Expostulations Concerning the Unity of the Self: Double Consciousness, Dual Perspective and Why Bother with all That?

Semra Somersan, Dept. of Sociology, Istanbul Bilgi University, Turkey.

Abstract

Despite the axiomatic unity of the self in Western psychology, postcolonial theorists argue for a ‘double articulation’ of human consciousness, particularly among the subaltern. Across cultures, as documented in ethnographies, there are seemingly parallel constructions of notions concerning soul plurality and altered states of consciousness. After reviewing the variety of theoretical considerations by different authors that attest to this and establishing connections with psychoanalytic theory, I pose the hypothesis that such ‘plurality’ is a conditional matter, depending on one’s position in society: It is not ‘a being’, but a possible ‘becoming’ in confrontation with all sorts of ‘others’; a privy to those who are removed in various degrees from the mainstream of society. I regard the various elaborations of double consciousness as having brought about a major shift in conceptualizing ‘human personality’ and the ‘human mind’ which has not been sufficiently recognized in Western socio-cultural theorizing, and consider its ramifications.

Keywords: ‘double consciousness’, ‘dual perspective’, ‘third space’, ‘Black Atlantic’, ‘perspectival subalternity’

Introduced into Western philosophy by Hegel (1807) and having entered the American context through the writings of W. E. B. Du Bois (1903), double consciousness was considered to be a part and parcel of the experiences of Afro-Americans by the latter. Antonio Gramsci, on the other hand, in his Prison Notebooks (1931-32; revised 1933-34) argued that the dual perspective is a *sine qua non* in the education of the hegemonic sovereign.

Thus, it would appear that persons situated at either opposite ends of ‘the spectrum of dominance’, possess a common attribute, the two-fold, and/or dialectic nature of their consciousness. I argue here, however, that the more
removed one is from the centre of the socio-economic, the stronger the sense of doubleness (or plurality), and that a parabolic relationship can similarly be discerned regarding distance from the center of general political power.¹

***

In his *Prison Notebooks*, Antonio Gramsci (1891-1937) develops the notion of dual perspective – ‘doppia prospettiva’ - (Hoare and Smith, ed. and tr. 1971: 169-173). According to him, this is best represented in Machiavelli’s Centaur, half beast, half human; showing the levels of force and consent, authority and hegemony, violence and civilization, of the individual moment and the universal moment, all at the same time. Gramsci was influenced by an early observer of politics, Niccolo di Bernardo Machiavelli (1469-1527), who described how princes were taught to incorporate contradictory modes of thinking, antithetical consciousnesses simultaneously, as rulers to be, to excel in their inherited profession.² He explained that writers taught princes about this with the aid of an allegory; describing how Achilles and many other princes of the ancient world were sent to be brought up by Chiron (a wise and beneficent centaur, teacher of Achilles, Asclepius and others) so that he might train them in this way. A prince must know how to act according to the nature of both; he cannot survive otherwise. (Hoare and Smith, ed. and tr. 1971: 170)

Concerning the other end of the spectrum of dominance, that of the oppressed-disenfranchised, the revolutionary psychiatrist and writer Frantz Fanon (1925-1961) put it this way: “However painful it is for me to accept this conclusion, I am obliged to state it: For the black man there is only one destiny. And it is white” (Fanon 1986: 13). Then he claims, “The black man has two dimensions: One with his fellows, the other with the white man. A Negro behaves differently with a white man and with another Negro. That this self-division is a direct result of colonialist subjugation is beyond question...” (Fanon 1986: 17)

Others have somewhat similar observations.³

Sociologist, historian, poet, author of several novels, and life-long critic of American Society, William Edward Burghardt Du Bois (W.E.B. Du Bois,
1868-1963) was even more articulate: With his notion of ‘double consciousness’, he referred to a major psychological dilemma that confronts African-Americans. In a recent revival of a striking passage from his book, in *The Souls of Black Folk* (1903/1989) he says:

> After the Egyptian and the Indian, the Greek and the Roman, the Teuton and the Mongolian, the Negro is a sort of seventh son, born with a veil, and gifted with a second sight in this American world- a world which yields him no true self-consciousness. It is a peculiar sensation, this double consciousness, this sense of always looking at oneself through the eyes of others, of measuring one’s soul by the tape of a world that looks on in amused contempt and pity. One ever feels his twoness- an American, a Negro; two souls, two thoughts, two unreconciled strivings, two warring ideals in one dark body, whose dogged strength alone keeps it from being torn asunder” (Du Bois 1989: 5).

