) His correspondent Louis Wilkinson was a Crowley adept; a book from the 1980s argues quite seriously that *Porius* is only comprehensible as a roman à clef about – alchemy. This cultic aspect might remind one of Hesse, whose Harry Haller (in *Steppenwolf*) has more than a little similarity to his contemporary Wolf Solent. One should beware of dismissing any scent of the cultic out of hand: cult is often the earliest form of public renown. Wagner’s Bayreuth has always had something of the cult about it; a recent unsympathetic commentator called Adorno and followers “a Bayreuth for philosophers of history after the capsizing of big ideas.” This is no argument against Adorno, though, for any real thought must be polemical, if it is to do more than collaborate with conformity. A figure like Lacan, too, retains something of the cult in his following, yet this is only an index of the University’s continuing inability to assimilate him into its normal routines. Such eccentricity is central to Powys.

Of these middle novels, *Glastonbury* is the weakest, in part because one cannot shake the suspicion that it is what Adorno called “an estranged masterpiece” (*verfremdetes Hauptwerk*), which tries too hard for monumentality, and cannot escape appearing a diffuse imitation of *Ulysses*. (At moments one wonders whether the caricature of Philip Crow the capitalist is not also simultaneously one of Joycean modernism, as when Crow bursts out in an odd parody of associational stream-of-consciousness with technological imagery.) There are still fine moments, such as John Geard’s nocturnal Gnostic visions (453f.), or Sam Dekker’s revelation of “a Christ in matter that is nearer the Grail than the Christ of the Church” (943). Powys is still struggling with the old Romantic problem of the Inexpressible, the horizon beyond language,
and “the issue of the struggle that went on tonight between the Enemies of the Legend and its Lovers would evade all but supernatural narration, however one might struggle to body it forth” (747). Even as a failure, this is still more interesting than a minor success.

Powys’ refusal to systematize his art is linked to his un-modern suspicion of natural science, perhaps one of his less interesting aspects, since often stated in the form of curmudgeonly negation. Yet he overcomes this in part in his portrait of Dr. Daniel Brush in *Weymouth Sands*, a figure who anticipates the anti-psy-chiatry movement (R.D. Laing, Thomas Szasz) after 1945. Precisely in his depersonalization, Brush is the complement to the madman Sylvanus Cobbold, who has made a ritual method out of his delusions, an esoteric art drawing on Taoist sexual practices. (One can only imagine the high moralizing dudgeon and censure that would today be directed at Powys for daring to present Cobbold the perverse child-lover in so sympathetic a light: an index of how ambiguous our current vogue for individual “rights” may be. Powys was nothing if not the sworn enemy of stolid, secure middle-class propriety.) Cobbold’s weird private rituals have elements of Freud’s Rat-Man or even Schreber; like the latter, he has a *Grundsprache* (fundamental language), central to which is the incantation *Caput-Anus* (*Bataille’s L’Anus solaire*). This is complemented by ritual use of garden tools, addressed with “a kind of Homeric litany:”

“The Pick,” he repeated in a droning liturgical intonation. “The Pick, the Spade, the Fork, the Rake, the Hoe.” And then he added, peering into a portion of the great barn where a substantial wheelbarrow – in a tone exactly as if this last object’s dim identity exacted more propitiation than the rest – “and the *very good* wheelbarrow!”

A rope in the shed, emblematic of the terror of suicide, is even given a name, Trivia, and begged to have mercy on its owner.

“Trivia, Trivia, Trivia, Trivia, Trivia,” he repeated, as if pleading for remission of sins.(396)

Cobbold has just been abandoned by the girl Marret, his partner in esoteric sexual mysticism, and is trying via apotropaic and incantatory magic to fight off despair.

“Caput-anus,” he mumbled; and having this in the numbness of his loss jumbled his two words together, he repeated this curious expression several times over with that deep craving to be comforted by symbolic gibberish that attracts children to certain ancient nursery rhymes. (405-406)

This “symbolic gibberish” plays a role in many of Powys’ novels. The “Tup’s Fold” chapter of *Weymouth Sands* is one of Powys’ great dramatic confrontations, as those between Solent and his mother, Solent and Christie, Solent and Jason Otter or Mr Urquhart. The ultimate predecessor for this would be Dostoyevsky: not only the Legend of the Grand Inquisitor, but also the astonishing dramatic meetings of Rogozhin, Nastasya Philippovna and Prince Myshkin in *The Idiot*. Dr. Brush confesses to Cobbold that “nothing would give me more pleasure than if you were to pick up that poker and knock my brains out.” For a
moment, Cobbold sinks down into the same projective or hallucinatory delusions as Solent. It is the Temptation of St. Anthony.

As Sylvanus gazed at the Doctor and pondered upon this startling remark, there came upon him a very curious sensation. He suddenly found himself seized with a queer feeling, as if the Doctor, stretched out there before him, was really a woman! (...)

“Caput-Anus!” he cried in his heart, “what in the devil’s name is happening to me? Am I going mad? Is it with this that it begins? Are you really flapping over there in that chair, you little fool? Are you really wanting me to ‘tart’ you? If not, why do I feel -- “ (536-7)

Cobbold grasps at this moment something like a hidden femininity of Science itself, kin to the other Magnae Matres of Modernity, namely Capital and the Law, and of which Dr. Brush is only a drone-servant, just as the Boys of Business are to Money.

“You poor devil!” thought Sylvanus. “What I feel now as I look at you is quite reason enough for your being unhappy. We need an opposite sex, just as plants need water.”

Neither Sylvanus nor Powys are homosexual, close as they may brush up to homoeroticism. Brush breaks the spell the same way as did Lord Carfax at the end of Solent, namely with a mocking bluff and a smile. It is Lacan’s prisoner’s dilemma: one man must pretend to be a man, for fear the others will not think him one. Manhood rests every bit as much on public masquerade, on being-for-other, as does womanhood. At Brush’s smile, Sylvanus reacts with anger; the clock on the mantel rings.

With the dying away of the last reverberations of the clock a thirst for Marret came over Sylvanus that made him howl like a famished wolf. He did actually give vent to a cry that seemed hardly human.(540)

He rushed weeping from the Doctor’s study (...) uttering, qute without any intention of doing such a thing, one of those childish jingles of his.

But after doing so, he turns to the Doctor:

“Damn your soul!” he cried savagely. “You are not a man!”

The person who is a man is George Protty, a “demented ornithologist” who thinks he is a Phoenix, but can nonetheless muster up the civility to bid Cobbold good night “in a tone full of respectful consideration.” Being a man, in Powys, means being able to act, and act with others, as Dr. Brush cannot, locked off in a position of morbid contemplation of life as he is. Action can also mean recognizing the necessity of social convention as well (as even Porius will do). The chapter ends with Cobbold returning the greeting with the same conventional English civility as Solent’s final “cup of tea.” His wolf’s-howl was in fact a paradoxical
return to heterosexual desire, taking the form of animality, of a forsaken creatureliness that must provoke tears as its complement (the capacity to desire and that for sadness and fear being inseparable).

*Maiden Castle*, too, despite the weakness of many of its characters, centers on a similar grandiose confrontation, in this case between Dud No-Man and his father Enoch (Urien) Quirm. It is always child against parent in Powys (a moment linking him to the Oedipal battles of the Expressionists), but never more so than here, where the Father has absorbed the Mother into himself, being nothing other than the Horde-Father of Freud’s *Totem and Taboo*. Thus Dud’s denying assertion (Freud’s *Verleugnung*) that

*I’m not one of your women – I’m not your daughter.*

This is related to Cobbold’s perception of Dr. Brush as a woman. To Dud’s denial, Urien responds uncannily with a strange, hollow noise in his throat:

…as he watched him he made sort of wind-in-the-telegraph-wire sound in his throat, a humming and drumming noise…

This eerie sound is metonymically related to the train-whistles Dud then hears with such relief a page later (227), and its spell is only broken when the two men reach the gate and Urien speaks to him in a normal voice, of which the “effect… was to drive out of him every intimation of the supernatural” (229). Since Urien is as if a part of Dud, his own hallucination, “it was still impossible for him to utter the syllables ‘Father’”(232); Urien can only be “his mother’s man” (231). Urien, as if in answer, tells his son that he, the Father, changed his name after his son’s birth (234): thereby almost making the son into his father’s father. Dud continues to resist this way out, though:

for the whole business of discovering a local habitation and a name for his solitary spirit went against the grain of his life-illusion. (234)

As Dud “stiffens” and hardens into bony opposition to his father, the latter is “heaving and laboring” as if giving birth, as if he were Pauline Nature itself “groaning for redemption” (*Romans* 8:18-23). Yet Urien is in fact trying rather to “break the bonds of life’s natural law” (239). In this he has stolen his son’s fire in advance. Dud is briefly able to call him “Father,” thereby breaking the charm binding them and allowing his father mortality (237). At the end, though, he realizes his hatred of his father is due to a desire *not to be born at all*, to remain unrealized in every sense, sexually and metaphysically (244). The entire passage is centered on ritual, exorcistic magic. As in *Solent*, it is an abysmal confrontation with the abject.

III. From History to Myth

That “supernatural narration” evoked, but not yet realized, by *A Glastonbury Romance* is finally worked
out by *Porius*, after a historical prelude in the form of *Owen Glendower*, an uncharacteristically “objective”\textsuperscript{14} if still interesting work. *Glendower* is Powys’ *Götz von Berlichingen*; like Goethe’s *Sturm und Drang* play, or the American Western, it dramatizes the tension between impersonal law and charismatic chivalry. In *Glendower*, the overwhelming paranoid signification that elsewhere only holds up narration with timeless, epiphanic excurses is actually built into the storytelling (as for instance when the Lollard Walter Brut “walked up to” a girl and “deliberately tearing a page out of his precious Gospels and folding it up very carefully... thrust it into her hand,” or when the narrator Rhisiart’s erotic feelings for the girl Luned “seemed to grow more and more general” and “abstract”).\textsuperscript{15} Near the end, though, Rhisiart too has his “childish gibberish,” when he cries out: “In his excitement he had outrageously and harshly mixed together the musical syllables of Catherine’s and Tegolin’s names!” (928). Watching from a distance the blaze of Glendower’s funeral pyre, Rhisiart wonders:

> Why did Owen call himself *Prince of Annwn*? And Rhisiart suddenly thought of Modry, and how she would talk sometimes of what she called “the harrowing of Annwn” by King Arthur. While Owen lived, there had always been something about him that for a narrow legal skull was hard to understand; but this dull thrumming of the strings and this fading glow in the sky were like a simple childish hand copying the Commentary of some planetary Pascentius! (934)

“Pascentius” sends one to the encyclopedia, where one finds that the name might refer to Pascent, third son of Vortigern, mentioned in the *Historia Brittonum* and in Geoffrey of Monmouth; but this Pascent is a dynastic rival and warlord, and can hardly have written Commentaries; who might have is the bishop Pascentius, whose successor attended the Synod of Orange in 441 (is this the Pascentius, Bishop of Poitiers, whose life was written by Fortunatus and is mentioned in Gregory of Tours’ *History of the Franks*, 4:18?). One knows Powys was fond of Pelagius, thus not of Augustine, whose work was tempered at precisely this Synod. More important is the Celticizing of the Harrowing of Hell (Annwn in the *Mabinogion* or nekyia. This is a central motif in most of Powys’ narratives.

In the case of *Porius*, it is sometimes difficult to take the book’s “message” – of an impending Golden Age, at times embarrassingly apostrophized as “Aquarian”\textsuperscript{16} – seriously, much less dignify it as philosophical. The obsession with blood and race here are more than merely unfortunate, especially given the time of the book’s composition (during World War Two). Admittedly, if Powys’ fondness for Jung can be embarrassing, it is one shared by many more canonical writers as well (the Surrealists, Mann in the Joseph novels, even Bachmann’s *Malina* as “anima”). The book perches just on the edge of “fantasy” literature, or science fiction (an edge Powys will then proceed to cross in his last decade, and had indeed already crossed in *Morwyn*).\textsuperscript{17} Astonishingly enough, Powys appears to have re-created not only the lost and unknown Dark Ages in all their eclectic, syncretistic oddity, but also something like a Late Antique anthropology: not dual, but tripartite: “It was neither his mind nor his body that was hit by what he’d seen: it was his soul” (146). Indeed, this independence of *pneuma* from *nous* was typical of Late Platonism, of Philo Judaeus, perhaps of some early Church Fathers as well.

The idea of “preexistence” - even of reincarnation – which is so central to the book is not Powys’ peculiarity
alone; Hugo von Hofmannsthal was interested in it in his early work, and there are poems of Verlaine’s devoted to the notion: “ce sera comme quand on a déjà vécu” (“Kaléidoscope,” 1873), or “Les Déjàs sont les Encores!” (“Réversibilités,” ca. 1887). What is particular to Powys is not only the massive historical armature in which this is encased – for one can find this in Joyce or Mann or Döblin as well – but the odd hesitation about formulating it. This is made clear in one passage of Porius where Brochvael experiences it.

And the “lledyf unben” or “disinherited chieftain” suddenly felt that long ago and far away this knob under his hand had been part of the balustrade of a flight of steps leading to an enchanted embarkation!

The cloud of gnats had also been a part of it. So had the startled seagull. But what part of it had that white profile propped on those thin arms? And into what waters did those steps lead? To Brochvael’s aeternum exilium? “Eternal exile” was a paradoxical name for the exultant thrill of homesickness swallowed up in a sensation of home-coming too delicious for words.

Curse it! He’d begun to question, to analyze, begun to reason upon what that magical pine-knob, cut, carried and carved by himself, a bit of wood among other bits of wood, but a veritable Hermes’ wand for stealing secrets from the gods, was actually conveying to him through his hand, and down his arm, across which hung his old woodman’s cloak! And with this accurst questioning the whole mystery began to fade. Anxiously he tried to cling to its departing essence, which, unlike his now somewhat too obtrusive cloak, was vanishing moment by moment. “Oh, Divine Water!” he prayed in his heart. “Whither do those stairs lead? What does this happiness mean?” (304)

Compare Sylvanus Cobbold’s incantatory invocation of rope and wheelbarrow in Weymouth Sands. Here we have it: the problem of Powys’ stubborn empirical distrust of system. Why should questioning and analysis have to destroy the sensation? What else is the poet’s business but this reflective and critical work? Powys’ recourse to the gesture of prayer, complete with pseudo-archaic language (“whither”) is a confession of failure. Yet the failure may well be deliberate, bound up with a refusal of art’s autonomy. This passage is followed by a characteristically detailed natural description, and then a rather flat brooding on the differences between reflections and shadows (304-5).

The key here is, that like Solent, Porius attains a hard-won forgetting by the end. “What he really felt at that moment – and what a moment to feel it! - was that in these last two days... he had broken loose from his whole past” (360). With this he acquires also his gnomic sententiae or formulae (“endure/enjoy till the end,” 487-8). As in Solent, too, the most important thing is less the doctrine arrived at than the narration that gets there; so Brochvael asks himself in the Druid’s lair, “Was the whole nature of human life, was its whole mysterious purpose, only to be explained as a titillatingly thrilling story?” (250) Later on, as Porius and the Henog (historian) are visiting the dying Pelagian monk Brother John (who answers their questions with a theological reference), it is said of the Henog:
He looked as if the dying man’s frivolity, in thus dragging in theological controversy when the very foundations of human civilization, that is to say the facts and fables of history, were awaiting discussion, must soon yield, if he remained quiescent, to a seriousness more proper to the occasion. (351)

This is the point of view of a servant of Clio, who had attacked Merlin’s belief in the magical openness of the future early on in the novel, and yet it is in part one supported by the latter itself as a whole. The novel’s most remarkable passages are those where it is less proposing a new religion than rewriting older mythologies and even histories themselves. For the point of Porius is precisely to find a place in time where “facts and fables” are both parts of history – as in the legendary time of the Mabinogion, or Geoffrey of Monmouth. In the chapter titled “Birth and Death” there is one such rewriting, between Llwyd and Gwawl, both from the Mabinogion:

And Llywd said: I will show thee friendship more perfect than this. Between me and God there is an Annwn of Illusion that is richer and easier to reach than the real one which Arawn, its ruler, shares with Pwyll. Into this second Annwn, this Annwn of Illusion, created by Math the son of Mathonwy and by Gwydion the son of Dion, there is a way that leads under land and water from Caer Dathyl. It is a way that goes by the north, leaving Dinas Arianrod to the south.

For a moment one wonders: if the “Annwn of Illusion” the realm of aesthetic imagination, the emphatic Art Stephen Dedalus seeks, the Surrealist dream of a metalanguage? But the text goes on to correct this.

In their false Annwn of Illusion Math and Gwydion have caused chains of enchantment to be suspended from the deep sky in such a manner as to descend into the lowest chamber of Caer Sidi – for you must understand that there is now a Caer Sidi of Illusion as well as the real one. (498)

Caer Sidi is a castle in the underworld of Annwn. A few pages earlier, Porius had quoted a line from the Book of Taliessin (XIV): “Complete is my chair in Caer Sidi.” Here however is the undoing of illusion, the breaking of a spell. Llywd is the enemy of Pryderi in the Mabinogion, a magician-bishop whose spells must be removed by Manawydan (in “Manawydan son of Llŷr”). The magician-enemies in Porius would be witch Nineue or even the Christian Minnawc Gorsant. Powys is ambivalent about illusion: on the one hand, “the human imagination… should never be robbed of its power to tell itself other stories, and thus to create a different future” (59-60). This means a fluidity of all such stories, their never being subjected to the codifying authority of any priestly caste. That of the Henog or historian is presented in less than entirely favorable light.

The Henog departed into the twilight with the same expression of inscrutable satisfaction as he had worn when he first ceased reading. “He’s alone in space,” Porius thought, “and only space has the power of reflecting his stories in such a manner that all their faults are lost and all their virtues remain. In the eternally empty space around him he sees the perfection he
aimed at and gives himself the credit for having attained it; and maybe, in some cosmic ideal sense, he has attained it.”

And Porius’ cloudy memory struggled with dim recollections of how Brother John had scolded him once for his prejudice against legendary tales. “Perhaps everybody who listens to the Henog,” he thought, “is resolved into this paradigm, or perfect pattern, of an ideal myth; and, by becoming a part of it himself, is transformed into the very perfection of which in his prejudice he refused to see as much as the fragment of a shadow!” (501)

Narrative is not only of the supernatural, but supernatural, magical itself. It is “that Druidic hypnotism of speech” Powys found he “could summon up” in his lectures and attributed to John Geard in A Glastonbury Romance. For this form of narration, the past is as open and unfinished as it was for Herder.

Philosopher, if you would honor and be useful to the state of your century: the book of prehistory lies before you! sealed shut with seven seals; a book of miracles full of prophecies: the end of days has come upon you! read!

The “book of prehistory” is a paradoxical formulation, for it cannot be written in words. It can only be evoked, like Brochvael’s unanalyzable experience of pre-existence. Nowhere is Powys more un-Modernist than in this: he never really questioned the representative power of fiction, for it was central to his creed.

**Modernity as Exception**

Doubts still remain. One wonders why one is unconvinced not only by much writing about Powys, but also by his own essays. Many older commentators on him took his dated critique of modern civilization too literally; attempts at “replacing” technology with myth have not aged well, though, whether in Hesse, Mann, Lawrence, Yeats or Eliot. Joyce’s merciless mockery of Lady Gregory’s Hibernophile cult is still relevant to many a sensitive plant who longs to flee to the lost wholeness of Celtic fantasy or Magna Mater. We would do well to be slightly skeptical of this sort of regressive Utopia. In Powys, as we have seen, it never becomes a system. Powys had no Modernist gift for theoretical speculation; if there are twentieth century composers, such as Prokofiev, who had natural talent, yet little self-critical capacity, and whose work must survive on the sheer verve of wit or melodic gift, Powys was something similar in literature: a story-teller with a vivid imagination who rarely caught his breath long enough to discipline his volcanic outpourings. His long years of lecturing in the US, a strangely anachronistic trait – can one imagine Kafka or Joyce on the lecture trail? and prolonged exposure to it may not have been beneficial to the later Auden – means that his work has something peculiarly oral, not written about it; his unwillingness to revise or edit suggests the same. The oft-noted Victorianisms of tone, whether rhetorical or colloquial, and which stick out so oddly from his later historical novels, are traces of this same oratorical technique. Thus his essays feel too chatty, lacking the specific density of the written that, precisely, would lead one not only to pause, but also to reread. (In all fairness, the same may be said of many of Auden’s essays, that reflect only too well the intellectual fashions of l’homme moyen sensuel of the New York cocktail party circa 1960.) One
wishes there were filmic records of those lectures, for he must have been a remarkable performer. For
the same reason, the lack of written finish of his novels, which are not quite “texts” in the now-standard
academic sense, cannot help pointing toward their author, who has not managed to detach himself from
them as did other modernists. Like Stendhal, Powys saw his writing as a lesson to himself and to others in
how to live; like Stendhal, again, Powys’ lesson remained a deeply lonely one, apart from any school or
movement. In a strange way, Powys’ “work” was also himself, not only his writing, as his Autobiography
betrays. In this he is, even if only faintly and distantly, kin to Artaud as well as Bataille. If he is part of
modernity, it is only as a perennial exception to any normative rules.