Sandra Adell (1994) claims that this formulation was influenced by of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831) as articulated in *The Phenomenology of the Spirit*. (Adell 1994: 8) Film-maker and writer Trinh Thi Minh-ha (1996), in a conversation with Annamaria Morelli, refers, I believe, to a somewhat parallel experience when she says:

> A number of people would continue to say, ‘what’s the use of having many meanings; why don’t we use words and sentences in a clear-cut manner so that nobody is mistaken...’ But here multiplicity of meaning, as I have elaborated, is not a question of cultivated ambivalence and ambiguity; it does not derive from a lack of determination or of incisiveness… Since marginalized people are always socialized to understand things from more than their point of view, to see both sides of the matter, and to say at least two things at the same time, they can never really afford to speak in the singular” (Minh-ha 1996: 8).

David Theo Goldberg (1994), on the other hand, may be alluding to distantly parallel phenomena, but from the exterior, rather than the dark interior, when he says, “*hybridities are the modalities in and through which multicultural conditions get lived out, and renewed.* “ (Goldberg 1994: 10)

The sensation of double consciousness is not unique to Afro-Americans, or Gramsci’s rulers. It may also be a ‘feeling of presence’, of hearing, of reading, of seeing, and reacting ‘double’ (multiple) and a form of ‘internal existence’ that confronts diverse subalterns in a great many societies, though the
experience may not be as marked as those with 500 years of slavery behind them: The Basque in Spain; the Irish, Welsh and Scottish in the UK; the Saami in Norway, Finland and Sweden, Palestinians in Israel; in different ways and degrees perhaps, Arabs, Armenians, Greeks, Jews, Assyrians, Zoroastrians and Kurds in Turkey (amongst many others); but also Turks and Kurds in Germany, Moslems in Greece, Corsicans in France; Native Americans, Hindus, Buddhists, Jamaicans, Arabs and other Moslems in the USA and UK, especially after events of 9/11 (2001).

Is there something that sets apart those with a history of slavery added on to colonization from other subalterns? Du Bois’, Fanon’s, Gilroy’s, and Bell Hooks’ (2000) claims, would lead one to believe that the experience is almost qualitatively different. Alternatively, I will argue here that the further removed one is from the centre of the political and the socio-economic, the more marked and heightened will be the internal conflicts within the self that give rise to dialectics (multiplexes) of consciousness as I show in Figure 1 (please refer to page 174 of this article).

Du Bois alludes to the difficulty and complexity posed by an ‘alter’ self, at odds with and sometimes fighting the ‘other’ self. Under the influence of the Western tradition he goes on to reflect thus: The history of the American Negro is the history of this strife– this longing to attain self conscious manhood, to merge his double self into a better and truer self.” However, he comes up with a more complex elaboration of personality at ease with itself: In this merging he wishes neither of the old selves to be lost. He would not Africanize America, for America has much to teach the world and Africa. He would not bleach his Negro soul in a flood of white Americanism, for he knows Negro blood has a message for the world. He simply wishes to make it possible for a man to be both a Negro and an American...” (Du Bois 1989: 5)

**Nietzsche, Freud and Jung: Opposition or multiplicity?**

As Hegel would have it however, consciousness itself is dual; in a section of *The Phenomenology of the Spirit* with the title “Self-Consciousness”, Hegel argues that doubleness occurs in two distinct moments.

In the principle distinct moment consciousness is self-consciousness as otherness, an immediately superseded difference which, however is
not. It does not have the form of being, but rather that of a being. In the second distinct moment consciousness unites with this difference. This is the unity of self-consciousness with itself, so the world of senses seems like an enduring existence, which however, it is not” (Adell 1994: 15).

This also brings to mind Sigmund Freud’s (1856-1939) formulation of personality as a three-tiered structure: id-ego-superego, which may lead one to believe that he was ahead of Du Bois and Gramsci. In his case, however, the structure was vertical and not horizontal, uncovering, ever-more masked layers (strata) in personality - from the instinctual to the social- with their idiosyncratic and ever-present tension. Furthermore, the vertical structuring had nothing to do with an individual’s status (as a marginal other or dominant centre) in society, being, rather, universal in human nature. Superimposing the Du Boisian structure upon the Freudian, then, I would find two egos, without altering the latter’s basic proposition of the structure of personality. Superego-ego1-ego2-id; one ego looking from the inside as it were, from the point of view of the contemporary Afro-Western self, and the other, from the outside, from the Anglo-Saxon’s, or the other’s perspective, underlying the source of double consciousness. The latter, ego 2, however, would not, could not be considered the equivalent of Freud’s superego, performing a qualitatively different function altogether (See Figure 2, page 175 of this article).

Psychoanalysts may or may not disagree with my extrapolations here. Lucy Huskinson (2004), for one, in line with the Western tradition argues thus:

...for Nietzsche and Jung the goal or height of human health and potential is the realization of the whole self, which they refer to as the ‘Übermensch’ and ‘self’ respectively… which is achieved by the cultivation and balance of all antithetical psychological impulses… and it is in this sense that I refer to the whole self as a union of opposites (Huskinson 2004: 3).

Her interpretation of Nietzsche and Jung is that ‘a self” becomes whole when it dynamically synthesizes its antithetical psychological material:

opposites cannot be reconciled or united to form a coherent whole. Opposites are defined as such because they are incommensurable… by definition they remain in a relationship of conflict and total difference” (Huskinson 2004: 5-6).
Postcolonial theorists, on the other hand, are more open to the co-existence of ‘incommensurates’. Minh-ha, in trying to explain her writing experience put it this way: “In writing one may be isolated, yet, with every word or every sentence one writes, I think one is endlessly conversing with a huge number of people” (Minh-ha 1996: 4). Then she adds: “This is why the use of the term ‘West’ in the context of my writing is always strategic, because the West is both outside and inside me” (Minh-ha 1996: 8).

Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari (1987) in their introduction to A Thousand Plateaus (the piece called “Rhizome”) say: “The two of us wrote Anti-Oedipus together. Since each of us was several, there was already quite a crowd” (Deleuze & Guattari 1987: 3). Furthermore, this plurality itself multiplied in the course of the writing, according to them: “We are no longer ourselves. Each will know his own. We have been aided, inspired, multiplied” (Deleuze & Guattari 1987: 3). They may have different intentions than the ones here, but, are implying a plurality of egos/consciousness in the writing process (as well as outcome) somewhat along the lines of Minh-ha and others cited above.

Salman Rushdie, in his novel Midnight’s Children (1981), on the other hand, emphasizes the contrast between the unity of the material body and the plurality of the interior:

O eternal opposition of inside and outside! Because a human being, inside himself, is anything but a whole, anything but homogeneous; all kinds of everywhichthing are jumbled up inside him, and he is one person one minute and another the next. The body, on the other hand, is homogeneous as anything. Indivisible, a one-piece suit, a sacred temple if you will. It is important to preserve this wholeness… Uncork the body, and God knows what you permit to come tumbling out. Suddenly you are forever other than you were; and the world becomes such that parents can cease to be parents, and love can turn to hate.” (Rushdie 1995: 236-37.)