Nonetheless Powys puts one in mind of Montaigne’s beloved maxims from Plato:

Fay ton faict et te cognoy. Chascun de ces deux membres enveloppe generallement tout nostre
devoir, et semblablement enveloppe son compagnon. (Essais I: iii)

Do your deed and know yourself. In modernity, one only learns who one is (if at all) through “doing one’s
deed.” Powys did; and his deed has a lesson for posterity, a lesson precisely against the academicization
of modernity, most often in French form. That Powys was and is possible at all means that there is (still)
another dimension to the modern than the now-exhausted and Scholastic project of self-reflexivity, or the
avant-garde’s sublation of art (now, in “performance art,” become the worst form of cheap Bohemian
entertainment, parasitically living off the very “institution of art” it claims to criticize). The apocalyptic
horizon of Powys’ work, which was also that of modernity as ism, is still with us now, but we have fewer
means than before with which to respond to it. Powys liked to refer to Berdyaev’s notion that modernity
would lead to a new Middle Ages, but this missed the point: the Middle Ages were in fact an emergence
of rational order and civilization from something much more obscure, namely the Dark Ages that would
be the subject of Porius. What lies ahead now is darker still; how to “faire son faict” in dark times?
The shadow cast by the technological and political collapse of our times – exemplified in the troubles
of America, the last laboratory experiment of Europe – falls not only on the Enlightenment, and the
Renaissance before it, but also on the “nature” of the human itself, which begins to take on dark contours
worthy not only of the older Freud, but also of Augustine. The renascence of religion has very real causes.
The continuing interest of Powys, and of Porius in particular, is his insistence on the comical, his refusal
to yield to the temptation to fatalism, to guilt and sin, in the face of so much darkness. This emphasis on
the comic links him with Joyce and Dante even more than Balzac or his beloved Dickens, since Powys’
comedy is not only a human one. It is his cosmic and comic perspective, his embedding of the human
within a larger natural horizon, that allows him to view the tragedy of the human with calm. His seeming
eccentricity thus becomes legible as, in its own way, still authentically modern.

Notes


5 There are similar moments in the novels of Alfred Döblin (see their discussion in my book, The Technological Unconscious in Modern German Literature, Rochester: Camden House, 2008, p. 154); as in Döblin, the condensation of meaning acquires here a near-paranoid intensity.

6 “Das Haus des Tags,” Spuren (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp 1979), 163-4 (my translation); see also “The Back of Things” on p. 172ff..


12 Maiden Castle (Woodstock: Overlook, 2001), 225.

13 “Pompeii only begins to decay once it has been unearthed,” as Freud had it (“Bemerkungen über einen Fall von Zwangsneurose,” Gesammelte Werke [Frankfurt: Fischer, 1999] VIII, 400).


18 “It is part of Powys’ deepest philosophy that life can be fulfilled if we tell ourselves the right stories”
(Ballint, “Porius and the Comedy of the Grotesque,” p. 15).


20 *Auch eine Philosophie der Geschichte zur Bildung der Menschheit* (Stuttgart: Reclam 1990), p. 86.

21 Nor is one always convinced by attempts at forcing Powys into the Procrustean bed of post-structuralism; so H. P. Fawkner reads Powys as applied Derrida, obliterating the difference between literary and philosophical texts, at times with unintended humor, as when it is stated in all seriousness: “In summary, then, there is cleavage in the world” (*The Ecstatic World of JCP*, Cranbury NJ: Associated University Presses 1986, 20). - Nonetheless, the careful work of Powys scholars such as Cavaliero, Ballin and Lock points the way toward a less cultic appreciation of his work.

22 Michael Ballin has seen *Porius* as a veiled autobiography (“Porius and the Comedy of the Grotesque,” *Powys Notes* 10: 1 (Fall-Winter 1995), p. 13); Charles Lock pointed out that Powys persisted in seeing Joyce’s work as more autobiographical than it was (“John Cowper Powys and James Joyce,” *In The Spirit of Powys*, ed. Denys Lane, Lewisburg, PA: Bucknell 1990, p. 30) and sees this “image of Joyce as a measure of self-projection, or even identification” (31).

23 Artaud, too, Gnostically negated his own being, attempting to re-write his own parenthood (“I, Antonin Artaud, am my own father and mother”), through ritual exorcisms – especially in his late work.

24 The erstwhile avant-gardist Philippe Sollers titled a collection of his essays, after the end of the leftist *isms* of the 1960s in which he had participated, *Théorie des Exceptions* (Paris: Gallimard 1985): Powys, too, could only be theorized or historicized as a grandiose exception.

25 This is brought out clearly by Ballin, pp. 14-15, who sees Powys’ comedy as “closer to the postmodern absurd of Beckett than the traditional modernist perspective” (17); although one might see the later fantasies as anticipating postmodernism, the present essay has tried rather to link Powys to modernism.
A method for the times: a meditation on virtual ethnography faults and fortitudes.

By Venessaa Paech

Increasingly, identities and relationships are realised and performed in virtualised communities and spaces. To cultural and social interrogators, traditional ethnographic methods represent a contextually rich pathway to mapping intimate and meta-behaviours online. However, conventional techniques must innovate and transform to accommodate a polysemous eco-system and population.

In this paper, I explore key strengths and weaknesses of the ethnographic method when applied to computer-mediated collectives, and highlight specific imperatives that should be considered by researchers. My goal is to offer insights into the deployment of ethnography in diverse digital fora, including how it can be adapted or combined with other techniques to create a hybridised methodology. I support the theory that “new media” is historically relative - and argue that - while unique qualities of contemporary connectors must be practically addressed in research, a macro-epistemological approach is most helpful to contextualise findings to, move scholars toward a best practice for virtual situation.

A method for change

The latter decades of the twentieth century saw the ascendency of expansive communication technologies that dazzled and commuted individuals, networks and economies with fresh momentum. These technologies have given rise to new sites of convergence, news tools for expression, newly situated socio-cultural tensions, and new vocations to manage the exchanges that occur in these ephemeral territories. Recent statistics from the USC Annenberg School for Communication’s Center for the Digital Future indicate these territories and their residents are growing more numerous. Their 2008 Digital Future Report indicates that membership in online communities has grown over 100% in the last three years. In record numbers, individuals are identifying as a ‘member’ of these microverses, visiting them regularly, publishing media-rich content within their ‘walls’, forming heterogeneous, disembodied and physical ties with their inhabitants.
More than half of online community members (54 percent) log into their community at least once a day, and 71 percent of members said their community is very important or extremely important to them. Fifty-six percent of members reported meeting their online counterparts in person… And, a large and growing percentage of members -- now 55 percent -- say they feel as strongly about their online communities as they do about their real-world communities. (2008 Digital Future Report, USC Annenberg)

The “messy, chaotic enterprise” (Pahl, 2003) of ethnography seems uniquely suited for research within the virtual collectives of our times: nebulous, shaded and poly-modal. Ethnography’s reflexive DNA allows it to probe the human fibre of cyberspaces. There is ample air traffic control analysis of ‘online community’ – reductive assessment of its movements, distilled into linear metrics such as ‘hits’ or registration numbers. But to understand what and who we are when we connect (and disconnect) online, scholars need to tap the ‘grey areas’ of social motility. Informed observation, participation and interpretation insulate debates around digital existences from banality, rhetoric or uncritical evangelism. As Howard Rheingold, the ‘father’ of virtual community, has argued, it is only through immersion at the community coalface that researchers will advance our understanding of our ‘bloodless’ networked publics (and privates).

What – and where – is ‘online community’?

Technologically-mediated social behaviours raise unique challenges for researchers, beginning with underlying definitions and assumptions (Wang & Gloviczki, 2008). Unpacking challenges in studying the World Bank’s ICT4DEV project, a part-virtualised network of stakeholders around the globe, Casper Bruun Jensen described the project itself as “an ontologically heterogeneous, variable and distributed entity, which does not respect any of the taken-for-granted levels and boundaries in the social science vocabulary. Is it micro or macro? Real or virtual? Material or discursive? Technical or political? We cannot tell.” (Jensen, 2006) Is this entity a community? It possesses members and non-members, literacies, shared purpose, sub-networks and cohesive (whether successful or not) infrastructure. What then might prompt us to classify it otherwise?

The term community, long debated in research, has become a banner term in contemporary cyberspace, adopted by causal agitators as product, panacea and parlance. Andrew Clark unlocks some complexities of ‘community’ methodologically in his working paper on ‘networks, ties and contacts’:

The idea of community is a confusing concept. It encapsulates issues of identity and belonging, similarity and difference, inclusion and exclusion, place and time, processes such as modernisation, and has been considered both a spatial and social phenomenon. (Clark, 2007)

Bettina Heiss maps a history of the term, and interrogates the sometimes problematic, archaic implications of ‘online community’ as a frame for studying mediated social clustering. (Heiss, 2007)
Overused by an array of competing agendas, the word is bromidic. For many it is divested of any authentic meaning. So neutralised, we return to perhaps the most truthful state of community there is (on or offline): it is what we make it and cannot be arbitrarily imposed by external forces. Rheingold and Benedict Anderson each capture this variability. Rheingold positions community as “social aggregations that emerge from the Net when enough people carry on those public discussions long enough, with sufficient human feeling, to form webs of personal relationships in cyberspace. (Rheingold, 1993) For Anderson’s ‘imagined communities’ of nationalism, meaning is constructed “by its participants, and not necessarily bound by structure of location.” (Anderson, 1991)

Wellman, Boase and Chen (2002) further point out that community is a moving target by nature, in a state of definitional flux long before the arrival of the Internet. For them, contemporary connective technologies are a neutral incubator for existing human forces, rather than a Promethean womb for new social phenomena: “Rather than increasing or destroying community, the Internet can best be seen as integrated into rhythms of daily life, with life online intertwined with offline activities. Slater (2002) accentuates the amorphous distinction between online and offline communities and their inhabitants, arguing it is both arbitrary and reductive. The virtual ethnographer must embrace community as a dynamic conceit, beware artificially demarked ‘community’ zones in modern cyberspace (inhabited by virtual tumbleweed) and instead look toward Rosaldo’s “busy intersections” (Rosaldo, 1989) and their newly constituted digital borderlands.

The indigenous behaviours of online community members are shaped by germinating passions (what members have in common, why they have converged); platform architecture (bulletin board, chat, social network, blog, wiki); community management techniques (guidelines, moderation strategies, status and reward systems); as well as offline social and interpersonal contexts. These can be incidental, serendipitous, or carefully composed. An online fan community will interact in a different way to members of a corporate intranet. (Preece, Maloney-Krichmar, Abras, 2003) Conversational flow, modes of expression (textual, symbolic, image-centric, multi-dimensional) and relationship hierarchies are all subject to these factors, which should inform the ethnographic gaze for online community. Additionally, they can be used as orientating pointers for the study. Foot (2006) proposes a pedagogical rendering of ‘web spheres’ as “a unit of analysis, boundable by time and object- orientation, and sensitive to developmental changes, within which social, political and cultural relations can be analyzed in a variety of ways.’(Foot, 2006: 2) Taking Foot’s lead, if we can triangulate between self-managed and architecturally-imposed boundaries, we have likely identified our online community node and can approach it as a ‘unit of analysis’.

Central to ethnographic orientation is the concept of the ‘field’ and ‘fieldwork’. Wittel posited that our reconstituted, wired selves demand a reconstituted notion of ‘field’; that the historical definition is too literalised and struggles with adaptation. He suggests we look to network theory for a more relevant, flexible ethnographic discourse within and encircling digital dominions:

Unlike field, a network is an open structure, able to expand almost without limits and highly dynamic. And even more important: A network does not merely consist of a set of nodes, but
also of a set of connections between the nodes. As such, networks contain as much movement and flow as they contain residence and localities. (Wittel, 2000, pg 2-3)

Park aligns online ‘travel’ (“to hyperlinks and ethnographic subjects”) with the journey into the ‘field’. (Park, 2004). Clark supports this idea in his advancement of ‘mobile sociologies’, arguing “networks, and their associated communities, no longer revolve around groups in fixed space, but around individuals theoretically set free from contextualising anchor points”. (Clark, 2007). So the researcher follows the fold, not the fences. However, the flexibility afforded the ethnographer to frame their own ‘field’ introduces new complications. By settling on boundaries, however ‘soft’, the researcher risks neutrality and may become complicit in “the construction of spaces and in the spatialisation of difference” (Wittel, 2000, pg 4). The clearest way to ameliorate this is transparency and accounting in praxis and results. If the researcher is probing the realities of a particular online world, their seat at the table in the construction of that community is by extension, a valid part of that community. The fact the community permits, forbids, welcomes or alienates a studied presence reveals something important about the way that community functions.

Beddows (2008) rightly asserts that virtual ethnography warps another core methodological concept - the sample. Because “most participants online are self-selecting”, and access to technology is impacted by demographic properties (such as financial status), subjects do not necessarily scale to a representative wider sample offline (Beddows, 2008). This conclusion mirrors a broader critique of ethnography – that while it can deliver nuanced insight; the method struggles in producing generalisable and testable theories (Morrill and Fine, 1997). This critique extends to the virtual world, where a catchment of virtual interactivity is not easily inflated into a sufficiently broad theoretical balloon. There are issues of self-selecting samples. Providing the researcher can gain a sense of who did not take part, the studies can still generate significant results.

Reexamining our assumptions around these core methodological terms can enhance ethnographic practice, augmenting historical applications with reflexive, timely tendrils. Investigative principles and best practice base lines are still present and still matter (their reliability is arguably more important than ever in the ‘liquid’ semioscapes of web 2.0), but they require a highly sensitive, chameleon like skin – mutable as unique scenarios dictate.

The body in transition

In historical ethnographic interrogation, the body is privileged territory; knowledge is status, and is acquired through the ‘doing’. Disembodiment is usually cast as a binary alternative to the physical, naturalised state; the authority of the body implicit in the etymology itself (disembodied – the anti-body). Virtuality (and by extension, virtual community), often finds itself marginalised by this material discourse; a greater intellectual rigor afford bodily literacies, while the immaterial exists as an esoteric negative. Researchers (Crichton and Kinash, 2002; Slater, 2002) have challenged the assertion there is implicit
merit in ‘face-to-face’ and that computer-mediated communication can equal, transcend, and fracture this authority in intriguing ways. Conquergood takes this a step further, charting the rise of a ‘new’ body in participant epistemology and its reclamation as necessarily fluid to achieve multi-pronged research goals:

> The communicative praxis of speaking and listening, conversation, demands copresence even as it decenters the categories of knower and the known. Vulnerability and self-disclosure are enabled through conversations. Closure, on the other hand, is constituted by the gaze. The return of the body as a recognized method… shifts the emphasis from space to time, from sight and vision to sound and voice, from text to performance, from authority to vulnerability. (Conquergood, 2003)

This framing recalls Jensen’s “ontologically heterogeneous, variable and distributed entity”: the body as partially existent, the mind [our exchanges, our impressions, our analyses) as a component of the body.

**Silences**

Ethnography’s ‘offstage’ moments are often its most revealing (Devault, 1990). In face-to-face interview and observation scenarios, researchers identify visual, aural and kinetic cues from their subjects that may signify taboo subjects, or demonstrate an emotional scale useful for behavioural interpretation (what prompts raising the voice; what produces a hush). Explorations of technologically accessed community require the ethnographer to adjust their search for silences; ‘remote’ connectivity with subjects forces a defter unmasking of the unsaid and the unseen, minus physically anchored indices. A delay in a posted response may not indicate discomfort with a question in the same fashion as a verbal pause. A temporary absence from an online community may suggest a consequential change in relationship to the community, or it might merely reflect a technical impediment to connectivity for a period. How then to read the shadows and silences of virtual associations with this partial visibility of subject and context?

The key is to locate silence that *is* visible, albeit it in different ways to the material world. Identify the constituents who are logged on, passively ‘present’ within the space but non-vocal. They may be publicly visible via a logged on status indicator, signifying their status as ‘lurker’. As Nonnecke and Preece assert in their demographic work on *lurkerdom*, “lurking is not free-riding, but a form of participation that is both acceptable and beneficial to online groups. Public posting is but one way in which an online group can benefit from its members.” (Nonnecke and Preece, 2000). They may not be visible publicly, but community administrators may provide intelligence on lurker numbers and contextualising details. Are there multiple private conversations occurring (through chat platforms or private mail facilities) on the periphery of exchanges in public community areas? The ethnographer cannot likely breach the discretion of these social narrows, but awareness of their presence and mapping their relationship to other community nodes can inform a wider understanding of vocal and non-vocal group elements. Observation and engagement over a time will suggest other areas of possible ‘invisibility’.
Ownership

The question of who owns (and who is likely to claim ownership of) virtual assets has confounded stakeholders in online worlds and communities since their inception. With the proliferation of virtual economies and object production within these worlds, the issue is gaining increasing traction - some members of virtual universes are calling for ‘liberation’ of their identities and accumulations from hosting stranglehold (Avatar Libration Front, 2008). But these vigorous debates are generally anchored around a virtual rendering of the material – currency, weapons, land, wardrobe, and toys. Immaterial assets, such as a word or a glance exchanged, are harder to classify, but are equally contestable as social capital with operators and owners.

The ethnographer conducting research in the offline field will encounter obstacles to access (Hammersley & Atkinson, 1995; Brewer, 2001). But ‘ownership’ contention of the research itself is uncommon in these situations. The researcher may need to negotiate rights to ethnographic data as part of their process, and ensure an ethical, inclusive approach to warehousing and dissemination. Such details are generally indentured between researcher and subject. The community is its own gatekeeper, managing access around internal mores and hierarchies. Rarely is a third party, not explicitly included in the research, in a position to lay claim to the intimacies of community. Offline communities may have external patrols and gatekeepers (both literal and subtextual), but their discreet communions are their own.

On the Internet, communities are more explicitly tethered to complex and sometimes conglomerate commercial interests; service providers and enabling authorities are ‘relationship providers’ (Blakely, 2008), who grant access, moderate content, have various ownership claims to communal content (community members opt in to sweeping licence agreements when they register to join), and can ‘deactivate’ individual identities or the community as a whole, at will. Ethnographers must tune their critical apparatus to detect these ‘invisible’ boundaries and gatekeepers. They need to engage arms length community custodians as part of their consent and access strategy, and should push for absolute clarity around expectations and rights to information shared by all participant parties as part of research. Likewise, the ethnographer owes these custodial entities transparency of intent and visibility on results. The owner of a website which houses an online forum deserves to know and understand the researchers presence within that community. A community manager’s ability to maintain harmony and a safe, comfortable space for their community actors is dependent on this sort of visibility. Community leaders have a duty of care (whether officialised or not), and deference must be awarded to those who create and administer these worlds.

This handshake is important to ensure community members are treated ethically, and for ensuring access is sanctioned and can be sustained. It is also to the ethnographer’s advantage, as these organisations and individuals can help in adding tacit insight or empirical gristle to their work. They can provide anonymised analytics to enrich interpretation; such as frequency of visitations, the number of identities associated to one individual, type and volume of content published within a space, geographic locations of members
and type and volume of disciplinary actions (such as banning). This data can mitigate some subjectivity in ethnographic accounting, and spur new interpretations or theories when held in compliment and contrast to performative behaviours in front of the virtual curtain (analytics might reveal a community member is misrepresenting their identity and frequency of visitation – what might this tell us about their negotiation of the power structures and relationship hierarchies within the space?)

Sophisticated commercial incursion into virtuality has also transformed community into commodity and social capital into a ‘sticky’ asset. This leaves online discourse exposed to market whim and corporate power struggles that can silence debate (Mosco, 2005). A popular social network implodes when the host’s venture capital dries up. What happens to its inhabitants, the identities they have created and the media rich ‘conversations’ they have published? Total erasure is a possibility. A thriving sodality can be disrupted or collapsed by a variety of market driven interventions. A fan community is sued by copyright holders for publishing fan-fiction. The non-commercial site unplugs, unable and unwilling to take on industry lawyers. Add to this the organic ebbs and flows of human relationships and researchers find themselves navigating have a meta-environment in rapid transit. Relationship clusters rise, fall and change hands with unpredictable outcomes. Methodological reflexivity is an important combatant to this ontological handicap. The ethnographer must be at least generally aware of the generalised commercial mediascape they are wading into and explicitly conscious of the fine print attached to any ‘walled gardens’ with which they seek deeper engagement.