At the end of the same novel he capitulates thus: “I have been so-many too many persons, life unlike syntax allows one more than three…” (Rushdie 1995)
In a fairly recent publication, a psychiatrist/psychoanalyst from Turkey, trained in France, shows he is more open to multiplicity than Huskinson, arguing that psychiatry itself was born out of multiplicity and plurality of the individual (Talat Parman 2002). His personal confession includes the following:

I have brought together my writings on psychoanalysis in the recent years together for this book. These are articles written by a single author. In spite of the singularity of the signature though, they are not the products of a single person. They were formulated, shaped and written among the many and plurality. Against those perspectives that view the individual as one-dimensional, psychiatry arouse out of the multiplicity and plurality of the individual. Psychiatrists base their personal equations on the many and the multiplicity. These pieces were written for the many and the plurality and I hope they would be read in this context” (Parman 2002, writing on the rear cover of the book- my translation).

Carl Gustav Jung (1875-1961), on the other hand, proposed a fourth, even more secluded archeological stratum to the self which he referred to as the ‘collective unconscious’, which would be the level underlying the id, where memories of universal and social/cultural history are stored.

To confuse things even further, then, I wonder if there should not also be an ego-3/ third consciousness to bring the historic/prehistoric, communal, pristine (African, Chinese, Indian- whatever) roots to the surface (part of Jung’s collective unconscious) and as well a 4th one, to correspond to the unfathomable interaction of 1x2x3, and to the West that is both inside and outside of all, except maybe the Westerners?? (See figure 2, on page 175 of this article).

I do not intend to argue here that these formulations by very different individuals are identical, I only allude to my understanding that they are at least to a certain extent parallel constructions, rendering collective description of similar human experiences from around the world possible.

**Third space and liminality**
In fact, even the discussion of ‘third space’ by Homi Bhabha (1994) has corresponding connotations. Bhabha referred to this ‘ambiguous’, in-between space/secluded consciousness, complicated ambivalence in the personality of those crossing cultures (cross-over’s?) to establish several socio-cultural niches. He proposed that metamorphoses occur in the process of migration from the Indian subcontinent to the former imperial centre, (Britain), a process that creates a kind of ‘third space of cultural hybridity’. More to the point, he says:

  for me the importance of hybridity is not to be able to trace two original moments from which the third emerges, rather hybridity to me is the third space which enables other positions to emerge. This third space displaces the histories that constitute it, and sets up new structures of authority, new political initiatives, which are inadequately understood through received wisdom” (Bhabha 1990: 211).

I wonder if Bhabha is not pointing to something already known to Chinese revolutionaries, that the authors of *Empire*, Hardt and Negri (2000), basing themselves on the work of Arif Dirlik, speak of it as “the beautiful anti-Confucian and anti-Platonic formula”: “It is not the two that recompose into one, but the one that opens into two.” Bhabha comments thus:

  The non-synchronous temporality of global and national cultures opens up a cultural space – where the negotiation of incommensurable differences creates a tension peculiar to borderline existences. Such assignations of social differences – where difference is neither One nor the Other, but something else besides, in-between- find their agency in a form of the future where the past is not originary, where the present is not simply transitory... It is an interstitial future that emerges in between the claims of the past and the needs of the present” (Bhabha 1990: 38-39)

**Anthropological affirmations**

The notions of double consciousness and dual perspective, interest me not just because they imply a break with the Western axiomatic ‘the self as a whole’ and the ‘psychic unity of humankind’ constructs, i.e. the ‘unitary theories of personality’ as well as the ‘universal structures of the human mind’, but also because I see parallels with an age-old anthropological subject; that of the ‘multiplicity of souls’ noted by a number of ethnographers in different parts of the world. A cross-cultural research I did on a sample of 60 world societies, quite a number of years ago, had revealed that though notions of the
individual soul as being singular in nature were common (53 percent), in 15 percent of these 60 traditional societies, the dual nature of the individual soul was the accepted norm, in 10 percent it was thought that the nature of the individual soul was triple, while in 8.4 percent humans were thought to have quadruple or quintuple souls! (Somersan, 1984: 151-165) So in total, 33.4 percent of world societies in this HRAF probability sample had the idea that no spiritual uniformity was present within the individual, with regard to internal existence. Furthermore, the study showed ‘multiplicity of soul’ notions to be more prevalent among horticulturalists and shifting cultivators than foragers, pastoralists, and intensive agriculturalists and to be absent in those societies that had beliefs in high gods that are interested and actively involved with human morality (as in the three monotheistic religions of the Middle East- Judaism, Christianity and Islam), than in those groups that had either no high gods at all, or where they were not interested in human morality, possession of more than one soul was common. Imposition of morality from (a) high god(s), in other words, did not lend itself to plurality of souls, while the lack thereof, did!