Research that probes macro-community constructs in cyberspace can repurpose the realities of these forces in a meaningful way. Philip Howard makes the case for a revitalised ‘network ethnography’ to best accommodate the informal and formal organisational clusters forged around new media.

Network ethnography is an amalgam of traditional ethnography and social network analysis. The sample is generated purposefully but informed by network analysis. As a method, it reveals the complex fabric of associations between members with very different roles in very different organizations, while also exposing their deeply shared ideational commonalities. (Howard, 2002 pg 22)

An upshot of this shifting ground is enhanced opportunity to investigate communities in transition; across multiple virtual spaces, through multiple identities associated to single actors, and from online to offline realities. The ‘digital’ in digital ethnography is but one layer of a holistic contextual circuit.

**Insider|outsider**

The dilemma of the stranger in a land of familiars is timeless. For ethnographers, it is a badge of honour, a sometimes epistemological fetish, and a scapegoat for less than robust research. Communities are the home of this tension, their natures defined by demarcations of members and non-members. Insiders
possess communal literacies. Outsiders collide with these literacy boundaries and must negotiate entry and acceptance, or exit and excursion. The arriving ethnographer is in many respects the archetypal outsider, a newcomer with an agenda that relies on framing the community as a discrete entity. As Jennifer Ryan highlights her ethnography of social networking spaces:

From the phenomenological point of view, the “truth” of ethnography lies in the interpretation of lived experiences, and is always partial. Such an endeavour is problematized by the author’s own re-interpretation of described experiences, a process that is undoubtedly influenced by the anthropological quest for authoritatively representing the “other.” (Ryan, 2008. pg 34)

This challenge can be exacerbated online, where communities are often fast and furious – galvanized around passions with little patience for the ‘impracticality’ of academia. Game design pioneer Patricia Pizer touches on this sentiment:

What’s not particularly useful are the ethnographies that are so often the product of academic research; imagine Margaret Mead playing a game as a hard-core fangirl, then publishing her “results” as an in-depth study of an MMO. It’s been done. Plenty. A number of academics approach games and cyberspace with either the magic dust of fandom in their searching eyes or the complete blindness of a lack of context for why and how games have evolved the way they have over the years. This research isn’t invalid; it’s merely not as useful as academia would have us believe. Often, the Ivory Tower is presented as the only source of “growing” our knowledge base and improving our games. It seems there must be something useful lying between our deep, dark dungeon of Game Goodness and the sparkling tower of Academic Light. (Pizer, 2008)

A potentially powerful force for future virtual community research will be the ascendancy of ‘native’ ethnographers – indigenous members of digitally located communities empowered to feedback into academic discourse alongside professional academics. In the vein of Rheingold’s participative pedagogy (Rheingold, 2008) this distinction may grow as arbitrary as the online/offline divide.

Organisational creators of a community and the foundational social architecture they establish can inform a study of that group. Here a final reality of contemporary online communities should be acknowledged. The creators, hosts and managers of significant virtual networks and communities frequently belong to the media elite: high-tech brethren of Richard Florida’s ‘creative class’ (Florida, 2003). “Web 2.0”, for all its approbated populism and democratizing rhetoric (O’Reilly, 2005), has been forged by the same ‘lettered’ cliques Carolyn Martin interrogates in her history of the electric ‘revolution’ and its champions:

Electricians were wont to indulge a powerful impulse to identify aliens and enemies, those suspect in electrical culture and perhaps dangerous to it, in terms of their textual competence. (Martin, 1988)
Venture capitalists, digital entrepreneurs, ‘technorati’, new media moguls – these are the silicon cowboys and girls (Weiners and Hillner, 1998; Pratt, 2000) that create and corral the ‘main street’ of virtual villages. Their decisions, their opinions, their geography (socio and spatial) are a core aspect of online community discourse and will remain so for the foreseeable future. A deeper understanding of these contemporary virtual ‘experts’ will enrich our insights into digital communities, not least around the degrees to which they are authentically self-organising, ‘routing around’ walled gardens and community architecture (and when they are clearly bound by these forces, aware or not).

**Anonymity, trust and identity**

Anonymity keeps the Internet buzzing. Without freedom to comment immediately and non-identifiably, much web traffic would slow to a crawl. Cultural anthropologist Michael Wesch reminds us: “Even since the days of our founding fathers, there have been people talking about the importance of being anonymous. Revolutionary acts, sometimes, require anonymity.” (Wesch, 2008). Indeed, virtual engagement offers degrees of anonymity for participants’ not often available offline. Methodologically, these degrees are sometimes juxtaposed against the alleged ‘intimacies’ of face-to-face, real world ethnographic voyages, where the researcher will invariably learn the names of their subjects, perhaps explore their homes and join in meals or other key activities. There’s an adoptive sensibility here, wherein the researcher becomes ‘one of the family’ and is naturalised into the communal setting (giving them unique exposure to explicit community literacies). Critics worry that the anonymity of self-virtualisation distances a researcher from their subjects, artificialising interactions and exchanges in an ‘unreal’ environment. Truth is diminished, or unattainable; authentic affinity and discretion infeasible. This is not impossible, but the assertion is far from a truism, and bears little connection to the technological conduit itself. The generalisation ignores the fact that filters to identity can be a boon for the digital ethnographer; facilitating greater behavioural intimacy than offline observation can achieve. A researcher can conduct candid, real time interviews with constellations of individuals unable to comfortably surface offline due to identification and safety concerns, such as whistle blowers, political dissidents, victims or perpetrators of crime, hackers or pirates. These and other marginalised and vulnerable voices often find a home and an audience online. Such subjects might be located through targeted solicitations in appropriate online networks, determined suitable after research. Correspondence and interaction via electronic platforms can be sufficiently anonymised to create the perception of safe space and insulation from judgment, in turn coaxing close to the chest revelations that enrich research. This confessional effect may be invoked within any vulnerable or closeted communities.

However, this impunity has an underbelly. An apparent lack of consequence (the sensation that boundaries do not exist, rules do not apply and the Internet provides cover from naming and shaming), fuels ‘trolls’, serial pests, ‘sock puppets’ and other virtual players who laterally target virtual communities. These actors engage in strategic disruption and deception, obfuscating and subverting the order of the spaces or environments they assault.
In conversation spaces with limited access and few participants, individuals can allocate their attention and informal social mechanisms can reduce disruptive behavior. In conversational spaces with low entry barriers and hundreds or thousands of participants, governance is more problematic [9]. Such colorful expressions as trolling, flaming, spamming, and flooding have emerged to describe behaviors that benefit some people while disrupting others’ ability to get what they want from a conversational space. (Lampe & Resnick, 2004)

There are pathologies of varying complexities at work. Gaming’, attention seeking and raging against power holders is often part of their modus operandi (Schwartz, 2008). The scale of their actions is vast – from tongue in cheek belligerence to criminal malevolence – and they generate reactive fallout within virtual sites. To a psychology intent on rupturing fixed practice, a researcher may represent an irresistible foil; an obstacle to be conquered, a villain to punish, a toy to swat, a threat to be exorcised. This is largely unavoidable, but a review of the (admittedly limited) literature around these characters, and time spent shadowing their activities across multiple spaces, would be helpful in raising awareness around identifying commonalities and means of bypass (including the perennial favourite of web-dwellers, don’t feed the trolls).

Adapting ethnography to virtual application permits considered probing of communities tethered to digitally-centric enterprise, whether white or black market. Digital entrepreneurs, online gamers, identity thieves, spammers, scammers and serial pests represent groups of individuals difficult, even impossible to access without computer-mediated communication. As with offline groups who have particular sensitivities, these discrete clusters demand obeisance, transparency and a soft methodological touch.

Members of online communities frequently adopt pseudonyms and carefully construct their digital alias to reflect or refract offline qualities and attributes. Material aesthetics and vulnerabilities can be transcended, providing the opportunity for recasting in countless, empowered roles. This splintering and muddying of identity is characterised by Sherry Turkle as a “multiple, distributed system” of self:

The life practice of windows is that of a decentered self that exists in many worlds, that plays many roles at the same time. (Turkle, 1996)

This ‘gaming’ and improvisation of the ego (a kind of auto-ethnography) is understandably compelling to students of existence in the digital age, but notoriously difficult to diagram. How do you accommodate a single user with multitudinous handles within a fixed community? How do you achieve visibility of associative identities? Do anthropologists need a clinical gaze to fully grasp these ‘distributed systems’? From whom are you obtaining consent?

Expectations are modified along with identity in these spaces, including expectations of trust. People have particular ways of formulating and gauging trust – certain levels of familiarity and disclosure, tangible demonstrations of trustworthiness. These vectors are calibrated online, where misrepresentation of identity and intent is basal, and authentic expressive choices are legion. People may become more guarded and
paranoid, wary of virtual scammers and predators (unhelpfully sensationalised by tabloid journalism). Or they may become more open than ever, volunteering information they never would offline. These calibrations of trust and truth telling are generally unpredictable, and are further complicated by the trackability of online behaviours. Ryan articulates this issue neatly in her work:

In this way, online communication complicates traditionally understood boundaries between the oral and the written, the public and the private... Because most of the information available on the Internet is archived by search engines such as Google, it has become increasingly important to manage one’s online reputation. The process of image management entails not only the calculated projection of symbolic markers of identity, but also an imagining of the audiences that may view this display. (Ryan, 2008. pp 118-119)

If the ethnographer chooses to inhabit a virtual community rather than actively construct a research site online, they must recognise the existence of these representational filters and forces, as they negotiate environments with intricate rules and codes of engagement that pre-date their presence.

Recent trends in cyberspace and wireless technologies indicate a push for social portability to avoid the need to constantly import and export one’s networks between separate virtual communities that force unique registration and connector building. Decentralised online identification initiatives like Open Id, created by programmer Brad Fitzpatrick, allow for porting a singular virtual representation of self through multiple communities with discrete contextual relationships (personal, professional, educational, passion-based, service orientated). In addition to user convenience (minimizing endless re-registrations with separate communities), the platform is designed as a protectionist measure against the vulnerabilities of those increasingly commercial virtual spaces. Fitzpatrick says Open Id is construed, “not to crumble if one company turns evil or goes out of business” (Fitzpatrick, 2005) These developments are expected to lateralise our online identities and our ‘social graph’. Formalised silos (usually commercially bounded) may well flatten and deflate, but rather than create a macro-community, this will likely increase the need for ‘self- system’ management; as we set desired filters and grafts to keep private distinct from professional, family discrete from friends, and so on. “Users don’t always want to auto-sync their social networks. People use different sites in different ways, and a ‘friend’ on one site has a very different meaning of a ‘friend’ on another.” (Fitzpatrick, 2007) Critics of Open Id use this same point to argue that a one size fits all passport system cannot possibly accommodate the individualised needs and expectations around privacy and purpose of Internet users. The trend toward porous identity and platforms will raise a new round of important questions and challenges for researchers, and again, reframe our definition of community and shared experience.

Power and politics

As long as online communities are composed of human beings attached to input devices, our analogue
hierarchies and hegemonies will manifest in the digital realm (Brabazon, 2001), acting upon these groups as they do our offline selves. Consider Vincent Mosco’s point:

The end of history, geography and politics are compelling myths and they are made all the more powerful with the expansion of cyberspace. However, with the spread of anti-globalization movements, and the substantial boost that cyberspace has provided them, even more so with the events of 9/11 and subsequent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, it appears that time, space and power have returned with a vengeance. (Mosco, 2005)

New communicative platforms invite reruns of timeworn tensions. Though there is often genuine ‘newness’ in their innovation (and our virginal reactions to that innovation), they are soon repurposed by old warriors discovering a new arsenal. Again, I turn to Marvin for her historiographical take:

Old habits of transacting between groups are projected onto new technologies that alter, or seem to alter, critical social distances. New media may change the perceived effectiveness of one group’s surveillance of another, the permissible familiarity of exchange, the frequency and intensity of contact, and the efficacy of customary tests for truth and deception. Old practices are then painfully revised, and new habits reformed. (Marvin, 1988)

Analogue economic, political and social hegemonies can also regulate online digital residency as a whole. Access costs - and we are nowhere near the planet of emancipated power-surfers some silicon priests would have us believe. The virtually situated researcher must learn to re-attune the underlying discourses that parse and border digital territories, as they would identify physical power structures and containers.

**Recording the journey**

Note taking in classical ethnographic fieldwork would seem a straightforward endeavour; arm oneself with notepad and pen, camera, audio recording device for interviews, perhaps a video camera if the situation permits. Of course, on a practical level, execution is never that simple – ask a researcher who paused to take notes at an ill-timed moment, or whose voice recorder failed at a critical juncture. But the most basic tools of the trade are clear, and readily obtainable for relatively low cost. Virtual ethnographers can retain this kit, but must be ready to amend it for digital environments.

Software and hardware that permits real-time capture of community moments as they occur is available and offers several advantages to the ethnographer. Applications that can be set up and run on automatic pilot allow hands free immersion for the researcher – they can configure their technology to record proceedings as they wish, then sit back and observe, or participate, without ongoing attention. These solutions can also provide an added dimensionality to virtual ethnography; letting the consumer of the research ‘live’ the community experience through multimedia playback (an extensible immersion not generally
possible in classic offline ethnographies). They provide greater agency to tailor the kit to community. For example, a purely textual transcript of user interaction in a highly visual online world such as Second Life, would remove important contextual elements. Enriched video and aural records will more accurately represent the space. Time lapsed screen capture of a bulletin board can demonstrate the organic peaks and troughs of the forum in a visceral way. The Memetic project offers a practical display of these hybridised technology solutions in action, recording interaction within a ‘flexible, hypermedia environment’ for simultaneous and post-analysis. (Buckingham Shum, S., et al, 2006)

Multimedia-rich records can amplify dissemination of research outcomes; piggybacking the broad and narrow cast capability of Internet and wireless infrastructure and services. Researchers can package, distribute and manage their findings and insights over new pathways, reaching new audiences and maximising the impact of their work. Audio and video excerpts can be edited into podcasts, or made available for streaming and download from a researcher’s website, or a popular media portal (such as YouTube). Michael Wesch has gained impressive traction for his work by producing a kind of open access scholarship, where notes and insights unfold in the public realm on his blog and striking multimedia summaries of his digital ethnography projects are deployed collaboratively within the mediums they engage. (Wesch, 2008). Wesch’s heuristics grant his discoveries resonance through and across mainstream media and popular culture strata.

The proliferation of media-sharing tools and services online and the rise of self-publish and print on demand culture have forced down the cost barrier to production and accessibility. Data rich files such as podcasts can be created and distributed globally at low cost and high velocity. The virtual scholar would do well to take advantage of this accelerated dissemination; a means to preserve relevance is especially useful in a field where technological Darwinism invites rapid redundancy of systems and the dynamism of online community makes it difficult to wait out the prolonged churn cycle of traditional journals and academic publishing routes.

**Conclusion**

Existing and emergent scholarship demonstrates ethnographical approaches are tenable when deployed in digital contexts; indeed, they are organically suited to the hyper-localism of distributed human networks. But unique challenges around privacy, identity, commercialism, trust, ownership and access mean inquirers must conduct a detailed preemptive scan of their ‘field’ to identify macro-narratives (such as the contested notionality of digital citizenship), pinpoint potentially restrictive parameters and manage associated ethical considerations before outing themselves and their goals to subjects and custodial or transactional stakeholders.

Increasingly, online community research that infiltrates public consciousness (via predominant media channels, pop-sociology texts or the blogosphere) is powered and shaped by commercially orientated
forces with a vested interest in the sustainability and malleability of digital hamlets. Industrialism is doubt-
lessly a relevant voice at this roundtable, but intellectual curiosities must fight for extended airtime in the
study of social organisation online to restrain colonising ideologies and preserve pedagogical and public
interest. A new era of scholarly collaboration with digital leaders and virtual community members can
deliver the passionate, persuasive and reflexive inquiry vital to chart the continental drift of Rheingold’s
“archipelagos”. (Rheingold, 1993)

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Sozialforschung / Forum: Qualitative Social Research, 1, Art. 21.
“On the Moon and Other Poems”

By Tom Murphy

On the Moon

What would Jello do
on the moon as Ralph Waldo¹
says “forget those 12 men’s² trash

it only exists in your mind
and behold the specter
blue earth rise beyond gray hill mounds”

“You theological freak, see the polar ozone holes,
mushroom clouds rise, that’s how Nietzsche
read you, hilarious Hitler invoked him”

“I do not know those men,
do they role Hermes dice?”³
“They’re not gods or men, they’re Devo,⁴
corporate clowns with triggers, ballistic websites
capping rainforests for profit, stating self-reliance
dogma, moon-dust now

as earth-dust will be
graviton free”

“as I sit above you miss read”

“You mean,
as you pontificate,
people die in your name”
he wanted to sleep with rwanda

he wanted to sleep with rwanda
nuzzle its oozing staphylococcus
feel its perpetual drumming

its bleating blood pulsing out onto the
hungry savannas
like a goat untethered
    eating away the freshest growth

consuming the tuber nubs as he
slept, the goat machete carves gorges
for blood feud fuel, in that REM state with rwanda
his strychnine sluices through big dada

and daddies hooked on slasher flicks, the
desert burns far off though mcproduction
proves that cash cows clear cut best for DROCkets
rwanda stirs in darkness next to his automat body

of lake water, schistosomiasis permeates bathers’ membrane,
corpuscle worms boring lava tubes,
    surface waves as hijab
tassels windward lifted to life in undulating passion
hidden deep below the labyrinth of cloth wounds

stirring for breath, rwanda heaves a subcutaneous sigh,
kicks the night long and its bloody offspring as the wails
rise with the thirsty orb lapping the shoreline of ruddy mix
spreads the ibo, tutsi, mao mao, shiite, ojibway and winnebago

thin limping to liberia, a casus belli yams the sweaty hide
of rwanda with a mosquito swat, monkeys’ bite & kiss from the
laboratory of connecticut, sluggish fluid trickles as crimson beads
like death-row homemade-tattooed tears, he who slumbers takes

a kick to the shin, an elbow exposes the soft belly that blindly
quakes him as knee slam the groin into his cavity with all that
smile rwanda has to give, only a newlywed therapy skit would
make you take this mate, rwanda? numerous tests show capable
machine-gun hands, a fatal sleep inside the threaded shell of
the giraffe hat, hutus decaffeinate the kiva for lac kivu; wakes,
stares across the savanna, there’s nothing out there but brutality,
he hugs rwanda close to his cankers, whispers, “no hippos or crocs”
Manqué USA *in noxa esse*

Which-a-paw hands deliver the caress  
the nose pick or shat wipe  
dexterous  
in protest  
cowed

Selection of choice  
morsels  
agog  
from lovability  
masticate slowly  
swirl blood to view  
legs dangling

a meal of fortune  
a movement of necessity  
this nonce a reminder *rerum*

cookies et paintings delved

The length and breadth are yours  
cradle it, coddle it, *id est te sua*

Such a machine that Lincoln became  
from hemorrhage be speckled lilac pillow  
trans from Ford’s theater into floating arms  
tarmaced with big ol’ rubber bands  
roving seamen & merovum

with presidential credenza  
The snorting bush, there’s mimesis of humanity  
*tabulae novae* begins with *antebellum* thumb puppets  
buffoonery of my captain clap ton

The banausic interlocution  
de megaphone  
polices the borders

how many niggles today  
felicific beach rapes  
peregrines reaved  
boofs of purchase
kid starsearch for pedophiles
monica unmasks men
the rapacious who serve as liberators
of mary horse dung house
rummy rants:
*Talos jacere* Scooby Doo
capping black gold for capitals own good
cutting cedar trees for Uruk’s own good
off the top of the ropes
Humbaba clotheslines Enkidu

*con* isotope

Monocular babes wander the crystallized sand
ladies and gentlemen, this embedding sponsored by
Gilgamesh, the software that excretes blood from the eyes
Gil Ga Mesh, the next best net server
used by the army’s lowest common denominator
intelligence

Now back to the mockumentary
“No one has a head bigger than
Buddy Ebsen”

Notes

1 Ralph Waldo Emerson (1803-1882). Transcendentalist, who wrote “Nature,” “The American Scholar,” “The Divinity School Address,” and “Self-Reliance” among other famous writings.

2 Refers to the trash left on the moon of the twelve American Astronauts between 1969-1972.

3 In Emerson’s “Experience” he states that, “Some heavenly days must have been intercalated somewhere, like those that Hermes won with dice of the Moon, that Osiris might be born” (255).

4 *Devo* (1976-1984), new wave band who claimed, “We are not men, we are Devo,” in order to state that they had evolved to a mechanical humanistic plateau of hybridity.