Turning over pages in ethnographic literature for specific examples, one encounters the Yanomamö of Venezuela and Brazil living in the Amazon forests, who believe that humans have three souls and an animal counterpart or alter ego. If an individual’s alter ego is killed, the human dies also. Practitioners of Haitian voodoo believe that humans have two souls: a tit bon ange which animates the body and a gros bon ange that is the source of consciousness, since the body is animated by a different spirit than consciousness. A person or being that captures the gros bon ange can control the person’s body. (Womack 2001: 214) Having one’s body possessed by another can be good or bad. In spirit possession, a loa (deity or ancestor spirit) displaces an individual’s gros bon ange and inhabits the person’s body. The possessing spirit can, then, enjoy the company of humans, dance with them and accept their gifts. By surrendering the body to a loa, a voodoo practitioner gains favors and protection from the spirits. On the other hand, if the gros bon ange is captured by another human, one who is skilled in the art of voodoo
and has malevolent intent, the individual becomes a zombie whose body is subject to another’s command (Womack 2001: 214-15).

The idea that the body can be controlled by a spirit being other than one’s own soul, is a common religious experience cross-culturally. This of course, can be considered a relatively more extreme form of plurality, but has been noted by quite a number of ethnographers and others as ‘altered states of consciousnesses’. ix

Born-again Christians, for instance, believe that they can be saved from eternal damnation only by being ‘slain in spirit’. This involves surrendering oneself to the Holy Spirit, which may manifest itself through convulsions and speaking in tongues or glossalalia. According to them however, a possessing spirit may also cause illness or make the person behave in inappropriate ways.

Among one of the native peoples of Bolivia, the Aymara, for instance, diseases may be attributed to soul loss, or susto, magical fright. The animo, one of the three souls a person possesses, is helped back into the body by placing an article of the patient’s clothing a short distance from his or her house, along with the contents of llama entrails, gall stones diluted in holy water and ritual foods. (Womack 2001: 215)

Western personality –fragmented or whole?
In Lacan’s (1977) reading of Freud, on one hand, human consciousness is not plural, but rather, fragmented. x For Nietzsche and Jung, on the other hand, the self becomes whole when it dynamically synthesizes its antithetical psychological material. (Huskinson 2004: 5) Huskinson, in her comparison of Nietzsche and Jung says:

in abstract terms opposites cannot be reconciled or united to form a coherent whole. Opposites are defined as such because they are incommensurable. To say that they can merge is to introduce compatibility between them and to deny their essential contrast and conflict…union of opposites is a chimera (Jung 2004: 5).
These not only contest Du Bois’ notion of double consciousness as a possible state of being, holding in its grip Afro-Americans as well as Gramsci’s rulers, but also seem to opt for a more ‘schizophrenic’, and at the same time a more reductionistic view of human nature. If such is the case then, not only in those with hybrid, hyphenated identities, and hegemonic sovereigns, but in all individuals there is one ego so divided that it cannot be pulled together, resulting in fatal diagnoses such as schizophrenia.

However, Lacan points out that: “Freud introduced the ego into his doctrine by defining it according to the resistances proper to it” (Lacan, 1977: 186). This may ring a bell, via the dual perspective. He also mentions that the ego is notable “for the imaginary inertias that it concentrated against the message of the unconscious, operates solely with a view to covering the displacement constituted by the subject with a resistance that is essential to the discourse as such” (Lacan 1977: 186). Furthermore, in the same paper, he refers to the “self’s radical ex-centricity to itself” (Lacan 1977: 191).