By Irene Kamberidou, Despina Tsopani, George Dallas and Nikolaos Patsantaras

Abstract

Spain has become the first country in the world to officially recognize and promote Men’s Rhythmic Gymnastics. In light of the Spanish Gymnastics Federation’s recent initiative (Feb. 2009) this paper examines corporeality and sport identity in ways that reflect processes of change, in exploring the interrelation of social theories, international dialogue and anachronistic gender-based ideologies that established gender stereotypes in competitive sports. Subsequently, this paper presents a case study and discusses the official recognition of men’s rhythmic gymnastics (RG) by the Federation of International Gymnastics (FIG). Despite gender stereotypes that depict this Olympic sport as unacceptable for the image of masculinity, the male body aesthetic, including masculine gender role identity, the rising involvement of boys and men in this sport throughout the globe can no longer be ignored. Incontestably rhythmic gymnastics for men and boys is growing and how far it will go remains to be seen. The socially constructed and historically specific nature of physicality, corporeality and sport identity need to be renegotiated since exclusions based on genetic characteristics are a contradiction to the value system of sport. (Olympic Charter, rule2 par. 5, 7/7/2007)

Keywords: gender-inclusive, gender fluidity, gender identity, corporeality, genetic personification, men’s rhythmic gymnastics

Introduction: sport as “a male preserve”

A plethora of international dialogue focuses on women’s access into all traditionally male dominated...
sports, women’s under-representation in competitive sports and in sport governing bodies, the limited coverage of women’s sports in the mass media, in addition to debates on gender segregation, women’s agency in sports, gender equity policies, masculinities and femininities, difference versus diversity, the engendered body, gendered physicality, corporeality, gender identity, the masculinization or femininization of women athletes in the mass media, and so forth. (Theberge, 1985; Guttmann, 1991; Duncan, Messner, Williams, Jensen, 1994; Hall, 1996; McNay, 2000; Hargreaves, 2000; Kirk, 2002; Scraton and Flintoff, 2004; Dworkin and Messner, 2004; Clarke, 2002; Evans and Penney, 2002; Heywood and Dworkin, 2003; Kimmel, 2004; Creedon, 2006; Hills, 2006; Kamberidou and Patsantaras 2007)

Gender research in sports has been extensively developed, women-centred and not without cause. Needless to say, restrictions and social stereotypes have been placed on women’s sport participation throughout the history of western society. Competitive sports have always had androcentric references—social and cultural constructions of masculinity and ‘masculism’— that initially excluded women’s participation. The medical and social discourses of the 19th and early 20th centuries on female physicality and identity (Sandow, 1898; Webster, 1930; Pfister, 1990; Guttmann, 1991) established stereotypes concerning performance and capabilities. (Kirk, 2002; Hills, 2006; Kamberidou, 2007) For example, in the 19th century sport activity was considered detrimental for women’s physical and mental health, including her social role as wife and mother. Women who engaged in athletic activity were warned that it caused psychological disturbances, the growth of facial hair, displaced uteruses, and so forth. Even during the 1930s female athleticism was condemned and sportswomen were intimidated by fears of losing social approval. (Guttmann, 1991; Kirk, 2002; Hall, 2004; Hills, 2006) Women’s involvement in competitive sports, in the beginning of the 20th century, was restricted to a handful of female-appropriate sports, as is considered RG today. Many sports, such as bodybuilding, football and ice hockey were perceived as ‘inappropriate’ or too ‘manly’ for women. It was not until 1992 that the International Olympic Committee (IOC) voted to include women’s ice hockey in the Olympic program.

Undeniably we’ve come a long way since the 1952 Helsinki Games, where women represented only 10 percent of the Olympic athletes. At the 2008 Olympics in Beijing women represented approximately 43 percent of the total athlete delegation, up from 41 percent in the Athens 2004 Olympics. However, the “glass escalator” (Williams 1992) is not yet gender inclusive, namely women are not promoted up the hierarchy and are still under-represented in all sport governing bodies, in executive bodies of national and international sport organizations and institutions, such as the IOC. In 1981, following the initiative of IOC President Samaranch, two women were elected to the IOC. Since 1981, only a total of 21 women have served as IOC members and today there are only 14 women who represent 14.1% of the total of 113 IOC members.¹

On the other hand, one need point out that gender issues in sports do not only concern women, as men also have a gender (Kimmel, 2004) and are subject to gender stereotyping, distinctive social expectations, social inequalities and exclusions.² The patriarchal and gendered practices of modern sport, namely the impact of gendered social structures and gendered social behavior, have shaped not only women’s lives but men’s lives as well. The discourse on gender in sport and sport identity will have to eventually move
away from the restrictive focus on girls and women, especially in light of recent examples such as the rising participation of men in the competitive sport of RG throughout the world who are demanding official recognition. (Tsopani, Dallas et al., 2006)

Sport has been depicted as “a male preserve” (Theberge 1985) and it has been commonly assumed that women’s participation leads to their masculinization. So it is interesting to consider how gender identities are constructed by men who participate in women’s sports, such as rhythmic gymnastics. Could this be perceived as a potential agent for the transformation of gender relations in sports? If men’s rhythmic gymnastics is officially recognized by the Federation of International Gymnastics (FIG), will this lead, for example, to the masculinization of the Olympic sport of rhythmic gymnastics (RG) or to the participants’ femalization? Rhythmic gymnastics developed on the basis of biological difference with a focus on women’s physical fitness and health, including gender stereotyping concerning femininity or female gender role identity. It is considered the ideal means for the construction, expression and (re)production of femaleness and womanhood, as defined when this sport emerged. (Sandow, 1898; Webster, 1930; Fellows and Torrey, 1942; Pfister, 1990; Guttmann, 1991). It has however had an impact on men’s gymnastics by modernizing and reforming it. If FIG officially recognizes men’s RG, and subsequently mixed groups and mixed pairs, will this signal the beginning of a process that will eventually break down the structurally secured gender segregation system of competitive sports? Undeniably the sport is growing and how far it can go remains to be seen.

**Men’s Rhythmic Gymnastics: a sport taboo has been eliminated in Spain**

In the last two decades men have been demanding equal participation in competitive RG, and specifically that FIG takes the necessary steps towards making men’s RG an official sport.³ Men’s RG teams have been active in Japan, Australia, Canada, the United States, Russia, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Greece, Spain and Italy. A growing number of male rhythmic gymnasts have been participating in competitions— solo, individual, team and even mixed pair— on a non-competitive (unofficial) level, since FIG recognizes only women’s RG.

Rhythmic gymnastics for men may sound atypical or peculiar to many, as did wrestling, hockey, bodybuilding, football, etc. for women in the past, but it has become a reality. In February 2009 the President of the Spanish Gymnastics Federation, Antonio Esteban Cerdán, announced the organization of the 1ª National Championship of Men’s Rhythmic Gymnastics and the Spanish government supports the federation’s initiative. This is a ground-breaking venture since it is the first federation that recognizes men’s RG. “Our country is a pioneer in this direction. The time had come to make an exceptional decision”, stressed rhythmic gymnast Rouben Orihuela Gavila, spokesman of Spain’s men’s RG.⁴ Certainly, there are still problems to confront. The championship will be held based on the code of point in effect for women’s rhythmic gymnastics and the athletes will not be able to compete outside their country’s borders since FIG does not recognize male participation.⁵
Men’s RG, very popular in Asia, originated from Japan where high school and university teams have been participating in national competitions such as the National Athletics Meet, All Japan Rhythmic Gymnastics Championship, All Japan Inter-Collegiate Competition, All Japan Junior Championship, All Japan Amateur Championship and Inter High School Competition. Men’s RG combines men’s artistic gymnastics, women’s rhythmic gymnastics and the Wushu martial art form. Men’s artistic gymnastics and Wushu martial arts emerged in Japan from stick gymnastics—which were promoted in order to improve the health and physical strength of the population. The technical rules for the Japanese version of men’s RG were established in the 1970s. Performed with music, as free-exercises and exercises with apparatus, at the National Athletic Meet by both men and women, they were named rhythmic gymnastics due to their resemblance to the FIG rhythmic gymnastics framework, evolving into what is known today as the Japanese men’s rhythmic gymnastics.6

Over the last 20 years, the Japanese version of men’s rhythmic gymnastics has been introduced at international competitions, where male athletes, as their female counterparts, are assessed according to their natural abilities, skills and coordination of movement, such as hand/body-eye co-ordination, and so forth. However, the main focus in men’s RG is on strength, tumbling and martial arts skills, as opposed to dance and flexibility in women’s RG.7

Men’s RG programs were presented for the first time—on a non-competitive, unofficial level— in the World Gymnaestrada in Berlin in 1975 and in 1995, at the 20th World Championship of RG in Budapest in 2003 and subsequently at the World Cup in Baku in 2003. The first Men’s RG World Championship in which five countries participated—Japan, Canada, Korea, Malaysia and the United States— was hosted by Japan on November 27-29 2003, and subsequently three more countries—Australia, Russia and Mexico—joined in and participated at the 2005 Men’s RG World Championship.8

Moreover, the Italian Federation of Gymnastics adopted Fulvia Leoni’s (2002) Code of Point for Mixed Pair competitions in RG. This code of point is used in National Competitions of RG in Italy, as well as in Greece, to evaluate mixed pair programs. Leoni’s code of point was used for the first time in Greece, in 2004, in the mixed pair competition of RG during the Gymnastics Festival, organized by the municipality of Thessaloniki and the Gymnasts Union of Northern Greece, on the occasion of the SPORTEXPO, held 15-16 October 2004.9

It seems that in today’s postmodernist reality, the outdated gender stereotypes that institutionalized and structured corporeality and sport identities no longer apply and need to be renegotiated.
“Empirical observations of sport demonstrate the absence of absolute categorical differences between men and women [...] that, when acknowledged can radically deconstruct dichotomous sex categories.”
(Dworkin and Messner 2004: 25-26)

Children and adults participate in Men’s RG
2005 Men RG International

USA 2003
Spain, 2009

Case study on men’s participation in rhythmic gymnastics (RG):

Methodology and Results

Three hundred and seventy (370) questionnaires were distributed at the 20th RG World Championship in Budapest in 2003—where Men’s Group Rhythmic Gymnastics were presented for the first time with FIG’s approval. From the 370 questionnaires that were distributed 299 were completed by 223 women and 76 men between the ages of 14 and 74.

Specifically, a total of 299 participants responded to a closed questionnaire concerning men’s participation in RG—69 female rhythmic gymnasts, 33 female coaches/trainers, 100 female judges, 28 female members of the technical committee of rhythmic gymnastics (MTCRG), as well as 41 journalists, 11 parents and 17 members of the audience of both genders.

The 299 respondents were classified into seven groups, according to their group category (gymnasts, judges, coaches/trainers, MTCRG, journalists, parents, audience) in order to examine the homogeneity (sameness) of views or lack of homogeneity. Additionally, they were classified into two group-units according to their relationship to the sport: (1) the internal environment (direct relationship to the sport of RG) and (2) the external environment (indirect relationship). The statistical evaluation of the data was prepared with the SPSS v.15 statistical package-program and the level of significance was set at .05 (p<.05).

According to the results, an overwhelming majority of the respondents—mostly women—support the official participation/recognition of men in RG (Chart 1), despite gender stereotypes that depict the sport as unacceptable for the image of masculinity, including the male body aesthetic. Additionally, 60.5% of
the respondents were in favor of the participation of men in mixed group and in mixed pair competitions! (Chart 2) and 52.5% believe that men’s participation in RG will increase the popularity of the sport. (Chart 3)

Chart 1

Specifically, the majority of the respondents in the seven groups were in favor of men’s participation in RG (76.9% in favor and 23.1% opposed). In regard to the classification of the respondents into two group-units, namely the internal environment and the external environment or direct and indirect relation to RG ($\chi^2= 27.4$, p<.001), an overwhelming majority in both group-units (94.3% and 82.6% respectively) supported men’s participation in RG and only 5.7% and 17.4% respectively, were opposed.

Men’s participation in Rhythmic Gymnastics (RG):

![Chart 1](link)

Chart 2

Although the responses in the seven group categories varied with regard to the participation of men in Individual and in Group competition programs, the total majority in the seven group-categories supported male participation: 54.5% in favor and 45.5% opposed. With regard to male participation in Mixed Pair and Mixed Group competition programs, a greater majority of the respondents approved: 60.5% in favor and 39.5% opposed. Such a possibility could have a catalytic effect on the gender segregated sport system.

With regard to the results in the two group-units (internal environment and external environment), over half of the respondents supported male participation in Individual competitions (53.6% and 55.3% respectively). Concerning the Mixed Pair and Mixed Group competition programs ($\chi^2= 0.82$, p>.05), the percentages in both group-units were similar/favorable— 60.9% and 60.2% respectively— in contrast to 39.1% and 39.8 % of the respondents who are opposed ($\chi^2= 0.12$, p>.05).
(a) Men’s participation in Individual and Group competition programs,

(b) Men’s participation in Mixed Pair and Mixed Group competition programs

Chart 3

Over half of the respondents (52.5% as opposed to 47.5%) in the seven groups ($\chi^2 = 5.01, p > .05$) considered that men’s participation in RG would increase the popularity of the sport. On the other hand, 54.1% of the respondents of the internal environment believed men’s participation would not increase the sport’s popularity as opposed to 45.9% who believed it would. Conversely, the majority of the external environment, that is 58.1% believed it would increase the popularity of the sport as opposed to 41.9% who did not—($\chi^2 = 3.56, p > .05$).

Will men’s participation in RG increase popularity of the sport?
Discussion: Gender Identity—Sport Identity

“The direction of the gendered society in the new century and the new millennium is not for women and men to become increasingly similar, but for them to become more equal [...] Such a transformation does not require that men and women become more like each other, but, rather, more deeply and fully themselves.” (Kimmel, 2004: 293)

There is no specific regulation in the Code of Point of Rhythmic Gymnastics (FIG, 2006) that clearly excludes or prohibits male participation. Men’s exclusion from the so-called female-appropriate sport of RG is self-understood, as had been women’s exclusion from many sport activities in the past. One need point out that the structurally secured and enforced gender dichotomy/segregation system in competitive sports, a result of the biological difference between men and women, has always been considered an unavoidable and conventional practice, enforced in the name of gender equity and equality. (Patsantaras and Kamberidou, 2006) Accordingly, men’s RG, if officially recognized by FIG, could be incorporated into this official gender segregation system as Men’s RG— as in the pioneering example of Spain’s Gymnastics Federation and the organization of the 1st National Championship of Men’s Rhythmic Gymnastics. Moreover, the International Olympic Committee (IOC) could consider voting in favor of including Men’s RG in the Olympic program, as it had included women’s ice hockey in 1992, since exclusions based on genetic characteristics are a contradiction to the value system of sports, as defined by the Olympic Charter. (rule 2, paragraph 5, 7 July 2007)

The gender fluidity in the sport of RG, not to mention audiences’ observations that men’s participation would increase the popularity of the sport (Patsantaras, Tsopani, Dallas, Kamperidou, Mitsi, 2006), indicate that changes are inevitably underway. One need reiterate that the majority of the external environment in our case study (58.1%) believed that men’s participation would increase the popularity of the sport. (Chart 3) Additionally, the joint participation of female and male athletes could have a catalytic effect on the gender segregated sport system, that is to say it could break down the structurally secured gender barriers. Specifically, the majority (60.5%) of the 299 participants who took part in our study were in favor of the participation of men in mixed group and in mixed pair competitions (Chart 2). Could Gymnastics—the gateway for women’s initial participation in competitive sports— become a social space for gender equality, a space that will signal radical future developments in high performance sports and sport identity?

Let’s not forget that competitive sports and the ideological foundation of Olympic sports—despite social exclusions—has always been identified as “a space of social emancipation”. (Patsantaras 2008: 56) Sport has always been an arena for contesting the status quo, not only by white women and women of colour, but also by men of colour. (Dworkin and Messner, 2004) Undeniably, sport identity has been associated with various socio-cultural meanings since the appearance of Olympic sports in the 19th century when women were excluded. In the beginning the Olympic movement was non-inclusive even to certain categories of men, such as men from the so-called Third World countries who were excluded from institutional positions, such as the IOC. (Patsantaras and Kamberidou, 2006)
Identity is a complex multidimensional construct and likewise athletic identity is a social construct, influenced by the social environment. The struggle for status or identity within sport is a struggle for equality, rights and recognition within society. Indisputably, injustices within sport often reflect larger societal injustices. Gender, racial, ethnic and class boundaries are constructed by sport and have been used to either preserve, reproduce, camouflage or even eliminate socio-political conflicts. For instance, sport in South Africa has been crucial in advancing the rights and liberties of oppressed groups. Sport, as an instrument of integration and harmonious race relations has repeatedly contributed to the construction of ethnic and racial identities, including the shaping or even undermining of collective identities.

Athletic identity is a social construct, a web of ideas and beliefs about masculinity and femininity (Messner, 1991; Hall, 1996; Clarke, 2002; Patsantaras et al., 2005). To be exact, gender is “a fluid assemblage of meanings and behaviours.” (Kimmel, 2004: 10) There is no one universal pattern of masculinity and femininity, but multiple examples of masculinities and femininities. This does not mean that gender is disappearing in today’s social reality. On the contrary, it is being transformed from a static biological perception (sex) and analytical category into a dynamic social category (social gender -human agency), the meaning of which is evolving and changing the expectations of the social environment and as a result affecting and changing gender identities.

Current discussions on the gender subject, no longer focus exclusively on the biological gender (sex), as an analytical category, but on the “social gender” (Kamberidou, 2007: 586) which formulates, defines and redefines identity according to evolving socio-cultural interpretations. In the new theoretical framework, in the current post-structuralist deconstruction of binary categories (Dworkin and Messner, 2004: 17), gender identity and corporeality are being contested and renegotiated, in other words viewed as linguistic concepts, socio-cultural manifestations, transformable meanings and evolving elements of change. (McNay, 2000; Evans and Penney, 2002; Kirk, 2002; Scraton and Flintoff, 2004; Macdonald, 2002; Clarke, 2002; Heywood and Dworkin, 2003; Kimmel, 2004; Creedon, 2006)

Until the 1970s social scientists studied only class and race as primary factors of social status and identity. Today, in regard to the foundations of identity, gender has been incorporated into race and class. (McNay, 2000; Dworkin and Messner, 2002; Kimmel, 2004) Gender, a major theoretical category, a conceptual tool for understanding the social world is the axis around which identity is constructed and social life organized. (Kimmel, 2004; Hall, 2004) The “social gender” (Kamberidou, 2007: 586), the gender subject, whether male or female, in this analytical framework, is a conveyor of identities, i.e. evolving social expectations, human agencies, potentials, opportunities, functions, disciplines, and so forth. This does not however mean that the biological gender (sex) has been eliminated or will no longer exist as a social category. This does not mean that the gender subject has been castrated or will become genderless. It signifies, however, that the biological factor, as an analytical category, is less and less interrelated to conventional views and outdated stereotypes concerning identity, corporeality, maleness or femaleness. It provides a form of “gender-neutrality” (Kamberidou, 2007: 584, 586), namely gender-inclusive perspectives and expectations in all social spheres. For example, there is no regulated gender segregation system imposed by rules and regulations in the economy, in the political arena, in information society, in science
and technology, in medicine, and so forth. Gender is deactivated or neutralized as an analytical category in these social spaces.

In sports, however, in contrast to other social spaces, identity continues to be “genetically personified.” (Kamberidou, 2007: 587) Namely, corporeality in competitive sports is examined and viewed exclusively in its biological dimension—as a static entity, a physio-organic-anatomical unit, instead of a totality of cultural representations and evolving interpretations. Sport identity, the athlete, regardless of gender, is perceived as a means, an instrument or a tool for high performance or victory at all costs, despite the consequences on the body from intensive training, doping, enhancement technologies, etc. In other words the athlete, male or female, is not perceived or examined as a gender subject/social subject but is ‘measured’ as a static material entity. Competitive sports are not structured as gender-neutral or gender inclusive. Certainly arguments exist, according to which, the human body is not a product of social and linguistic interpretations and indeed this may apply to certain biological parameters related to certain performance-records in specific Olympic sports. Nevertheless, the historical context of the Olympic phenomenon has shown us through many examples and models (Patsantaras, 2008; Theberge, 2007), that this is not the case, but rather that outdated ‘biological facts’ and social theories have been accordingly integrated into social structures and structural thinking, formulating and reproducing social views and gender stereotypes concerning performance and capabilities. For example, restricting the number of competitive sports and events for women at the Olympics has usually been justified in terms of the supposedly “intrinsic limitation of their biological make-up.” (Pirinen, 2002: 95) A ‘fact’ that has been disproven today. Consequently, the exclusion of men from competitive RG based on biological difference (Hargreaves, 2000; Clarke, 2002), as that of women in the past from many competitive sports, is inconsistent with prevailing social values on gender equality, gender equity and human agency. (McNay, 2000; Evans and Penney, 2002; Olympic Charter)

**Conclusion**

Competitive sports—traditionally viewed as a domain where men are encouraged to pursue a ‘masculine’ gender role identity—convey strong messages about masculinity and femininity. The socially constructed and historically specific nature of physicality (Macdonald, 2002; Hills, 2006), corporeality (Kamberidou, 2007) and consequently sport identity must be re-examined beyond traditional notions and outdated stereotypes. (Pfister, 1990; Guttmann, 1991; Kirk, 2002) For example the pioneering initiative of the Spanish Gymnastics Federation. Incontestably rhythmic gymnastics for men and boys is growing, and the official recognition of men’s RG by FIG and subsequently that of mixed groups and mixed pairs could signal the beginning of a process that will lead to radical transformations in the sport system. A process that could eventually break down the structurally secured gender barriers.

The multi-variable, multifaceted and complex transformation processes of gender identity, and consequently sport identity, requires the establishment of an interdisciplinary, inter-cultural network of
researchers—that will collaborate with sport federations, NGOs, the IOC and governments—to address issues of identity and discrimination directed at individuals or groups due to gender, race, class, sexual orientation and so forth since they result in their exclusion from full participation and their consequent struggle for inclusion and recognition. Research should no longer be limited to the medical or sport science framework or how sport medicine constructs the athletic body as gendered. Required are theoretical approaches, reflective and critical analyses in the humanities and social sciences which contribute to the understanding of the gender subject in today’s diverse multicultural societies. Incontestably, as traditional social categories diversify, sport identity diversifies and is challenged. Sport sociologists, for example, could consider a cultural studies approach to their scholarship, focusing on theoretical accounts which centralize on gender along with race, racism and ethnicity, especially since “sport is an area where controversial issues of national identity and affiliation are easily evoked/provoked.” (Sugden, 2006: 225)

References


**Notes**


2 In Greece, for example, there is a tendency to interpret gender to mean women only, in gender scholarship, discourses, at conferences, symposia and in the curricula. It seems that primarily female students register for classes concerning gender issues. At the University of Athens only recently have a few male students of the Faculty of Physical Education and Sport Science registered for our elective course gender issues in sports because—as is the case internationally (Kimmel, 2004)—it is assumed to be focused exclusively on women.

3 See various men’s RG competition programs on YouTube; and at the *Men’s Rhythmic Gymnastics* website http://www.menrg.com; and at Sov Sport http://www.sovsport.ru (retrieved Oct. 1, 2009)


5 Ibid. 2009.

6 In individual competitions, only four apparatus are used: the double rings, the stick, the rope and the clubs. However, apparatuses are not used in Group competitions. The Japanese version includes tumbling performed on a spring floor. Points are awarded based a 10-point scale that measures the level of difficulty of the tumbling and apparatus handling. See *Men’s Rhythmic Gymnastics* at http://www.menrg.com (retrieved 01/10/2009)

7 Recognized by FIG as an independent sport exclusively for women in 1962, rhythmic gymnastics, is a multidimensional activity that combines elements of gymnastics, theatrical dance, ballet and apparatus manipulation. Women’s RG displays aesthetic harmony through graceful movements, flexibility, endurance and self-expression. It is a sport in which one or two apparatus—rope, hoop, ball, clubs and ribbon—are manipulated by single competitors or by pairs, trios or even more (generally five). International
competitions are distinguished between Juniors (under age sixteen), and Seniors (ages 16 and over). The largest events in the sport are the Olympic Games, World Championships and Grand-Prix Tournaments. Analytically see Tsopani, D., Tasika, N. Pantazidou, E., Tinto, A. (2005). Also see: anon.“History of RG & Kalev” Kalev http://www.kalev.net/kalev-history.htm (retrieved 1/12/2009).

8 For more on this see: Men’s Rythmic Gymnastics at http://www.menrg.com (retrieved 25/10/2008).


12 See the Men’s Rhythmic Gymnastics in USA website http://www.menrg.com/USA/indexUSA.html (retrieved December 1, 2009).

13 With regard to trends and views concerning mixed pair competitions in RG also see Di Cagnio, Tsopani, Bosco, Maridaki, 2003.
The CIA on my Campus...and Yours

By Philip Zwerling

I share my campus with the Central Intelligence Agency. Years after covertly funding the National Students Association, spying on suspect faculty, and dosing unsuspecting students with psychedelic drugs, the CIA is back, funding conferences on „intelligence ethics”, subsidizing courses for academic credit, and recruiting operatives among some of the poorest students in the nation.

Though only one of 16 separate U.S. intelligence agencies, the CIA is perhaps the most famous, or infamous, of them all, and one of the most secret, with an estimated 2/3 of its budget (also secret) allocated for covert operations, estimated at some 3 billion dollars (Mooney 5). The combined budgets of the 16 agencies that constitute the IC, or Intelligence Community, is 43.5 billion dollars each year.

Founded July 26, 1947, at the beginning of the post World War II Cold War with the Soviet Union, the CIA grew out of the old wartime OSS, Office of Strategic Services. Though the public is not privy to or able to influence its decision making we have learned after the fact, through the work of the 1975 Church Select Committee to Study Government Operations and other investigators, of the CIA”s involvement in the assassination attempts against Patrice Lumumba in the Congo, Rafael Trujillo in the Dominican Republic, the Diem brothers in Vietnam, General Rene Schneider in Chile, Fidel Castro in Cuba, and its hand in the overthrow of governments in Iran in 1953, Guatemala in 1954, Zaire in 1961, Indonesia in 1965, Chile in 1973, and its backing for the Contra mercenary army in Nicaragua in the 1980”s.

These activities are well known and documented, but many of today”s students are unaware of this history. Those faculty and administrators who today collaborate with the CIA in spite of this past either argue that the CIA has changed its ways or that their personal involvement may moderate future CIA activity. Both attitudes were adopted by American intellectuals in 1950s, 1960s, and 1980s and have proved naive and illusory every time.

Most recently the long list of CIA abuses grew following 9/11 when the CIA set up so-called „black sites”, that is secret overseas prisons, and simultaneously tortured prisoners at the US base at Guantanamo, Cuba over a period of several years. According to the International Red Cross, prisoners (and these were prisoners who had not been [and may never be] indicted, tried or convicted of any crime) were waterboarded, confined in small boxes, shackled to the ceiling by their arms, kept in frigid cells, and slammed repeatedly
into walls (New York Times April 7, 2009). We learned that accused Al Qaeda leaders Abu Zubagdah and Khalid Sheikh Mohammad had been waterboarded (a form of torture the US previously prosecuted Japanese soldiers for as a war crime following W.W. II), 83 and 183 times respectively. Torture that was inflicted after they had already divulged all of the information they possessed (New York Times April 18, 2009).

The CIA tortures of this new millennium are replays of fifty years earlier when President Eisenhower set up the benign sounding Office of Public Safety “to increase the professionalism of police in Asia, Africa, and particularly Latin America” (Langguth). The first OPS Director was CIA agent Byron Engle. The OPS trained 100,000 Brazilian police following the CIA coup against elected President Jao Goulart. According to A.J. Langguth, author of Hidden Terrors: The Truth Behind U.S. Police Operations in Latin America: “The newly efficient police, drawing on training provided by the US began routinely torturing political prisoners and even opened a torture school on the outskirts of Rio...” Tortures included electric shock to the genitals and the ever popular waterboarding. Clearly the CIA has not changed its ways. Rather its actions are remarkably consistent over the course of its history.

The second defense of collaborators, that the involvement of „good people,” educated people, humane people, with the CIA has or might ameliorate these CIA activities only begs the question of how much worse they could have been if left solely in the hands of „bad guys.” Over time individuals’ scruples have had less impact than the culture, mission, history, and the very raison d’etre for this secret organization. A bad system does not allow much room for people to do good.

Less well known, perhaps, than the assassinations and government overthrows has been the CIA’s work within the US and abroad to infiltrate and manipulate to its own purposes labor organizations, refugees, journalists, artists, writers, intellectuals, musicians, film makers, and central to this paper, scientists, researchers, and students on campuses all over the globe. From its center at Langley, Virginia, the CIA has a worldwide reach (not unlike the tentacles of a giant octopus) working what Frank Wisner, the CIA’s first Assistant Director for Policy Coordination, called “a mighty Wurlitzer organ capable of playing any propaganda tool he desired” (Wilford 7).

This manipulation worked through subversion, covert action, and especially, through secret funding. For example for over 25 years, beginning in 1952, the CIA secretly employed as many as 400 journalists. The New York Times alone accredited in excess of ten CIA agents as reporters (Wilford 227). Other CIA agents infiltrated the American Newspaper Guild (Wilford 242). They influenced publishing houses like Praeger and literary magazines like Partisan Review (Wilford 103) and Encounter, where, for example, they promoted the work of Edward Shils to denigrate the sociologist and government critic C. Wright Mills (Birnbaum 34). The CIA organized and funded public intellectuals through front organizations like the American Committee for Cultural Freedom and the Congress for Cultural Freedom to disseminate US propaganda abroad. Run by the CIA from 1950 to 1967 the CCF had offices in 35 countries, published 20 different magazines and a newspaper and in turn funded the Italian Association for Cultural Freedom and the British Society for Cultural Freedom (Saunders 102-103). Also in the 1950”s actor and future
President Ronald Reagan was “a leading spokesman and publicist for the CIA front Crusade for Freedom” (Saunders 127).

In one case they perpetuated a literary and historical fraud by publishing a book, The Penkovsky Papers in 1965. Purported to be the secret diary of an executed CIA agent within the Soviet military the book was really written and funded by the CIA (Gibbs 8). In fact, “well over a thousand books were produced, subsidized, or sponsored by the CIA up until 1967” (Gibbs 3). For example the anti-communist book The God That Failed, still in print today, was largely edited, published, and distributed by US government agencies (Saunders 65-66)

In the film business, directors John Ford and Cecil B. DeMille and actor John Wayne collaborated with the CIA (Wilford 117) and other film makers “to insert in their scripts and in their action the right ideas with the proper subtlety” (Wilford 118). In at least one case, a film made from George Orwell’s” novel Animal Farm, was funded by the CIA for theatrical release to the American public. (Wilford 118). At Paramount Studios a CIA agent claimed success in influencing the selection of scripts for filming as well as the manner in which they were brought to the screen (Wilford 120).

Artists, critics, collectors, museums, and galleries received CIA funding to produce and promote art deemed in the best interests of the US. This usually meant abstract expressionism designed to counteract the influence of Soviet realism (Wilford 106), it being thought that abstract art best expressed the US ideal of artistic freedom. But, since it was funded and promoted by the CIA it often was not, in fact, free at all.

The CIA justified all of these activities as crucial to waging the Cold War, protecting US interests and, even, protecting American lives. These activities were also secret, covert, and deceptive. And all were discontinued when exposed to public scrutiny. Obviously the CIA felt that the public would be less apt to accept as accurate material found in a literary journal, a movie, or a book that it learned had been funded by a government agency with its own political agenda, rather than chosen by an independent editor or publisher for its literary value or honest reporting.

But this paper is most concerned with the CIA on campus, a cloak and gown relationship now 60 years old and as subversive of academic values of free and critical inquiry, and rigorous and objective scholarship today as it was in the past. As in the past the CIA is attracted to covert work on campus to obtain access to the best brains, to skew research, recruit students (1,000 Agency employees are recruited from campuses each year), burnish its image, and to spy on faculty. As former CIA Personnel Director F.W.M. Janney wrote: “It is absolutely essential that the Agency have available to it the greatest single source of expertise: the American academic community.” (Mills 29)

We know what this covert CIA work on campuses meant in the past. In the late 1940’s and early 1950’s Yale crew coach Skip Walz was paid $10,000 by the CIA to “spot” likely recruits. Given these names, the CIA would conduct secret background checks, investigate the students without their knowledge or approval, and then approach them with job offers (Mills 21). By the late 1970s about 5,000 academics
were working with the CIA to identify and recruit students for the Agency (Witanek 4).

William Buckley and Henry Kissinger were recruited at Yale and Harvard, respectively, to inform on their colleagues at the time of the campus purges and loyalty oaths of the 1950’s.

Also in the 1950’s the CIA carried out its project MKULTRA mind control experiments, which included giving LSD to unsuspecting subjects, at 44 colleges and universities in the US (Mills 38). Participating in the program was Ewan Cameron, President of the American Psychiatric Association (Gibbs 3).

In the same decade, MIT and Cornell academics at field projects in Indonesia trained military officers who later led the coup that overthrew Indonesian President Sukarno and resulted in over a million deaths (Witanek 2).

In 1966, a CIA funding was exposed at Michigan State University to train South Vietnamese police to prop up that dictatorship.

In 1968 “the CIA used the Eagleton Institute for Research at Rutgers University in a plan to influence the outcome of the presidential election in Guyana. Through the Eagleton Institute the CIA helped amend the Guyanese constitution to allow Guyanese and relatives of Guyanese living abroad to vote by absentee ballot. Then 16,000 votes were manufactured in New York City giving the CIA’s candidate, Forbes Burnham, a narrow margin over socialist Cheddi Jagan (Witanek 3).

In 1966 the decades long CIA secret funding of the National Students Association was uncovered by Ramparts Magazine. In fact, the CIA was the largest funding source for the NSA, whose officers in return were required to sign secrecy oaths about the CIA relationship:

“...the CIA had a significant say in NSA operations. Student agents were enjoined against making...diplomatic overtures without first requesting permission of the Agency. In return for their cooperation, student agents received draft deferments arranged by the CIA (Mills 133).

The CIA also funded other campus front organizations like The Foundation for Youth and Student Affairs and then used that organization as a „pass through” to secretly fund other youth organizations like the Asia Foundation, the American Friends of the Middle East, The International Student Conference, the United States Youth Council, and the International Catholic Youth Federation (Wilford 137).

The aim was to use reputable, existing foundations when possible and to create cover organizations when none existed. According to CIA agent Tom Braden:

There was a cover branch at the CIA whose job it was to provide cover, like the foundations we used in our operations....It was just a mechanism that we used....it was a crisscross of money. There was never any danger of the CIA running out of money (qt. in Saunders 135).
The so-called bone fide foundations (Ford, Rockefeller, etc.):

...were considered the best kind of cover. A CIA study in 1966 argued that this technique was particularly effective for democratically run membership organizations, which needed to assure their non witting members and collaborators as well as their hostile critics that they have genuine, respectable, private sources of income. Certainly it allowed the CIA to fund a seemingly limitless range of covert action programs affecting youth groups, labor unions, universities, publishing houses...from the early 1950’s (Saunders 135)

One author estimates that between 1963 and 1966 the CIA was involved in one-half of all foundation funding in the U.S. (Saudners 134).

When such secret funding was revealed in 1967:

...a confidential White House report...observed: “We cannot expect to duplicate with overt funding the flexibility, responsiveness, and directly targeted results obtained by [the] CIA” (Wilford 138).

In 1984 Professor Richard Manshack, Chair of the Rutgers Political Science Department assigned an undergraduate class to research Western Europe political developments and then secretly passed the student reports on to the CIA without the students’ knowledge or permission (Mills 33)

Since 1985 the CIA has run special seminars for university administrators focusing on campus recruitment (Mills 23)

In 1986, following disclosures that Dr. Nadav Safran, Director of Harvard University’s Center for Middle Eastern Affairs, was on the CIA payroll Harvard removed him but only after he had been funded by the CIA to write an academic book on Saudi Arabia and to organize an academic conference on Islam (Mills 32).

Just a few years earlier Samuel P Huntington, former Director of Harvard’s Center for International Affairs, was revealed to have been in the employ of the CIA “publishing documents that were both paid for and censored by the CIA” (Mills 32)

Also in 1986 the Northwestern University Traffic Institute hosted a CIA program to train Salvadoran police, some of them connected to the death squads then operating in El Salvador (Mills 38).

In 1988 the CIA had agents on 10 college campuses as part of its Officers in Residence program where active CIA agents teach academic credit bearing courses (Mills 30)

Publication of a secret memo in 1991 revealed that the Rochester Institute of Technology had signed a
Memorandum of Agreement with the CIA in 1985 agreeing that “it”s curriculum would be „responsive to certain defined specialties of the CIA”” (White 180) In 1988 a CIA agent had become an Institute trustee. In the same year the Federal Programs Training Center opened on campus where students were paid to forge documents, design furniture with secret drawers and picture frames with hidden compartments to hide listening devices (White 185).

Head of the American Political Science Association in 2000, Columbia University”s Robert Jervis was on the CIA payroll (Gibbs 2). Jervis is now a coeditor of the Security Studies Series published by Cornell University Press, serves on the board of nine scholarly journals, and has authored over 100 publications (http://www.sipa.columbia.edu/academics/directory/rlj1-fac.html accessed 4/6/09)

In 2002 the former head of the CIA, Robert Gates, became President of Texas A&M University (Gibbs 1). He declined President Bush”s invitation to become the first Director of National Intelligence in 2004 perhaps believing he was already effectively aiding the intelligence community on his college campus. He later left A&M to become Secretary of Defense.

In 2009 the CIA contracted with University of Southern California to have an undergraduate marketing class design a recruitment campaign for them.

“In the class, a preliminary suggestion for a slogan urged potential recruits to “Discover the Truth” about the CIA. That was jettisoned after some students in a test survey didn’t understand it and others suggested that such a search might turn up information discouraging to applicants. Instead, the class settled on a slogan that invites people to “Discover the CIA. Be Part of Something Bigger,” imposed over a colorful world map....” (Gordon 34)

That image seems highly appropriate as international assassinations and coups d”etat clearly constitute something bigger and „imposed” on the world.

CIA representatives regularly attend academic conferences of “librarians, geographers, anthropologists, mathematicians, statisticians, etc.” (Mills 37)

It is no wonder, therefore, that CIA spokeswoman Sharon Foster could announce in 1988 that “the CIA has enough professors under Agency contract „to staff a large university”” (Mills 37).

Section 38 of the 2004 Intelligence Authorization Act set up the Pat Roberts Intelligence Scholars Program with four million dollars a year to recruit and train graduate students for the CIA (Cockburn ). Participants” identities are kept secret (Willing).

The 2010 intelligence authorization bill now before Congress „invites schools to apply for grants for courses that would meet the needs of the intelligence community. Students taking the courses would have to recieve security clearances and their participation would remain secret. After graduation the students
would be required to work for the CIA.” (Wiener 21).

Under the guise of protecting the homeland and defeating international terrorism the CIA is back on campus today where its activities are once again wholly antithetical to academic ethics and goals.

For example, scholars who do research for the CIA find their research classified. This scholarship cannot be disseminated in the academic community where the very reason for research is dissemination and such scholars simultaneously become complicit in the nefarious workings of the CIA. Imagine how suspect medical research touting a major drug benefit becomes when other researchers and the public find out it has been funded by the drug manufacturer. Imagine as well how researchers may trim their inquiries and tune their conclusions not to offend a major funding source, whether that source be Merck, R.J. Reynolds, or the CIA.

This conflict of interest extends to publication where we must wonder whether CIA sponsored scholars who submit work to CIA funded publications where their work is peer reviewed by other CIA funded scholars do not find a friendlier reception for their work than scholars who refuse CIA funding. In this manner the CIA affects not only which scholars get published (and what we all get to read) but indirectly affects academic promotion and tenure which are dependent upon research and publication.

Scholars are granted security clearances to pursue their research but then find that they must submit all of their writing in that area to the CIA for review and permission to publish. Rather than granting access to information, a security clearance becomes simply one more way to control the flow of information.

The CIA funding largesse may also explain an absence of articles critical of CIA activities in academic journals. Researcher George Gibbs, Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Arizona, reports: “I surveyed the five top journals in political science that specialize in international relations during the period 1991-2000. I did not find a single article in any of these journals that focused on CIA covert operations” (Gibbs 4). CIA money can publish articles and it can also insure silence.

Things are now much as they were in 1968 when Dr. Earl Bolton was Vice President of the University of California Berkeley “...and secretly consulting for the CIA.” His memo, widely circulated among U.S. universities, advises the use of duplicity and deception to hide the CIA connection to the campuses. It also suggests lying about CIA involvement in university projects stating, “The real initiative might be with the Agency but the apparent or record launching of the research should, wherever possible, emanate from the campus.” The memo continues:

Follow a plan of emphasizing that CIA is a member of the national security community and stress the great number of other agencies with which the agency is allied [and] ... stress in recruiting articles and speeches that the agency is really a university without students and not a school for spies. There is as much academic freedom within the walls of the building and among those competent on the subject as on any campus I know.
Bolton’s memo also recommended setting up programs with CIA funds “to establish the study of intelligence as a legitimate and important field of inquiry for the academic scholar.” (Witanek 1). Forty years later, the CIA is still at it, with lots of help from academics.