“The Black Atlantic”
Paul Gilroy’s (1993) The Black Atlantic is an attempt to develop Du Boisian double consciousness, to think outside the fixed boundary lines of individuals and nation-states, and to create a space in which a double consciousness that is both inside and outside modernity, can be conceived. This is not to say that the new mestiza (Bhabha’s hybridity) and Gilroy’s Black Atlantic mark the same space. Rather, it is to suggest that current conditions create the same kinds of problems for meaningful narratives in different parts of the globe. “Gloria Anzaldua, between Mexico and California, Salman Rushdie between Bombay and London, all give examples of identities which, though created by the new global capitalism, are resistant to its logic” (Baldwin 1999: 167). Gilroy, argues for the integration of the experience of Black Peoples into conceptualizations of modernity, but perhaps more significantly emphasizes hybridity of cultures as they interact and develop to form new connections and patterns. Like Bhabha he sees a danger in thinking of culture in terms of bounded, national, homogenous units and argues for a transnational perspective. So he considers the Black Atlantic or the African Diaspora...
which binds together the black people of Africa, the Americas, the Caribbean and Europe in a long history of intercultural connections… He argues that not one part of the Atlantic can be understood without considering its connections to the other parts. Thus within Diasporas all cultures are hybrid and all their products are syncretic.

According to Gilroy this means that any ethnically absolutist notions of British or European culture have also to be revised, which also implies according to Baldwin (1999: 177) that, in a sense, every single person on earth lives in diasporic space; all cultures are hybrid and all cultural products syncretic.

So would, I suppose, Ulrich Beck (1997 and 2000) argue that in the world today, moving from ‘the container society’ of nation-states toward a ‘reflexive cosmopolitan world society’\textsuperscript{xii}, and as well, Alain Touraine with his conception of the shift of interest in society as a ‘household’ that fulfils all necessary functions and duties (closed loop), to one that is composed of social actors where human rights are above all else, including social duties.\textsuperscript{xii}

Having extrapolated double consciousness in \textit{The Black Atlantic} (1993), Gilroy brings Frantz Fanon to the discussion in his \textit{Against Race} (2000). Quoting a paragraph from Fanon’s \textit{The Wretched of the Earth} (1963), comments on it thus:

His words articulate a reminder that between the fortified encampments of the colonizers and the quarters of the colonized there were other locations. These in-between locations represent, not disability and inertia, but opportunities for greater insight into the opposed worlds that enclosed them. There the double consciousness required by the everyday work of translation offered a prototype for the ethically charged role of the interpreter with which our most imaginative intellectuals have answered the challenges of postmodern society” (Gilroy 2000: 71).

Later on, in the same chapter \textit{Modernity and Infrahumanity}, he adds:
While racisms endure, a distinctive understanding of identity does emerge from serious consideration of the dense, hybrid and multiple formations of postcolonial culture… A comparable state of being and not belonging has already been named by black thinkers as well versed as Amery in the esteemed traditions of speculative thought from which they were sometimes excluded by racial typology. They called it double consciousness” (Gilroy 2000: 77).

Gilroy thinks that the work of writers around the problem of Negritude, that of Leopold Senghor and Fanon as well as Aime Cesaire also provide possible points of entry to this field. He says:

Their work is special not because they transcoded the Hegelian speculations of African Americans like Du Bois into a different moment, but because, as Sandra Adell has so brilliantly shown, the black identities they argued with and argued over were partly created with a strange combination of conceptual tools provided by such unlikely figures as Leo Frobenius and even Heidegger” (Gilroy 2000: 77-78).

Walter Mignola, diverges from the pattern so far discussed, by arguing that “while hegemony allocates meaning, subalternity contests and reallocates”, which would give articulation a chance to work through the latter only. xiii According to Moreiras, Mignola’s “border epistemologies” “are based upon the force of a double consciousness that incorporates civilization to barbarism at the same time that it negates the hegemonic concept of civilization”. Using an expression suggested by Veena Das, Moreiras proposes that: “perspectival’ or ‘relational subalternism’ breaks the trap of hybridity thinking as the ultimate horizon of (counter) hegemonic cultural work” (Moreiras, 1999: 377-78). According to him, this provides an understanding of subalternist position in ‘formal terms’, which stands “outside any given hegemonic articulation at any given moment”. My hypothesis here relates to perspectival subalternity by positing a metaphoric and geometric distance from the socio-political center, but it is more comprehensive than Moreiras in that it also includes the hegemonic sovereign in its bosom, which position or moment also represents a sort of ‘off-the-center’ form of being, according to Gramsci via Machiavelli.
Double Consciousness: Double Burden or Salvation?

Those who formulated these concepts, it seems to me, inevitably destroyed once and for all, the neat unitary categories of personality and culture given by Western philosophical formations and the psychic unity of personality, of “the whole self” except when it is mentally/behaviorally disturbed. The scientific community in the West may not have taken sufficient notice, but they have put doubt into many minds concerning basic psychological axioms, i.e. that the individual is normal, healthy and happy only when the parts (or different wholes within) are in unison, opposites united, and the internal experience and consciousness in harmony. Together, they also prepare the ground for a more comprehensive contestation that personalities are much more complicated than dreamt up by any philosopher or psychiatrist in the early days of modernity.

Turning the Western axiom on its head, they pose the alternative that though the experience of double/multiple consciousness may be universal in varying degrees; the unity of personality is not. These thinkers, particularly Du Bois, Gramsci, and almost as comprehensively, Fanon (being hybrid and liminal individuals of the early 20th century themselves), have forced a change in extant theories of personality, throwing out once and for all, the axiom of the psychological unity of the self. In addition to a vertical layering of various hidden components from the social to the instinctual as formulated by Freud, they argue that there is also a horizontal stacking and interaction of palimpsest cultures/experiences that individuals inadvertently encounter in the course of a lifetime. If there is any dialectic truth in Hegel’s conceptualization of consciousness itself as being dual, then all humankind possesses this capacity and disadvantage at distinct moments.

My argument however, stands: The extent of the proliferation of egos, consciousness and even ‘souls’ is contingent on one’s geographic and metaphorical distance from the centre of the spectrum of dominance and affluence, in addition to hybridity; not an inevitable ‘conclusion’.
Having a second ego, (an)other self, an alter consciousness or a companion ‘soul’, makes not only for a much more cumbersome life, but also a more complex, enriched personality as the Du Boisian argument, in a perverted sort of way, would lead one to think. The tension between the two norms/ideals (or an ideal and a norm) in combat or in somewhat adverse companionship, in other words, may not be totally without utility. It makes living more intricate perhaps, even painful, may increase the height and variety of ones sorrows and depths of depression, but also a little less indeterminate, while it performs an extra internal check of all past-present-future action and thought in the public domain.

Since time immemorial, the notion that the east is already in the west, the postcolonial in the colonial and the black in the white, -that is whenever and wherever the various poles of the world encountered and interacted with ‘the other’- is also born by these concepts. Each ‘other’ would eventually be dialectically transformed; the tabula rasa metamorphosing into a bloody painting of multiplicity by millions of artists.

What good is it then, to have double/triple consciousnesses from a macro social perspective? No doubt homogeneous societies are more prone to scapegoating and racism once they encounter ‘others’ while the historically heterogeneous ones are less likely to do so (ceteris paribus, of course).

Could it be that those with some sort of ‘double consciousness’, are the very persons who have the potential to act as cultural brokers and initiate change in society and social attitudes? Is it in fact, the various ‘others’ that inadvertently help in eroding the Leviathan of Prejudice-Discrimination and help solve dilemmas and conflicts created by their very presence?