President Dwight Eisenhower, a former Army general and a former college president (Columbia University) in his farewell address of January 17, 1961, not only warned against the rise of a „military-industrial complex” but shared a second fear: “The prospect of domination of the nation’s scholars by Federal employment, project allocations and the power of money is ever present - and is gravely to be regarded” (qt. in Gibbs).

Some 45 years later you are apt to discover, as I did a few months ago, that the CIA is on my campus ...and yours. I’ve been teaching at the University of Texas Pan American for the last two years. It’s the fifth largest campus in the UT system but with its undergraduate population of 15,536, of whom 88% are Hispanic, it ranks second in the nation in the number of bachelor’s degrees awarded to Hispanic students (“UTPA Stats” pgs. 1,2). As I’ve also learned, the students here in the lower Rio Grande Valley are from one of the poorest areas of the state, often work full time to support families and are often the first in their family to attend college struggling in an academic environment for which they are often poorly prepared.

UTPA lies in Edinburg, seat of Hidalgo County, one of the poorest in the nation where one-third of families live below the poverty line. It is the 253rd poorest of Texas” 254 counties. You don’t need a lot of intelligence to know that people here need jobs and money and the CIA arrived with offers of both in October 2006 with a five year grant worth two and a half million dollars as part of their new outreach program entitled Centers of Academic Excellence.

Part of a national effort begun in 2004 that has cost 16 million dollars and now involves eleven universities coast to coast (Trinity University in D.C., Norfolk State, The University of Texas El Paso, Wayne State, California State University San Bernardino, Clark Atlanta University, Florida International University, Tennessee State University, the University of Washington, and Carnegie Mellon), the CAE ups the ante from previous outreach projects like Title VI Fellowships and the National Security Education Program. Rather than fund language classes for students interested in a variety of US government careers, the CAEs are directly tied to the intelligence service and the grants come directly from the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (Willing). The program targets minorities and women at Historically Black Colleges, Hispanic-Serving Institutions, Tribal Colleges, and Asian American and Pacific Islander-serving institutions (Guidance and Procedures 1). Created in 2004 the ODNI coordinates the work of the 16 US intelligence services and superseded the Director of National Intelligence, who had previously served concurrently as the Director of the CIA.

The primary goal is recruitment, or in the words of the ODNI to “enroll and graduate a significant number of ethnically diverse students who are eligible and competitive for careers across IC agencies and components” (Guidance and Procedures 1). According to Charles Allen, formerly with the CIA and now with the Department of Homeland Security: “We need young, bright aggressive Americans who really want to
serve their country” (quoted in Willing).

But what these bright young Americans look like counts too. As T.J. Waters, an ex-CIA agent who teaches in the Eckerd College Intelligence Program in St. Petersburg, Florida said: “The intelligence community of the 21st century has to look and think a lot more like the world around it. These (programs) are a recognition of that” (quoted in Willing). It should also be noted that minority students, female students, students from poor families, students who often face limited job opportunities in the midst of a recession are ripe for recruitment. In the words of UTPA anthropology student Josi Mata: “They are profiling certain universities that have a high minority enrollment. They want students to fit in in Third World countries, specifically Latin America” (The Texas Observer April 21, 2006).

Earlier CIA recruiting at UTPA had been on the level previously seen at USC, making money available for marketing and recruitment. In 2005 a UTPA College of Business Administration’s Advertising and Promotions class was awarded a grant from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Collegiate Marketing Program through EdVenture Partners, which develops private industry-education partnerships with universities across the country by “blending academic theory with practical, hands-on applications” (UTPA press release). The class developed a recruitment program aimed at their own campus, produced an advertising campaign, and hosted a job fair for the CIA. According to the UTPA press release:

The challenge for the class ...is to design and implement its own unique marketing campaign for the CIA, focusing on specific marketing objectives designed by the CIA.

The goal is to increase awareness of the CIA and its career opportunities, market the CIA as an employer of choice to UTPA students and assist the CIA in positively marketing the agency and dispelling myths about the agency and careers within the agency.... [student] Flores said UTPA was selected to participate in the project based on the institution”s positive academic record, geographical location and diverse culture. “The CIA is interested in how to market to different ethnic groups and UTPA was the perfect candidate for this,” [undergraduate student] Flores said....

The marketing team had conducted a survey of UTPA students and determined that 57 percent had never been exposed to any CIA advertisement and 62 percent had never considered a career with the CIA. Flores said the survey also showed that most students thought the CIA was a very secretive organization and did not consider the CIA as a business organization with many job opportunities. “Our goal is to change those numbers significantly,” Flores said. “Through diverse marketing strategies, we will increase CIA awareness and promote the CIA as an employer of choice.”

During the marketing event, representatives from the CIA visited the UTPA campus to inform students of job opportunities with the agency. In addition to a live band, free food and drinks and games, nearly 1,500 students were also able to register for door prizes such as concert
tickets, cash prizes, T-shirts and a television. The marketing team will continue to track the level of awareness of the CIA among UTPA students by conducting a follow-up survey of students in the coming weeks. Based on its research thus far, the team has made a few marketing strategy recommendations.

“To market to ethnically diverse populations, one must understand the culture. Furthermore, it is most effective to market to cultures individually rather than standardize the message,” Flores said. “Our marketing agency chose a modern strategy – hosting an event – to create awareness, rather than the CIA’s more traditional approach used in the past.”

The project culminated...when the marketing students presented their results and recommendations to the CIA and EdVenture Partners representatives in addition to many UTPA staff and faculty members. The students also proposed the CIA maintain frequent visits to the University to increase awareness of the agency. Marilyn Blatnikoff, diversity recruitment coordinator for the CIA, was impressed with the students’ presentation and said their hard work and preparation was evident through their presentation and marketing suggestions. “Some of their recommendations are exactly in line with what we are trying to do,” Blatnikoff said. “We are trying to narrow our range of schools and go more often to those schools, so their suggestions are great” (Rodriguez)

In 2006, the CIA was back at UTPA with more money, two and a half million dollars, an initial a five year commitment, and a collaboration that changed the academic curricula.

UTPA took ODNI money and created the Integrated Global Knowledge and Understanding Collaboration. Christened IGkNU, the effort cobbles together courses in different departments to constitute both an undergraduate minor, a graduate certificate, and a Master of Arts, all in “Global Security Studies and Leadership.” According to their glossy brochures each “prepares students for careers in intelligence, national security, and other sectors of the global economy...” The back page of each brochure bears the impressive emblem of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence beneath the words “funded by.” The same emblem, complete with clickable internet link, appears on the IGkNU home page. IGkNU is the creature of ODNI. But how servile a creature?

Certainly the ODNI is getting its money’s worth with a toe hold on campus. In the words of Dr. Van Reidhead, Dean of UTPA’s College of Social and Behavior Sciences, home to IGkNU, “The intelligence community needs people with a global knowledge foundation. They (the intelligence community) can teach the trade crafts” (Perry).

To this end, IGkNU sponsors two summer language immersion programs, one in China (presumably the US rival for world preeminence in the 21st Century), and Morocco, a representative of the Arab and Islamic world from which comes the contemporary terrorist threat. In addition they send students to career conferences in D.C. where undergraduates mingle with recruiters from the various intelligence services.
IGkNU also sponsors a resource room in the UTPA library named for themselves and stocked with information about the intelligence services, an annual speakers series, an annual National Conference on Global Security, and funding for faculty to develop new courses in the field.

IGkNU follows the advice in Earl Bolton’s 1968 quoted above:

> The real initiative might be with the Agency but the apparent or record launching of the research should, wherever possible, emanate from the campus.... Follow a plan of emphasizing that CIA is a member of the national security community and stress the great number of other agencies with which the agency is allied.”

IGkNU never references the CIA except in a long list of US intelligence services and their activities are proffered as originating on campus and being of academic value. IGkNU then partners with other campus groups and individuals creating a daisy chain of interlocking front organizations all tied together by the CIA money.

For example, the ODNI grant to UTPA requires annual conferences, but rather than sponsor their own conference IGkNU drew in two partners while still retaining the purse strings. The UTPA Office of International Programs and PACE (the Pan American Collaboration for Ethics in the Professions) lent their names to IGkNU and appeared as joint sponsors of an academic conference on campus in November 2008 entitled “Ethics in Intelligence, Security and Immigration: The Moral and Social Significance of Gathering and Managing Information and Borders in the Global Community.” One of the conference organizers, UTPA Associate Professor of Philosophy Dr. Cynthia Jones commented: “The conference will be geared to an objective view of the issues and by no means will it have a political agenda.”

But we might ask, would a conference on the dangers of smoking sponsored by the major cigarette companies or a conference on the ethics of gay marriage sponsored by the Moral Majority be able to claim either objectivity or the absence of a political agenda? The ODNI is very clear about the bias inherent in any such conference backed with IC CAE money since the top speakers are cherry picked for political reliability and a pro-CIA point of view, stating: “Colloquium...should contain....Keynote addresses by senior IC officials and national level experts” (Guidance and Procedures 7).

Students and faculty were invited to attend the „free“ conference (after all the ODNI had lavishly paid for it and stocked it with FBI, CIA, DEA, ICE and US Border Patrol Agents) and receive a „certificate“ of attendance. An undetermined number of UTPA and faculty members attended but I counted twenty-five or so UTPA students and faculty lining the entry way protesting the conference and leafletting attendees.

Having lent a patina of academic rigor to IGkNU for the conference, PACE Co-Chair Jones then went back to the Philosophy Department to propose amending the curriculum and establishing a course in “Intelligence Ethics.” This effort is also straight out of Bolton’s 1968 memo “to establish the study of intelligence as a legitimate and important field of inquiry for the academic scholar.” (Witanek 1). Surprisingly,
however, Jones’ colleagues divided on the proposal and on a vote of 4 to 4 the new course died for the present although Jones was encouraged to teach the course as a special topics class.

IGkNU founded a summer „spy camp,” a summer institute offered free to area high school students and advertised as “GOT INTELLIGENCE?” The IGkNU website describes the outreach to 9-11 grade teenagers:

The importance of intelligence gathering and analysis has become increasingly evident since September 2001, succeeding in a larger undertaking of US engagement abroad. Numerous studies have indicated the need for US intelligence analysts with diverse backgrounds and ethnicities, to become the new cadre of employees. As the challenges of the new century unfold, government agencies, private industry, consulting companies, and thinking tanks will increasingly rely on this new cadre of employees in formulating policies, and developing business strategies that are globally aware while at the same time protecting the interest of the US Government and corporations. The “GOT INTELLIGENCE?” Summer Institute is directed toward fostering Global Knowledge, Understanding, and Leadership skills to a new generation of students at the high school level. The Summer Institute will be multidisciplinary in nature, incorporating topics in History, Information Science, Engineering, Geology, Psychology, and Language studies, and designed to give the students critical tools which make them capable of analyzing events at the national and international level.

In the words of the ODNI, the high school outreach programs are designed to “increase the talent pool of students considering a career in the IC” (Guidance and Procedures 5). In other words, it’s never too young to join the CIA, for the ODNI also encourages summer spy camps for youth as young as “junior high school” (Guidance and Procedures 5) which will include: “several intelligence related exercises, scenarios, case studies....” (Guidance and Procedures 5).

In our sit down meeting on May 5, 2009 in newly refurbished offices in the Lamar building on the UTPA campus, Program Director Nick Weimer, hired out of a career in the hotel and tourist industry, told me IGkNU has “no affiliation with the CIA. We do not work with the CIA” (although the ODNI funding comes in part from the CIA budget). “If a student wanted to work for the CIA,” Weimer said, “we’d take them as we would a student who wanted to work for the State Department.”

Though the grant requires the University to hold an annual public conference, sponsor study abroad, institute some curricula in the intelligence field, and reach out to high school students, Weimer insisted “We build the program, not them. In no way is our program spy training” (interview with author). However, the ODNI own Guidance and Procedures bulletin for the IC/CAE states clearly that a major goal of the funding is “Curriculum modification activity” governmentese for not only for creating new IC courses but also increasing the number of courses “modified to include IC related topics” (Guidance and Procedures 11) as the CIA infiltrates an unlimited number of university classes.
At the same time, however, UTPA is not an independent partner since the ODNI requires that “IC agencies and elements are actively involved in the development, implementation and operation of the IC CAE Program” (Guidance and Procedures 4).

And once again the Intelligence Community (CIA) reaches out into issues of academic careers, promotion and tenure, linking the IC CAE money to “support for sabbaticals, research, and related activities of faculty....” (Guidance and Procedures 7). Play ball with the CIA and gain access to the goodies that ensure successful careers.

IGkNU also used the IC CAE money to furnish and stock a conference room on the third floor of the UTPA library where many IGkNU speakers are presented. Though the conference room is open to all students the ODNI is clear about its use requiring that collaborating colleges “ensure that books, magazines, and material about each of the IC agencies and components are readily available for students” (Guidance and Procedures 8). Again, imagine a „tobacco industry library room” stocked only with pro-smoking materials to propagandize students.

And where the Universities own faculty are deemed insufficiently reliable to promote the CIA the ODNI will “Provide curriculum development assistance. Assistance may include officers-in-residence, contractors, local and national level experts and retired IC cadre to assist in IC CAE Program Development” (Guidance and Procedures 9). One group eager to aid the effort is the Association of Former Intelligence Officers whose editor wrote in their monthly bulletin of May 2007:

I recently visited the campus and found the students very engaging and eager to learn. I believe it would serve the nation well if AFIO members in the vicinity of UTPA made themselves available to visit the university and interact with the students. Of course there are the self proclaimed experts that are critical of the program, and anything we can do to support this DNI effort will serve our community well (AFIO Weekly Intelligence Notes)

Not everyone has been so welcoming of the CIA/UTPA collaboration. A campus organization of undergraduate and graduate students, Students for Peace and Justice, has raised the issue in a series of small demonstrations, including their presence at the 2008 PACE/IGkNU conference, and leafletting faculty mailboxes. And some faculty have grown perturbed by the CIA”s growing campus presence. I asked Jose Skinner, an Associate Professor of English at UTPA, a published fiction writer formerly active in the Nicaragua solidarity movement, what was wrong with having the CIA and other intelligence agencies fund programs and courses if it benefits our students educationally and in finding jobs:

What kind of courses does the CIA have in mind? Advanced Waterboarding Techniques? Recruitment and Training of Unilaterally-Controlled Latino Assets? Case Studies in the Destabilization of Democratically-Elected Governments? No corporation or agency of the U.S. government should be allowed to set or influence curriculum at our university (interview 5/22/09)
Does it matter, I asked Skinner, if the money comes through the ODNI rather than directly from the CIA?

If it doesn’t matter where the money comes from. Why not ask the Gulf Cartel or the Mafia for funds? I hear they have lots. I assume such monies come with curricular strings attached, like the Intelligence funds do. That being the case, some course suggestions: Money Laundering Through the Ages, Polyploidy in Enhancement of THC in Cannabis Indica, Pablo Escobar: Hero of the People (ibid).

Half of a million dollars a year arriving in the midst of a worldwide recession is welcome funding to a struggling state school. So far the protests are few and small in number and most faculty and students have yet to pay attention to what is happening on their campus. Much the same, however, could have been said about the beginning stages of campus activism in years past around sweatshop labor and apartheid divestment. In 2005 student demonstrations at New York University forced a planned CIA recruitment effort off that campus. Campus teach-ins and demonstrations being contemplated now may bear fruit in the coming academic year as part of a growing national movement. So far the CIA has operated in the shadows on campus but the academy is the place where research and investigation illuminate issues and where critical thinking leads to public debate. And that may be too much attention for a CIA that has never been comfortable operating in the light of day.

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The Constraints and Prospects of Post-military Literary Engagement in Nigeria.

By Ameh Dennis Akoh

Abstract

Nigerian drama since independence has been in a constant state of flux; from the tradition of the pioneer conventional playwrights to the playwrights of the radical aesthetics beginning from the 1970s and beyond, in theory and practice, it has presented itself as an ever-dynamic genre with attendant frustrations and hopes; the major challenge being the continuing dominance of the older generation of playwrights over the fledgling creativity in the face hard socio-economic milieu and state tyranny. This paper evaluates Nigerian drama since the holocaust of the Civil War period and the years dominated by military dictatorship, and makes projections with few dramatic texts, what the scope of Nigerian drama, in theory and praxis, after General Sani Abacha is and should be.

Nigerian drama has, arguably, never had a dull moment in theory and practice. From the traditions of the pioneer dramatists through the second generation to the new voices, it has presented itself as an ever dynamic, ever-growing genre. Consequently, throughout Nigeria’s chequered history (the constitutional anomaly of the First Republic, the fratricidal carnage of the Civil War, the squandermania of the Yakubu Gowon regime and its attendant oil boom lavish, the lasciviousness of the Second Republic, the tortuous years of military misrule to the present democratic experiment), the role of drama and the dramatist in moralising, identity and character formation, etc., has not only been enterprising but also purifying. These periods have variously been captured in such plays as Soyinka’s Kongi’s Harvest, Madmen and Specialists, King Baabu, Osofisan’s A Restless Run of Locusts, Midnight Hotel, Aringindin and the Nightwatchmen, Ojo Bakare’s This Land Must Sacrifice, Hagher’s Swem Karagbe, Emeka Nwabueze’s A Parliament of Vultures, to mention just a few. The above plays fall into the different categories of playwrights according to generation, namely: the first generation of early post-independence conventional playwrights, the post-civil war radical playwrights whose subject matter became the then running battle between capitalism and socialism and fronting for the latter in their ideological confrontations, the middle generation which emerged in the dying days of Marxism as praxis, and the new generation which are a product of the last
days of military dictatorship in Nigeria and Africa. This last category has been christened “new voices” in Nigerian drama (Akoh, “Ideo-aesthetics” 146-168). This classification is reached from the conviction that in their search for aesthetic ideology they attempt disparately to reach new goals or build on or re/deconstruct old dramatic canons within ideo-aesthetic boundaries in both language and theme.

For the first and second groups of playwrights, critical literatures abound, all of which variously provide bases for classification in ideology and aesthetics. Either as in-depth critical materials on individual playwrights or a generation, these first two generations have enjoyed a much-privileged (if not prejudiced) critical attention to the point of a rehash. Apart from the avalanche of essays and chapters in journals and books on individual playwrights, full-length books such as Olu Obafemi’s *Contemporary Nigerian Theatre*, Victor Dugga’s *Creolisations in Nigerian Theatre* and James Booth’s *Writers and Politics in Nigeria* bother on these generations. Saint Gbilekaa’s *Radical Theatre in Nigeria* remains the most authoritative treatise on the second generation drama and dramatists to date. And since Gbilekaa’s outing no single book has been published to embrace the generation after Osofisan. The present author’s doctoral thesis, “Shifting Paradigms in Ideo-aesthetics of Post-civil War Nigerian Drama”, however provides a scintillating leeway through the various traditions since the holocaust of the civil war to the present as it takes these traditions in their divergent merits and demerits within a postmodernist framework. Stephen Inegbe in his “Drama and Theatre in Nigeria after Soyinka” has also done a somewhat historical survey of Nigerian drama following Soyinka’s generation. These and many others are a record of a continuing tradition of criticism. But while in the latter only a passing attention is given to the new playwrights, my espousal of the shifting trends in post-war drama gives an extensive space of critical attention to six new writers, namely Irene Salami, Julie Okoh, Alex Asigbo, Ahmed Yerima, Ojo Rasaki and Tracie Utoh. This paper is of the view that the face of both dramatic writing and dramatic criticism in the millennium would unequivocally be defined by the level of attention given to these new playwrights.

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Interestingly, since the exit of the military in 1999, play texts have not ceased to flood the bookstands from both the old and new playwrights. Some of these post-1999 plays are: Ojo Bakare’s *Once Upon a Tower*, J. P. Clark’s *All for Oil*, Soyinka’s *King Baabu*, Osofisan’s revised version of *Aringindin and the Nightwatchmen*, Tracie Utoh-Ezeajugh’s *Our Wives have gone Mad Again*, Sowande’s *Super Leaf*, Yerima’s *Ire and the Liman*, Victor Dugga’s *A Bridge of Strings*, Hagher’s *The Travails of James Scott*, Alex Asigbo’s *War of the Tin Gods* and *The Reign of Pascal Amusu*, Effiong Johnson’s *The Stolen Manuscripts* and others. Hardly do any of these plays deviate from the burning issues confronting postcolonial transitory state of Africa or Nigeria. Be it the first generation or any other, Nigerian drama has since moved away from the ‘cold art’ of Gao Xingjian (594-601). Consequently, in the present state of affairs, playwrights of the older generations, in order to still remain artistically and socially relevant to their environment, have either modified their artistic vision or totally abandoned it for a new one that is more germane to the times. While Soyink has abandoned the lofty shrine of Ogun for the public proletarian space in his last two outings (*The Beatification of Area Boy* and *King Baabu*), Femi Osofisan has virtually defied being caged within the second generation aesthetic ideology of popular justice for which he was arguably the most
prolific. Radical theatre therefore has in his hands been remoulded or repackaged to meet the needs of the millennium (Akoh “Metaphysics” 130-143). From his revised *Aringindin and the Nightwatchmen* to *The Life of Ajayi Crowther*, Osofisan now opts for a more sympathetic and subtle approach to the problem of leadership, poverty and inter-group relations in society. He has therefore abandoned orthodox Marxism for a more subtle, humanistic approach; a somewhat ‘reformation of Marxism on revolutionary front within the postcolonial ‘transitory’ democracies of Africa and the Third World’ (Akoh “Popular Justice” 22-36, “Historicist Hermeneutics” 11).

I have made some projections elsewhere on the scope and new face of the drama of the millennium:

Four major plays are critical to post-military drama in Nigeria – the revised version of *Aringindin and the Nightwatchmen*, *King Baabu*, *Then She Said It* and *War of the Tin Gods*. The first, written in 1999, was the last major play of the twentieth century; the second and third, the first major plays of this century; and the fourth (published in 2002) seeks a marriage of aesthetic ideology of the old and new. All of these plays seek a definition of the scope of both artist and the people in Nigerian drama of the new age. While *Aringindin and King Baabu* clearly define the scope of post-military literary engagement in Nigerian drama, *Then She Said It* explains the needed communitarian spirit of post-feminist drama and *Tin Gods* draws us close to the need for a functional aesthetic theory for playwriting and practice (Akoh “Ideo-aesthetics” 214).

With a redefinition of their erstwhile artistic spirit especially of a conventional playwright like Soyinka and a ‘toning down’ of orthodox Marxism in the hands of its most prolific spokesman in Nigeria, Osofisan, a meeting point is charted between critical realism and socialist realism in Nigerian theatre. This also may be responsible for why it is a bit difficult to put a nametag on the new playwrights who are more interested in themes rather the question of ideology. It is however interesting to note that of the four representative plays in the quotation above one comes from a new playwright and many more have been published since that submission.

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One obvious fact is that playwrights of the ‘new’ generation are still struggling to find their feet within the highly competitive space of dramatic writing in which both the first and second generations are still actively participating and dominating. Some of the reasons for this development shall be advanced later. While the feminist playwrights are so enraptured in making more political statements like most of their artistic forebears, the non-feminists seem to be so much issue-oriented that they lose grip with form and technique or end up at jerky artistic experiments, which show that their fledgling creativity is still in search of the artistic finesse now common with the older generation of playwrights; a trend that is common with every developing literary tradition.

Part of the general constraints to new writings from new writers is publishing or better still, the barriers
posed by publishing houses. In their choice of texts (be it drama, poetry or prose) to publish, Nigerian publishers always would go for already established authors that can fetch them monetary gains; there is hardly any room for new writers whose fledgling creativity may even hold more promise than it was with established ones at the early stage of their artistic development, if only given the opportunity. Because of this rejection many budding playwrights remain cowed or simply stop publishing after one or two attempts; and hence their artistic flowers would be truncated at a time they are ready to blossom.

Another constraint is the dearth of critical writings on these new writers even after investing their personal funds into self-publishing. Nigerian critics (of which this writer is a part) are still obsessed with the writings of the older generation like Soyinka, J. P. Clark, Sofola, Osofisan, Sowande and sometimes Tess Onwueme. Even with the avalanche of dramatic pieces that have been born in the 1990s from Iyorwuese Hagher, Olu Obafemi, Efióng Johnson, Julie Okoh, Stella Oyedepo, Tracie Utoh-Ezeajugh, Toni Duruaku, Irene Salami, Bakare Ojo-Rasaki, Chris Egharevba, Greg Mbajiorgu, Ahmed Yerima, Alex Asigbo, Barclays Ayakoroma, Solomon Iguanre, and a host of others, as critics in academia we have connived with our students writing long essays and dissertations to either silence the new writers or completely decapitate them. This, in my opinion, appears to be the most biting of all the obstacles facing new writing in Nigeria today. Dramatic criticism seems to thrive only on the works of the masters. With only a few exceptions like Hagher, Obafemi and Yerima who have enjoyed a festschrift each on their writings (the latter has two now), most of the new playwrights remain relatively unknown through our silence of rebuke for their works! On the heels of this scenario comes the inevitable question: Where are the Dan Izevbayes, the Ogunbas, Abiola Ireles, Jeyifos, etc., through whose criticisms the works of the first and second generations of dramatists became popular within and outside of Nigeria? Why are there so many outcries over the dearth of (good?) dramatic writing in the face of the so many plays still being written and produced on the Nigerian stage? It is principally because both old and new critics find it probably unbecoming to make them subjects of literary criticism.

For both the old and new playwrights, one hurdle however to cross is the simple assumption that the battle has already been won over dictatorial regimes after the exit of the military. This is a costly assumption that can make the theatre of any nation to slumber or compromise its call. And with the invasion of the home video and collapse of a reading culture in Nigeria, it becomes an even more difficult task for new playwrights to break even with the Nigerian audience.

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In spite of the many odds against new dramatic writings in the Millennium, playwrights of this generation seem to be showing an indefatigable spirit with their continuous production of plays that reflect stark realities of the time. As earlier observed the number of new plays published between 1999 and now is incredibly high. With the interesting revision of artistic positions by older generation of playwrights, an artistic wedlock may with time emerge between the old and the new playwrights. This appears to be part of the call in Asigbo’s play, War of the Tin Gods, which also shows a growth in the fledgling creativity of the playwright. An artistically relevant adaptation of Aristophanes’ The Frogs, the play brings up for
interrogation a nagging national question through a parody of the aesthetic ideology of two great Nigerian
dramatists of an older generation, Woye and Emi. Like Aristophanes’ Aeschylus and Euripides before
Plato, Woye and Emi (indubitably Soyinka and Osofisan) debate the merits of their individual works
before the throne of Olodumare to discern whose creativity should be adopted in the place of the mor-
ibund state of creative writing (playwriting in particular) in the nation. This is a response to the call by
the younger generation of playwrights themselves led by Aki and Aba (the language of these two young
writers sounds Ojo Bakare’s and Asigbo himself) for a resurrection of the two sages. In the heat of the
debate, Orunmila appears and recommends a blend of the ideo-aesthetics of both writers for new writing
in Nigeria, to which Olodumare consents.

Crafted in the spirit of the prologue in Oliver Goldsmith’s *She Stoops to Conquer*, which pleads for support
and patronage for the dying comic art of Seventh century England, Asigbo in *War of the Tin Gods* thus
interrogates the ideo-aesthetic weakness (or is it relevance?) of playwrights of his own generation and
calls for an artistic renaissance. This call in Asigbo’s play clearly gives an indication and promise which
his latest outing *The Reign of Pascal Amusu* holds as an artistically relevant work to Nigerian drama of
the twenty-first century.

Much hope also abounds for the feminist playwrights. Moving from their hitherto militant facile femi-
nism they are now shifting to a more humanistic, sober and reflective approach. This is a most interesting
development considering the manner in which military dictatorships have crumbled across the African
continent. The forces of reason and subtlety or cunning, not the might of guns, only can change the *status
quo*, the post-feminists seem to be saying. This is evident in Tess Onwueme’s last dramatic outing – *Then
She Said It*, which she has re-titled now as *What Mama Said*. Indeed, among all the ‘feminist’ drama-
tists in Nigeria, and the most significant ones, her plays stand out as most representative of this creative
movement. From her first major play in the facile radical feminist persuasion, *The Reign of Wazobia*, to
her maturation in *Tell it to Women* which advocates for what I have elsewhere termed African Womanism,
this paradigm shift is evident (Akoh “Poetics” 136-143). *Then She Said It* is only an amplification of this
temperate but significant paradigm shift. This latter persuasion has been embraced by some of her younger
artistic compatriots like Tracie Utuh-Ezeajugh in very clear ideo-aesthetic explication. Utuh-Ezeajugh’s
plays are simple and executed without the usual political cants prevalent in the plays of her fellow ‘new’
feminist voices. What has privileged Utuh-Ezeajugh above this group is partly her daring spirit and unam-
biguous presentation of the characters’ strength as well as their foibles. While recognising the place of the
women, she still takes an unambiguous post-feminist stance, a privilege, which she appropriates, bringing
her close in ideo-aesthetics to the latter phase of Onwueme’s writing.

Of the new feminist playwrights, Utuh-Ezeajugh’s *Our Wives have gone Mad Again* opens up a dialogue
between old feminism and the new post-feminist ideology. The obvious merit of *Our Wives* is in its ideo-
logical twist from the norm, a twist which stands as a foil to the almost infallible picture of the ‘new’
woman presented by the many, sometimes self-styled, feminist writers in their bid to overthrow patriarchy
that ignores the intricacies of time, environment and individual experiences. Utuh engages her dramatic
writings not only with the discourse on feminism but other contemporary socio-political issues of both

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national and international concerns. The inference then on the feminist dilemma in Nigerian drama in its search for originality and relevance within the post-feminist framework is that feminism or feminist theorising is still in its transitory stage, and feminist scholars need to broker a theory that recognises the limits of experience and practice.

Generally, again, as the trend continues to betray the realities of the time, one cannot however gainsay the value of the work that the new playwrights are doing; their works portray stark realities of the times, as do the television and the home video all of which need in time to come to improve on their techniques (Akoh, 2006b). Their generally simple language may also be in their earnest desire to get closer to the people for whom they write and whose lives they hope to touch positively; considering also the gnawing problem of language in African literature generally. More so, these new voices can be categorised in the group of the ‘famished’ artists all of whom are products of the military years. Unequivocally, then, these playwrights will also grow, as did their artistic forebears. When the enabling environment begins to emerge, one may begin to also witness works that are not only ideologically pungent but also artistically germane.

At the Nnamdi Azikiwe University, Awka, Nigeria, Alex Asigbo and Tracie Utoh-Ezeajuh have started an experiment of publishing collections of new dramatic writings, an experiment that if well harnessed and sustained holds so much hope for playwrights of this generation. For instance, in the latest collection, new writers like Saa-ondo Iormgurun, Edward Ossai and Izu Nwankwo have been published and introduced into the Nigerian critical market.

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What then should be the scope of literary drama in Nigeria hereafter? What should be the direction of its criticism? As already observed above, the availability of an enabling environment, namely the economic conditions, ready or easy access to publishing houses, etc., may be a an engendering factor for us to also witness works that are not only ideologically pungent but also artistically germane. More of experiments like the Bode Osanyin’s Writers’ Resort in Lagos should be encouraged and sustained. New playwrights would also need to strengthen their focus more on the new power structure that is building capitalist strongholds around the common people in the new democratic environment. Consequently, concern for subject matter should be privileged over any other consideration, for art should not be the voice of the individual alone but also that of the collective will of the people.

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The Indeterminacy of Quine’s Indeterminacy Thesis.

By Oyelakin Richard Taye

Abstract

W. V. Quine argues that observational sentences and general concepts are indeterminate. The implication of this is that there is no unique meaning and translation of any sentence or concept in any chosen language as there is a proliferation of translational manuals. This paper argues that if the indeterminacy thesis is true then this has invariably and greatly affected the potency of the fundamentals of Quine’s arguments by its own criterion. This is because if the thesis is true, it follows that the thesis itself is indeterminate and it is therefore unjustified to declare translation and meaning indeterminate. By Quine’s theory, a general regress besets us all here but we must first make a significant sense of the import of this article. The paper, however, explores the consequences of this conclusion.

Background to Translation and Meaning

Quine’s task in *Translation and Meaning* is to find out how much of language, science, and the world we can make a meaning of by understanding language as a social tool to respond to the effect of stimulation on our nerve endings. The attempt is that if language is understood as a response to stimulation, then it would become clear what scope would be left for meaning, the analytic-synthetic distinction, synonymy, etc., all of which are constituents of language. Quine is not a Lockean empiricist who claims that the meaning of an expression is the idea associated with it in the mind of the speaker. He is not a Wittgensteinian theorist who claims that the meaning of a certain word is the way it is used to describe the world. Quine’s position is that we should remove all these theories of meaning. We should, as much as possible, remove all talk about meaning altogether. This is because the talk of meaning presupposes a certain entity called meaning. But, this talk about meaning is what Alston referred to in *Quine on Meaning* as the habit of hypostatization, the habit that Quine rejects.¹ Talk of meaning like this confuses our language. All we should deal with is how our socially learned words are used as responses to stimulation. It is then safe to refer to Quine’s theory here as stimulus theory. Quine is making an enquiry into the way our socially learned words are used to respond to stimulation.
**Translation and Meaning**

Quine’s task in *Translation and Meaning* is to examine how much of language we can understand by studying it as an instrument used for responding to stimulation, a prime example of which is a flash of light zapping the retina. It may then be asked: how does Quine’s task affect meaning, the analytic-synthetic distinction, synonymy, etc, all of which are important concepts in language? In other words, it may generally be asked: how does Quine’s theory affect language? Quine’s belief is that if our language can be understood in terms of stimulus/response, then it would become clear that it does not leave any significant scope for meaning. The outcome is that meaning in language as related to intension becomes irrelevant. Quine sees his task as:

> to consider how much of language can be made sense of in terms of its stimulus conditions, and what scope this leaves for empirically unconditioned variations in one’s conceptual scheme.\(^2\)

Quine’s contention is that if language is studied as a relationship between stimulation and behaviour response, then by assenting or dissenting to that stimulation it may become clear how we may make sense of our linguistic system and whatever significance it may hold.

For Quine, language is described as the complex of present dispositions to verbal behaviour. The issue here is to explain human behaviour (Quine calls it verbal behaviour) by its currently observable correlation with stimulation. This means that language should be understood as disposition to stimulus response. This enquiry is an attempt to study the words and utterances of a speaker based on his/her dispositions to respond to external stimulations alone. This study will include the understanding of the set of stimulations that will elicit the disposition either to assent or dissent in the speaker. If we study the words and sentences of a language based on the dispositions to respond to verbal stimulations alone, the question is: what are the consequences of this model for language and the nature of words and utterances in general? Quine argues that by studying these dispositions we would understand whether our language is determinate or indeterminate. From this nature of the study of language, what is the kind of meaning that words can have? Again, what scope does it leave for the distinction between statements that are necessary and statements which are contingent? Questions like these are what Quine’s enquiry in *Translation and Meaning* tries to explain.

**Radical Translation**

When we use words or language as a social instrument to respond to the world, it is important to examine what status meaning takes in such a process. Quine says in *Pursuit of Truth* that “the meaning of a sentence of one language is what it shares in its translations with another language…”\(^3\) Then to determine the
meaning of words and sentences in one language, it becomes pertinent to determine what it shares with other languages by its translations. This assumption is what led to Quine’s enterprise of radical translation. In this enquiry of radical translation, Quine imagines a linguist who is to translate an alien language into his or her own native language without the help of a native informant. The only data that the linguist has to rely upon to get the translation scheme of the native are the native utterances and their attendant observable behavior. This is just because the linguist has no other means of translating the language of the native. A linguistic scheme is formulated prior to its use as response to the stimulation. It may also be said that the linguistic scheme is formed just as we are responding to the stimulation. Therefore, the linguist is expected to formulate a translation manual to be used in his enquiry.

One of Quine’s objectives is to show that the meaning that words and sentences take does not go beyond their relationship with verbal or non-verbal stimulation. Quine’s research therefore attempts to show that if language can be sufficiently explained by its relationship with natural disposition to stimulation, then it would become sufficient to argue that any theory or concept that places any different interpretation of meaning onto words and sentences becomes incorrect. This means that if some key concepts in language such as meaning, analyticity, synonymy, semantic rule, etc., are to convey any meaning at all, they are to convey stimulus meaning.

To form his translation manual, the linguist starts his enterprise by noting how the native uses his words in response to present stimulation. For example, the native utters ‘Gavagai’ at the sight of ‘Rabbit’. The linguist immediately notes that ‘Gavagai’ translates to his own sentence, ‘Rabbit.’ However, since the native might use a different sentence at the sight of a rabbit which might translate to ‘animal,’ ‘white,’ or ‘rabbit,’ the linguist has to find out when the native wishes to assent to the sentence ‘Rabbit’ at the sight of a rabbit and not at the sight of an animal or a white object. Then at the sight of a rabbit, the linguist has to utter the word ‘Gavagai’ and study the native’s assenting or dissenting response. But, to achieve this feat, he has to be able to translate the native’s ‘Yes’ and ‘No.’ However, Quine’s translator will leave some important aspects of language-speaking out of the enquiry here. There are some culturally coded gestures which usually accompany either ‘Yes’ or ‘No.’ Different gestures are employed for different contexts. It then becomes an issue how Quine’s translator will translate these elements of body language.

The linguist learns the native’s equivalence of ‘yes’ and ‘no’ by watching the native’s response to the sentence ‘Gavagai’ that follows the physical stimulation accompanying the appearance of a rabbit. If he elicits ‘evet’ in so many instances of the sight of a rabbit, then ‘evet’ is taken to be equivalent to ‘yes,’ while ‘yok’ is found to be the equivalent of ‘no.’ For further clarity, questions are asked to make sure that the native’s ‘yes’ and ‘no’ are adequately mastered. For Quine, the linguist uses this method to develop the working manual with which to penetrate the heart of the native’s language. For instance, the linguist can now translate the native’s sentence ‘Gavagai’ as ‘Rabbit’. He can also translate his ‘yes’ and ‘no.’ With this development, Quine recasts meaning in terms of stimulation. The affirmative stimulus meaning of a sentence such as ‘Gavagai’ for a given speaker is defined as the class of all the stimulations that would prompt his assent to it. Conversely, the class of all stimulations that would prompt dissent for a given speaker is defined as the negative stimulus meaning of a sentence. An example of a negative stimulus
meaning is the case in which the native would dissent to the stimulation of a hedgehog because it is not a rabbit, and he is being asked about rabbits. Therefore, the stimulus meaning of a sentence for an individual sums up his disposition to assent to or dissent from the sentence in response to present stimulation.

**Occasion, Standing, and Observation Sentences**

Given Quine’s stimulus theory, various kinds of sentences depend on their relationship with the disposition of the subject to respond to the conditioning stimulation. These sentences are classified as occasional, standing or observational. An occasion sentence, for example, is one in which the subject uses his disposition to assent or dissent, given the current stimulation. The scope of time within which what is referred to as the current stimulation is determined is the ‘modulus.’ The modulus sets spacio-temporal limits to the present stimulation. The sentence ‘see a rabbit’ is uttered at the sight of rabbit. When the rabbit disappears, the sentence becomes ‘we saw a rabbit’. The interval of the time when the spectators undergo the present stimulation of a rabbit is referred to as the modulus.

An occasion sentence is different from the other kinds of sentences because its stimulus meaning is solely dependent on the present stimulation within the modulus. This means that the stimulation that elicits assent during a certain modulus may elicit dissent at another. In this case, minimally worded sentences such as ‘Red,’ ‘Gavagai,’ ‘It hurts,’ or ‘It is raining,’ etc., are all occasion sentences existing within a particular modulus. However, for standing sentences, the eliciting stimulation has a longer span. The subject has the tendency of repeating his earlier response, given the same stimulation. Hence it is possible for subjects to span multiple moduli. For instance, the subject’s assent to the sentence ‘The weather is hot’ has a longer modulus than to the sentence ‘Gavagai.’ Here the sentence ‘The weather is hot’ is a standing sentence. There is also a daily assent to the verbal stimulation of a sentence such as ‘It is 1:00 pm.’ For standing sentences, their stimulation may keep the response unchanged over a considerably longer time. Sentences with short moduli are referred to as occasion sentences, while those that span longer moduli are called standing sentences. In the case, it is the modulus that distinguishes occasion sentences from standing sentences.