Equipped with a plurality of consciousnesses, these ‘others’ may provide broader horizons for perceiving and acting upon the world at an individual level; but no less important is the impact they may create in transforming society and revolutionizing it from within. Describing their radical ‘polycentric multiculturalism’, Stam and Shohat refer to Du Boisian ‘double
consciousness’ as “a form of being of those familiar with the margins, as well as the centre, (or even many margins and many centers)” (1994: 300). Seeing all cultural history in relation to power, they claim that such people are in the best position to ‘deconstruct’ dominant or narrowly national discourses. The ‘epistemological edge’ they have in relation to the dominant majority makes this possible. Stam and Shohat’s polycentric multiculturalism “thinks and imagines from the margins, seeing minorities not as interest groups but rather, as active, generative participants at the very core of a shared, conflictual history.”

Are multi-cultural individuals and cultures directly influenced by the palimpsest egos in their bosom? Is it hybridity that leads one to have such alternative consciousnesses or is it unhealthy personalities and lack of psychic unity as claimed in classic Western philosophy and psychiatry? Or is there, as Bhabha would like to believe, a ‘third space’ which makes it possible for ‘other’ positions to emerge? And does this always happen in the context of difference and inequality, one way or another? I have only made propositions in these regards, but such questions also await empirical answers which can only emerge from the devoted and synergetic attention of anthropologists, cultural analysts, sociologists, and psychologists.
Figure 1: Relationship of Double Consciousness to the degree of relative subalternity and hegemonic sovereignty.

Figure 2: Relationship of Double Consciousness to the Freudian and Jungian views of personality.

Collective unconsciousness

Somersan: *Expostulations*... 174
NOTES

i By this I imply that that the center is where most of the people are, in relation to the hegemonic, and not the position of the hegemonic sovereign itself.

ii “You should understand therefore, that there are two ways of fighting: by law or by force. The first way is natural to men, and the second to beasts. But as the first way often proves inadequate one must needs have to the second. So a prince must understand how to make a nice use of the beast and the man…” (Machiavelli, 1961 [1515]: 99).

iii Jean-Paul Sartre, for instance, in a comment that could be considered racist by today’s standards, says “They [the Jews] have allowed themselves to be poisoned by the stereotype that others have of them, and they live in constant fear that their acts will correspond to this stereotype…. We may say that their conduct is perpetually over determined from the inside.” (Sartre 1995: 95).

iv Especially his Black Skin, White Masks, 1986.

v Du Bois, 1989: 5. No doubt here, he is under the influence of the Western tradition of the unity of the self, or the “whole self” as Huskinson refers to it.


vii though not necessarily hierarchical… In the conference where I first presented this paper, Dr. Peter Remington, chair of the panel, argued that Freud had definitely not foreseen the three (id-ego-superego) as in a hierarchical relationship. What I have in mind however, is the relative seclusion of the structures from daily experience rather than their dominance over one another. I would also argue though, that in Freudian analysis, one or the other component may dominate the other two.

viii The HRAF Probability Sample represented a group of 60 world societies (before major contact with the West) that was randomly selected by the Human Resource Area Files and that could be used for academic research to test hypothesis and theories on world societies.


xii Alain Touraine, 2002, Commenting on “Agenda” BBC World Service Radio Program, broadcast on Sunday, Feb. the 10th 2002, 08:30 hours (=GMT plus 3 hours=time in Turkey).


xiv as in multiple or split personality, in paranoia and other kinds of schizophrenia

References.


Bali, Rifat. 1996. “Turkiye’de Yahudi olmak” (Being Jewish in Turkey), unpublished manuscript.


Orgun, Gün. 2001. “Sömürgecilik Sonrası Yazınında Marjinallık ve Kozmopolitanlık” (Marginality, Cosmopolitanism and Postcolonial Literature), Deniz Derman et al. (ed) in Dısarıda Kalanlar/Bırakılanlar (The Outsiders), Istanbul: Baglam, 133-145.