In addition, there are also observation sentences. An observation sentence is one that keeps its stimulus meaning unchanged, given some other collateral information. Examples of such sentences are ‘No bachelor is married,’ and ‘No child is an adult.’ Observational sentences, as the examples might, show, may have their site in either a belief or system of mores in the sense that the foundation of the acceptability of language, strictly speaking, may be said to be conventional. This fact in turn may explain the relationship of observational sentences to beliefs, perhaps even mores. Quine refers to observation sentences as occasion sentences that wear their meaning on their sleeves. An observation sentence is a sentence to which all the speakers of a given language have the disposition to assent, given the same conditioning stimulation, and in spite of any other contrary stimulation. For a sentence to be referred to as an observation sentence, it has to satisfy two criteria. The first is general acceptability: the sentence must command an outright assent.
or dissent by all speakers. The second condition is intersubjectivity. This means that all speakers must have the same disposition about the sentence. Quine argues that observation sentences can be translated by the linguist based on the criteria identified. Quine notes as well that truth functions such as negation, logical conjunction, and alternation can be translated by the field linguist from the native language to his home language.9

**Synonymy and Analyticity**

Given the preceding exposition, how can we determine sentence synonymy and the analyticity of various statements in question? Following Quine, an observation sentence is an occasion sentence which maintains its stimulus meaning unchanged for subjects, even in the presence of any conflicting stimulus information. Sentence synonymy becomes explicit in terms of stimulus meaning. Synonymous sentences are observation sentences that have the same stimulus meaning. In this case, ‘Gavagai’ and ‘Rabbit’ turn out to have the same stimulus meaning and hence they are synonymous. Quine argues that sentence synonymy is related to the stimulus synonymy of sentences. Stimulus synonymy is also related to stimulus analyticity. An analytic sentence is a sentence that is true come what stimulation.10 Kant also identifies *a priori*-synthetic sentences such as ‘7 + 5 = 12’ as necessary, but while intuition11 determines the necessity of such sentences for Kant, it is stimulation that determines stimulus analyticity for Quine. Stimulus analyticity has a social acceptability and sameness in intersubjective disposition that every speaker asserts whatever the stimulation. ‘There have been black dogs,’ ‘2 + 2 = 4’ and ‘No bachelor is married,’ are all stimulus–analytic simply because they have a feel that everyone appreciates.12 According to Quine, analytic statements are of two kinds: (1) those that are logically true, and are non-experiential, some examples of which are tautological, such as ‘No unmarried man is married,’ ‘All married men are married,’ or ‘No married man is unmarried.’ These are all true under any reinterpretations or redescriptions of ‘Man’ and ‘Married.’ (2) Those that are turned to logical truth by substituting synonyms for synonyms, an example of which is ‘No bachelor is married, are similarly true under all forseeable circumstances,’13 according to Quine’s logic.

Of the sentences that are directly conditioned by experience, Quine argues that there is an objective entity in the world to which speakers may either rightly or wrongly refer. It has to be noted that for Quine, the only value of our language is that it is used as response to stimulation. The fact of the matter is the stimulation to which sentences respond. For instance, the sentence ‘This is red,’ has a non-verbal stimulation about which we can be either right or wrong, i.e. if a red thing is shown to the speaker and he utters ‘Red,’ then he is technically correct in his assertion. The listeners can also have the retinas of their eyes affected by the irradiation of red light and draw a consequent conclusion. It is also the case with some other sentences such as ‘It is raining,’ or ‘It is hot,’ that they can be proven true or false depending on the circumstances conditioning their utterance. All these sentences have a certain non-verbal stimulation about which their speaker can be right or wrong. From this exposition of Quine theory, it can be argued that sentences are used as responses to stimulation: that is, when we use a sentence to respond to
certain stimulation, there is a unique and enduring form of stimulation to which our sentence responds. For instance, the statement; ‘This is red’ refers to an objective red light. This condition is objective in the sense that speakers’ responses to the stimulation are the same and are presumed to have the same stimulus meaning to all actual and potential speakers.

However, it must be stated again that since we use language to respond to stimulation, it may either follow that the formation of our linguistic scheme exists prior to its use to respond to stimulation or that we form our linguistic scheme as we respond. To respond to the world, different linguistic schemes could be formed in as much as they are supported by evidence. For instance, the sentence ‘Ehoro’ in Yoruba can be roughly translated as ‘Rabbit’ based on the chosen translation manual which translates ‘Ehoro’ as a ‘Rabbit’ and not as ‘rabbit stage’ or ‘undetached rabbit part.’ Again, ‘Ehoro’ in Yoruba can be translated as ‘Rabbit stage,’ (Word and Object, P 54), based on the manual chosen to translate ‘Ehoro’ as ‘Rabbit stage.’ Other translational manuals may be chosen to translate stimulus sentences. These manuals are equally successful in the translation of ‘Ehoro’ as the theory of Radical Translation predicts. Translating one language to another must follow a definite translation manual.

Now, Quine argues that the linguist may translate the native occasion sentence, ‘Gavagai’ as ‘Rabbit,’ according to the translational manual chosen. But, some other translational manuals can be used, leading to a different translation, although both sentences would be based on the same evidence. Therefore, the translation of the occasion sentence ‘Gavagai’ as ‘This is a rabbit’ is indeterminate because it can equally be translated as ‘This is a rabbit stage,’ ‘This is an undetached rabbit part,’ ‘This is an integral part of a rabbit,’ ‘This is a rabbit fusion,’ etc, depending on the translational scheme used. These roughly synonymous statements exemplify what Quine refers to as ‘inscrutability of referents.’ The argument is that any translation chosen will fail to be a unique translation for the ‘Gavagai’ since there are other equally sufficient translations for the sentence.

**Sentence and Terms**

Quine’s argument for the indeterminacy of meaning is presented as follows. There are some utterances such as ‘Red,’ or ‘Rabbit,’ whose stimulus meaning can be determined by either the dissent or assent elicited by the stimulation (in these instances, of either the irradiation of a retina with red light or the presence of rabbit in field of vision). Consequently, for such sentences, there is a stimulation about which speakers can be either right or wrong. However, there are terms such as ‘rabbit,’ ‘gavagai,’ ‘red,’ etc., which are used to describe the abstraction of the properties of the individual things. These general terms do not have non-verbal stimulation about which speakers can either be right or wrong. Their meanings depend on the translation manual used. Now, since it is possible to have more than one translation manual, the question is: which is to be used? Quine’s argument is that any translation manual used will “fail to determine a unique choice of translation manual.” This is because there are other acceptable translational manuals which can be used in translating the terms.
The indeterminacy thesis can be better understood in this way. These conclusions are what Quine arrives at, in the attempt of a linguist to achieve a complete translation of an alien language: (1) Observation sentences can be translated. (2) Truth-functions can be translated. He argues also that (3) Stimulus analytic and stimulus contradictory sentences can be recognized, and questions of intrasubjective stimulus synonymy can be settled. But he notes that stimulus synonymous sentences cannot be translated. This is because it is possible for there to be more than one possible referent for any stimulus sentence, such as ‘Gavagai.’ These statements, as it were, exemplify Quine’s idea of Analytical Hypotheses. It should be noted, however, that analytical hypotheses and auxiliary definitions are what Quine refers to as “the linguist’s jungle-to-English dictionary and grammar.” By this metaphor, I understand Quine to refer to the translation manual that the linguist will use in his translation exercise in a foreign environment where language appears as alien or foreign.

But Quine raises a sticky problem about analytical hypotheses. The difficulty is as follows: while it is possible that in the case of an observation sentence such as ‘Gavagai’ there is a fact of the matter according to which the linguistic scheme could be right or wrong, in the case of general sentences, this state of affairs is simply not the case. This development occurs simply because these sentences do not have a direct conditioning stimulation. And there is no fact of the matter about which to be right or wrong for the analytical hypothesis used to translate the general terms. It is then possible that there are different sets of analytical hypotheses which are compatible with all the linguistic behaviour and empirical facts, but which give conflicting translations. For instance, it is possible for one analytical hypothesis to translate a certain native expression as ‘are the same as.’ For that translation manual, ‘gavagai’ will translate as “This is the same as a rabbit.” This statement will constitute an acceptable translation since it agrees with the disposition of the subject and the stimulation in question.

On the other hand, that same native expression may be translated by another analytical hypothesis as ‘are stages of the same animal.’ According to this hypothesis, ‘gavagai’ will be translated as ‘This is a rabbit stage.’ Other analytical hypotheses may translate the same sentence differently. Since there is no fact of the matter in this case, because ‘gavagai’ is a term and not a stimulus sentence, it becomes difficult to argue that one translation is better than the other in determining the meaning of ‘gavagai.’ However, a stimulus sentence is also vulnerable to indeterminacy of reference. Stimulus sentence and term are different in the sense that while a stimulus sentence has a direct objective stimulation about which speakers can either be right or wrong, the term does not have such clarity. Translation manual(s) is/are relied upon to determine the significance of any term.

The Indeterminacy of the Indeterminacy Thesis

The exposition in the preceding section may be accepted as a fair presentation of Quine’s indeterminacy thesis. In this case, the thesis may be summarily stated as follows: No sentence, statement, or concept has a unique meaning since there are numerous but equally sufficient translational manuals with which to
determine their meaning or translate it into other languages. The relevant question which readily follows is this one: is the thesis as summarily stated determinate? The question may be approached from two angles. The first one is Quine’s angle and the second is the critic’s angle. If it is found to be determinate, then Quine might have scored a strong point against language as well as his critics. Quine’s task in Radical Translation is to convince his readers that the translation of one language into the other is an indeterminate enterprise, meaning that in selecting a particular translational manual, it is guaranteed that no particular sentence or concept can have a unique meaning given the multiplicity of manuals at our disposal. If a sentence or concept lacks a unique meaning it then becomes difficult to translate it from one language to the other with any rigor or certitude.

Quine’s argument might be sketched in this form.

1. All statements, sentences and concepts are indeterminate.
2. To show that (1) is true we must create a sense of determinacy.
3. To create a sense of determinacy, a sentence must then be determinate.
4. Therefore, to show that statements, sentences and/or concepts are indeterminate, a statement must be determinate. Such a statement should be used as a paradigm to show that others are indeterminate.

In view of this preceding argument, Quine’s answer to the question of determinacy would be that the statement of the thesis is determinate. Quine would argue that it is determinate because a statement must be used as a paradigm to understand determinacy and to show that others statements are indeterminate.

Yet from critic’s point of view, the argument may be presented as follows:

1. All statements, sentences and/or concepts are indeterminate.
2. F is a sentence.
3. G is a statement.
4. H is a concept.
5. Therefore, premises 2, 3 and 4 are indeterminate following from premise 1.

The summary statement of Quine’s thesis (being a statement) falls within premise number 3. Therefore, the critics answer to the question is that it strictly follows that the statement is indeterminate.

In view of the two arguments presented, an adherent of Quine may object that Quine’s argument is more
convincing and therefore sufficient. What must be done now is to weigh the validity and sufficiency of each argument. For our convenience, we shall refer to Quine’s argument as argument A and the critic’s argument as argument B. Argument A runs the error of presuming that when we have a true general statement as a premise of an argument, there must be at least a particular instance of that general statement which is false, for us to make sense of that general statement. For instance, the statement ‘All men are mortal’ will presuppose a statement ‘There is a man who is immortal’ in order to make sense of the concepts of ‘mortality’ and ‘immortality.’ Obviously, this conclusion does not logically follow from the premise(s). In fact, logically, I can say that such a view has violated the law of non-contradiction. Saying that a thing both is and that it is not at the same time is contradictory and then untrue. Therefore, argument A is not a sufficient argument nor is it necessary. Besides, it is not a valid argument.

Let us assess argument B. The argument includes a valid move from the general statement to particular instances of the general statement. For instance, if “All men are mortal” is true and “Socrates is a man” is true, then it is strictly valid to conclude that the statement “Socrates is mortal” will be true. To conclude otherwise will contradict the entire argument. The whole thrust of the argument is to show that argument B is a valid and sufficient argument in and of itself.

In view of the assessment of the two arguments, we can see that Quine’s argument is invalid and insufficient in this context. Argument B is valid and sufficient to establish the point showing that the statement of the indeterminacy thesis is itself indeterminate by Quine’s very own argument. The case of indeterminacy is more complex because each term in the statement is also indeterminate, according to Quine. And if each term of any statement is indeterminate, this fact leaves a very large margin of possibility for error regarding the claim that language is indeterminate. This is the point Miriam Solomon makes in Quine’s Point of View:

If Quine’s skeptical considerations are applied consistently, they yield the result that none of language is determinately translatable, not even the signs for assent and dissent which are required for translation of observation sentences. For one could ask the skeptical question, how can we tell that the native ‘evet’ should be translated by our ‘yes,’ rather than by our ‘no,’ or by some other English utterance?\(^{19}\)

So, if each term of a particular language is indeterminate and the statement of Quine’s indeterminacy thesis is a statement of a particular language that consists of terms, what strictly follows is that the statement of Quine’s thesis is indeterminate. It must be noted here that whichever way the thesis is couched, since Quine’s thesis is against language in general, as long as it contains terms of a particular language, whichever language it is, it is vulnerable to the same argument of indeterminacy. Well, perhaps, one may advise Quine to use another means apart from language to present the thesis so as to free it from the attack.
Consequences of the Indeterminacy of the Indeterminacy Thesis

One may then ask, what are the consequences of the indeterminacy of the indeterminacy thesis? In other words, what purpose does this discovery serve in philosophy? At least two issues can be identified as the consequences of this argument. The first is the absurdity contained in Quine’s argument. This absurdity runs as follows: although Quine attempts to show the world that translation is indeterminate, the attempt degenerates into arguing that meaning and the entire language itself are indeterminate. If an entire language is indeterminate, then all Quine’s write-ups become suspicious, necessarily and by definition, as they are linguistic in nature. Again, if the entire language is indeterminate and Quine is using an indeterminate language to show this fact, his attempt becomes the apparent case of an absurdity. Quine is like a scientist on Earth who invents an apparatus and argues with the prosthetic aid of the apparatus that the entire solar system, including its individual constituents, is faulty. Such a scientist should not be taken seriously, the reason being that if his discovery is true, then his apparatus/prosthesis is itself a faulty one, being one part of the constituents of that faulty solar system. It follows that such an apparatus should be given up because it can only achieve very little if it can achieve anything at all. Such is the case regarding Quine’s indeterminacy thesis; it is self-stultifying. An indeterminate linguistic tool cannot be used to declare language indeterminate. It then follows that language is not indeterminate as Quine has argued. Even supposing that the entire language is indeterminate, the same language cannot be used as the medium to show it. Such a medium should be sought elsewhere, and not in language.

This logical chain leads to the second issue. According to William P. Alston in Quine on Meaning, Quine’s indeterminacy of translation degenerates into a global indeterminacy of meaning. This degeneration is so significant that

Quine’s argument leads to the conclusion that no one means anything determinate either by any of his terms or by any of his non-observation sentences. And since the constitution of language is ultimately derivative from the speech activity of its users, it follows that no term or non-observation sentence in a language means anything determinate.

But this conclusion is not true of the way that speakers of a particular language understand and use their language. For instance, my first language is Yoruba. In Yoruba language, ‘ehoro’ is an approximate interpretation of ‘rabbit’. So when a Yoruba speaker says ‘Ehoro’ (‘Rabbit’ in English), he does not have a proliferation of translational manuals in perspective, and neither do his listeners. What he means is a whole enduring ‘ehoro’ and this is what the listeners understand the term to mean. That is why Yoruba language is spoken and understood by the prospective users without any disruption in communication. It must be noted that some of the fundamental purposes of language are for the pragmatic means of day-to-day communication and a vehicle through which a certain culture is communicated and expressed. Yoruba has peculiarly rich cultural values which need a determinate and an undistorted language to carry their meanings through and display and exhibit the richness embedded in the culture. Therefore, Yoruba preserves a clear manual for communication and cultural enrichment.
The same thing obtains with the word ‘Apon,’ an approximate interpretation of ‘Bachelor.’ When a speaker of Yoruba utters ‘Apon,’ the listeners understand it to mean ‘an adult male who is unmarried’ and not a ‘detached part of a bachelor’ or ‘a bachelor stage’ or another as Quine will want us to think. And when the word is uttered no question follows. The reason why there is usually no question or that none is expected is that all the speakers of the language already have the idea (or something like it) of ‘Apon’ registered in their minds. This thesis is the one that Chomsky’s and Katz’s mentalistic theory of language argued. Basically, they argue that the fundamentals of language do not consist in the systematic structure of the disposition towards stimulation; these fundamentals of language, they claim, consist in some other implicit mental properties which are inherent in human beings. This argument leads to the conclusion that the taxonomic theory of language leaves so many important things about the nature of language –learning and acquisition unexplained.

This point is identical to the one that Alston is making in Quine on Meaning when he states:

If everything Quine says about that were correct, I would still know what ‘rabbit’ means in my language. I know this just by being a master of my language. Knowing this is an essential part of what it is to have that language; knowing this is required for being able to use that language as a vehicle of thought and means of communication. If I didn’t know such things as that ‘rabbit’ denotes complete organisms rather than parts or stages of complete organisms, I wouldn’t be able to engage in communication the way I do.

If no unique meaning is attached to terms and statements used in a particular language, then communication becomes difficult, even untenable. No listener can make a meaning of what he utters. In other words, having a unique meaning is one sure characteristic which makes a particular language an adequate instrument of speaker–hearer communication. This is the way Yoruba language is practically used and understood in its society. So if practical and societal experience is part of Quine’s empirical fact, then the practical and societal use of Yoruba language is part of the behaviouristic fact. Hence it may be argued that this practical use of Yoruba language defies Quine’s theory. And if Quine’s prediction that “when theory and experience conflict, it is theory that gives way” is anything to go by, then in view of the way Yoruba language is used, Quine’s theory will have to give way. Specifically for Quine:

the total field is so underdetermined by its boundary conditions, experience, that there is much latitude of choice as to what statements to reevaluate in the light of any single contrary experience.

What I have argued is that Yoruba language is meaningful just because sentences, statements and concepts are used determinately and if it had been understood the way Quine argues, communication would have been impossible. In fact, if Alston’s inference from Quine is correct, i.e., the entire language is indeterminate, then it becomes extremely difficult, if not perilous, to embark on the exercise of translation at all. This is because, as Barry Hallen has pointed out in African Philosophy: The analytic Approach, the linguist approaches the alien’s language with some supposedly determinate ‘regulative principle’ without which
translation can never be possible at all.

Guiding the linguist’s interpretation of aliens’ behavior will be the “regulative principle” that most of the native’s rules (intentions/beliefs) are the same with ours, which is to say that most of them are true.\textsuperscript{26}

Hallen continues:

The, in a sense, elementary good sense of this claim is underscored once more by pointing out that the only beliefs and the truths the field linguist brings to the translation situation are those of her own natural language culture.\textsuperscript{27}

The point which I am making here is to the effect that if Quine’s linguist has a determinate cultural background and determinate technical principles with which to approach an alien’s language, then at the background of Quine’s entire theory are the determinate fundamentals of language. This fact cannot be denied, implying that language is too pragmatically important to be rejected as indeterminate. Now, let us now assume that language is determinate. Assume further that the linguist’s language and the alien’s language are both determinate. Then, it reasonably follows that from two determinate languages, a competent linguist, over time, should be able to determinately translate the alien’s language to his own. I may be so bold as to say that this fact is the fundamental principle which has made it possible for one language to be interpreted to the other and which has made a speaker of one language be able to learn and understand other languages. Examples of multi-lingualism abound in our societies, implying that languages can be determinately translated into one another.

**Conclusion**

What I have argued is that Quine’s indeterminacy thesis is defective in the sense that it is self–destroying. This danger makes manifest the absurdity which is contained in the thesis itself. I have also argued that language is not so construed as indeterminate. Language, as the Yoruba example has shown, is used and understood determinately even if it is indeterminate. If language is so construed as Quine has argued, I have argued that this would have practically made fundamentals of language and communication impossible. In effect, such a linguistic predicament would have made the existence of any human society impossible since without the determinate fundamentals of language, organised human society would have been practically impossible. However, questions such as whether it is possible to behave deterministically within an interderministic context, or whether a deterministic moments can arise within a general indeterminacy, or whether, pragmatically speaking, there could be a functioning system within even the greatest systematic indeterminacy, are for future research to debate and perhaps decide.
Endnotes and References


5 Quine refers to each of these words as a sentence. This is another issue that could be taken up about Quine. A researcher may attempt to engage in a conceptual distinction between word, statement, proposition, expression, and sentence.


8 Quine W. V. O., *Word and Object*, p 42.


13 Quine W. V. O., *From A Logical Point of View* (Harvard, Harvard University Press), pp 22-23. Quine’s contention is that while the logically true statement is non-experiential, the analytic statementsuch as ‘Bachelors are unmarried males’ is true come what stimulation via a principle of synonymy. This statement depends on the stimulation and may be experiential.


15 It should be noted that this situation may also be referred to as “indeterminacy of referents.”

17 Quine W. V. O., Word and Object, p 68.

18 Quine W. V. O., Word and Object, p 70.


23 Alston P. W., “Quine on Meaning” p 60.

24 Quine W. V. O., From A Logical Point of View, pp 42-43.

25 Quine sometimes refers to this phenomenon as the “principle of charity” or “sense of analogy.”

